Cornelius Van Til의 Heidegger 철학에 대한 존재론적 및 신학적 평가를 정리해드리겠습니다. Van Til이 Heidegger의 존재론을 어떻게 이해하고 비판했는지, 그리고 그 신학적 함의가 기독교 신학과 어떻게 연결되는지 분석하여 제공하겠습니다. 연구가 완료되면 알려드리겠습니다.
Van Til’s Evaluation of Heidegger’s Ontology and Its Theological Implications
Introduction:
Cornelius Van Til, a Reformed theologian and presuppositional apologist, engaged critically with modern philosophical thought, including the existential ontology of Martin Heidegger. Van Til believed that non-Christian philosophies invariably result in “the wisdom of this world” which is “foolishness” to God (). In his writings and lectures (e.g. The Defense of the Faith and articles in the Westminster Theological Journal), Van Til analyzed Heidegger’s concepts of Sein (Being) and Dasein (human existence) and contrasted them with the Christian worldview. He argued that Heidegger’s ontology – however profound it might seem – ultimately fails when measured against the truth of biblical, Trinitarian theology. Below, we examine Van Til’s assessment of Heidegger’s notion of being, his critique of its contrast with Christian theology, and the apologetic and theological implications he drew from it.
Heidegger’s Ontology: Sein and Dasein According to Van Til
Heidegger’s philosophy, especially in Being and Time (1927), reorients the question of Being (Sein) through the lens of human existence (Dasein). Dasein is the “being-there” – the human who uniquely understands and questions Being. This anthropocentric starting point treats the human perspective as the horizon within which Being is disclosed. Van Til acknowledged Heidegger as “by many thought to be the most profound thinker among modern philosophers” (The Later Heidegger and Theology -- By: Cornelius Van Til | Galaxie Software), but he also noted that Being and Time was famously described as a “‘gott-loses’ (god-less) Buch” (The Later Heidegger and Theology -- By: Cornelius Van Til | Galaxie Software). In other words, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology deliberately proceeds without reference to God, setting his philosophy “over against the Christian religion” (The Later Heidegger and Theology -- By: Cornelius Van Til | Galaxie Software).
From Van Til’s perspective, this is the crux of the problem: Heidegger begins with autonomous human existence rather than with the Creator. Van Til observed that modern thinkers like Heidegger and Sartre make man the ultimate reference point for meaning. Such philosophies “center in man as ultimate and therefore self-explanatory” (). In Heidegger’s case, Dasein in its facticity and being-in-the-world is treated as the source of the understanding of Being, rather than a creature made in the image of God. Van Til would argue that this human-centered starting point is a form of the original sin of autonomy – the attempt to interpret reality apart from God’s revealed truth. By making Dasein the measure of Being, Heidegger’s ontology effectively ignores the Creator-creature distinction that is foundational to Christian theology.
Van Til did not dismiss Heidegger’s thought without examination. In fact, he stressed the importance of understanding such philosophies in depth: “if we are compelled to reject the views of modern thinkers such as Heidegger, we must first follow them through all the labyrinth of their thought. Unless we have done this our criticism is superficial and premature” (). Van Til demonstrated familiarity with Heidegger’s themes (e.g. Geworfenheit or “thrownness,” Sorge or “care,” Schuld or “guilt,” and being-toward-death), acknowledging their influence on contemporary theology. However, after this careful study, Van Til concluded that Heidegger’s view of being is ultimately incoherent. He wrote that Christians “must not hesitate to point out to Heidegger and others that there is no meaning and coherence in their views”, precisely because by banishing God from the discussion of Being, they lose the true source of unity and intelligibility (). What remains is an ontology of despair: an analysis of human existence (Dasein) that finds anxiety, guilt, and mortality but cannot locate genuine hope or ultimate meaning.
Contrast with Christian Theology: Being and Revelation
Van Til sharply contrasted Heidegger’s impersonal ontology with the Christian understanding of God and creation. In Christian theology, “Being” is not an abstract mystery disclosed by human inquiry, but ultimately identified with the personal, triune God – “I AM WHO I AM,” the self-existent Creator of all beings. All contingent beings (including human Dasein) derive their existence and meaning from God. Thus, true ontology in a Christian sense begins with acknowledging the Creator-creature distinction: God is the absolute being, and we as creatures find our purpose and definition in relation to Him. By ignoring this, Heidegger’s philosophy misses the most fundamental reality.
