드보르의 본의 왜곡 아닌가…체계 넘어서려는 노력 실종
해외동향: 기 드보르의 영화전집 DVD 세트와 저작집 발간의 의미

2006년 07월 23일   양창렬 프랑스통신원 이메일 보내기

"하나의 유령이 문화를 배회하고 있다. 상황주의자 인터내셔널이라는 유령이." 이것은 68년 1월의 ‘마가진 리테레르’, "상황주의자" 특집호에서 장-피에르 조르쥬가 했던 말이다.

기 드보르의 ‘영화 전집’ DVD 세트와 ‘저작집Œuvres’이 잇따라 발간됨에 따라, 대중들 사이에 40년 전의 아방가르드 유령들이 또 다시 출몰하고 있다. ‘영화 전집’은 올리비에 아싸야스 감독이 기 드보르가 연출한 여섯 편의 영화와 다큐멘터리 한 편을 복원하고, 서한집에서 영화 관련 구절들을 발췌한 책자를 끼워 넣음으로써 전집으로서의 구색을 갖추었다.

‘저작집’은 기 드보르에 대한 연구서를 출판한 바 있는 뱅상 카우프만의 책임 하에 간행되었으며, 1천9백 쪽에 이르는 이 책에는 연대기 순으로 정렬된 기 드보르의 저작, 발표문, 기사, 편지, 사진 등이 담겨 있다.

이 두 도구 덕분에 기 드보르 및 상황주의자들에 대한 연구는 전기를 맞이할 것으로 보인다. 하지만 아싸야스와 카우프만의 노고에 박수를 보내야한다는 사실과 무관하게, 이 작업들은 기 드보르의 전략의 아포리아를 제기한다.


오늘날 DVD는 지극히 개인적인 소비 매체다. 상품이자 소유물이며, '사적 사용'에 제한된 자본주의 교환 법칙 및 소유권 이데올로기까지 고스란히 체화하고 있는 DVD(혹은 비디오)라는 매체는 스펙터클의 유지에 기여하고 있다. 집 안으로 들어온 극장(홈씨어터)으로 대변되는, 스펙터클의 일상생활 장악에 대한 고민 없는 복원은 반쪽에 불과하다.

기 드보르가 ‘사드를 위한 울부짖음’(1952)에서 시도했던 실험들―백색 화면 위를 표류하는 화면 바깥의 목소리(voix off)와 검은 화면의 침묵의 교체, 그리고 영화 시작 3분 뒤에 들려오는 "영화는 없고, 시네마는 죽었다. 더 이상 영화는 있을 수 없다. 원한다면 토론으로 넘어가자"라는 도발적 선언―의 의미를 되새겨 보아야 한다.

여기에서 '목소리'와 '이미지'의 분리는 미학적 차원에서 멈추는 것이 아니라 영화 바깥의 삶과 스펙터클의 대립을 표현하는 지극히 정치적인 것이다. 바깥의 목소리, 꺼진 목소리―이 둘은 모두 voix off이다―는 스펙터클과 외양에 의해 박탈된 '언어 소통 가능성'을 되찾기 위한 봉기이기도 하다.

따라서 '아방가르드 영화 클럽'에서 그 영화가 처음 상영되었을 때 쏟아졌던 관객들의 반발과 상영 중단 해프닝은 오히려 기 드보르의 反-영화, 영화를 위한 영화가 아니라 도구로서의 영화가 성공을 거둔 사례다. 화면 밖으로 나와 목소리를 키우고(voix on)―극장, 그리고 스펙터클 안에서는 떠들면 안 된다― 삶을 논하는 것이야말로 "상황을 구축"하기 위한 첫 걸음이기 때문이다.

씨릴 네이라가 지적하듯이, 드보르에게 영화는 "다른 어떤 예술보다 스펙터클의 작동에 참여하므로, 영화는 스펙터클의 전복의 도구"로 간주되었다. 그러나 DVD에 담긴 매끈한 영상들은 이제 하나의 영화 '텍스트'이자, 이미지-표상으로서 분석 대상이 될 것이다.

1984년에 친구, 편집자, 영화 제작자였던 제라르 레보비시가 암살된 이후, 기 드보르는 자기 영화의 배급과 상영을 금지했었다. 그로부터 20여 년 만에 다시 개봉된, 소문만 무성했던 ‘In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni’에 씨네필들은 열광했고, 그들은 그 서정주의적 이야기 속에서 '모던 영화(cin?ma moderne)'의 기운을 찾아내고자 했다.

이 현상은 드보르의 영화를 하나의 '예술 작품'으로 간주하고 그것의 미학을 발견하려는 시도이긴 하지만, 예술로서의 삶이나 삶으로서의 예술이 아니라, 오히려 예술의 종말과 폐지 이후의 삶에 대해 고민했던 드보르의 전망을 흐리게 만든다.


