I. "What Metaphysics Is" in Hartshorne's Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method(NY: University of America Press, 1983/70)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is an adequate philosophic method for explicating creative synthesis?", specifically "What is metaphysics?" In the opening of the chapter, Hartshorne defines metaphysics as "the study which evaluates a priori statements about existence"(19). It is important for a metaphysician to distinguish "empirical from metaphysical or a priori statements"(19). The criterion of the discernment is "observational falsifiability"(19). Metaphysical assertions contradict no conceivable observation, so fit any conceivable experience, while empirical assertions contradict some conceivable observations, so fit some conceivable experiences. Hartshorne's definitions of metaphysics are following:
(a) The unrestrictive or completely general theory of concreteness; (b) The theory of experience as such; (c) The clarification of strictly universal conceptions; (d) The search for unconditionally necessary or eternal truths about existence; (e) The theory of objective modality; (f) The theory of possible world-states, or the a priori approach to cosmology; (g) The general theory of creativity; (h) The search for the common principle of structure and quality; (i) Ultimate or a priori axiology (Theory of value in general); (j) The inquiry into the conceivability and existential status of infinity, perfection (unsurpassibility), eternal and necessary existence; (k) The rational or secular approach to theology(24); (l) The attempt to make non-exclusive or purely positive statements(33).
These definitions imply a refutation against positivists.1) According to positivists, metaphysical assertions are meaningless because they cannot be reduced to mathematical or logical propositions and thereby cannot be verified or falsified. For the reason, positivists regard empirical data only, reducible to mathematical or logical propositions, as meaningful.
But according to Hartshorne, "the a priori truths that metaphysics seeks to clarify are highly abstract"(22). What really matters in metaphysics is not to seek highly abstract principles from concrete realities, but just to seek mere abstractions apart from them. In this respect, metaphysics is defined as "the study of the abstraction 'concreteness'"(22) because "the concrete is the inclusive form of reality, from which the abstract is an abstracted aspect or constituent"(27). Therefore, metaphysics is neither an empty idealism nor a meaningless speculation, but a synthetic science integrating all empirical sciences.
II. "A Philosophy of Shared Creative Experience" in Hartshorne's Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method(NY: University of America Press, 1983/70)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is creative synthesis as data for an adequate philosophic method?", specifically "What is a philosophy of shared creative experience?" According to Hartshorne, a philosophy of shared creative experience means that "to be is to create"(1), that creativity is the first principle of metaphysics. To prove it, he consults experience.
An experience is a creative synthesis that "many factors...fuse together into a new single entity"(2). It is partly determined by the previous entities, but is a free action in that it synthesizes the past entities into "a single reality" irreducible to "interrelated parts"(3). So it is really creative. This "creativity, emergent novelty is universal"(6) to all actual entities, so is called the "shared creativity." "Sharing of creativity is the social character of experience, its aspect of sympathy, participation, identification with others"(8).
Hartshorne indicates three mistakes in the traditional view of God the creator First, the view that "the creator is in no sense or aspect created" is wrong, because "he is, in some aspect, a creature, a product--at least of his own making"(10). Second, the view that "the creature is merely creature, in no way creator"(10) is wrong, because we really create something. Third, the view that God is totally creative and the world is totally created is absolutely wrong, because all actualities, even subhuman, have causa sui or self-creation. This old view presupposes creativity is monopolized only by God, but Hartshorne asserts that creativity is shared by God and his creatures. This is "a philosophy of shared creative experience."
III. "Non-Restrictive Existential Statements" in Hartshorne's Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method(NY: University of America Press, 1983/70)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is an adequate philosophic method for explicating creative synthesis?", specifically "What is non-restrictive existential statements?" Here the word "non-restrictive" is the same as necessary, the word "existential" as experiential, and "non-restrictive and existential" as metaphysical. Thus, "non-restrictive existential statements" are metaphysical statements. According to Hartshorne, the statements on experience or knowledge can be classified into three: a partially restrictive statement, a completely restrictive statement, and a completely non-restrictive statement.2)
First, a partially restrictive statement, an ordinary statement, is "partially restrictive of existential possibilities; for, if they are affirmative, they also implicitly deny something; and if they are negative, they also implicitly affirm something"(159). Second, a completely restrictive statement is bare nothing or an absurdity, because "it expresses an impossibility, not a conceivable but unrealized fact"(159). Third, a completely non-restrictive statement is a necessarily true statement or a statement valid a priori, because it is "in no conceivable circumstances falsifiable"(161-162). The third is a metaphysical statement.