One major point of contrast is revelation. Christian theology asserts that God speaks into our existence – through general revelation in creation and conscience, and supremely through special revelation in Scripture and in Jesus Christ, the Logos. Heidegger, by contrast, operates within the bounds of human finitude: for him, truth is aletheia (unveiling or disclosure) that occurs within Dasein’s experience. There is no “word from outside” the human condition – no transcendent revelation – in Heidegger’s system. Van Til noted that Heidegger “would see questions about the being and nature of God as irrelevant or meaningless” to the philosophical inquiry of being (Thoughts on Heidegger, Anyone? | The Puritan Board). In a forum discussion summarizing Heidegger’s stance, one commenter observed (in a very Van Til-like assessment) that Heidegger “has imprisoned himself in [Plato’s] cave and thrown away the key… For Heidegger, there is no word from the outside, no revelation” (Thoughts on Heidegger, Anyone? | The Puritan Board). Van Til would heartily agree with this critique: without God’s self-disclosure, Heidegger’s Dasein is essentially trapped within the limits of its own being, trying to generate meaning from the shadows on the cave wall.
The concept of God is another divergence. Van Til pointed out that Heidegger’s thought offers at best a vague notion of “god” or a higher reality, but certainly not the personal, sovereign God of Scripture. In fact, Heidegger criticized traditional metaphysics for its “onto-theology,” where God was treated as just the highest being within the chain of being. Ironically, Heidegger’s remedy – focusing on Being-itself rather than a personal God – results in what Van Til saw as an even more profound theological emptiness. In Heidegger’s seminal work, God is absent; later in his career Heidegger spoke of the need for “a god” or hinted at spiritual language, but never returned to the God of biblical theism. Van Til’s assessment is that Heidegger’s ontology is “god-less” by design, and any apparent spirituality in it lacks the grace and truth of Christianity. As Van Til remarked, “the gospel as Heidegger understands it has no grace in it in the biblical sense of the word” (). Heidegger’s Sein might echo a kind of sacred mystery, but it is an impersonal mystery – utterly unlike the gracious personal being of God who enters history to save sinners.
Because of this, Van Til argued that Heidegger’s view of human existence stands in stark opposition to the Christian view. Take, for example, Heidegger’s analysis of guilt (Schuld) and death. In Being and Time, guilt is an existential condition – a sense of indebtedness tied to Dasein’s very existence – and death is the ultimate possibility that gives authenticity to life. There is no concept of sin against a holy God, no objective moral transgression, and consequently no atonement in Heidegger’s framework. By contrast, Christian theology says our true guilt is juridical and moral – we have broken God’s law – and death is “the wages of sin.” The cure is not simply to face death resolutely (as Heidegger’s authentic Dasein might do) but to receive divine forgiveness and eternal life through the atoning death and resurrection of Christ. Van Til highlighted this difference: Heidegger’s philosophy “leaves man with his false notions of guilt, of care and of death” and never asks him to repent or find redemption “through the atoning death of Christ” (). In other words, the Heideggerian vision of Sein-zum-Tode (being-toward-death) can produce at best an honest existential anxiety, but offers no deliverance from the real bondage of sin and death. Christian theology, on the other hand, proclaims a gospel of grace – something utterly missing in Heidegger. Van Til tersely summed it up: “The gospel as Heidegger understands it… does not challenge the apostate man to confess and forsake his sin… It leaves man with [these] false notions… without even asking him to consider whether the wisdom of the world has not been made foolishness with God” (). The true Gospel, by contrast, does call the sinner to confession, and it does confront the wisdom of the world with God’s revealed truth.
Finally, Van Til emphasized that any genuine understanding of human being (Dasein) must be grounded in its relationship to the Creator. He wrote that man “needs to be first interpreted in terms of Christ before he can find meaning in his world” (). Only when we see human existence as created good, fallen in sin, and redeemable in Christ do we truly grasp what being human means. In Van Til’s view, Heidegger’s brilliant phenomenology of human existence was ultimately a detailed description of the fallen human condition in search of meaning – a search doomed to frustration if it refuses to acknowledge Jesus Christ as the Way, the Truth, and the Life.
