A Brief Descriptive Review

1.      In chapter IV--"Happiness and the Public World: Beyond Political Liberalism" in the book, Process Philosophy and Social Thought, edited by John B. Cobb, Jr. and W. Widick Schroeder(Chicago, Illinois: Center for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1981), Franklin I. Gamwell is concerned to answer the question, "What is happiness and the public world beyond political liberalism?"

2.      Gamwell's answer is that "maximizing happiness is maximizing the public world,"¹⁾ that happiness is neither a private interest, nor a liberal preference, but the public world in the long run, and that  "the maximally virtuous person is the maximally happier person" insofar as "the maximal happiness principle" is based on "the maximal public principle: so act as to maximize the public world--and, by implication, in the long run."²⁾

3.      Gamwell's method of teaching us is by first showing us "the poverty of liberalism,"(pp. 39-42) "a Whiteheadian view of happiness,"(pp. 42-6) and finally "beyond political liberalism."(pp. 46-52)

4.      Gamwell maintains that the significance of understanding "happiness and the public world: beyond political liberalism" is to recognize that "value for self is maximized insofar as one pursues the maximal contribution to others,"³⁾ that "one's possibilities as a coordinated individual are greater insofar as the accumulated importance appropriated from the wider world greater,"⁴⁾ that "in its concern to prevent interference, liberalism has been blind to the way in which a community devoted to private interests prevents the higher ranges of freedom and individuality from appearing,"⁵⁾ and, therefore, that "the social and political order in America"⁶⁾ should be defined not by "the priority given to economic goals and economic institutions,"⁷⁾ but by the public happiness beyond preferential liberalism.

5.      My own opinion is:  Gamwell's ethical theory clarifies that American individualism called political liberalism or private happiness is metaphysically wrong in the long run, and, therefore shows us that our private happiness should be pursued only in connection with our contribution to communal happiness.  On this principle, our chronic disease, individualism, and a lot of global crises including ecological will be better cured.

---

1)  p. 51

2)  p. 49

3)  p. 45

4)  pp. 45-6

5)  p. 52

6)  Ibid.

7)  Ibid.

A Brief Descriptive Review

1.      In chapter eighteen--"Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest" of the book Religious Experience and Process Theology, edited by James Cargas and Bernard Lee(NY, NY: Paulist Press, 1976), Charles Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is loving others beyond enlightened self-interest?"

2.      Hartshorne's answer is "to care for others beyond enlightened self-interest...is not just a requirement of the gift of grace--it is a command of reason."¹⁾

3.      Hartshorne's method of teaching us is by first showing us what is "the illusions of egoism"²⁾(pp. 302-13), what is "ethics and freedom"³⁾(pp. 313-6), what is "man, the obligated animal"⁴⁾(pp. 316-8), what is "the aesthetic basis of ethics"⁵⁾(pp. 318-20), and finally what is "ethics and reform"⁶⁾(pp. 320-2).

4.      Hartshorne maintains that the significance of understanding "Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest" is that the self-interest theory of ethical motivation is "bad psychology, even bad biology, and bad ethics and metaphysics"⁷⁾ because "the basic principle is the appeal of life for life, of feeling for feeling, experience for experience, consciousness for consciousness--and potential enjoyment for actual enjoyment,"⁸⁾ that "qualified determinism"⁹⁾ is required for ethical responsibility because "conditioning is a fundamental reality,"¹⁰⁾ that a man is "either ethical or unethical--it cannot be neutral, or simply nonethical"¹¹⁾ because all (higher) animals are "in some sense and degree social"¹²⁾ and "interested in other animals,"¹³⁾ that "to be ethical is to seek aesthetic optimization of experience for the community"¹⁴⁾ because an ethically good act...contributes to harmony and intensity of experience both in agent and in spectators,"¹⁵⁾ and finally that the social and political reform is "an ethical imperative"¹⁶⁾ because we should "be creative and foster creativity in others."¹⁷⁾

5.      My own opinion is this.         

        According to Hartshorne, religious love as social awareness and action from social awareness is not simply self-love but also altruistic love.  It is by our love that we can contribute to others welfare.  This is our ethical responsibility, which is not only a religious imperative but also a command of reason.  In aesthetical respect, our good acts contribute to "harmony and intensity of experience both in agent and in spectators."¹⁸⁾  In conjunction with social and political problems, reform of socio-political injustices is an ethical imperative.  It can be, thus, said that our ethical motivation and responsibility is social. 

        If so, our love does not remain at "a mere emotional glow towards others"¹⁹⁾ but goes further to a social power which increases cosmic harmony by contributing other's welfare and by reforming the unjust socio-political structures--such as poverty, racism, sexism, and etc..  And also our metaethical framework can illuminate our or other religious intuitions without conceptual and logical absurdities.