동일한 현상이 ‘저작집’에서도 나타난다. 필립 솔레르스는 드보르에 대해 "읽기는 쉽지만 이해하기는 어려운 저자"라고 말했다. 드보르의 구문은 혼란스럽지도 않고, 특별히 새로운 단어들을 담고 있지도 않지만, 그의 논조 자체가 글 속에서 파괴 과정에 있기 때문에, 어느 누구도 그의 글 속에서 논리적인 '추론'을 할 수 없다는 것이다.

이것은 학계에서 드보르를 연구 대상으로 '전유'하는 것을 어렵게 만들었다. 그러나 ‘저작집’은 드보르의 아포리즘들 사이의 공백을 메움으로써 '추론'을 가능하게 하는 반면, 독자들의 전용(d?tournement) 가능성을 줄인다.

‘르 피가로’의 서평은 "‘저작집’이 드보르의 저작들을 하나의 '고전'으로 만든다"라면서, 이 상황을 징후적으로 보여준다. 이는 한 편으로, 이제 드보르가 학계의 논의 대상이 될 수 있다는 말이지만, 다른 한 편으로, 드보르는 이제 아카데미에 포획될 준비가 되었음을 의미하기도 한다.


이런 문제는 이미 드보르가 죽기 전에 가장 '스펙터클한' 케이블 채널인 카날 플뤼스(Canal+)에 자신에 대한 다큐멘터리를 제작하도록 허락하고, 가장 '부르주아적인' 출판사인 갈리마르에 자신의 저작의 재간행을 맡긴 것에서 시작된다.

장 보드리야르는 상황주의자들이 체계 바깥에 위치한 삶과 상황을 구축하려는 "관념적인 (그러나 이미 통속적인 것이 되어버린) 유토피아"를 추종한다고 비판하며 스펙터클 개념을 지양할 것을 주장했다. 그러나 말년의 기 드보르의 납득하기 어려운 행동은, 보드리야르의 평가와는 정반대로 드보르가 스펙터클 체계 내에서 그 체계 자체를 이용, 보다 정확히는 "전용"함으로써 그 체계를 해체하려 했음을 보여준다.

기 드보르의 마지막 내기에도 불구하고, 스펙터클이라는 "이미지가 되어버린 자본"은 (정치적) 급진성마저 스펙터클한 방식으로 "전유"하고 소비해버렸다. ‘영화 전집’과 ‘저작집’을 보면서, 우리가 한번쯤 아니 여러 번 고민해야 하는 것은 바로 이런 '전략적' 질문들이다. 체계 안에서 체계를 어떻게 넘어설 것인가. 

양창렬 / 프랑스 통신원·파리 1대학


©2006 Kyosu.net
Updated: 2006-07-23 22:25
▲맨위로


댓글(0) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
공유하기 북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

Le Monde diplomatique

 

Proche-Orient, la déchirure

 

Chronologie du Liban
(avec AFP)

1943 : Le Liban, sous mandat français depuis 1920, accède à l’indépendance le 22 novembre.

1946 : Evacuation des troupes françaises.

Mai/septembre 1958 : Guerre civile. Le président Camille Chamoun, accusé de mener une politique pro-occidentale par les nationalistes arabes, fait appel aux Américains qui débarquent en juillet. Les troupes se retirent après l’élection à la présidence du général Fouad Chehab.

1969 : Les « accords du Caire » légalisent la présence palestinienne dans les camps du Liban-sud.

1970 : Après les sanglants affrontements de « Septembre noir » en Jordanie, l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine de Yasser Arafat se replie au Liban.

Israël, confronté aux attaques et infiltrations de commandos palestiniens, multiplie les raids de représailles.

1973 : combats entre Palestiniens et armée libanaise.

13 avril 1975 : Début de la guerre civile. Les milices chrétiennes s’affrontent aux forces de gauche et musulmanes, appuyées à partir de janvier 1976 par les Palestiniens.

6 juin 1976 : Intervention de l’armée syrienne, à l’appel des formations chrétiennes en mauvaise posture face aux forces palestino-progressistes. En octobre, les sommets de Riyad et du Caire décident l’envoi d’une Force arabe de dissuasion, composée en majorité de Syriens.

16 mars 1977 : Le leader druze Kamal Joumblatt, chef du Parti socialiste progressiste, est assassiné à proximité d’un barrage syrien.

Mars 1978 : Israël occupe militairement le sud du Liban jusqu’au fleuve Litani. Résolution 425 de l’Onu exigeant un retrait israélien. Déploiement de la Force intérimaire des Nations unies (Finul). Israël se retire partiellement en juin, laissant en place les milices chrétiennes de Saad Haddad.

