게임이론의 코스트/베너핏 논리를 집단행동 즉 정치에 응용한 것이다. 이 분석틀에서 문제가 되는 것은 이득을 보려면 비용이 들게 마련인데 이 비용이 공평하게 떨어지지 않는다는 것이다. 여기서 프리라이더의 문제가 생긴다. 공공재와 세금부담이 이 논리에 따라 분석될 때 상당한 강점이 있다. 상당히 전형적인 게임이론이다. 이 책의 논리는 그다지 새로울 것은 없다. 정치학에서도 상당히 비슷하게 말하는 저작이 많다. 쉽고 명료하게 서술되었다는 것이 장점이다. 자세한 것은 내가 영어로 쓴 아래의 리뷰를 보라.
다음은 내가 아마존에 포스팅한 리뷰이다.
Cost/Benefit When we look at cases of organizations like labor union, pressure group or firm, Even if members share the common interest, it doesn't guarantee they will act on that interest. To achieve the purpose, one should pay the cost. But 'a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by it achievement.' So if one could get the benefit without cost, he would let others bear the burden.
Public Good/Taxing: Everybody's business is nobody's business let's take example. The state provides public good like the defense, police protection, law system, which 'must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone'. It can't be free to provide those services. The burden is charged as tax. But tax evasion is as old as human history. It's the reason why the tax has been defined as 'compulsory payment'. Likewise 'collective good' of organizations cause the same free rider problem.
Size matters: Individual acts on the function of cost and benefit: The lower cost to get the collective good, the more willing to bear the cost. The smaller is the size of group, the larger is the share of collective good one gets in relation to total cost. Even though only one member with greatest interest pays all the cost, he will do so as long as benefit exceeds cost. This kind of group can provide collective good without relying on coercion or incentive apart from the collective good itself. But without arranging the share of burden (group-oriented act), the amount of collective good can't be optimized (exploitation). 'Accordingly, the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good.' Moreover, the larger is the group, the less likely noticeable is the effect of individual's contribution. So here the leviathan comes in: Coercion and incentive. Once there is the formal organizing, the larger the better, for it leads to lower cost to each. But organizing itself should be obtained at cost. 'These are the costs of 'communication among group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the costs of creating, staffing, and maintaining any formal group organization.' These costs put on the total cost of getting collective good. And it makes the supply of collective not optimized. This reinforces the need of coercion/incentive.
Inclusive/Exclusive Group: If the nature of collective good is fixed (scarce) in supply, members doesn't resist to newcomers. In this case, members become competitor or rival to each other, for the availability of collective good is exclusive to each member. 'The firms in an industry would be an exclusive group when they sought a higher price in their industry by restricting output.' Here the monopoly is the ideal to participant. But in nonmarket situation, the opposite is true, for collective good is not fixed in supply. In other word, it's inclusive. In such a case, if permitted, the group tends to expand upto the point that benefit equals cost. When seeking lower taxes, or tariff, firms would make 'an inclusive group, and would enlist all the support they could get.
Privileged/Intermediate/latent Group: Privileged group refers to the small group providing collective good for sure without organizing or coordinating. Intermediate group refers to the small group where nobody gets the benefit sufficient to motivate him to provide the good himself but it's not big enough to demotivate completely. Latent group refers to the large group where the problem of free riders is salient.
Case Study-Unions are for collective bargaining: We take it for granted that labor union is by nature big organization. But contrary to common guess, the first labor unions in Britain and States began not as large, impersonal, metropolitan organizations (latent group) but as small, committed, local organizations (privileged group). It was better to be the privileged group with member's devotion and sacrifice (noncollective good cf. Owen), for it launched in hostile environment. But once a local union exists, a few factors drive it to organize the whole industry and to be large, national union.
1. In market economy, employers should compete each other, so they can't survive with higher wage.
2. Employers could find source of strikebreakers, were industry-wide organization.
But when it comes to large, national union, there should be the problem of free rider. Workers can't hate collective good like wage raising, better work condition, job security. But the strike, weapon to get it, means the cost, and that, strikebreakers are legally free to cross picket line and would enjoy better paying than ever. And bargaining with employer cannot help being collective not individual or restricted to union member. So here comes the compulsory membership i.e., closed shop or union shop. 'Compulsory membership and picket lines are therefore of the essence of unionism'. This explains away why the early history of union was flooded with violence between/among workers and employers. The decline of labor union in States could be illuminated in the same way; 'No Closed Shop'. Without coerced participation, there is no means to support the union. For individual efforts wont change the whole picture. To attract members, unions relied on noncollective benefit such as insurance, welfare benefit, seniority rights. But the advent of welfare state deprived them of incentive to offer.