The Relevance of Revelation to Morality in H. Richard Niebuhr

I.      Introduction

        The aim of this paper is to discuss the relevance of revelation to morality in H. Richard Niebuhr.  At the first glance of this topic, some may ask, Why should we require to deal with revelation when we speak of morality?  Niebuhr's succinct answer is that revelation is "the foundation of a rational moral life," without which we become fools in our search for ethical life.¹⁾  In this respect we must speak of morality with reference to revelation.  Here lies the importance of our topic.

        Our research for the relevance of revelation to morality in H. Richard Niebuhr concentrates on the two sections ("Revelation and the Moral Law" and "Human Value and the God of Revelation") of the last chapter of The Meaning of Revelation.  This investigation, however, needs to be dealt altogether with Niebuhr's other writings--such as "The Center of Value" and "Faith in Gods and in God" in Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, the first and the last chapter of Christ and Culture, "Value Theory and Theology" in The Nature of Religious Experience, and The Responsible Self--because his illustrations of our topic are sometimes well developed in those writings. 

        For this reason we are required to reconstruct Niebuhr's teaching on our topic partially, while largely following up with the stream of his logic flowing in the two important sections of The Meaning of Revelation.  In research of this topic, my stance is not a faultfinder but a learner.  Before examining the main issue, we need to sketch Niebuhr's idea of revelation briefly in order to investigate the relevance of revelation to morality.

II.      Preliminary Remarks

        Niebuhr accepts the conclusion of historical relativism that "all knowledge is conditioned by the standpoint of the knower" in the sense that any human understanding involves not only the spatio-temporal point of view but also human resources, such as languages, patterns, images, which are all under historical changes and limitations.²⁾  However, this does not lead Niebuhr to agnostic relativism because he believes that, in spite of historical conditioning and conditioned, we can and do know something objective, universal, absolute.³⁾  In a sense it is an act of faith to accept the reality of our experience as psychologically and historically conditioned.  For this reason Niebuhr points out "animal faith"  in natural and social sciences.⁴⁾  As for knowledge of God, Niebuhr calls for the radical faith as total commitment to God.  This informs that "neutrality and uncommittedness are great delusions where God and the gods of men are concerned."⁵⁾

        According to Niebuhr, we have two types of history: the external history of dead things and the internal history of living selves.  Simultaneously both pure and practical reasoning operate on the 'brute data' given in historical experience.  Our talk of revelation does not entail the rejection of the external views of ourselves because, just as sense-perception does not occur without sensational data, so the internal experience does not emerge without external embodiment.⁶⁾  However, each of perspectives concerns revelation from its peculiar perspective.  The immediate data of pure reasoning are the sensations of the mere body, while those of practical reasoning are 'affections of the responsive self' such as joys and sorrows, loves and hates, fears and hopes.  As far as ethics concerns the latter, it must seek the meaning of such immediate feelings.

        How can the moral self find the meaning of immediate feelings?  A typical answer may be that it is through reason that we can seek meaning behind our immediate feelings.  Niebuhr, However, replies that "the heart reasons with the aid of revelation."⁷⁾  He takes into consideration one more element, namely imagination as the section title "Imagination and Reason"⁸⁾ insinuates. 

        For Niebuhr, imagination is a capacity to symbolize his experience by employing "concepts, images, patterns," without which "reason does not dispense."⁹⁾  While pure reasoning investigates the complexity of reality as such by using the impersonal, effectual, and descriptive patterns, practical reasoning deals with it by employing the personal, valuational, and dramatic images.  Problematic is not that both science and theology use imagination in terms of their interpretation of empirical data but that they employ false conceptions, images, and patterns.¹⁰⁾  Therefore, our moral theology requires adequate imagination for its right understanding of immediate feelings.

        What is an adequate imagination?  Niebuhr answers that it is revelation.  Through revelation moral selves can get to "a pattern of dramatic unity," which "brings rationality and wholeness into the confused joys and sorrows of personal existence ad allows us to discern order in the brawl of communal histories," rather than "the conceptual patterns of the observer's reason."¹¹⁾  From the revelation of Jesus Christ we can abstract 'dramatic images' which help us to illuminate and reconstruct our own beings and deeds in the remembered and anticipating present. 

        However, this rational value of revelation is not primary but instrumental in the sense that the illumination and reconstruction of our beings and actions are derived from the intrinsic value of revelation, not vice versa.  In this respect, the value of revelation cannot be determined apart from the revealer himself.  In other words, we cannot know personal and social selves here and now unless we are known by God.¹²⁾  As far as a self is known by another and so knows itself through another's eyes, the self is the one committed to a certain person. 

        Who is the person by whom we are known and so whom we come to know?  It is God the self-revealer as "our knower, our author, our judge and our only savior."¹³⁾  This character of revelation informs that "we find ourselves to be valued rather than valuing and that all our values are transvalued by the activity of a universal valuer."¹⁴⁾  In this respect, our valued character is the foundation of our valuing character.

        Nevertheless, since the meaning of revelation does not occur without our "responsive acts" to God as self-revelatory, "revelation...is realized in us only through the faith which is a personal act of commitment, of confidence and trust..."¹⁵⁾  Without response there happens no revelation in responsive selves, even though revelation always happens in nature.  In this respect, the meaning of revelation does require our response to God the source of being and the center of value, and we must think and speak of Christian ethics in conjunction with God the revealer by whom we are known and so whom we come to know.  Then, what relevance does revelation have to moral laws?  The answer to this question is given in the following chapter.

III.     Main Issue

        Traditionally, Christians have confessed "the content of the Gospel as the 'saving truth and moral discipline'" manifested in the Council of Trent, the Westerminster Confession, the Formula of Concord, even though there are more or less differences among those beliefs.¹⁶⁾  According to Niebuhr such creeds state that revelation informs that our understanding of God and our moral law are closely tied to God himself; but it does not explicate how they are interrelated.  In order to answer to this question Niebuhr begins his argument by his analysis of our memory:

We carry in our personal memory the impress of moral laws; in our personal memory no less there are the long traditions of what ought and ought not to be done.  As the latter tradition is embodied in laws, constitutions and institutions available to the external view, so the former doubtless has its physical counterpart in the structure, the neutral pattern of our organism.  In both cases the external view does not understand these laws as we do from within.¹⁷⁾

This passage denotes two points: first, that moral law for Christians is mediated by both communal monuments which objectively embody those meanings out of the past and living persons who critically appropriate this legacy in the present; second, that moral laws mediated by our personal and social memory have been formed in the complex of internal history.  These points affirm that it is erroneous to identify our moral law with our permanent imperatives because such identification is to confuse the true source with its ramification.  For this reason Niebuhr accepts positively the criticism of philosophers and sociologists, the criticism that moral law is derived from the spatio-temporal realm of existence and that moral law is the "literal, habitual and institutional embodiments."¹⁸⁾

        However, both of groups don't feel the necessity to refer to revelation in an account for the moral law.  Niebuhr briefly criticizes that the case of philosophers is "confusion of views of the universal with universal views" and that of sociologists is "the totalitarian tendency which inclines us to believe that our outlook yields not only truth but all the truth there is."¹⁹⁾  Niebuhr rejects the Kantian assertion that the moral law can be spoken and established without reference to revelation. He criticizes this assertion in two respects: our confessor-ship and our Christian context.

