:: 텍스트(5/25)

Indeed, one interesting upshot of the emergence of virtue ethics is that some deontologists and utilitarians have reached to it by recognizing its importance and seeking to address it within the terms of their own theories. Hence, for example, the revived interest in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, the elaboration of character-based versions of Kantianism and utilitarianism, and the utilitarian Peter Singer’s latest book on ‘How are we to live?'[3] This is currently resulting in some very exciting work, particularly in the area of Aristotelian and Kantian scholarship. A recent collection has McDowell bringing Aristotle closer to Kant, and Herman and Korsgaard bringing Kant closer to Aristotole[4] I have not yet come across to interpret Mill in Aristotelian ways but I suspect it will happen any day[5]

This has meant that the lines of demarcation between the three approaches have become blurred. Describing virtue ethics loosely as an approach which ‘emphasizing the virtues’ will no longer serve to distinguish it. By the same token, of course, deontology and utilitarianism are no longer perspicuously identified by describing them as emphasizing rules or consequences in contrast to character[6]. No one, as far as I know, is bothered by the fact that there are no longer satisfactory short answers to the questions ‘What is deontology?’ and ‘What is utilitarianism?’, but currently, at least some philosophers seem bothered by the fact that we virtue ethicists cannot come up with one to answer ‘What is virtue ethics?’. The demand that virtue ethics, unlike the other two approaches, should ba able to state its position succinctly, in terms both sufficiently broad (or disjunctive?) to get all virtue ethicists in and sufficiently tight to keep all deontologists and utilitarians out, seems a bit excessive. Why should anyone expect us, uniquely, to be able to do it? 

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[3] O.O’Neil, ‘Kant After Virtue’(1984); R.B. Louden, ‘Kant’s Virtue Ethics’ (1986); R. Crisp, ‘Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue’(1992); J. Driver, ‘The Virtues and Human nature’ (1996); B.Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgement (1993); M. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (1995); Peter Singer, How Are we to Live? (1996)

[4] J.McDowell, ‘Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle’s Ethics’; B. Herman, ‘Making Room for Character’; Christine Korsgaard, ‘From Duty and for the Skae of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action’, all in S. Engstrom and J. Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics (1996). See also Stephen Hudson, ‘What is Morality all About?’ (1990)

[5] See the notes to ch. 2 of R. Crisp (ed.), Utilitarianism (1998) 

[6]Three excellent recent survey articles on modern virtue ethics all constantly qualify the usual slogans, pointing out ways in which new developments in utilitarianism and deontology have subverted them. See G.V. Trianosky, ‘What is Virtue Ethics all About?’ (1990), Justin Oakley, ‘Varieties of Virtue Ethics’ (1996); and Daniel Statman, ‘Introduction to Virtue Ethics’ (1997).