Positivists regard metaphysical statements as unclear, unverifiable, and therefore meaningless. The decisive mistake of positivists lies in their failure to recognize that "exclusive verifiability means necessity, and exclusive falsifiability, impossibility"(170). So Hartshorne holds that "the necessarily true must be knowable as true and only as true, and that, conversely, whatever is in principle verifiable though not falsifiable is thereby shown to be necessarily true"(162). It is, therefore, concluded that metaphysics is the study of non-restrictive and existential statements, which are necessarily true, verifiable, and meaningful.3)
IV. "The Social Conception of the Universe" in Hartshorne's Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion(Boston: Beacon Press, 1953)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is a philosophical principle for reality as social process?", specifically "How can we conceive the universe as social?" Here "the universe" is the same as "all realities," and "the social conception" as a philosophical principle of neo-classical theism. Hartshorne maintains that we must conceive of the universe and of all things as social.
According to Hartshorne, the minimum definition of the conception of "the social" is a "feeling" which means "shared experience" or "the appeal of life for life, of experience for experience"(34). The definition implies the social character of experience is shared by all things. In this respect, the social idea is a basic principle of metaphysics because it "fits all actual or conceivable facts of observation," so "covers all possibilities except the unthinkable extreme of zero order, or pure chaos, and the opposite extreme of zero freedom, or absolute determinism"(32). Thus, it is true to say that all things are social, that reality is a social process.
All that exist, from a rock to God, are societies. Rocks are "democracies lacking in any ruling member," while organic animals are "monarchies" possessing such a member(38). God is also a society, an all-inclusive monarchy which implies cooperations with all rather than arbitrary control over all. In other words, God influences, and is influenced by, all. Insofar as God's power is understood as a "social power", "the problem of evil appear as a false problem due to a faulty or non-social definition of omnipotence"(41). As far as God is understood as an all-inclusive monarchy, the problem of death and of immortality can be solved in that all perishing entities are imperishably cherished by "the divine memory"(42). Therefore, "the social conception of the universe" is a valid philosophical principle explicating for reality as a social process.
V. "Six Common Mistakes About God" in Hartshorne's Omnipotence & Other Theological Mistakes(Albany: SUNY, 1984)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What are six common mistakes about God prevailing in classical theism?", specifically "What went wrong in classical theism?" Hartshorne characterizes the mistakes as follows: 1) the divine perfection as unchangeableness, 2) the divine power as omnipotence, 3) the divine knowledge as omniscience, 4) divine love as Unsympathetic Goodness, 5) immortality, and 6) revelation.
1) The divine perfection as unchangeableness is wrong in that God is unchangeable in some respect but changeable in other respect, in that God is unsurpassable by others but surpassable by himself. 2) The divine power as omnipotence is wrong in that God is "creative of and" partly "controls individuals with some decision-making power of their own, some ability to settle details left undetermined by the highest power instead of "monopolizing decision-making"(38). 3) The divine omniscience is wrong in that "God does not already or eternally know what we do tomorrow, for, until we decide, there are no such entities as our tomorrow's decisions"(39). 4) The divine love as unsympathetic goodness is wrong in that "God is loving in the sense of feeling, with unique adequacy, the feelings of all others, entirely free from inferior emotions...entirely steadfast in the constancy of the divine care for all, but, in response to the novelties in the creatures, with ever partly new experiences"(39). 5) The classical conception of immortality is wrong in that to presuppose an enduring career is an idolatrous trial to possess an imperishable deity, hence in that, considering a social character of reality, we can find an objective or social immortality only is metaphysically possible(40). 6) Finally, the classical conception of revelation is wrong in that revelation from God is infallible, yet a receiver of it fallible. hence in that to insist the special revelation as final, irreversible, and unsurpassable is to tread "a gigantic step...from an infallible God to an infallible book"(41).
The first four of mistakes are violation of "the principle of dual transcendence" in that they imply God as "one-sided"(48) and the divine attributes as monopolar. But God is "two-sided"(48) and the divine attributes are dipolar. So classical theism is a half-truth. And the last two of mistakes are violations of the human nature. So classical theism is an absurdity. Therefore, "six common mistakes should be corrected by neo-classical theism because they merely show half-truths or mere absurdities.