        At first, Kantian duty "does not represent the self-analysis of the Christian confessor," nor does Kantian God deduced from the imperative reflect "the relativity of our historical reason, of our interest in the maintenance of selves and of our wishfulness for the preservation and victory of this particular individual or social self."²⁰⁾  In addition, Kantian assertion does not fit into the Christian context which concerns the will²¹⁾ of God behind the moral law, recognizes the moral law as God's will, and sees the moral law as moving.²²⁾  Based upon these general criticisms, Niebuhr makes further his criticism about the Kantian presupposition that the moral law can be understood and established without regard to revelation of God.

        First, he asserts that the true 'imperativeness' of the moral law is not derived from finite sources but from God the infinite.  His explanation is this: if what we ought to do is to achieve what we ought to be, it can be avoided by the question, "why we ought to be anything else than we are; if the moral law is the demand of reason, it can be evaded by indicating that even "the best reason of the best men" is under "our doubt of reason's power and of the goodness of our best reasoners"; if the moral law is defined as "the demand of our society," it can be avoided by getting out of our society; if it is understood "the decree of life," the law can be evaded by "voluntary or involuntary death."²³⁾ 

        All of these finite sources of the moral law cannot be its true imperativeness because they are all evasive and finite.  However, revelation informs that the true source of the moral law is nothing but God himself as far as the law is understood as God's demand upon us.  Hence, the imperative behind the law is the imperative of God the demander.

        Second, Niebuhr points out that "the moral law is changed, furthermore, by the revelation of God's self in that its evermore extensive and intensive application becomes necessary."²⁴⁾  His explication is why the law is a changing thing: while the Kantian duty is confined to some human beings at least or to all human beings at best, God's revealed will is extensively applied to all creatures, human and non-human, any of which is not excluded from the whole nexus of moral relations to God; while the Kantian law observes the good in such a way that "we love those who love us or who share our principles and do no harm to our values," the demand of God is applied not only to our friends, the oppressed, victims, but intensively to our enemies, oppressors, victimizers.²⁵⁾ 

        As far as a moral law goes on toward its extensive and intensive application, the changeless succession of moralities is illusionary because God's demand is freshly commanded upon us and understood by us in every new moment.  For this reason, "when God becomes the will behind the moral law...a revolutionary transvaluation occurs because of it [revelation]".²⁶⁾  This moving character of the moral law is the clue to its corruptible character which connotes that the moral law is always a corruptible thing tainted by false imaginations and interested mind. 

        How can we be saved from such corruption?  It is possible through our faith relationship to God the creator of all creatures.²⁷⁾  When we have faith in God the creator, we don't need to have false imaginations which glorify our worth and defend our distinctiveness from others.  We don't need to fall into self-centeredness which seeks self-preservation amidst the fear of loss of our selves.²⁸⁾

        Then, how can we come to such faith?  It is through revelation of God.  Revelation of God is not a disclosure of the moral law but of the law's sin.  Hence, it is our turning point from the imperative to "an indicative," from the law of love to "a free love of God and man."²⁹⁾  Through revelation of God Christians can continue to re-organize their law and to transform their life.  For this reason, Niebuhr calls revelation of God as the "republication of the moral law."³⁰⁾  This implies that, as far as we respond to the demand of God the original author in revelation, our moral law continues to be re-articulated freshly and our moral life continues to be re-shaped creatively without resort to self-defensiveness.  Therefore, revelation is the re-organizing principle of the moral law, as part of our understanding of God's will, and the transforming power of the moral life. ³¹⁾

        In appendix A, The Responsible Self, Niebuhr maintains that our confessional theology finds the re-organizing principle and transforming power in the revelation of God through Jesus Christ.  Such general principle and power image are not the purely conceptual but the symbolic principle and image because they are abstracted from Jesus Christ the person.³²⁾  For this reason, Niebuhr calls Jesus Christ as "the symbolic form."³³⁾

        Similar to Paul Tillich, Niebuhr understands one of functions of symbol as a reference to something transcendent beyond it.  Jesus Christ as the symbolic form points to the transcendent God beyond himself and draws us into the transcendent One before whom we are unique selves.  In our effort to appropriate the symbolic form we find ourselves in a new dimension or context.  The God whom Jesus Christ called 'my father' becomes our father and we become his children. Here our self-understanding including our moral law is reconstructed radically.  

        Such renewed understanding allows our ultimate trust and loyalty to move from something finite to God the infinite who is worthy of such complete commitment.  What was for Jesus Christ a response to God becomes for us as his followers a revelation of God.  Through mediation of Jesus Christ, we are reconciled to the One on whom we including the many are absolutely dependent.  This reconciliation makes us transform our moral life in every new moment.  As Jesus interpreted "all actions upon him as signs of the divine action...and so responds to them as to respond to divine action," so may we do so.³⁴⁾  Therefore, we necessarily require revelation of God and confess that Jesus Christ as the symbolic form is the re-organizing principle for our morality, as part of our self-understanding of God's will, and the transforming power of our moral life.

        Here it can be asked, "Is there other way to knowledge of God and the establishment of moral law from it?"  Niebuhr answers 'yes.'  He does acknowledge our natural capacity to discern moral laws and establish moral principles without the aid of revelation in that "we know an act to be our duty before we know it to be the will of God" and that without such pre-knowledge our cognitive procedure can not proceed.³⁵⁾  Then, is a natural knowledge of God sufficient enough that we can do discern moral laws and establish moral principles?  Is revelation unnecessary and illusionary?  Niebuhr answers 'no' in his confessional position.

        According to Niebuhr, when they deal with values and moral law, Kantian philosophers recognize a source of value in the sufficient cause and "a being who unites worthiness to exist with existence."³⁶⁾  For them, God is demanded as the guarantor who will preserve all their values, existences, and goods.  Some social scientists contend that God is the projection of religious need, behind which lies "the fear of death, of loss of goods and the desire for self-maintenance, and the "divine law is the projection of social custom" based upon natural faiths.³⁷⁾  Both of cases does not need to refer to "a source in special revelation."³⁸⁾

        Against philosophers Niebuhr argues that our God is not a personless god, pure abstraction, hypothetical apparatus.  Such a god may meet our anticipation and permit "the static unity of established order."³⁹⁾  Our God revealed in Jesus Christ is beyond all our expectations, relativizes all finite values including moral law, and empowers us to proceed toward the growing unity of moral life.  For this reason, Niebuhr maintains: "And so the oneness which the God of Jesus Christ demands in us is not the integration of our purposes and values but our integrity, singleness of mind and purity of heart."⁴⁰⁾  Here Niebuhr emphasizes the importance of our faith relation to the living God in our self-understanding and moral life.  Truly, we cannot worship the dead god of philosophers but totally commit ourselves to the living God of Jesus Christ who created, sustains, redeems us.

        Against social scientists Niebuhr argues the value of deity in Radical Monotheism and Western Culture.   According to Niebuhr, every human being is a theist because she/he needs that which makes life worth living.   Rejecting one god is accompanied by accepting another.  Hence, to exist as a human being is to have faith in gods, or a god, or God.  Polytheism and henotheism are frustrating and divisive because their answer to the inquiries of life's meaning always remains unanswered or partially answered, because their causes and their centers of value exclude other causes and other centers of value or contend with each other.  All gods are derived from something finite, so will perish someday.  God the One beyond the many alone is the ultimate cause and the ultimate center of value, does sustain our life worth living.