Van Til’s Apologetic Critique of Heidegger’s Ontology
From Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic standpoint, Heidegger’s ontology exemplifies the failure of unbelieving thought. Presuppositionalism argues that apart from the Christian worldview, one cannot make sense of the world’s intelligibility, morality, or meaning. Van Til often described non-Christian philosophy as oscillating between rationalism and irrationalism: the attempt to gain autonomous certainty on the one hand, and the plunge into meaninglessness on the other. Heidegger, as an heir of post-Kantian continental philosophy, recognized the bankruptcy of pure rationalism and so leaned toward the “irrationalist” side – emphasizing subjective experience, language, and historical situatedness (phenomenology and existentialism) over any universally valid truths. While this was a corrective to earlier excessive rationalism, Van Til saw it as “the wisdom of this world” simply swinging to the opposite extreme. Without God's revelation, human reason couldn’t secure ultimate truth (as Kant showed), but human experience alone couldn’t provide it either – thus resulting in existential angst. Heidegger’s Dasein is “thrown” into a world it never chose, trying to glean meaning under the shadow of eventual nothingness (death). In Van Til’s analysis, this is the tragic result of the creature’s attempt to interpret reality without the Creator: either proud self-reliance (rationalism) or humble despair (irrationalism). Heidegger chooses the path of facing despair head-on, but in Van Til’s judgment, he “has imprisoned himself” in a cave of finitude with no hope of escape (Thoughts on Heidegger, Anyone? | The Puritan Board). There is “no word from outside” – a situation that leaves human beings ultimately in darkness.
A key apologetic point Van Til raised is that Heidegger’s system, by leaning entirely on “being-as-experienced,” cannot actually justify any claims beyond the subjective. Heidegger famously set aside questions of ontic (entity-based) truth to focus on ontological (being-based) truth. But by doing so, he severed the link between human understanding and any external, objective reality guaranteed by a truthful God. For Van Til, this is a fatal move. If all truth is reduced to how Being is unveiled to Dasein, we have no sure foundation to say why that unveiling is meaningful or reliable. In Christian terms, it is God’s sovereign mind and truthful character that is the epistemological foundation for human knowledge. Heidegger’s refusal to acknowledge such a foundation means that his beautiful descriptions of phenomena have no final interpretive anchor. As Van Til put it, “there is no meaning and coherence” in such a view () – coherence ultimately comes only when all things are understood in relation to the triune God. Van Til would challenge the Heideggerian (or any non-Christian) to account for the very intelligibility of language, thought, and being without borrowing from the Christian framework. In practice, Van Til argued, unbelievers inevitably “borrow capital” from Christianity – for example, treating the world as orderly or language as meaningful – even while their theoretical principles (like radical historicity or relativism in Heidegger’s case) undermine any fixed truth. This internal inconsistency is what Van Til’s transcendental critique would expose. He would say to the Heideggerian: “You seek the meaning of being, but you deny the one by whom all being exists. Thus you will never find the ultimate meaning of being until you start with the presupposition of the God who is.”
Moreover, Van Til believed Heidegger’s ontology demonstrates the ethical challenge of non-Christian thought: it lets man evade moral accountability. By redefining guilt as an existential mood rather than a violation of God’s law, Heidegger effectively removes the sinner’s true predicament (and thus, his need for a Savior). Van Til saw this as part of fallen humanity’s constant suppression of truth (Romans 1:18–23): man “in his sin” does not want to confront the reality of a holy God, so he reconstructs “being” in a way that sidelines God. In Van Til’s words, Heidegger’s approach “leaves [the] apostate man to confess and forsake his sin” – or rather, fails to call him to do so – as he instead searches for meaning on his own terms (). A Van Tilian apologetic would press the point that real meaning, moral truth, and hope are impossible on Heidegger’s terms, and that Heidegger’s own deep analysis of angst and guilt testifies to the truth of the Christian diagnosis of man’s condition (created for God yet estranged by sin). Van Til might say that Heidegger has accurately described the feelings of a lost soul but refuses to name the cure. Thus, presuppositionalism would use Heidegger’s insights against him: the very fact that humanity is haunted by guilt and longing for authenticity is because, as Augustine said to God, “our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee.”
Theological Implications: Heidegger’s Influence and Van Til’s Response
Heidegger’s existential ontology had significant influence on 20th-century theology, and Van Til was highly attentive to this. In the mid-20th century, theologians like Rudolf Bultmann drew on early Heidegger to “demythologize” the New Testament, reinterpreting doctrines like the resurrection or eternal life as symbols for existential self-understanding. Later, others like Heinrich Ott, Gerhard Ebeling, and Ernst Fuchs (often associated with the “New Hermeneutic”) engaged with the later Heidegger’s thought (especially his views on language and interpretation) to reshape theology. Even Karl Barth’s dialectical theology, while not directly Heideggerian, shared an anti-rationalist, historicized approach that some found resonant with Heidegger’s themes. Van Til addressed these developments head-on, notably in his 1964 article “The Later Heidegger and Theology” (WTJ 26:2).