VI. "God as Supreme, Yet Indebted to All" in Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is the divine relativity as a social conception of God?", specifically "How can be conceived of God as supreme, yet indebted to all?" Classical theism affirms God as solely absolute and hence indebted to nothing. The intention of the affirmation is to say the qualitative difference between God the creator and other creatures. By presupposing the difference, classical theism has developed dualism and paradoxes. Dualism and paradoxes produced honest atheists, who abandon theism as a project of human mind, and positivists, who reject metaphysical ideas as meaningless. It means that classical theism doesn't show them its validity and adequacy. If God is totally different from his creatures, it is impossible for us to know and say him. As far as trying to do this impossible task, classical theists merely produces dualism and paradoxes. Classical theism goes wrong in the starting point.
On the contrary, Charles Hartshorne develops dipolar theism on the basis of a social conception of the universe, i.e., a generic notion of the universe. According to him, God is surely supreme. But in order to be supreme, God would have to be indebted to all. A God that is not indebted to all is not supreme, and hence not really God. Divine supreme requires indebtness to all, namely God requires in order to be supreme. This is the point of "surrelativism." As far as God is supreme, yet indebted to all, it is true that we as "an enlightened person" not only can conceive God without logical absurdity, but also "may worship and serve him with whole heart and mind"(1), that we can overcome the logical contradictions of dualism, traditional paradoxes, and positivism, and finally that we can preserve the worshipfulness of God and the meaning of religious life.
VII. "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All" in Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948)
In the chapter, as in the previous, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is the divine relativity as a social conception of God?", specifically "How can we conceive God as absolute, yet related to all?" God is, of course, absolute. But in order to be absolute, God would have to be related all. A God that is not related to all in any and every respect is not absolute, and hence not really God. Divine absoluteness requires relatedness to all. This is the point of panentheism. Traditional theism or dualism presupposes that God is beyond all creatures. Pantheism presupposes that all things are God. Panentheism implies that all things are in God. It means that “God is absolute, yet related to all”--"both in its external and its internal, its absolute and its surrelative, aspects, both in its transcendent independence and in its transcendence or sensitivity, its absolute or nonreflexive, and its relative or reflexive, supremacy, its A-Perfection and its R-Perfection, its non-self-surpassing, and its self-surpassing, surpassing of all others"(60).
If he is only external, as in classical theism, God is defined as the unmoved. If he is merely unmoved, God cannot respond adequately to any and every admiration from us, and cannot increase in value. If God fails to respond adequately or to increase in value, he is a mere dead, not a living God. So it is natural that Nietzsche said God is dead, that Feuerbach said God is merely a project of human desire in that God as solely abstract is beyond the actual world and our experience of it.
But according to panentheism, God is not only external but also internal, so he is unmoved in some respect and is "unfailingly and adequately moved"(82) in other respect. He cannot be surpassable in some respect, he can be surpassable in other respect. So he can increase in value and be alive, not dead. Therefore, we can conclude that Hartshorne is successful in insisting God without logical inconsistency and paradoxes, and that his panentheism can make God really alive and our religious life truly meaningful.
VIII. "The Divine Attributes as Types of Social Relationship" in Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is the divine relativity as a social conception of God?", specifically "How can we formulate the idea of God in preservation of its religious value while avoiding the contradictions and paradoxes that characterize classical theological formulations?" Classical theism presupposes the divine attributes as abstract types--such as omnipotence, omniscience...and etc.-- beyond social relationship. But it loses a logical consistency because the divine attributes are understood as abstract types of "social relationship, of which the divine acts are concrete instances or relations"(156). So Hartshorne insists the classical conceptions of God, if consistent, should be revised as the neo-classical: e.g., omniscience as "contemplative adequacy"(120-124), holiness as "motivational adequacy"(134-142), and divine power as "causal adequacy"(142-147). Thereby he affirms that a doctrine of divine relativity "enables us to construct a consistent theory of divine attributes"(120).
Hartshorne lists serious religious deficiencies--otherworldliness, power worship, asceticism, moralism, optimism, obscurantism--which are "all connected with the neglect of divine relativity"(148-149). In addition, Hartshorne says that many of the world's most serious and "appalling difficulties" are "due in no small measure to the failure of religion genuinely to synthesize power and sensitivity...These unresolved dualisms have split the world and each man within himself"(150). As Hartshorne argues, the conception of divine attributes beyond social relationship produces a variety of serious global and personal matter.