        Here some may ask to Niebuhr, how can you say that such a living God, such a transcendent God is not a hypothetical apparatus, the projection of human need?  Niebuhr answers that our living, transcendent God is neither hypothetical apparatus nor human projection because we find some image and pattern about such God in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 

        A life-death matter is beyond our control.⁴¹⁾  For this reason, faith is understood a personal commitment to "something...that has power or is power."⁴²⁾  As far as that something has and is power, it requires us a total devotion to it more than a simple knowledge or an intellectual assent, although the former is closely related to the latter. 

        On the cross Jesus met God the enemy, the slayer, before whom all finite powers, such as existences, morality, values, are destroyed.  Some may think death as the ultimate power and distrust God in face of death.  However, Jesus trusted the ultimate power behind the power of death.⁴³⁾  Unto death Jesus Christ trusted God the last power rather than overwhelmed by the fear of his ultimate destiny believing his everlasting faithfulness to all his creatures.  God kept his faithfulness to Jesus by "the raising of the temporal plane."  On the cross God is known the enemy, the ultimate power, the inscrutable One, while we are known sinners, unbelievers. 

        The resurrection of Jesus Christ is the victory of universal trust over suspicion, of universal loyalty over disloyalty.  This victory is won whenever and wherever we are reconciled to God.  In this manner Jesus as revelation works as the reorganizing principle and transforming power of our morality, value, and life in our amidst to the end that we may respond to the One beyond the many as our friend.

        In this final context we find that the will of God revealed in Jesus Christ stands beyond our expectations, moral law and principle.  A god or gods may bestow us some integration of purposes and values, allow us to establish some universal moral law and principle, and guide us to the unity of moral life.  However, this is simply an instrumental good, namely the good-for-us.  The intrinsic goodness of God belongs to God himself.  God as powerful enough for his goodness and good enough for his power refuses to serve our all our expectations and morality which have been made from the good-for-us perspective.  Rather, he 'ministers' all our expectations, moral principle and law in a creatively transforming way.  

        Through the revelation in Jesus Christ the powerful and good God demands us "the sacrifice of all we would conserve and grants us gifts we had not dreaded of--forgiveness of our sins..., repentance and sorrow for our transgressions..., faith in him..., trust in his mercy."  This is what Niebuhr calls "the revolution of the religious life" through revelation.⁴⁴⁾  Thus, it is evident that the true binding force of all beings and actions is derived from neither the self, nor the law, but the living God revealed in Jesus Christ.⁴⁵⁾ It is only when we see morality in light of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ that our human-centered ethics is reconstructed into God-centered ethics and our morality is empowered to proceed out of the foolish and sinful self-defenses toward its endless transformation.  Therefore, we become fools in our search for morality without conjunction with revelation as "the foundation of a rational moral life."⁴⁶⁾

IV.     Conclusion

        Similar to traditional theologians, Niebuhr begins his teaching of revelation and morality with the Christian conviction that revelation is the normative foundation of our morality.  Unlike to them, Niebuhr rejects their identification of revelation with morality because he is well aware that our truths of revelation is subjected to historical relativism.  In this respect, he accepts historical and Kantian criticisms.  However, he doubts whether historical and metaphysical methods are sufficient enough for discussing the morality issue.

        From his confessorship Niebuhr maintains that any universal imperative underived from the will of God is evasive and finite.  In the Christian context he discovers that moral law is a moving thing, so that it should be applied extensively and intensively to changing everyday situations.  Thus, he assert the changeless succession of morality to be illusionary and calls for faith in the revealed God in Jesus Christ.

        In interpreting the will of God revealed in Jesus Christ Niebuhr abstracts the symbolic images and concepts from this revelation rather than the conceptual ideas and patterns from the established truths or order.  Of course, he acknowledges a natural knowledge of God and the establishment of morality based upon it.  For Niebuhr this approach is, however, not sufficient enough for our discussion of morality because in this rational but finite context we cannot understand and define the true feature of morality adequately.  For this reason, Niebuhr falls for the ultimate and infinite context illuminated by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.  In the ultimate and infinite context of the special revelation Niebuhr finds adequate images, such as enemy, friend, and general principles for re-organizing and re-shaping our morality.

        Throughout this entire work Niebuhr coherently and successfully opens the theological foundation for reassessment and transformation of morality in light of revelation.  Specifically, his discoveries of relativism as the principle of limitation and conditioning, of faith relationship to the living God, of imagination and symbol in our reasoning process, of revelation's re-organizing and transforming power deserve to be praised. 

        Without the discovery of relativism we cannot discern morality from the will of God as its true source; without the discovery of faith relationship to the living God we fall into self-worship or supernaturalism by replacing the will of God by the established truths or miracles⁴⁷⁾; without the discovery of imagination and symbol we are astray according to the guidance of foolish reason led by false imaginations; and without the discovery of revelation's re-organizing we cannot come to the new but renewable understanding and the creative transformation of morality.  Based upon such discoveries, it is, therefore, concluded that Niebuhr constructs his ethics and argument of morality fairly coherently, even though we can find that some ideas and issues are not fully developed.

Bibliography

Niebuhr, H. Richard, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: The Macmillan Company,

        1960)

___________________, "Value Theory and Theology," The Nature of Religious

        Experience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh, ed. com.: J.S.

        Bixler, R.L. Calhoun, H.R.Niebuhr (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937)

___________________, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Torchbooks,1951)

___________________, "The Responsibility of the Church for Society," The Gospel,

        The Church And The World, ed. Kenneth Scotte Latourette (New York: Harper,

        1946)

___________________, The Responsible Self (New York, Evaston, and London: Harper

         & Row, 1963)

___________________, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, (Louisville,

         Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1960)

---

1)      H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960) p. 132.

2)      Ibid., p.7, 8-18.

3)      Niebuhr states that "the recognition and acknowledgement of our relativity, however, does not mean that we are without an absolute" [H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Torchbooks,1951), p.194].

4)      The Meaning of Revelation, p.22.

5)       Ibid.. p. 36.   

6)       Ibid., pp. 89, 84-7.  See: "The Responsibility of the Church for Society," The Gospel, The Church And The World, ed. Kenneth Scotte Latourette (New York: Harper, 1946), pp. 116-17.  See also The Responsible Self (New York, Evaston, and London: Harper & Row, 1963), p.63-65.

7)       Ibid., p. 131.

8)       This is the first section of chapter III.

9)       The Meaning of Revelation, pp.96-7.

10)      Niebuhr explicates false imaginations by three examples: an example of mental insanity, of social misunderstanding, and of egoism (Ibid., pp.99-101).

11)      Ibid., pp. 109, 110.

12)      This known-knowing process continues to happen between a self and its object, while in science it is performed in such a one-sided way from a subject to an object (Ibid., p. 145).

13)      Ibid., p. 152.

14)      Ibid., p. 153.

15)      Ibid., p. 154.

16)      Ibid., p. 156, 156-58.

17)      Ibid., p. 159.

18)      Ibid., p. 161.

19)      Ibid., p. 162.

20)      Ibid., p. 164.