Juillet : Pilonnage des quartiers chrétiens de Beyrouth par l’armée syrienne après un changement d’alliance, Damas s’étant rapproché des forces palestino-progressistes.

6 juin 1982 : Israël envahit le Liban et assiège Beyrouth (opération « Paix en Galilée »).

Fin août-début septembre : Arafat et 11 000 combattants palestiniens évacuent Beyrouth. Quelque 400 000 Palestiniens restent dans les camps.

14 septembre : Assassinat du président élu Béchir Gemayel. Entrée des Israéliens dans Beyrouth-Ouest le 15.

16-18 septembre : Massacre dans les camps palestiniens de Sabra et Chatila : au moins un millier de morts. Un rapport officiel israélien établira la responsabilité directe des miliciens chrétiens des Forces libanaises (FL) et indirecte des troupes israéliennes.

22 septembre : Election de M.Amine Gemayel à la présidence.

17 mai 1983 : Accord de paix libano-israélien, qui sera abrogé par les autorités libanaises.

Août-septembre  : Relance de la guerre civile. Les milices chrétiennes abandonnent la montagne du Chouf aux druzes de M. Walid Joumblatt.

23 octobre : Attentats contre les QG américain et français de la Force multinationale (FM) à Beyrouth : 241 Américains et 58 Français tués. La FM se retirera début 1984.

Novembre-décembre : Combats dans le nord entre loyalistes et dissidents palestiniens, soutenus par Damas. Arafat et quelques milliers de ses partisans, encerclés dans Tripoli, quittent le pays.

Mars 1984 : Premier d’une série d’enlèvements d’otages occidentaux.

Mai-juin 1985 : Première « guerre des camps » entre combattants palestiniens et miliciens chiites d’Amal (pro-syriens).

Juin : Israël achève son retrait, mais maintient une force dans le sud pour soutenir l’Armée du Liban sud (ALS) d’Antoine Lahad.

28 décembre : Accord à Damas entre milices druzes, chiites et chrétiennes. Affrontements interchrétiens après le refus de M. Gemayel de le ratifier.

Février 1987 : 8 000 soldats syriens sont déployés pour pacifier Beyrouth-Ouest. En juin, le premier ministre Rachid Karamé est tué dans un attentat et remplacé par M. Selim Hoss.

Mars 1989 : Le général Michel Aoun, à la tête d’un gouvernement de militaires chrétiens, non reconnu par les musulmans, lance une « guerre de libération » contre Damas.

22 octobre : Accords interlibanais de Taëf (Arabie saoudite), qui établit un nouvel équilibre entre les communautés et définissent le cadre de la présence syrienne.

22 novembre : Assassinat du nouveau président René Moawad, remplacé par M. Elias Hraoui.

Janvier-mars 1990 : Guerre interchrétienne entre FL et les troupes du général Aoun, opposé à Taëf. En octobre, à la suite d’une offensive syro-libanaise, celui-ci est évincé du pouvoir et se réfugie en France. Fin de la guerre qui a fait en 15 ans plus de 150 000 morts.

22 mai 1991 : Traité syro-libanais « de fraternité et de coopération », qui officialise le rôle prépondérant de la Syrie.

Octobre 1992 : M. Rafic Hariri forme un gouvernement et lance la reconstruction de Beyrouth.

Juillet 1993 : Bombardements israéliens sans précédent depuis 1982 : 132 morts.

Avril 1996 : Opération israélienne « Raisins de la colère » destinée à briser le potentiel militaire du mouvement chiite Hezbollah : 175 morts, pour l’essentiel des civils.

24 mai 2000 : Israël se retire du Liban sud, mettant fin à 22 ans d’occupation. Le Hezbollah prend possession de la zone.

Octobre : Nouveau gouvernement de M. Hariri, vainqueur des législatives.

Juin 2001 : Premier retrait partiel des troupes syriennes, suivi par plusieurs autres.

2 septembre 2004 : A l’initiative de Paris et Washington, adoption de la résolution 1559 réclamant le départ des troupes syriennes et appelant au désarmement des milices.

3 septembre : Amendement constitutionnel prolongeant de trois ans le mandat du président Emile Lahoud (élu en 1998), en dépit des mises en garde internationales. Crise politique.

20 octobre : Démission de M. Hariri auquel succède M. Omar Karamé.

14 février 2005 : Rafic Hariri est assassiné. L’opposition accuse les régimes libanais et syrien.

28 février : Démission sous la pression de la rue de M. Karamé. Grave crise politique.

3 avril : Accord Syrie-Onu sur le retrait des troupes syriennes « au plus tard le 30 avril ».

19 avril : M. Nagib Miqati forme un cabinet restreint.

26 avril : Fin officielle de la présence syrienne au Liban.

