Introduction
As most Christian thinkers believe, the appropriate attitude toward war is thought to be love--love for the need of neighbors and by the demand of God. In this respect Christian love must satisfy two requirements: both for neighbors and God. It means that, when neighbors are in need of some help, a Christian should respond to them by love and her/his way of loving them satisfy what God really wants him/her to do. Here the problem is that what way of loving is best is as much uncertain as what God really wants us to do.
The uncertainty makes us have various attitudes toward war among which there, as Joseph L. Allen suggests in his book War: A Primer For Christians (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991), are three main attitudes: the crusade, the pacifist, and the just-war. What is the best way of Christian loving for neighbors in the case of the Persian Gulf War? In my view the just war position is thought the best because it includes the consideration of the power of self-interest, the responsibility for the unjustly suffering neighbors, and the recognition of the necessity and limits of using force as love for them, while the first two positions cannot respond to the needs of neighbors adequately.1) For these reasons I believe that the just war theory is the most appropriate attitude toward the need of neighbors at wartime.
Then, what are the criteria for the just war theory? Although there are various views on, the just war tradition seems to have broadly two sets of moral criteria: the six or seven of "the jus ad bellum ('war-decision law,' the rules that determine when the resort to armed force is morally justified), and the two criteria of the jus in bello ('war-conduct law,' the rules that govern the justifiable use of armed force in combat)."2) Either of two sets alone can never evaluate whether a war is justifiable or not, so the combination of them is necessarily required for the evaluation of war. By examining the Persian Gulf War according to these just war criteria this paper seeks the answer to the topic question, "In what respects was the Gulf War justifiable, in what respects was it not, and why, from a Christian standpoint?"
I. War-decision law
1. Justifiable cause. Iraq's attack on Kuwait was obviously unjust and barbarious to violate "the most fundamental norms of international public life"3) in that it was done without a just cause and the declaration of war aims, in that after its occupation of Kuwait Iraq revealed the typical patterns of brutality which an aggressor nation may show,4) and in that Iraq menaced an international peace and order in the Middle East. Defenseless Kuwait called for help from the international community, and the United Nations under the leadership of the United States took charge of responding to the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. The intervention of the world allies in the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait has a justifiable cause in order to protect Kuwait people from the unjust attack from Iraq, to restore the Kuwaiti rights that have wrongly been taken away, and to reestablish the international peace and order in the Middle East surrounding Kuwait.5)
2. Legitimate authority. This principle is concerned mainly in whether the legal process in decision for going to war was legitimate or not. This question may be constitutive of two subsequent questions: first, who was in the authoritative position to decide for waging war in the Persian Gulf, and then, what the authority did on the legal level. First, the authority is each government of the coalition, not the United Nations because it is not a government. Especially, important is the United States government because it took the lead in mobilizing the coalition, securing resolutions in the UN, and carrying out military actions.6)
The use of the military power was authorized by the President of the United States, supported by its Congress, and sanctioned by the Security Council of the United Nations. In addition, the action was continuously reassured by the relevant legitimate authorities.7) In this respect, it is clear that the decision for waging the Gulf War was made by the legitimate authorities and according to the legitimate procedures.
3. Last Resort. The first issue here is whether the economic sanctions against Iraq8) would have been effective in restoring the international disorder within a short term. This is doubtful because in spite of the comprehensive sanctions Saddam Hussein was unwilling to alter his position. Secondly, it can be asked whether five and half months was sufficient to bring about the peaceful resolution for the Kuwait incident instead of resorting to war. This is a serious question because war should be avoided as far as possible.
It is not certain whether five and half months was sufficient to bring about the peaceful solution for the Kuwait incident instead of resorting to war. But the United States and the coalition had clear reasons to resort to war: first, the prolonged process for the peaceful resolution might have strengthened Hussein's position in Kuwait; second, there was no advance in the negotiations between Iraq and the United States because of Iraq's insincerity and recalcitrance. For this reason it seems to be appropriate for the United States and the coalition to resort to war after the failure in bring about the peaceful resolution for the Kuwait incident.