21)      Niebuhr is reluctant to attribute the term 'lawgiver' to God because it has a possibility of misuse in that the moral law is the consequence of the self's interpretation of God's actions upon it in the personal and social memory, that the law is not given without mediation in any way.  For this reason, Niebuhr prefers doer to lawgiver in his other writings.  Here the term 'the will [of God]' signifies God as doer who is the true source of the moral law.  Cf. The Responsible Self, p. 67.

22)      In The Responsible Self, Niebuhr maintains that deontological ethics tend to preclude the question of what is going on because it fails to see that living reality is moving and so may betray the universal law (The Responsible Self, p. 67).

23)      Ibid., p. 165.

24)      Ibid., p. 166-67.

25)      Ibid., p. 167.

26)      Ibid., p. 168.

27)      Niebuhr asserts that "knowledge of God is available only in religious relation to him" ["Value Theory and Theology," The Nature of Religious Experience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh, ed. com.: J.S. Bixler, R.L. Calhoun, H.R.Niebuhr (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937) p.115].

28)      Ibid., p. 173.  Cf. The Responsible Self, p. 100.

29)      The Meaning of Revelation, pp. 170, 171.

30)      Ibid., p. 171.

31)      In the conclusion of "The Center of Value," Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, Niebuhr maintains that the radical faith in God the One beyond the many transforms our knowledge and action adequately (See "The Center of Value," Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, pp. 125-26).

32)      In Christ and Culture, Niebuhr locates Jesus' practice of faith, hope, love, obedience, and humility virtues in his relation to God.  Each virtue abstracted from the others manifests a personal identity before God that accounts for the excellence of that virtue and the other as well.  For this reason, Niebuhr maintains that "the strangeness, the heroic stature, the extremism and sublimity of this person, considered morally, is due to that unique devotion to God and to that single-hearted trust in Him which can be symbolized by no other figure of speech so well as by the one which calls him Son of God (Christ and Culture, p. 27).

33)      See appendix A, "Metaphors and Morals," of The Responsible Self (pp. 154-59).

34)      The Responsible Self, p. 167,

35)      The Meaning of Revelation., pp. 163, 175-76.

36)      Ibid., p. 179.

37)      Ibid., p. 181.

38)      Ibid., p. 181.

39)      Ibid., p. 184.

40)      Ibid., p. 185.

41)      The Responsible Self, pp. 114-15.

42)      Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, p. 117.

43)      Ibid., p. 187.

44)      Ibid., p. 190.

45)      The Responsible Self, p. 122.

46)      Ibid., p. 132.

47)      Niebuhr distinguishes his dogmatic faith in God from "uncritical dogmatism" which is "the practice of those explicit or disguised relational systems of thought about the good which arbitrarily choose some limited starting point for their inquiries and either end with the confession that value is an irrational concept which must nevertheless be rationally employed because nature requires this, or otherwise rule out of consideration great realms of value relations as irrelevant" [Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1960), p. 113)].

Commentary on 1cor 12:4-27 and 13:8-13

(a) what is the topic of 1cor 12:4-27 and 13:8-13?

        The main topic that Paul has in mind in both chapters is what Christian spiritual life¹⁾ should be understood and practiced, considering the Corinthian perverted understanding and practice of spirituality which made them 'puff up' and divisive by claiming the superiority of a particular spirituality over against others.  For this reason Paul's intention in both chapters is corrective rather than instructional or informational.²⁾  His corrective answer is that Christian spiritual life requires diversity in unity, aims at building up the church, and must be practiced by love as the permanent source and relativizing principle for the Christian practices of spirituality in the present and the future.

        In 1cor 12:4-27 Paul asserts that Christian spiritual life requires the necessity of 'diversity manifested within unity', over against a Corinthian tendency of 'uniformity among diversity,' for the purpose of building up the wholesome church.   This chapter can be divided into two sections: vv. 4-11 and vv. 12-27.  In the first section Paul corrects Corinthians' singular enthusiasm concerning their own spiritual gift, esp. the gift of tongues, by appealing to the nature of the divine activities, i.e., the divine sovereignty to distribute each believer diverse gifts "as he pleases" (v.11), and to the purpose of giving them spiritual resources, i.e., the purpose "for the common good" (v.7).  In the second Paul reinforces all this by making use of the 'body' analogy which emphasizes the interconnectedness and uniqueness of individual members (vv. 14-26) and their belonging to Christ and the faith community through the Spirit (vv. 12-3, 27).

        In 1cor 13:8-13, based upon his eschatological vision, Paul suggests love as the permanent source (vv. 8, 12, 13) and relativizing principle (vv. 9-11) for the Christian practices of spirituality while bestowing the spiritual gifts the temporary value valid only to the present and relativizing all knowledge of God obtained by the gifts as fragmentary and perishable.  Through chapters 12 and 13 Paul redirects the Corinthian perverted understanding and practice of spirituality by explaining what Christian spiritual life should be understood and practiced (in the present and toward the eschaton).

(b) what 12:12-14 discloses about Paul's understanding of baptism (cf. 1:30; 6:11; 10:1-5)

        The emphasis in vv. 12-4 is not on baptism as a rite but on Corinthians' shared experience of the one and the same Spirit and therefore on their belonging to (the body of) Christ.  The evidences for this are: first, there is no reference to 'water'; second, Paul bestows baptism as a metaphorical meaning to enter "into one body"; third, he indicates that the members of the body comes from the religious/social diversity in the Corinthian church such as "Jews or Greeks, slaves or free"; and finally he explains baptism in a metaphorical sense as drinking "one Spirit".  The comparisons with other passages such as 1:30; 6:11; 10:1-5 also support the argument.

        In 1cor 1:30 Paul asserts that the source of Christian life is Jesus Christ by whom we are given the undeserved right stance toward God ("righteousness"), called into a new faith community ("sanctification"), and delivered from sin ("redemption").  The whole nuance of this is, "You (Corinthians) belong to Jesus. 

        Paul addresses in 6:11: "But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and the Spirit of our God."  The expressions "washed" and "in the name of..." remind us of baptism terminologies.  However, Paul's intention here is to indicate that Christian faith requires the transformed practice when he considers that Corinthians still remained in their previous habits of behavior and did not reflect whether their life was in conformity to the standards of their new community.

        Especially in conjunction with "drinking one Spirit" (12:13) there appears a corresponding passage in 10:17, "Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread."  In this passage the practice of the common meal is metaphorically used for each individual believer's making up the body of Christ rather than defining what the Lord's Supper should be practiced.  Based upon the context of 12:12-4 and the comparisons with other passages such as, 1:30; 6:11; 10:1-5, Paul's reference to baptism connotes Corinthians' shared experience of the one and the same Spirit and therefore on their belonging to (the body of) Christ. 

(c) what chapter 12 as a whole discloses about Paul's view of the Spirit (cf. chapter 2)

        Before stating the inspired gifts by the Spirit in 12:4-11, Paul establishes the bottom line of the inspiration of the Spirit as the shared confession that "Jesus is Lord" (v. 3).  This implies that Corinthian believers seems to judge themselves and others according to their own wisdom or knowledge, formed previously or quasi-christianly, which misses the focal point of what the inspiration of the Spirit is like.