7 mai : Retour du général Aoun après 15 ans d’exil.

2 juin : Assassinat du journaliste Samir Kassir, un des dirigeants de la révolte anti-syrienne, par ailleurs collaborateur du Monde diplomatique.

20 juin : M. Fouad Siniora est élu premier ministre du Liban. Il a été appuyé par le groupe présidé par Saad Hariri, Mouvement pour le futur, majoritaire à la nouvelle Assemblée.

21 juin : L’ex-chef du Parti communiste libanais Georges Haouwi, un proche de l’opposition antisyrienne, est assassiné dans un attentat à la voiture piégée à Beyrouth.

27 juin : Le ministre du travail a levé l’interdit frappant depuis 22 ans les Palestiniens du Liban (entre 200 et 350 000 selon les Nations Unies), concernant l’exercice d’une cinquantaine de métiers dans le secteur privé. Cette décision intervient au moment où une forte proportion de travaileurs syriens (centaines de milliers) ont quitté le pays, peu avant le retrait des troupes syriennes.

12 décembre : Assassinat de Gebran Tunéi, député et directeur du quotidien An-Nahar.

11 janvier 2006 : M. Kofi Annan nomme le procureur belge Serge Brammertz à la tête de la commission d’enquête sur l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, en remplacement de Detlev Mehlis.

26 mai : Assassinat par Israël au Liban d’un dirigeant du Djihad islamique palestinien, Mahmoud al-Majzoub, tué avec son frère dans un attentat à la voiture piégée.

28 juin : Opération « pluies d’été » à Gaza. L’armée israélienne envahit le territoire.

12 juillet : Israël lance une opération de grande envergure contre le Liban, par air et par mer, à la suite d’une embuscade du Hezbollah, qui a tué 6 soldats israéliens et en a capturé deux autres.

21 juillet 2006

 

중동에 관한 특집 ...  

 

- Actualité (2002-2005)
- Historique
- Les dossiers de la négociation
- Internationalisation du conflit
- Les deux protagonistes
- Compléments documentaires

 


댓글(1) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
공유하기 북마크하기찜하기
 
 
해적오리 2006-07-24 22:26   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | URL
퍼갑니다..^^
 

The Nation
Home > Issues > July 31, 2006 (web) > Too High a Price

 

 

editorial | posted July 14, 2006 (web only)

Too High a Price

PRINT THIS ARTICLE
EMAIL THIS ARTICLE
WRITE TO THE EDITORS
TAKE ACTION NOW
DEL.ICIO.US BOOKMARK
SUBSCRIBE TO THE NATION
With the spreading violence in Lebanon and Gaza, the Israeli doctrine of absolute security and massive retaliation--the notion that any attack or threat of attack on Israel will be met with a disproportionate response--is again proving counterproductive to Israel's own security as well as to the larger stability of the region. It makes no sense for Israel to destroy the civil infrastructure of the Palestinians and of Lebanon in response to the kidnapping of its soldiers, or to further weaken the capacity of the governments of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority while at the same trying to hold them accountable for the actions of groups and militias they cannot reasonably control. This collective punishment of the Palestinian and Lebanese people is not only inhumane and should be condemned but also leads to more radicalization and to more chaos.

That was the lesson of the Israeli siege of the Palestinian Authority in 2002, which severely weakened the PA's ability to govern, helping to pave the way for the political success of Hamas. And it will be the lesson of the increasing destruction of Lebanon. Indeed, the most likely casualty of the latest case of Israel's massive retaliation will be the fragile social peace and the democratically elected government in Lebanon. Ironically, the much-trumpeted Cedar Revolution, the only example of the success of the Bush doctrine that neoconservatives can still point to, could be brought down by the Likudnik policies of Israel that the neocons so champion. It took Lebanon more than twenty years to recover a degree of stability and civil peace after the last major incursion. How long will it take to recover from the unraveling of the stability that American and Israeli policies are helping to bring about?

It is now clear that the American and Israeli strategy of trying to isolate Hamas and Hezbollah on the one hand, and Syria and Iran on the other, have backfired. Would the situation in Gaza have gotten so out of hand if Israel, the United States and the European Union had tried to work with the democratically elected Hamas government from the outset? And would Hezbollah have felt the freedom to take the reckless action it took--the deplorable firing of rockets on Israeli civilians? As Juan Cole points out today on Informed Comment, "A Lebanon with no Syrian troops and Hizbullah in the government was inherently unstable. With Syria gone, Hizbullah filled a security vacuum and also was less restrained."