In reviewing Heinrich Ott’s work on Heidegger and theology, Van Til noted that Ott and others were excited by a “turn” in Heidegger’s later philosophy that seemed more compatible with Barthian theology than with Bultmann’s program (The Later Heidegger and Theology -- By: Cornelius Van Til | Galaxie Software) (The Later Heidegger and Theology -- By: Cornelius Van Til | Galaxie Software). Ott essentially argued that if Heidegger’s later thought (with its focus on the “word” and transcending subject-object thinking) were applied, it might support a theology like Barth’s, which also emphasizes the transcendence of God’s Word beyond our control. According to Van Til, “the total significance of Ott’s effort” was showing that “a theology like that of Barth fits in well with a philosophy like that of the later Heidegger” (). This claim – that a leading modern theology and a leading modern philosophy could be in harmony – was startling. Van Til’s reaction was two-fold: on one hand, he agreed that Barth’s modernist theology had indeed absorbed so much existential philosophy that it scarcely resembled classical Christianity; on the other hand, he insisted this was nothing to celebrate but rather to condemn.
Van Til argued that if Barth’s theology dovetails with Heidegger’s philosophy, it only proves Barth’s message has been emptied of true Gospel content. “He might have added,” Van Til says of Ott, “that a theology like that of Barth adds nothing of importance to the philosophy of the later Heidegger” (). In other words, Barthian theology in this view doesn’t correct or rise above Heidegger’s ideas – it simply echoes them in religious language. Van Til goes further to lump Barth and Bultmann together in terms of ultimate effect: “Ott is right, in saying that Bultmann is as anxious as Barth to bring the gospel of the New Testament to modern man. He might have added that the gospel as Barth understands it and the gospel as Bultmann understands it is essentially the same as the gospel as Heidegger understands it” (). This is a striking statement. Van Til is claiming that beneath their surface differences, neo-orthodox theology (Barth) and liberal theology (Bultmann) end up offering a “gospel” that is essentially Heideggerian existentialism: a message of authentic existence or new self-understanding without the supernatural truths of historic Christianity. In such a message, there is talk of “faith” or “encounter,” but no literal fall into sin, no incarnate God-Man atoning on a cross, and no bodily resurrection triumphing over the grave. Thus, “the gospel as Heidegger understands it has no grace in it in the biblical sense” (), writes Van Til. It is not truly Good News, because it does not save – it only reassures modern man on his own terms. It “leaves man with his false notions of guilt, of care and of death” still intact (). The depth of Christ’s atonement, the reality of God’s grace, and the call to repentance are all lost, replaced by existential self-analysis. Van Til’s critique here is essentially that theological existentialism is a fatal compromise, blending the vocabulary of Christianity with the philosophy of unbelief, and thereby robbing the Christian message of its power. He bluntly calls Ott “deceived” for thinking that any Heidegger-compatible reinterpretation could let the true gospel shine through ().
Another theological implication Van Til discussed is the concept of Geschichte (historic event or “history” as meaningful occurrence) versus Historie (empirical history), a distinction important to both Heidegger and existentialist theologians. Bultmann, influenced by Heidegger, claimed the New Testament’s significance lies in Geschichte – the existential “God encounter” event – not in the literal Historie of whether, say, Jesus physically walked on water or rose from the tomb. Van Til vehemently opposed this dichotomy. He commented that Ott “is deceived to think that the message of the gospel is heard in any view of Geschichte that is agreeable with Heidegger’s later thought” (). In plain terms, if one tries to reinterpret the Gospel as a purely existential “happening” divorced from real historical facts, one ends up with no Gospel at all. The biblical writers insist the Gospel is news about actual historical events (1 Corinthians 15:1-4, Luke 1:1-4). By aligning theology with Heidegger’s philosophy of Geschichte, modern theologians were (in Van Til’s eyes) effectively denying the faith and preaching “another gospel” – one that cannot save. Van Til’s apologetic response was to call the church back to a consistent, Bible-based theology that refuses to trim biblical truth to fit secular philosophy. He urged that Christian theologians must not seek credibility by adopting the latest philosophical trends (be it Heideggerian existentialism, or any other), because in doing so they surrender the very distinctives that make Christianity true and life-giving.