        Indeed, Paul begins with an indication that Corinthians before conversion were in idolatry (v.2).  At that time they could be inspired by other spirit(s).  For Paul, what distinguishes Christian inspiration from other is the shared faith in Jesus Christ as the Lord.  This faith is not simply a matter of individual believing.  Rather it has to do with how a Christian must understand and form her/his spiritual life in the new community which is in relationship to Christ the crucified and risen Lord.  In this context, Paul asserts that the Spirit inspires each believer to confess Jesus Christ as the Lord (v. 3) and to be given diverse gifts, services, and workings (vv. 4-10), in order to use them "for the common good" (v. 7).

        In chapter 2 Paul mentions that Christians are the existents inspired by the Spirit, not by the worldly spirit(s) [2:12].  The main point of the divine inspiration by the Spirit is to make Christians possess "the mind of Christ" (2:16) who was crucified on the cross (2:2) and to understand all spiritual gifts according to this mind (2:10-16).  Paul seems to acknowledge that Corinthians were inspired by the Spirit (2:12-3).  Corinthians' problem is to understand such inspiration according to their own standards, formed previously or quasi-christianly, that they boasted themselves and made divisions in community.  For this reason all inspired gifts must be tested by "the mind of Christ" the crucified and risen so that they be transformed fully Christianly. 

        Paul's common view of the Spirit in both chapters 12 and 2 is that Christians in a genuine sense are transformed in self-understanding, in that they are inspired by the Spirit to enter the new community which confesses Jesus Christ as the crucified and risen Lord, and in practice, in that they are inspired by the Spirit to behave christianly according to their faith relationship to God in Christ through the Spirit. 

(d) what 13:8-12 has in common with 8:1-3

        From his eschatological stance Paul defines in 1cor 13:8-13 that love is valid not only in the present but in the future while the spiritual gifts, such as prophecies, knowledges, tongues, are valid in the present.  Why does love persist while the inspired gifts perish?  The answer to this question are not hinted in 1cor 13:8-12 but sought by connection with 1cor 8:1-3.  In 1cor 8:1-3 Paul maintains, "Knowledge puffs up but love builds up" (8:1).  This implies that knowledge has no power to relativize and direct itself to the edification while love does have. 

        However, a question still remains, "Then, why is knowledge unable to possess such power?"  Paul's answer is that human knowledge reveals its fragmentariness (13:8, 12) while love as our faith relationship to God entails "the necessary knowledge" which uncovers that a human being know God partially and is known by God perfectly (8:3).  For this reason our loving God relativizes and redirects our knowledge in a transforming way.  Likewise, love as our relationship to God relativizes and redirects all the inspired gifts for building up the church.  In this respect, love as our faithful relationship to God is the relativizing principle and the directing principle for Christian spiritual life to build up the church.

---

1)      What I here mean by the term 'spiritual' includes not only the Corinthians' spiritual phenomena, such as spiritual experiences and gifts, but their religious, social, and political status, such as the state of Jews or Gentiles, free citizens or slaves.

2)      See The First Epistle To The Corinthians (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Publishing Company, 1987), Gordon D. Fee, p. 570.

Reexamination of Donald Carson's View on Suffering and Evil

I.      Introduction: Purpose and Method

        For Christians suffering and evil seems to be the most intriguing issue in dealing with the providence of God in that the biblical and doctrinal traditions tend to have definitely affirmed the absolute sovereignty and the gratuitous love of God and that it is never easy to reconcile God's sovereignty with evil.  How can we understand and respond to suffering and evil from the Christian perspective?  D. A. Carson, as a biblical theologian, may give us an insightful answer to this question.

        In his book, How Long, O Lord?: Reflections on Suffering and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1990), Carson, who treats the Scripture evenhandedly, provides us profound reflections on suffering and evil.  His scholarly and pastoral concerns characterizes this book as a "preventative medicine"¹⁾ to help potential Christian sufferers to think about suffering and evil, to stand firmly in faith, and to live responsibly in face of suffering and evil.  In this respect his book may be an answer to the question, How can we understand and respond to suffering and evil Christianly?  This paper aims first to seek the fair understanding of Carson's view on suffering and evil and then to assess his view.

        Carson's book is constituted by three main parts: first, preliminary remarks on false steps on suffering and evil; second, the biblical themes tied to the problem of suffering and evil; third, compatibilism of God's sovereignty and human responsibility, and Christian life before the tension between them.  This paper follows this order arranged in his book. 

        In handling his book I excluded some minor portions, such as chapter 13 (which deals with twelve practical strategies for pastoral care) and an appendix (which is an attempt to apply his view on suffering and evil to the AIDS case), and renamed some titles to be more easily understood.  Since his way of explanation tends to enumerate manifold points on a certain topic, I tried to grasp them succinctly and precisely rather than to drop them because they support the substance of his theology.  Finally, in the conclusion, I assessed the significance and inadequacies of Carson's view as fairly and critically as I could.

II.      Main Issue

1.      Preliminary Remarks on False steps on Suffering and Evil.

        In chapter 2 Carson points out three kinds of false steps on suffering and evil: general (pp. 23-28), non-Christian (pp. 28-33), and "sub-biblical" (pp. 33-36).  The three divisions are somewhat interrelated but not necessarily because, as Carson acknowledges, they are arbitrarily divided by him.²⁾  It is important to examine such steps because it adumbrates what Carson will assert in next chapters.

        First, general steps.  Carson takes an example of the actual event that a psychologically distorted woman got into an elementary school and shot some children.  In this case he finds general steps, falsely taken, about suffering and evil as follows: a) that kind of tragedy takes place only in crime ridden areas or poor countries; b) human efforts by monetary investments can prevent that sort of event efficiently; c) my misfortune is important than others'; d) the notions of "radical evil, of a fallen world, must be qualified"³⁾ by an individual's goodness; e) our prayer concerning suffering and tragedy should be concentrated only upon "material well-being"⁴⁾ (pp. 23-25).

        Carson corrects general steps in five aspects: a) the Scripture include not only victorious stories over suffering but also stories about a continuation of suffering in that in some stories the Bible clearly witnesses that "the 'good guys' do not always win"⁵⁾; b) suffering should be understood in a longer viewpoint rather than a short because God's timetables, always appropriate, may violate our expectation of an immediate relief from suffering in some cases; c) suffering is not always bad in that God brings good out of it; d) our knowledge about suffering is marginal because suffering itself and its origin is largely mysterious; e) the cross is more than simply the means of our salvation because it connotes the importance and meaning of suffering in the fallen world (pp. 25-28).

        Second, non-Christian steps.  According to Carson non-Christian steps are an atheistic or mechanistic view, a view of God as less omnipotent, a deistic view of God, and a pantheistic view.   Carson argues that an atheistic or mechanical view is deficient because it explains rationally how the universe allows occurrences of suffering and evil but cannot do how rational animals, understanding that rational explanation, are angry about suffering and evil; that a view of God as less omnipotent is partly efficient in reconciling God's omnipotence with goodness in face of radical suffering and evil but largely deficient because a less omnipotent God can be sympathetic with our sufferings but cannot help us substantially; that a deistic view of God is obviously false because God's indifference to our suffering and evil cannot include a personal or interacting aspect of God; and that a pantheistic view is not sufficient because evil and suffering are relativized when they are expected to be removed by "progressive self-realization, progressive self-improvement"⁶⁾ (pp. 28-33).