Finally, it can be raised a question, "whether the diplomatic process was pursued with sufficient vigor and commitment."9) The attitude of the United States and the coalition in negotiation with Iraq seems to have been vigorous and serious because they tried to contact with Iraq on both official and non-official channels. On the contrary, Iraq seems to have been stubborn and calculated in that it asked the unjust demands such as a demand concerning the national border or the geographic division and shook off the continuous efforts of France to mediate between Iraq and the United States and the coalition right before the outbreak of war. In this respect, the principle of last resort seems to have been well performed on the level which might be understood by the public.
4. Declaration of war aims. George Bush, the President of the United States and the supreme commander of the coalition troops, declared that the war aim was to terminate hostilities and to impose restrictions upon "Iraq's ability to develop more weapons of mass destruction."10) In this respect, the United States and the coalition fulfilled the principle of declaration of war aims.
5. Proportionality of Ends. As Allen teaches in his book War, "this criterion prohibits resort to war if the evil effects of doing so will likely exceed the evil to be prevented (and the good to be attained) by going to war."11) In order to satisfy this criterion it needs to be asked "What would have happened if Iraq's aggression of Kuwait had not been checked by the coalition troops?" The answer may be that Iraq might have been strengthened in his political-military position, that its infliction upon Kuwaiti rights, human and non-human, might have aggravated, and that its growing power have been a great threat to the just and peaceful order of the Middle East as well as the world community. On the basis of these assumptions the evil effects of going to war would have not exceeded the evil committed by Iraq. In this respect the Gulf War satisfies the principle of proportionality of ends.
6. Reasonable chance of success. The coalition troops were the collection of various troops and its ground forces were relatively less experienced in combat than the Iraq's. In addition the weather condition of the desert was never favorable to the coalition troops. However, its air forces was overwhelmingly superior to Iraq and its ground troops were supported by the high-tech weapons and the strategic defense system. In this respect it seems that the coalition was in almost certain prospects of success.
7. Right intention. According to Allen the principle of intention is constitutive of two respects: the motivation for going to war and the objective of such an action.12) First, the issue of motivation may begin with the question whether the United States, as well as the coalition, was was solely noble as the President Bush mentioned at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War.13) When taking into account the reality of international relations largely based on self-interest, we can hardly deny that the United States, as well as the coalition, was motivated by both the solidifying friendship with the victimized Kuwaiti and the national or supranational self-interest.
For this reason some radical critics argue that the former motivation (friendship) is specious and the latter (self-interest) is real and conclude that the Gulf War was an unjust war totally motivated by national and supranational self-interest. They believe that the United States has taken inconsistent policies concerning international conflicts in the sense that the United States didn't intervene in some international conflicts such as China's invasion of Tibet, Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. So they conclude that the Gulf War was waged entirely according to the prudently calculated self-interest, national or supranational.
Behind this conclusion there may be two assumptions: first, that the stable order of the Middle East is directly related to self-interest, national or supranational; second, that the cost of waging war would not be high because Iraq is not so much powerful as China and the Soviet Union. These assumptions are true in that self-interest is a basic motivation for all international relations. But they are not sufficient to explain the United States' inconsistencies in dealing with international conflicts in that the inconsistencies may also be constituted by other reasons such as the different policy line of each President, domestic political situation, and the approval or disapproval by the Security Council of the United States.