---

1)  p. 301

2)  p. 302

3)  p. 313

4)  p. 316

5)  p. 318

6)  p. 320

7)  p. 304

8)  pp. 302-5

9)  p. 314

10) p. 316

11) p. 316

12) Ibid.

13) Ibid.

14) p. 319

15) Ibid.

16) p. 320

17) Ibid.

18) p. 319

19) Charles Hartshorne, Man's vision of God and the Logic of Theism(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964)  p. 166

A brief descriptive review

 1.      In chapter four--"God And Righteousness" of his book Man's Vision of God(Connecticut: Hamden, 1964) Charles Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What is God and righteousness?"

2.      Hartshorne's answer is it means that God's existence and his righteousness are interrelated, that "the questions of cosmic reality and of the measure of goodness"¹⁾ are correlated, and thereby that " our ethical insight" and "metaphysical reasoning" are interrelated²⁾.

3.      Hartshorne's method of teaching us is by first showing us how have "the relationships between goodness and theistic belief" been conceived in a variety of extraordinary ways, why should the metaphysical questions and ethical questions be treated at the same time(pp. 142-4), and then, to prove it, by examining a classical assertion that "to act rightly is...to act rationally, and this in turn is explained to mean, to act in accordance with enlightened self-interest"³⁾(pp. 144-55), and finally by considering "the ethical significance of the idea of the perfect or divine love"⁴⁾(pp. 155-73)

4.      Hartshorne maintains that the significance of understanding "God and righteousness" is that we can recognize the correlation between the metaphysical questions of  "cosmic reality" and the ethical questions of "the measure of goodness"⁵⁾, "social panpsychic principle capable of general application to reality as such,"⁶⁾ the divine perfection as the motivational adequacy or loyalty to our good doings, "religious love" as "action for social awareness"⁷⁾, and finally the divine love as "social awareness and action from social awareness"⁸⁾

5.      My own opinion is this. 

        a)  According to Hartshorne, the metaphysical questions of God and the ethical questions of the divine goodness is interrelated to each other.  So to make "our basic conceptions adequate to a supreme being"⁹⁾ is of significance to our metaethical framework.

        b)  According to Hartshorne, to differentiate the self loving and the self loved sharply is a fallacy of traditional theism, and promoting welfare of others contributes to one's own.  So we can affirm the possibility of our love to contribute to other's welfare such noble deaths in battle fields.

        c)  According to Hartshorne, this mutual contribution in love is the generic notion applicable not only to creaturely existences but also even to God.  So we can understand the divine or perfect love as "social awareness and action from social awareness"¹⁰⁾, so that we can overcome all kinds of anti-social ethics, such as pacifism.  Specifically by confirming religious love as "not only a motive and goal" but "also a method, the only valid method, of influencing others"¹¹⁾, we can see the dual aspects of war, a tremendous evil in one respect and a method of loving others in other respect.

---

1) p. 144

2)  Ibid.

3)  pp. 144-5

4)  pp. 155-6

5)  p. 144

6)  p. 155

7)  p. 166  Hartshorne says "that love is not only a motive and goal, it is also a method, the only valid method, of influencing others"

8)  p. 173

9)  p. 144

10)  p. 173

11)  p. 168

A brief descriptive review

1.      In chapter Three--"The Divine Attributes as Types of Social Relationship" of his book Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978) Charles Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "What are the divine attributes?" or "Are the divine attributes types of social relationship?"

2.      Hartshorne's answer is that the divine attributes are types of social relationship¹⁾.

3.      Hartshorne's method of teaching us is showing us what is "failure of the historical doctrines"(pp. 117-20),  what is "contemplative adequacy or omniscience"²⁾(pp. 120-4), what is "motivational adequacy or holiness"³⁾(pp. 124-34), what is "causal adequacy or divine power"⁴⁾(pp. 134-42), what is "divine personality"⁵⁾(pp. 142-7), what is "some practical applications"⁶⁾(pp. 147-55), and finally what is conclusion of this chapter(pp. 155-8).

4.      Hartshorne maintains that the significance of understanding "the divine attributes as types of social relationship" is that we can define the Absolute existence "in positive relational terms...without ultimate paradox"(p. 156), that we can overcome the absurdities and inconsistencies of the classical theism and can conceive "the supreme reality as the living God, the supreme subject of social relations, yet with and absolute character"(p. 157), that we can have a sound attitude toward life, namely, a healthy ethics, without falling into some biased doctrines, such as "asceticism", "moralism", "optimism", "obscurantism"(p. 149), and thereby that we can overcome nonsensical "segregation"(p. 153), blind "pacifism"(pp. 154-5), and idolatrous worship of some non-ultimate power which is not all-inclusive at all(pp. 153-4).