CONTINUED BELOW
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that Syria has a special responsibility to resolve this crisis. But the whole thrust of American policy of the last two years has been to reduce unconditionally Syria's influence in Lebanon so as to leave Lebanon to the Lebanese. By what logic does the Administration now seek to hold Syria accountable for the reckless action of Hezbollah militia in southern Lebanon? As Cole suggests, the hasty unplanned departure of Syrian forces may have ironically given Hezbollah more freedom to act than before. A dialogue with Syria together with an effort to have a more careful planned disengagement of Syrian forces would have given the Lebanese government a better chance of establishing control over its sovereignty in southern Lebanon.

The big beneficiaries of American policy have been the more radical wings of Hamas and Hezbollah and the Iranians, who more and more look like the champions of the Palestinian people. The big losers are the so-called moderate Arab regimes, which again look helpless in the face of what is seen as Israeli aggression, and the moderate Israelis, Palestinians and Lebanese who hoped for some normalcy of life with the prospect of peace, especially when the Hamas leadership appeared to be moving toward recognition of Israel. The United States and the larger world, too, are losers, for no one benefits from this mindless escalation of violence, particularly at a time of growing sectarian violence in Iraq and rising oil prices.

The events of the past two weeks should remind us that the peace and stability of the region is too important to be left to Israel and to Washington. There is a need for much greater and more forceful UN and European Union involvement and for the kind of diplomacy that the Europeans and the UN conducted in the late 1980s and the early '90s that led to the mutual release of prisoners and eventually to the Oslo peace process. The UN Quartet--consisting of the UN, the United States, Russia and the EU--has been far too deferential to the Bush Administration's failed road map strategy, and it is time for more active and comprehensive G-8 and UN-led diplomacy. Secretary General Kofi Annan's dispatch of two representatives to the region is a start, but it must be followed up by G-8 and UN Security Council action to rein in forces on all sides. This diplomacy should be aimed first at establishing a cease-fire and a mutual prisoner exchange and second at recognizing Hamas in Palestine and establishing talks with Syria and Iran. The United States must urgently back this diplomacy as well as make clear to Israel that it cannot support its current military action. The price it will pay in Iraq and in the region as a whole for doing so is just too large.

Get The Nation at home (and online!) for 75 cents a week!

If you like this article, consider making a donation to The Nation.


댓글(0) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
공유하기 북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

The Nation

 

 

article | posted July 20, 2006 (web only)

Nasrallah's Game

Adam Shatz

PRINT THIS ARTICLE
EMAIL THIS ARTICLE
WRITE TO THE EDITORS
TAKE ACTION NOW
DEL.ICIO.US BOOKMARK
SUBSCRIBE TO THE NATION
In January 2004 Sheik Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, presided over a major prisoner exchange with Israel, in which the Lebanese guerrilla movement and political party secured the release of more than 400 Arab prisoners in return for the bodies of three Israeli soldiers and an Israeli businessman and alleged spy, Elhanan Tannenbaum, whom Hezbollah had kidnapped. Moments before the exchange was sealed, Ariel Sharon withheld three Lebanese detainees, one of whom, Samir Kuntar, had killed a family of three in the Israeli town of Nahariya in 1979. Nasrallah, having failed to release Kuntar and the two other men, declared that Hezbollah would "reserve the right" to capture Israeli soldiers until the men were freed.

On July 12 Nasrallah launched the most daring assault of his tenure as Hezbollah's leader: the capture of two Israeli soldiers in a raid that left eight other Israeli soldiers dead. He called the attack "Operation Truthful Promise."

Nasrallah is not a man who minces words. Still, questions linger as to the timing and location of Operation Truthful Promise, which detonated Israel's most ruthless assault on Lebanon since the 1982 invasion. Although Hezbollah's operation was apparently planned five months in advance, it occurred amid the Israeli siege in Gaza, which followed the capture of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian guerrillas and was inevitably interpreted as a gesture of solidarity with the Gazans, particularly the Hamas leadership, dozens of whose members were recently abducted by Israel. What is more, Hezbollah did not strike in the occupied Shebaa Farms, a sliver of land in the Golan Heights, as it usually does, but inside Israel, a violation of international law that Israel--despite its own numerous violations of Lebanese territorial sovereignty--could invoke as a casus belli. In other words, Hezbollah undertook an audacious act of brinksmanship that was bound, if not designed, to escalate tensions with Israel.

CONTINUED BELOW
It is, of course, possible that Nasrallah regards the Jewish state as a paper tiger, and did not expect it to seize upon Hezbollah's raid as a pretext to pulverize his movement and to scrap the "rules of the game" that have governed the low-intensity conflict that Hezbollah and Israel have waged along the border since the latter's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. But this is to underestimate Nasrallah, a shrewd, calculating man who, as a careful reader of history, is fully aware of how Israel has responded in the past to cross-border attacks. Indeed, when I spoke to him at his (now leveled) headquarters in Beirut in October 2003, Nasrallah--sitting near a photograph of his son Hadi, who was killed in a clash with Israeli soldiers in 1997--seemed in no mood to ignite a war that would bring Israeli troops back to Lebanon. "When you get something by paying such a precious price, you are more keen on safeguarding it," he told me. "We will not accept anyone coming and squandering it. We are the sons of this soil, the sons of this country. We have no other place to go."