        Third, "sub-biblical" views.  They refers to the attempts: to deny or limit God's omnipotence, to affirm human beings as totally free, and to assert knowledge of evil to be necessary.  According to Carson an attempt to deny or limit God's omnipotence appears to be successful in that it makes God exonerated from any charge of evil, but it is inadequate in that it destroys mystery within suffering  by exempting God from any use of evil, even for good purposes, lest "the rationality of faith"⁷⁾ may be lost in defending God over against the reality of evil;  an attempt to affirm human beings as totally free makes God contingent because God cannot interfere in any human affair (a denial of God's omnipotence) and God cannot know what human beings will do (a denial of God's omniscience); and finally an attempt to assert knowledge of evil to be necessary is erroneous because that kind of knowledge is necessary for a life in the fallen world, not for a second career in God's Kingdom (pp. 34-36).

        Through his analyses Carson argues that the three kinds of false steps are derived from an unfair handling or an ignorance of the biblical teachings on suffering and evil and therefore "make no reference to Jesus Christ and his suffering, death, and resurrection."⁸⁾  For this reason he concludes that "our theoretical and practical approach to evil and suffering must fasten on the cross, or we are bound to take a false step."⁹⁾  This conclusion moves him to the reexamination of biblical themes tied to the problem of suffering and evil.

2.      The Biblical Themes Tied to the problem of Suffering and Evil

        In Part 2 of his book Carson presupposes that the biblical teachings may be unsatisfactory to those who want a perfectly intellectual solution of the problem of suffering and evil.  He, however, insists that the whole framework of biblical themes "provides the elements of support, of comfort, of hope."¹⁰⁾  Biblical themes seems to be chosen arbitrarily by Carson because there seems to be no internal necessity among them and he has no remark on why he chooses them. We may, however, categorize them into a threefold structure: a general category, a special category, and the unique category.

        First, a general category of biblical themes on suffering and evil include such themes as "the price of sin"¹¹⁾; "social evils and poverty"¹²⁾; suffering peculiar to Christian; "curses and holy wars--and hell"¹³⁾; "illness, death, bereavement"¹⁴⁾; and "the vantage of the end."¹⁵⁾  Second, a special category is a theme of "mystery and faith"¹⁶⁾ in Job's story.  And finally the unique category is the theme of "the suffering God"¹⁷⁾ on the cross.  According to such an order Carson develops biblical themes gradually.

        A.      A General Category.

        First, The Price of Sin.  What is the price of sin?  Carson answers that it is suffering and death.¹⁸⁾  Behind this answer lies a presupposition that sin is rebellion against God, sinners are deserved to be punished, and our world is the fallen world.  In this respect suffering itself is not evil.  Nevertheless,  since suffering is closely related to the structure of the fallen world, it is evil and is experience as evil.¹⁹⁾  For this reason Carson asserts that suffering is the result of the fall rather than the immediate consequences of sin.  Based upon this assertion, he insists that moral evil is inclusive of natural evil because they, even if distinctive, are all the result of sin in that they are all provoked by the structure of the fallen world.²⁰⁾ 

        Then, why do good people suffer while bad guys prosper?  To this question does Carson answers in four ways: that the adjective 'good' is a false conceptualization because there is no absolutely good person in the world; that it is wrong for human beings to assert their rights because "our 'rights' before God have been sacrificed by our sin" ²¹⁾; that the belief that the final judgment will establish the ultimate justice of God insinuates that reward and punishment are not proportionately imposed upon human beings in this world; and in face of the apparent injustice Christians should thank to and trust God for his long patience with us in the sense that if he executes his justice immediately and precisely this world would be the hell (pp. 46-48).  Upon this understanding of the relationship between suffering/evil and sin/fall does Carson structure the rest of biblical themes.

        Second, Social Evils, Poverty.  Carson understands social evils in terms of the state.  According to him, Christian attitude toward the state is ambiguous because Christians should be faithful to the state at its appropriate use of coercive power, motivated by the divine providence behind it,  while they must resist it at its abuse of power caused by the human corruption.²²⁾  In this respect Carson suggests the appropriate attitudes toward the state as follows: a) Christians should have a realistic attitude toward the state because it may prevent and provoke evil; b) Christians should recognize the deep inclination of human beings to evil in the fallen world; c) Christians must be responsible for promoting justice; d) Christians should be aware that the state sometimes does good because of the divine providence behind it and sometimes do wrong because of the human wickedness.

        Carson classifies the poor in five kinds: "the unfortunate poor,"²³⁾ "the oppressed poor,"²⁴⁾ "the lazy poor,"²⁵⁾ "the poor who are dependent on the punished,"²⁶⁾ and "the voluntary poor."²⁷⁾  On the five kinds of the poor he comments: that the unfortunate poor should be treated with compassion and material support; that the oppressed poor should be treated with compassion and justice because exploitation takes place due to human sin²⁸⁾; the lazy poor should be expostulated to repent and be diligent because the Bible teaches clearly that laziness is sin; the poor who are dependent on the punished should be helped, but in that case we should first recognize "our proximity to evil"²⁹⁾ and the destructiveness of sin in that sin in nature causes to produce the innocent victims; and the voluntary poor should be understood self-denial rather than sin, but we should be aware that there can be no self-denial of them were it not for the sin of others (pp. 56-63).  On the basis of this analysis Carson concludes that in conjunction with poverty Christians should concern in human responsibility rather than the divine providence.

        Third, suffering peculiar to Christians.  It is understood in two respects: discipline and discipleship.  In general situations suffering provides Christians discipline in the sense that it helps Christians to combat sin; it is a means for our good; it is a proof that we are the children of God; it is an instrument to intensify our faith by pain; it is a chance to praise God as in the case of Habakkuk; and it is an opportunity to find God's love as in Paul's epistle to Rome.³⁰⁾  At persecution suffering demands discipleship of Christians in the sense that they are commanded to "take up their cross and follow" Jesus (Mk. 8:34) which implies to be prepared to suffer and to deny "self-interest, self-glorification," to be acknowledged by Jesus and to be distrusted by the world, to be the witnesses of the Lord to the world.³¹⁾  In this respect Carson argues that suffering is a privilege for Christians.

        Fourth, curses and holy wars--and hell.  Carson defines Jeremiah's self-malediction as "the rhetoric of outrage,"³²⁾ by which definition curses are understood  accuses of evil and demands for the realization of justice rather than pessimism for being born and human miseries.  In a national dimension curses are defined as "cries for vengeance," i.e., demands for war.³³⁾  In actuality the Old Testament traditions understands war as a means to check evil in that it is the divine providence to remove idolatries and evil practices, as in the Canaan, or to punish a less evil nation by means of a more evil nation.³⁴⁾  While the New Testament shares with the Old the meaning of war as a means to execute the divine justice, it goes beyond the holy war traditions and the logic of vengeance in that it takes into account a means of mercy.³⁵⁾

        In order to discuss the conception of the hell Carson consults Jesus and analyzes his teachings on the hell into five connotations: a) the hell is a shocking machine to recalcitrant sinners; b) his parable on the hell insinuates that the recalcitrance of sin will still persist in the hell (Lk. 16:19-31); the hell implies that there will be the perfect justice in the sense that there will be no innocent sufferers; the hell is prepared for those who do not believe the heaven; and when punishing sinners by putting into the hell God feels bitter rather than easy.³⁶⁾  Based upon such an understanding Carson asserts that the conception of the heaven and the hell is a non-negotiable truth to believed literally.³⁷⁾

        Fifth, illness, death, bereavement.  At first Carson categorizes illness and death in a unit and explains that illness and death are brought into the world by human sin; they may be the immediate judgements upon specific sins, but not always; illness and death as the divine punishment upon human sin can be brought about by natural and supernatural causes; God may bring good from illness and death; a premature death is a non-Christian conception because all human beings are to die, in that death is God's just judgment upon human sin, and a premature death is nothing but a minor difference among individuals in light of the eternal life in the heaven.³⁸⁾  And then, he criticizes Wimber's theology of healing as follows: the important is not healing itself but Jesus' intention behind healing and therefore the focus is not healing but a sufferer or Jesus; healing may intensify faith but is a minor means; and at suffering from illness we should trust God because God alone is the true comfort to us.³⁹⁾  Finally,  the author asserts the Christian value of "death transcended" in the ultimate hope of the eternal life.⁴⁰⁾  Such an assertion is based upon his strong belief in the eschatological vision.