In summary, Van Til saw Heidegger’s ontological philosophy as a significant challenge that infiltrated theology, but he responded by unmasking its theological implications as incompatible with Christianity. He maintained that grace, revelation, and the person of God are indispensable in any discourse about Being or existence. If theology makes peace with Heidegger by abandoning those elements, it ceases to be Christian theology. In Van Til’s words, such theology “adds nothing” to Heidegger – it merely follows worldly wisdom, which God has made foolish () ().
Conclusion: Van Til’s Balanced Theological-Philosophical Analysis
Cornelius Van Til’s evaluation of Martin Heidegger’s ontology is a balanced critique combining philosophical analysis with theological conviction. Philosophically, Van Til engaged with Heidegger’s ideas about Being and human existence, recognizing their influence and insight into the modern mind. He praised the need for careful study of Heidegger (“follow them through all the labyrinth of their thought” ()) and acknowledged the “explosive” impact Heidegger had on theology (The Later Heidegger and Theology -- By: Cornelius Van Til | Galaxie Software). Yet Van Til decisively rejected Heidegger’s framework as ultimately unable to deliver truth or hope. The root of Van Til’s critique is theological: Heidegger’s ontology, by excluding the triune God and His revelation, becomes a sophisticated exposition of man’s attempt to live without God. From Van Til’s Reformed vantage point, this is the essence of sinful thought – and it cannot succeed. He demonstrated how Heidegger’s concept of being collapses into man-centered meaninglessness, and he contrasted it with the Christian vision in which true Being is known only in relation to the personal Creator and Redeemer.
Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic highlights the antithesis between Heidegger’s secular existentialism and Christian theism. He showed that key biblical truths (the reality of sin, the need for atonement, the gift of grace) have no place in Heidegger’s ontology – and any theology that adopts Heideggerian ideas will likewise be stripped of those vital truths. In response, Van Til didn’t merely dismiss Heidegger; he used Heidegger as a foil to underscore the richness of the Christian answer. For example, where Heidegger speaks of Dasein’s guilt and care, Christianity speaks of real guilt before God and God’s care for us. Where Heidegger sees death as the end, Christianity proclaims Christ’s victory over death. Where Heidegger offers authenticity as a goal, Christianity offers holiness and communion with God as our created purpose. Thus, Van Til urges that only by presupposing the biblical God can we have a coherent ontology that makes sense of our experience. “Man,” he writes, “must be interpreted in terms of Christ before he can find meaning in his world” ().
In conclusion, Cornelius Van Til’s analysis of Martin Heidegger’s ontology is a firm yet nuanced rejection of Heidegger’s system on theological grounds. He appreciates the questions Heidegger raised about modern man’s crisis of meaning, but he insists that the answer lies not in Heidegger’s impersonal Sein, but in the God who is and who has spoken. Van Til’s critique serves as a reminder that any philosophy of being divorced from the Being of God will ultimately lead astray. True wisdom and ontology, for Van Til, begin “at the beginning – God”, and any attempt to build an understanding of existence on another foundation will prove to be, in the final analysis, “foolishness” ().
Sources:
- Cornelius Van Til, “The Later Heidegger and Theology,” Westminster Theological Journal 26:2 (May 1964), pp. 121–161. (Van Til’s in-depth review of Heidegger’s philosophy in relation to modern theology, especially Barth and Bultmann) () ().
- Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed. (P&R, 2008). (Van Til’s classic work on presuppositional apologetics, wherein he critiques non-Christian thought systems for elevating human autonomy over divine revelation).
- Cornelius Van Til, “Original Sin and 20th-Century Thought,” in Jerusalem and Athens (Philadelphia: P&R, 1971). (Van Til engages modern philosophers like Sartre and Heidegger, arguing that their views lack coherence and meaning apart from Christ) () ().
- Heinrich Ott, “The Later Heidegger and Theology” in New Frontiers in Theology, vol.1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), ed. James M. Robinson & John B. Cobb. (Programmatic essay by Ott which Van Til critiques, showing the attempted synthesis of Heidegger’s later thought with Barthian theology) () ().
- Rudolf Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology” (1941). (Influential essay applying Heidegger’s concepts to theology – background for Van Til’s criticism of demythologized ‘gospel’). Van Til’s analysis highlights how Bultmann’s Heidegger-inspired reinterpretation strips the gospel of grace ().
- Forum discussion on Heidegger and theology (Puritan Board, 2010) – provides a Reformed perspective echoing Van Til’s points that without revelation Heidegger’s concept of being is trapped in human subjectivity (Thoughts on Heidegger, Anyone? | The Puritan Board).