If Nasrallah knew that Operation Truthful Promise might provide the Israelis with an excuse to invade Lebanon, something that could--and, briefly, did--make Hezbollah the target of Lebanese rage (even, evidently, among some of his Shiite followers), what does he hope to achieve and what is his endgame? Why risk the future of his movement, which has a significant bloc in Lebanon's Parliament, a seat in the Cabinet and a vast network of social services and enterprises (the party is Lebanon's second-largest employer)? The devastation of Lebanon, and of Hezbollah strongholds formerly occupied by Israel, would seem a rather high price to pay for a few prisoners, particularly if Hezbollah ends up sharing the blame for the destruction of the country's tourism industry, the oxygen of its economy.

Nasrallah's objectives most likely lie elsewhere. Since the 2000 Israeli withdrawal ("the first Arab victory in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict," as Nasrallah often notes), Hezbollah has faced mounting pressure, from the West but also at home, to lay down its arms and become a purely political organization--a fate the party dreads, since it prides itself on being a vanguard of Islamic resistance to American and Israeli ambitions in the Middle East. This pressure dramatically intensified with UN Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), which called for the disbanding of all Lebanese militias, and with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon last year. By conducting a raid that was likely to provoke a brutal Israeli reprisal, Nasrallah may have gambled that the fury of the Lebanese would soon turn from Hezbollah to the Jewish state, thereby providing a justification for "the national resistance" as Lebanon's only deterrent against Israel. So far, Israel (with the full support of the Bush Administration) has played right into his hands, inflicting more than 300 casualties, nearly all of them civilians, and pounding the civilian infrastructure, eliciting sympathy for Hezbollah even among some Lebanese Christians. By striking at Israel's Army during its most destructive campaign in Palestine since 2002's "Operation Defensive Shield," Nasrallah must have known that he would earn praise throughout the Muslim world for coming to the aid of Palestinians abandoned by the region's authoritarian governments, a number of which have pointedly chastised Nasrallah's "adventurism." And by bloodying Israel's nose, Hezbollah could once again bolster its aura in the wider Arab world as a redoubtable "resistance" force, a model it seeks to promote regionally, especially in Palestine, where Nasrallah is a folk hero, and in Iraq, where Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the radical Shiite Mahdi Army, has proclaimed himself a follower of Hezbollah and has threatened to renew attacks against US forces in solidarity with the Lebanese.

Operation Truthful Promise was also, in part, a service rendered to Hezbollah's patrons in Damascus and Tehran, whether or not Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were consulted beforehand. The Syrian President warned former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, in their last meeting before Hariri's assassination, that if he pushed for Syria's withdrawal Assad would "break" Lebanon. With Hezbollah's raid, Assad may have found a way to get Israel to break Lebanon for him--a wish that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz were more than happy to fulfill. Damascus may be facing renewed threats, but Assad can now bask in Nasrallah's glow without directly engaging the Israeli military, which, as he knows, is divided on whether to depose him (since the only realistic alternative to the secular Baath regime is the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood); Lebanese anger has been redirected from Syria back to Israel; Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora looks on helplessly as the Israelis strafe his country; and the West has been warned that Lebanon will remain fractured, volatile and incapable of controlling its borders unless Syria's interests (particularly in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights) are taken into account. President Ahmadinejad, for his part, can thank Nasrallah for diverting attention from the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, and for burnishing the Islamic republic's reputation as a staunch defender of Palestinian rights--and, not least, of Muslim Jerusalem--in a region whose other (largely Sunni Arab) governments have compromised with the enemy. And the spectacular display of Hezbollah's Iranian-made weaponry, which have reached further into Israel than even the Israelis feared, and of the group's sophistication in deploying them, have reminded Israel and the United States of the "surprises" (Nasrallah's word) in store in the event of an attack on Iran.

Nasrallah is under no illusions that his small guerrilla movement can defeat the Israeli Army. But he can lose militarily and still score a political victory, particularly if the Israelis continue visiting suffering on Lebanon, whose government, as they well know, is powerless to control Hezbollah. Nasrallah, whom the Israelis attempted to assassinate on July 19 with a twenty-three-ton bomb attack on an alleged Hezbollah bunker, is doubtless aware that he may share the fate of his predecessor, Abbas Musawi, who was killed in an Israeli helicopter gunship attack in 1992. But Hezbollah outlived Musawi and grew exponentially, thanks in part to its followers' passion for martyrdom. To some, Nasrallah's raid may look like a death wish. But it is almost impossible to defeat someone who has no fear of death.