        Sixth, the vantage of the end.  Carson points out two types of eschatology in the New Testament: 'here already' and 'there not yet.'  He understands the former as the beginning of the end and the latter as the consummation, both of which illuminate why suffering and evil  is disproportionately imposed upon the good and the wicked in this world and how perfectly the divine justice will be established in that world.⁴¹⁾  According to him the practical implications of the biblical eschatology are as following: the hope in the real treasure of the heaven is a motivation for overcoming suffering and evil in this world; this hope relativize our desire for vain values in the fallen world; death is understood as a juncture in light of eternity; and this long view makes Christians confident in God's justice and its ultimate consummation.⁴²⁾  In this respect the author urges that Christian faith without that hope is vain and loses the theoretical and practical capacity to resolve the problem of suffering and evil.

        These six themes are constitutive of a general category.  There is, however, irrational suffering and evil which is not fit into this category.  It, therefore, requires a special category.

        B.     A Special Category.

        In the book of Job Carson finds a special category of suffering and evil that refuse to be reduced to the realm of rationality.  By analyzing Job's suffering the author tries to show what irrational suffering (and evil) may imply: first, Job's suffering took place in the execution of the divine sovereignty in that sense that it was caused by the Satan and the Satan's works are within the providence of God's sovereignty; second, it shows the fact there exist innocent sufferings and this very fact reveals that not all sufferings are the result of sin and some sufferings takes place without reference to human sin; third, it implies that suffering in nature cannot be prepared to confront and, even if possible, prepared minds may feel extremely shocked; fourth, although in the midst of irrational suffering sufferers frankly speak of their despair and confess their loss of hope, God does not blame and condemn them; fifth, Job's suffering discloses that suffering in essence is mysterious in the respect that God does not tell Job his intent by being silent about his wage with the Satan; sixth, Job's struggle illuminates our possibility to fight against inapprehensible suffering and praise God in the midst of it.⁴³⁾  These peculiar meanings of Job's suffering are a clue to why his friends' replies were inefficacious, in that they are ignorant of such meanings, and why his suffering violates a general category of suffering and evil.

        In Elihu's speech Carson finds better answers to Job's question in the midst of the innocent suffering.  He summarizes his speech into four points: first, the answers of Job's friends are false because they are based upon "a simple theory of retributive justice-punishment proportionate to sin"⁴⁴⁾; second, it is erroneous for Job to impugn God's justice in that human beings cannot fully comprehend God's mysterious providence, not in that God's evildoing can be excused; third, God has continuously spoken to Job in his suffering, but he couldn't recognize and acknowledge it; and finally Job should wait with patience until God gives an appropriate answer to him.

        After Elihu's speech and Job's monologues God's speech begins with unanswerable questions.  He does not maintain that Job's suffering is a punishment of sin and has no remark on the origin of suffering because miserable creatures ignorant of even the primordial evils, represented by the 'behemoth' (Job 40:15) and the 'leviathan' (Job 41;1), are not qualified to impugn God's justice.⁴⁵⁾  In this respect a false question is why the righteous suffer.  Therefore, what remains to us is to acknowledge that there is something unknown and mysterious in suffering and evil in the fallen world and to trust God rather than to acquiesce in evil.⁴⁶⁾  Here a question can be raised: Is faith possible in the midst of the mysteries of suffering and evil?  The unique category can answer this question.

        C.     The Unique Category.

        Can we still trust God in face of radical suffering and evil?  Carson answers that we can definitely trust God in such tragedies because God sent his only Son our Lord Jesus Christ to us and had him suffered on behalf of us.  For this reason he urges that God knows our suffering not by his intellect but by his experience.⁴⁷⁾  Here the author wants to concentrate on an aspect of suffering and evil in the cross of Jesus Christ which consists of four elements: the cross as "the triumph of God's justice and love,"⁴⁸⁾ as the revelation of what God is like, as the credibility of God, and as the exemplary nature.

        First, the triumph of God's justice and suffering.  This element is in opposition to the theories of immediate retribution.  They destroy the mystery of God's providence in the sense that God's timetable is perfect and may be other than human demands of immediate resolution; that if God executes his justice immediately and precisely, this world would become the hell; and that God's perfect justice goes together with his gratuitous love in the world.⁴⁹⁾  In this respect the cross of Jesus Christ is the ultimate event to satisfy both God's perfect justice and gratuitous love simultaneously.  It is what Carson calls "the triumph of God's justice and love."⁵⁰⁾ 

        Second, the revelation of what God is like.  This is opposed to the doctrine of the impassibility of God.  Carson points out the presuppositions of that traditions as follows: some passages to describe God as passible are anthropomorphic and therefore less incredible expressions for the divine attributes; God as eternal is above the spatio-temporal category of the universe; and what suffers is the humanity of Jesus, not the divinity.⁵¹⁾  The doctrine based upon these presuppositions are criticized by Carson in two respects, substantial and methodological.  In a substantial respect it deteriorates into agnosticism in that God hidden behind space and time cannot be known to us in any sense.⁵²⁾  In a methodological respect, since preoccupied with the presupposition that anthropomorphic expressions are not internal to the construction of the divine attributes, it precludes the Bible stories to describe God's passibility and therefore handles the Scripture unfairly.⁵³⁾  In this respect Carson definitely refuses to accept the doctrinal tradition of the divine impassibility.

        Then, what is Carson's alternative?  It is to affirm the passibility of God positively.  For Carson anthropomorphic expressions is not literally true but tells us something real about God.  He maintains that God only as impassible sovereignty is God of the Greek philosophy, not of the Bible which is "suggestive of his emotional life and his distinctively personal relationships with his people."⁵⁴⁾  For this reason Carson thinks that according to the biblical teachings we should hold that God can suffer and really suffered on the cross of Jesus Christ. 