Especially it should be noted that the approval by the Security Council may be a significant variant in deciding whether to go to war or not. For example, in the Korean War in 1950, the use of the military force against North Korea was approved by the Security Council because the representative of the Soviet Union was absent. If he had been present, the representative would have vetoed a bill for the military action against North Korea and the United States could not have sent troops to South Korea. In this respect it is certain that the United States, as well as the coalition, was motivated by both altruistic and self-interested causes, not totally by self-interest.14)
Second, there seems to have been mainly two objectives of waging war: to liberate Kuwait from Iraq and to bring about more stable and peaceful order in the Persian Gulf. Concerning the objectives the coalition seems to have been divided into three groups: one group took the former objective only; second group took not only the former objective but also the ambitious objective to aim at removing Hussein from his regime15); and third took the middle of the first and the second group.16) The United States finally seems to have taken two objectives of waging war as a compromise among three types: to drive out Iraq from Kuwait and to impose restrictions upon Iraq's weapons capability to bring about mass destruction. Here the compromised objectives has the revised objective17) of the ambitious18). The revise objective is less destructive (=more moral) and more reasonable19) (=more realistic) than the ambitious one. In this respect, the United States, as well as the coalition, had the right objective.
On the basis of the motivation test and the objective, it can be, therefore, concluded that the Gulf War on the whole was rooted in right intention.
II. War-Conduct Law
1. The principle of discrimination. According to Allen, this principle is concerned in the question: whether there were the direct and intentional attacks upon non-combatants.20) Unfortunately, the Gulf War made a multitude of civilian casualties even though the coalition troops used the high-tech weapons having high precision to focus on the aimed military targets and endeavored to concentrate on the clearly discerned military targets. This irony seems to be derived from two reasons: first, Hussein's wicked tactics to camouflage the military facilities in the civilian areas; second, the UN troops' ignorance of it. As a result in the Gulf War the bombing on some military targets seems to have been unintentional but direct attacks on non-combatants.
In addition, the coalition air forces' attacks on the electricity and water supply were unintentional but direct attacks upon civilians. First, the attacks on electricity are weak attacks upon civilians in that electricity is essential to modern life even if it may be one of the legitimate military targets. Second, the attacks on the water supply are strong attacks upon non-combatants in that water is essential for human survival and water deficiency provokes the prevalence of diseases. In this respect the principle of discrimination in the Gulf War were fulfilled unsatisfactorily.
2. The principle of proportionality between means and ends. This principle is concerned in the best achievement of the war aim by the least destruction of the enemy.21) This seems to be the least accomplished principle in the Gulf War. First, the war made too many casualties, both combatant and non-combatant. If it is to be a just war, a war should try to minimize casualties of both our troops and the enemy's. Then, the Gulf War was careless about this issue.
Second, the coalition air forces attacked the retreating Iraqi troops who did not surrender to it. In a sense this attack seems to have been done according to the anxiety that the fleeing troops might be rearranged for the immediate threat to the coalition troops. Of course, the soldiers who refuse to surrender may be legitimate military targets. But in that situation it was unlikely that the retreating Iraqi troops would be the immediate and powerful threat to the coalition troops when the military overwhelming power of the coalition is taken into account.
Third, the coalition air forces attacked such infrastructures of Iraq as communication, electricity, and the water supply. It is, of course, true that all these factors are directly and indirectly involved in Iraq's ability to wage war. However, they are necessary for modern life. Especially the attacks upon the water supply, as examined in the previous principle, resulted in the direct attack upon civilians. When he discriminated Iraqi people the victims from Hussein the victimizer, George Bush implied that they had unjustly suffered by and should be liberated from the cruel oppression of Hussein. Nevertheless, the United States and the coalition tried to harm Hussein by imposing new and unbearable sufferings upon the innocent victims. For this reason the attacks upon such infrastructures is not different from the direct attacks upon civilians. On the basis of three respects, the coalition troops deeply violated the principle of proportionality between means and aims.
Conclusion
The Persian Gulf War well satisfies the seven criteria of war-decision law. On the contrary, it was executed very unjustly to the extent that it deeply violated the principle of discrimination and of proportionality. In this respect it is, therefore, concluded that in the just war criteria the Gulf War is basically just in determining to wage war but largely unjust in executing war because it was considerably cautious of applying the principle of discrimination and of proportionality to the War.