 

about

Adam Shatz has been the literary editor of The Nation since 2003. He has worked at the New York Times Book Review, Lingua Franca and The New Yorker. Shatz is the editor of Prophets Outcast: A Century of Dissident Jewish Writing About Zionism and Israel (Nation Books).He also edited Lingua Franca's book reviews and has reported from Lebanon and Algeria for the New York Review of Books. Shatz has contributed numerous articles on politics, music and culture to The Nation, The New York Review of Books, the Village Voice, American Prospect and the New York Times.

 

 


댓글(0) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
공유하기 북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

Le Monde diplomatique - English edition

July 2006

 

Middle East in crisis
Lebanon: the other Palestinians

 

As the world focuses its attention on the grave crisis in Lebanon and Gaza (see “A long week in Gaza City”), which risks being transformed into a regional conflict, it is time to listen to the Palestinians in Lebanon - in particular those still living in the refugee camps.

By Marina Da Silva

The current crisis in Lebanon has revived the debate about disarming Hizbullah and returned attention to the Palestinians, who mostly live in Lebanon’s refugee camps, forgotten by history and left out of negotiations. Now they are being pushed to the centre of the political stage and are trying to assert a right of return which they have never renounced.

Khadda, who lived in the biggest camp in Lebanon, Ein al-Hilweh, on the edge of Saida, so dreaded the tensions and armed conflicts in it that she left the camp, risking the cohesion of her family. Her husband, who runs a small shop, has stayed, and her children go back every weekend. She said: “The refugee camps, and Ein al-Hilweh in particular, are always described in the national and international press as no-go areas that harbour criminals and Islamic extremists. But we are the camp, more than 45,000 of us, and we cherish our identity and our history. It’s not those tearaways, at most a couple of hundred, who are the products of insecurity and political stalemate.” Even more than the violence, Khadda is weary of the sense of suffocation, of the poverty clearly visible in the narrow, filthy streets and crumbling houses, fertile ground for Islamic radicalisation.

The turning point came in 1982 with Israel’s invasion and the forced departure of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its fighters. The PLO had provided work for nearly 65% of the Palestinians, as well as funding for health and education (also open to destitute Lebanese). Lebanon’s Palestinians then felt forgotten by the Oslo agreements of 1993: the PLO concentrated its diplomatic efforts on the West Bank and Gaza, which also received international aid. The budgets allocated to Lebanon by international NGOs, Unrwa (1) and other UN agencies were drastically reduced. The refugee camps that bore the brunt of war and economic hardship have been passed over.

The Islamist movements, mainly Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), have touched the poorest sections of the population by providing much-needed aid. Hamas benefited from popular anger after Israel deported 415 Palestinians close to the movement from the occupied territories to southern Lebanon in December 1992; Hamas benefited again when Israel began targeted assassinations of Palestinian Islamist political leaders: Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in March 2004 and Abdelaziz al-Rantissi a month later, both in Gaza. Their portraits are everywhere. Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections in January has added to its strength.

Um Fadi, who is close to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was surprised “like everyone else” at the Hamas victory, but she was pleased with the result, a vote “against corruption and for Palestinian rights, including the right of return”. Ein al-Hilweh is not like it was when her children were born there: in those days the camps were the symbol of Palestinian political life and of building a society in exile. “Today,” she said, “the population is hostage to political factions settling internal scores. Often there are deaths and people are afraid. But they don’t want to leave, because the camp still symbolises our long wait for return and the struggle for our rights.”

On 1 May a member of Fatah was killed by a militant member of Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), a Salafist group thought to have links with al-Qaida. The death was the latest in a long list of casualties. These confrontations, political as much as criminal, often go beyond internal rivalries: they are part of a strategy of tension orchestrated by the various organisations’ secret services and meant to confuse. Ein al-Hilweh retains its symbolic status as a political camp where all Palestinian parties are recognised and respected, a real capital of the Palestinians in exile.

Sensitive situation

“The situation is sensitive,” said Abu Ali Hassan, a former leader of Ein al-Hilweh who is now at Mar Elias, a small, mainly Christian camp in Beirut, where he is in charge of relations with the Lebanese political parties. “The disarmament of the Palestinian organisations, called for by resolution 1559 of September 2004, at the instigation of France and the United States, constitutes one of the issues in Lebanese political life (2). The national unity government in Beirut has formed a committee to negotiate the disarmament of the bases outside the camps and control the arms inside them. We’re working towards creating a united delegation and ensuring that this issue isn’t dealt with just from a security point of view, but that the outcome will advance our political rights and improve the humanitarian situation in the camps.”