5.      My own opinion is this.  According to Hartshorne, God can be properly conceived only under the social conception.  God's knowledge should be considered under the social structure of subjectivity.  His power should be reflected under persuasion.  Then we can insist God as constitutive of, and constituted by, us. 

        If we can secure the social conception of the universe, especially of God, we can avoid absurd follies of attitudes toward life, and establish a sound ethics which can overcome individualism, nonsensical segregation, idolatrous worship of non-ultimate power, and believing blind pacifism.

---

1)  In strictly saying, "the divine attributes are abstract types of social relationship, of which the divine acts are concrete instances or relations"(p. 156).

2)  What can be inferred from this title, "Contemplative Adequacy or Omniscience", is that Hartshorne interprets the traditional conception of omniscience as contemplative adequacy.

3)  What can be inferred from this title, "Motivational Adequacy or Holiness", is that Hartshorne interprets the classical conception of Holiness as motivational adequacy.

4)  What can be inferred from this title, "Causal Adequacy or Divine Power", is that Hartshorne interprets the traditional conception of divine power as causal adequacy.

5)  In this section, Hartshorne argues that divine personality is merely abstract, so he can not be actual.  And he insists that God is "a supreme person"(p. 142).

6)  In this section, Hartshorne argues that asceticism, moralism, optimism, and obscurantism are all ignorant of divine relativity(p. 149), that absurd segregation, blind pacifism, and idolatrous worship of the non-ultimate power are derived from false understanding of power, divine or human.

A brief descriptive review

1.      In chapter one--"God as Absolute, Yet Related to All" of his book Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978) Charles Hartshorne is concerned to answer the question, "Is God absolute, yet related to all?"

2.      Hartshorne's answer is that “God is absolute, yet related to all”--"both in its external and its internal, its absolute and its surrelative, aspects, both in its transcendent independence and in its transcendence or sensitivity, its absolute or nonreflexive, and its relative or reflexive, supremacy, its A-Perfection and its R-Perfection, its non-self-surpassing, and its self-surpassing, surpassing of all others"(p. 60).

3.      Hartshorne's method of teaching us “God as absolute, yet related to all” is by explicating us what is Bradley's theory on external relations(pp. 60-5), what is internal relations(pp. 65-7), what are absolute terms(pp. 67-9), what 1s God qua absolute(pp. 70-1), what is independence and contingency(pp. 71-2), and what is independence is relation to the possible as such(pp. 72-4), what is the independence of enduring individuals(pp. 74-5), what is supreme as all-inclusive(pp. 76-7), what is the principle of eminence(pp. 77-8), what is an eminent effect(p. 79), what is abstract and concrete in God(pp. 79-82), what is the absolute as less than God(p. 83), what is some absolutistic arguments(pp. 83-6), what is the relative as including the absolute(pp. 86-88), what is surrelativism and panentheism(pp. 88-92), what is higher synthesis of absolutism and pluralism(pp. 92-4), and finally what is relativity and logical entailment in Appendix to Chapter II(pp. 95-115).

4.      Hartshorne maintains that the significance of understanding "God as absolute, yet related to all" is that we can get panentheism as a higher synthesis of transcendentalism--such as "traditional theism or deism"(p. 89)-- and pantheism, surrelativism as a "higher synthesis of absolutism and pluralism", and thereby that we can "combine the following assertions: the idea of the supreme being connotes absoluteness; it connotes, therefore, external relations; it also connotes relativity, internal relations, and all-inclusiveness"(p. 94).

5.      My own opinion is this.  If God is only external, he falls into the  unmoved.  If God is only unmoved, he cannot respond to our admiration and cannot increase in value.  If God cannot increase, he is dead, not alive.  So Nietzsche said God is dead.  This God is not real.  So  Feuerbach said God is a project of human desire. 

        According to Hartshorne, God is not only external but also internal, so he is unmoved in some respects and is "unfailingly and adequately moved"(p. 82) in other respects.  He cannot be surpassable in some respects, he can be surpassable in other respects.  So he can increase in value, grow, and be alive, not dead.  This is surrelativism and panentheism.

        If God is alive and can influence and be influenced by us, we can be better in value because he is always more than us.  Hartshorne's notion of God is just like that.  Hartshorne's surrelativism and panentheism can make God alive and our life meaningful.  So it can be concluded that Hartshorne is successful both in insisting God with logical insistency, and in making our religious life and traditions meaningful

※  Questions on reading

1.  What is entailment?  By it, What would Hartshorne try to prove(p. 95-)?

2.  What is extensional and intensional, "'intensional inherence'"(p. 111-)?

3.  What is "Carnap's notion of 'state descriptions'"(p. 100-). genuine description?

4.  According to Hartshorne, what went wrong in understanding the roles and relations of subject and predicate?

5.  What does it mean the sentence, "For to be included is, we have argued, an external relation, a relation of which the included is a term, but not a subject."(p. 86)