As far as defining God "in positive relational terms...without ultimate paradox"(p. 156), we can overcome the absurdities and inconsistencies of the classical theism and conceive "the supreme reality as the living God, the supreme subject of social relations, yet with and absolute character"(p. 157). And we can have a sound attitude toward life without falling into biased religious doctrines, such as "asceticism", "moralism", "optimism", "obscurantism"(p. 149), and thereby defeat nonsensical "segregation"(p. 153), blind "pacifism"(pp. 154-5), and idolatrous worship of some non-ultimate power which is not all-inclusive at all(pp. 153-4).
IX. "God And Righteousness" in Hartshorne's Man's Vision of God(Hamden, Connecticut: Arcon, 1964)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "How can the connection between theology and ethics be conceived in light of man's social vision of God?", specifically "How can theology illuminate ethics?" Here "God" is the same as theology, "righteousness" as ethics. There are those who argue to "divorce the questions of cosmic reality and of the measure of goodness"(144). But for Hartshorne, their argument is metaphysically impossible as following reasons:
First, if taking "the time factor" seriously, we can see that a process of concrescence is "the sympathetic character of imaginative realization" or togetherness of self and other self in one motivation(148-150). It means that "the future welfare of others can be a motive as direct and genuine as one's own future welfare"(145-146). "The ultimate motive is love, which has two equally fundamental aspects, self-love and love for others"(151). In this respect, both "foolish altruism" and "foolish egoism" are wrong. And it is metaphysically impossible to reduce all interests to self-interest.
Second, if taking into consideration "the significance of the idea of the perfect or divine love"(155-156) in the light of neo-classical theism, we can see that theology illuminates ethics. By understanding divine perfection as unchangeableness and divine love as zero reception, classical theism makes God irrelevant to our ethical contributions and thereby ethics meaningless. But in view of neo-classical theism, divine perfection is understood as his unfailing memory or reception of all perishing entities, and divine love as "social awareness and action from social awareness"(173). Accordingly, the basis for the view that theism cannot illuminate ethics is defeated on metaphysical grounds.
Thus, it is possible to conceive of a supreme instance of goodness, and hence it is possible for theology to illuminate ethics. Moreover ethics needs theology because it needs to refer to a supreme instance of goodness which is divine "action from social awareness."
X. Charles Hartshorne's "Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest" in Religious Experience and Process Theology, ed. by James Cargas and Bernard Lee(NY: Paulis Press, 1976)
In the chapter, Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "How can we conceive the basic principle of motivation beyond enlightened self-interest?" Here "self-interest" is the same as individual happiness and "enlightened self-interest" as a non-social conception of ethical motivation. According to Hartshorne, the true ethical motivation is defined as to contribute to future life and, at the same time, to serve God. But there are those who insist that "a self-interest of motivation" is the rational aim of an individual. Their argument cannot adequately sustain religious intuitions as well as a command of reason as following reasons:
First, a self-interest theory of motivation is an illusion in that it mistakenly presupposes a human being as an enduring atomic self. It is "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness"4) to presuppose an enduring substance as an ultimate block of things. If he is taken as an enduring atomic self, a human being cannot make any difference not only in his experience but also in other's. Given a social conception of the universe--world, God, and self--, and given due attention to temporal distinctions, we find that a self-interest theory of ethical motivation is irrational and unethical.
Second, insofar as based on unqualified determinism, egoism is false in that absolute freedom is as equally false as absolute determinism. A creative becoming is partly determined by its previous entities. It means "conditioning is a fundamental reality"(316). So two extremes--absolute freedom and absolute determinism-- are false. In addition, a man is "either ethical or unethical--it cannot be neutral, or simply nonethical" because all (higher) animals are "in some sense and degree social" and "interested in other animals"(316). In Whitehead's terms, a society is a nexus with social order. To exist is to be social. Taking into account the defining character of reality and the social character of reality, we find that egoism based on unqualified determinism is irrational and unethical.