Abbas Zaki, from Fatah, heads the PLO representation in Jnah, in the southern suburbs of Beirut. He believes that its reopening in May was a strong political signal: “The government doesn’t want to deal with this issue by force; it’s mainly armed Palestinians in a dozen bases spread out across the Beqaa valley and in the coastal town of Nahme, 15km south of Beirut, who cause problems.” The statement by Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, in Paris last October, that Palestinians living in Lebanon had to “obey the law” and that they were there as “guests” was not welcomed.

Lebanese newspapers regularly report infiltrations of Palestinian militants from Syria into the western Beqaa, which have led the Lebanese army to seal off some 40 illegal crossing points between the countries and to tighten its control of Palestinian factions that are linked to pro-Syrian organisations based in Damascus, such as the PFLP-GC, Fatah-Intifada (a splinter group of Fatah, led by Abu Musa) and Al-Saiqa (the Palestinian wing of the ruling Ba’ath party in Syria).

“Because we’ve led the armed resistance to Israel and are still active and influential, we’re seen as obstacles to peace”, said Nabil, who heads the people’s committee in the camp at Beddawi, below Tripoli, in the north. Beddawi has less crowded houses, rebuilt roads and sewers, and is further away from the battle zone. It might seem peaceful, but to Nabil ,war remains a threat: “Israeli planes still fly regularly over Lebanon, north to south and back again, with total impunity. Sabra and Shatila will remain forever in our memory. We were massacred while we were under the protection of international forces. The arms in the camps are there to ensure our protection” (3).

The arms question conceals the Palestinians’ living conditions and their banishment. According to Unrwa’s March figures, there are 404,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, of whom 220,000 live in a dozen camps around the country. These include: in Beirut, Mar Elias, Burj al-Barajneh, Sabra and Shatila, and Dbayeh; in the south, near Saida, Ein al-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh; also in the south, near Tyre, al-Buss, Rashidieh, Burj al-Shemali; in the north by Tripoli, Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi; and Wavel in the Beqaa valley. There are also small illegal ghetto-camps, not recognised by Unrwa and therefore without aid.

The Lebanese army keeps up pressure around the camps, particularly those in the south which provide shelter for some 100,000 refugees; access to these is restricted and requires a permit.

Fatah remains the most powerful organisation here, while in the camps in Beirut, northern Lebanon and the Beqaa, the pro-Syrians have maintained a significant presence. Everywhere the increasing strength of the Islamist movements is noticeable: some think it now puts Fatah and Hamas on an equal footing.

According to Unrwa, 60% of Palestinian refugees live in poverty and as many as 70% are unemployed. Until recently there were 72 jobs they were unable to practise outside the camps; they were not allowed to bring construction material into the camps; and they cannot leave or re-enter Lebanese territory without a visa, which lasts for only six months.

In June 2005 the Lebanese minister of labour, Trad Hamade, who is close to Hizbullah, signed a memorandum in favour of Palestinians born in Lebanon and registered at the interior ministry, which partly lifts the ban on doing certain jobs. But this does not change anything for qualified Palestinians, who still cannot practise medicine, law or architecture. There is total silence about a 2001 law that forbade Palestinians to buy houses or property in Lebanon, which has led to legal confusion, particularly on inheritance.

Samira Salah heads the PLO’s department for Palestinian refugee affairs and coordinates the campaign for the rights of refugees in Lebanon and the right of return, in accordance with UN resolution 194. She sees Hamade’s measures as a step forward, though they will not change anything in real terms: “Proposals were already made in 1995 indicating that a Palestinian born in Lebanon had the right to work, on condition he had a permit; but this permit is still almost impossible to obtain and the minister’s proposal doesn’t include social security or insurance.”

The campaign for Palestinian rights was started in April 2005 by a collective that brings together 25 Palestinian associations, the Palestine National Council, the PLO’s refugee affairs department and members of civil society. The campaign includes workshops and training, and seeks to gain the support of the Lebanese population to create a broad movement of political pressure. Under the slogan “Civil rights until we return; together with the Lebanese we will resist settlement and naturalisation of refugees”, the campaign has four main demands: the right to work, to own property, to security and to free association. These are not new but they have never been answered.

There are now some 4 million refugees, about 60% of the Palestinian community, who were originally forced into exile in their hundreds of thousands when the state of Israel was created; 90% live in the Palestinian territories and neighbouring Arab countries. Lebanon’s Palestinians crystallise the most sensitive issues in both Lebanese and regional politics. They are a reminder that any move in the Arab-Israeli conflict is linked to a resolution of the refugee problem.


댓글(1) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
공유하기 북마크하기찜하기
 
 
balmas 2006-07-24 03:10   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | URL
"There are now some 4 million refugees, about 60% of the Palestinian community ..."