I'm still struggling with lecture 4 of Russell, where he tries to explain his theory of judgement, which seems to be the crossroads where he and Wittgenstein took their own ways. So it's very important for me to know what Russell's position is and what Wittgenstein's. Therefore it's very tedious of me to read some papers about what exactly Wittgensteins' criticism was, which is the interests of the papers I am reading, making me boring. (Not the authors' faults, anyway)
Wittgenstein's answer is here:
"The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, "A makes the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)
It is clear that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.
This show too that there is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc - as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day."
(5.5422, 5.542, 5.5421)
His solution is very unique. Exactly what does he try to say with these sentences? I want to answer it. Long way to go. For now I want to say that it's not so unfamiliar to me. I think I have been tracing this line of philosophical investigations, that is, "there is no such thing as the subject, etc".