Third, an enlightened self-interest without a divine memory is not good enough in the long run. "Ethics is the generalization of instinctive concern, which in principle transcends the immediate state of the self and even the long-run career of the self, and embraces the ongoing communal process of life as such"(318). Ethics needs a divine memory. Without it, in the long run, we don't need to be ethical because our contributions to other's welfare will be renunciated with the end of the earth. But if there is an unfailing memory of our making differences to him and our neighbors, our love does not simply remain in "a mere emotional glow towards others", but goes further to a social power which increases cosmic harmony by contributing other's welfare and by reforming socio-political injustices, and thereby goes further to glory to God maximally.
XI. Franklin Gamwell's "Happiness And The Public World: Beyond Political Liberalism" in Process Philosophy and Social Thought, edited by John B. Cobb, Jr. and W. Widick Schroeder
In the chapter, Gamwell is concerned to answer the question "How can we understand that maximizing happiness is maximizing the public world beyond political liberalism?" Gamwell's answer is that "maximizing happiness is maximizing the public world," that, in the long run, happiness is not a matter of preference but that of the public world, and that "the maximally virtuous person is the maximally happier person" insofar as "the maximal happiness principle" is based on "the maximal public principle: so act as to maximize the public world--and, by implication, in the long run"(49-51). Here Gamwell's method of teaching us is by first showing "the poverty of liberalism"(39-42), "a Whiteheadian view of happiness"(42-46), and finally "beyond political liberalism"(46-52).
1) "The poverty of liberalism": According to Gamwell, "the liberal understanding of self-interest is not only private but also preferential"(40). It leads liberalists to the view that "the study of political facts is 'value-neutral' or 'value-free'"(41). But as far as "human activity aims at some good, Aristotle claimed, a science of action requires a knowledge of the chief good"(42). It is, therefore, concluded that political liberalism reveals poverty and ethics requires the principle of measurement.5)
2) "A Whiteheadian view of happiness": According to Gamwell, a Whiteheadian view of happiness can defeat the poverty of liberalism. First, Gamwell argues that a Whiteheadian view illuminates our primordial experience as "a 'sense of worth'" in that our original experience is a process to seek its importance among many possibilities(43). Second, he asserts that a Whiteheadian view of happiness, as in Aristotle, is teleological in that an actualizing process of becoming is not aimless but aims at a creative novelty irreducible to the previous many. Third, he holds that a Whiteheadian view of God gives us a measure of "an actuality's value" in that God is understood as an all-inclusive reality(42-44). Fourth, he indicates that a Whiteheadian view of human being shows us "a defining characteristic" in that Whitehead's philosophy suggests us that "a human's pursuit of the general good also maximizes the value for self," hence that "the maximally virtuous person is the maximally happier person"(46). On the basis of theses reasons, Gamwell concludes that "political theory is inescapably normative" and that a Whiteheadian political theory gives us the foundation for ethics(46).
3) "Beyond political liberalism: On the basis of "a new understanding of the relationship between freedom and order," Gamwell refutes the liberal belief that "freedom can be maximized only if self-interest is viewed as preferential"(51-52). According to Gamwell, the world as the givenness not merely takes a role of limitation. But it offers agents the better possibilities of freedom. Thus, the maximal happiness can be guaranteed only when the public world is maximized. This is what Gamwell calls "the maximal public principle"(49). In this respect, to pursue a private happiness only is not to maximize one's freedom but to minimize. It is, therefore, concluded that, "in its concern to prevent interference, liberalism has been blind to the way in which a community devoted to private interests prevents the higher ranges of freedom and individuality from appearing"(52), hence that "maximizing happiness is maximizing the public world"(51).
1) It is noteworthy that Hartshorne indicates and revises two major mistakes of the modal logic: "verifiability as criterion of empirical meaning is modal nonsense, falsifiability as criterion of meaning in general merely begs the question against metaphysical truth; however, verifiability...is valid as criterion of meaning in general; and falsifiability is valid as criterion of empirical meaning"(21-22).
2) Here can be, of course, added a completely restrictive statement. Then, statements on experience or knowledge can be classified into four.
3) To prove it, in the article, Hartshorne offers and discusses the crucial examples of metaphysical statements as follows:
Necessarily, something exists.
Necessarily, experience occurs.
Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs.
Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of which are both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative.
Necessarily, divine or infallible experience, having fallible experience among its objects, occurs.
It is suggested that the last formulation sums up the others(172).
4) Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology(NY: The Free Press, 1978) p. 7
5) "A theory of politics requires an ordering principle of final causation, i.e., a principle of value, which alone one to describe the relations among choices"(42).