1) The crusade attitude toward war is an inadequate way of Christian love because it seeks the absolute justice without mercy by making use of irresponsible force upon the opposite side. Allen's indication concerning this error can be summarized as follows: it ignores that the enemies also are our brothers and sisters in God's universal love; it forgets that all are involved in some degree of both good and evil before God; it expects an illusion that the perfect forms of peace or order can be brought in history; and it inflicts indiscriminate attacks upon the opposite side including civilians. Joseph Allen, War: A Primer For Christians (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1991) pp. 13-15.
According to Allen the pacifists are classified into two: the pragmatic and the witnessing pacifists. The former cannot respond to the needs of neighbors adequately for the following reasons, as Allen points out: it fails to see human nature as deeply and recalcitrantly sinful; it confuses the commandment of non-resistance in the Scripture with the spirit of non-violence; it tends to be victimized by the pretentious evils; and finally it inflates the efficaciousness of non-violence, as one of various ways of Christian loving, which may be effective only in some situations. Ibid., pp. 24-27.
2) George Weigel, "From Last Resort To Endgame: Morality, the Gulf War, and the Peace Process" in But Was It Just?: Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, ed. by David E. Decosse (New York: Doubleday, 1992) pp. 20-21. It should be noted here that this paper selects the seven of the jus ad bellum as Joseph Allen does, while Weigel suggests six.
3) Ibid., p. 20
4) Concerning this point Richard B. Miller mentions: "Soon the international press and Amnesty International reported that occupying forces engaged in widespread destruction and looting of Kuwaiti property, including medical establishments and supplies. Reporters also accused Iraqi forces of torturing and executing civilians, including children, detaining without trial hundreds of Kuwaiti citizens and deporting thousands more, and raping numerous Kuwaiti women before executing them"(War in the Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics, ed. by Richard B. Miller [Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/ John Knox Press, 1992], p. 441).
5) Joseph L. Allen points out the types of just cause: "(1) to protect people from unjust attack, (2) to restore rights that have wrongly been taken away, and (3) to defend or reestablish a just political order"(Joseph L. Allen, War, p. 36).
6) This is Allen's teaching on the issue of 'legitimate authority' in my first draft.
7) Concerning this point George Weigel says: "At every significant decision point between August 2, 1990, and February 28, 1991, the United States engaged in extensive consultations with its principal allies, including major Arab states. In short, the Gulf War was authorized, not just once, but in a continuing process of international agreement, by all the relevant 'competent authorities.'" (George Weigel, "From Last Resort To Endgame: Morality, the Gulf War, and the Peace Process" in But Was It Just?: Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, p. 22)
8) Here it may be asked, "Why did the United States put immediate pressure upon Iraq by the economic sanctions just two weeks after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait?" It may be because the United States required to cut off the close connection between Iraq and Soviet Union in weapons, military training, and so on. See: John Langan, "An Imperfectly Just War" in War in the Twentieth Century, p. 461.
9) John Langan, S.J., "An Imperfectly Just War" in War in the Twentieth Century p. 460
10) Ibid., pp. 458-9
11) Joseph L. Allen, War p. 41.
12) Joseph Allen, War p. 43
13) George Bush says of the liberation of Kuwait: "the principle of a just war is that it support a just cause. Our cause could not be more noble" (But Was It Just?, p. 129).
14) In addition, to seek self-interest is not always evil. Really evil is to seek self-interest consistently over against, at the expense of, other's. See chapters 10 and 12 of the book, Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses, ed. by Robert McAfee Brown(Hew Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986).
15) According to John Langan, this type was supported by "Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States" (John Langan, "An Imperfectly Just War" in War in the Twentieth Century, p. 461).
16) Langan says that this type was supported by "France, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union" (Ibid.).
17) The revised objective is to impose restrictions upon Iraq's weapons capability to bring about mass destruction.
18) The ambitious objective is to remove Hussein from his regime.
19) Here the word 'reasonable' implies two connotations: first, 'having reasonable prospects of success.'
20) Allen, War pp.43-45.
21) Ibid., p. 46.