        Third, the credibility of God.  According to the Pauline teaching Carson asserts that the cross is a way of destroying the faith in God for unbelievers but a way of establishing the credibility of God for believers and that the suffering of Jesus Christ on the cross is a ridicule for the wicked but credentials for us.⁵⁵⁾

        Fourth, the exemplary nature.  What characteristic did Jesus's death on the cross have?  Carson answers that Jesus' death is the "uniquely fruitful death" to save all human beings.⁵⁶⁾  Then, does this characteristic have nothing to do with us?  Absolutely not!  To be a Christian every believer is required to 'take up one's own cross.'  It implies that we will be suffered and even put to death as Jesus did.  This is what Carson calls "the exemplary nature of Jesus' death."⁵⁷⁾

        As previously mentioned, Carson has developed the biblical themes concerning suffering and evil according to three steps: a general, a special, and the unique category.  Here a question still remains, are God and evil compatible?  This question ushers us into the problem of the compatibility of God and evil.

3.      Compatibility of God's Sovereignty and Human responsibility

        Carson succinctly summarizes the whole teaching of the Bible into two propositions:

1. God is absolutely sovereign, but his sovereignty never functions in such a

   way that human responsibility is curtailed, minimized, or mitigated.

2. Human beings are morally responsible creatures--they significantly choose,

   rebel, obey, believe, defy, make decisions, and so forth, and they are

   rightly held accountable for such actions; but this characteristic never

   functions so as to make God absolutely contingent.⁵⁸⁾

These propositions are what Carson calls "compatibilism."⁵⁹⁾  He first presupposes that the compatibility of God and evil is basically "the mystery of providence."⁶⁰⁾  This suggests that two propositions cannot be expounded fully with logical clarity.  Nevertheless, for Carson, it is not totally impossible to explicate them.

        Then, what does compatibility mean?  Carson answers by three points.  First, God asymmetrically interferes in good and evil from behind in the sense that "God stands behind evil in such a way that not even evil takes place outside the bounds of his sovereignty, yet the evil is not morally chargeable to him: it is always chargeable to secondary agents, to secondary causes" and that "God stands behind good in such a way that it not only takes place within the bounds of his sovereignty, but it is always chargeable to him, and only derivatively to secondary agents."⁶¹⁾  Second, God's asymmetrical interference in good and evil and human freedom explain why human beings are responsible for evil.  Third, human freedom cannot make God contingent because it is fragile since the fall.  Based upon these points, Carson criticizes two types of contemporary theological approaches to the problem of the compatibility/incompatibility of God and evil.

        One approach is an "a priori definition" or so-called 'free will defense' which asserts that "human will must entail absolute power" act contrary to God.⁶²⁾  Carson argues against this approach in two respects.  First, this free will defense will may explain how human beings can be rebellious to God but cannot answer to the questions: "if 'free will' necessarily entails absolute power to contrary, will we enjoy such 'free will' in heaven?" and "if God can keep us from sinning there, does this mean that 'free will' is sacrificed?"⁶³⁾  Second, this defense destroys God's sovereignty and personhood in that “God's decision is not predestination in any meaningful sense, but a kind of ratification-in-advance...does not speak of God foreknowing that such and such will take place, but that God foreknows the person."⁶⁴⁾

        Other approach is an attempt to limit God's sovereignty and to affirm human free will, based upon such biblical expressions to describe God as "'regret,' 'relent,' 'grieve over,' 'retract,' or the like."⁶⁵⁾  Carson criticizes this approach in three respects.  First, an emphasis upon God's personhood alone weakens God's sovereignty.  Second, an exaggerated emphasis upon human freedom ignores God's free choice such as his election.  Third, these two errors are based upon prematurely fixed categories and therefore cannot treat the Scripture evenhandedly.

        Here we can see that two types of approaches has a common factor in that they attempt to reduce God's sovereignty to a less form.  This, for Carson, is an act to abandon compatibilism and an rebellion to the Bible.  In this respect Carson argues that compatibilism is the truth based upon the whole framework of the Scripture and that there is a tension between God's sovereignty and human responsibility--the tension to assert the mystery of God's providence over against the rationalistic tendencies of contemporary theologies.  However, we here can raise questions: Can we still have faith in God without fully rational explanations of this tension?; If can, what can we do before it?  These questions lead us to the next chapter.

4.      Christian Life before the tension between God's sovereignty and human responsibility.

        Can we still have faith in God without fully rational explanations of the tension?  Carson answers 'yes.' In order to prove his answer Carson appeals to two points.  First, the presence of the tension does not mean the impossibility to speak of mysteries at all because we still speak of such mysteries as 'trinity,' 'the union of the divinity and the humanity in Jesus Christ.'⁶⁶⁾  Second, the Scripture teaches us to 'obey and trust God.'⁶⁷⁾

        What can we do before the tension between God's sovereignty and human responsibility?  Carson's first teaching is that we should be "in endurance, perseverance, and faith in the God who has suffered, who has fought with evil and triumphed, and whose power and goodness ensure that faith resting in him is never finally disappointed" (Ibid., p. 246).  In face of such a tension, ambiguity, and mystery, we should endure rather than outrage, be patient rather than complain, have faith in God rather than rebellion to him.

        Carson's second teaching is that we should prayer.  He mentions two extremes concerning prayer: the first asserts that prayer makes something change, future is totally indeterminate, and therefore God is less than sovereign; the second does that God is sovereign, future is totally determinate, and therefore prayer cannot make anything change.⁶⁸⁾  His position is the middle of two extremes and suggests an intermediary prayer.

        He takes an example of the Moses' prayer for his people after the Israelite idolatry of the golden calf.⁶⁹⁾  As in that case, if we pray, God stops immediate punishments upon a nation or a people according to his goodness; if not, God punishes them according to his justice.  So no matter how we pray or not, God is always righteous and unchargeable.  However, if we do not pray, we are chargeable of such a tragedy because we shrink our responsibility for having concerns in neighbors' well-being.⁷⁰⁾  In this respect it can be, therefore, concluded that in face of the mystery of God's providence we should obey and trust God, be patient and in faith, prayer for a nation or a people at an intermediary position.  This is what Carson teaches about the Christian attitude before the tension between God's sovereignty and human responsibility.

III.     Conclusion: Assessment of Carson's View on Suffering and Evil.

        First of all, Carson's assertion of both God's sovereignty and personhood is theoretically and practically meaningful.  From a theoretical perspective, if God is God, he must be sovereign; and, if God is relevant to us, his personhood should be acknowledged in any way.  If God loses his sovereignty he can be surpassed by other creatures.  If God loses his personhood he falls into a Cosmic Tyrant or a mere absurdity.

        From a practical perspective, if God is not sovereign, he cannot be worshipped: and, if God is not relevant to us, our prayer and worship deteriorate into meaninglessness.  If God is always moved by our prayer and worship, he cannot be sovereign.  If God is never moved by our prayer and worship, he cannot be relevant to our history and personal life.  In this respect Carson's assertion of both God's sovereignty and personhood avoids two extremes in discussion of God's nature.

        This is more clear in his teaching of prayer.  If prayer always makes something change and if future is totally indeterminate, God is less than sovereign.  If God is only sovereign and if future is totally determinate, prayer cannot make anything change.  For this reason Carson asserts that a right understanding of prayer is to walk between these two extremes.  This assertion is correct because, if God is always moved by our prayer, he cannot be the Cosmic God in any sense and because, if God is always unmoved by our prayer, he cannot be the One worshipped.

        Sensational in discussing the divine nature is his bold assertion of God's passibility.  Carson, of course, indicates that to say that God suffers is not literally identical just as we suffer.  But he clearly asserts that God was suffered on the cross and can be still suffered.  In addition Carson affirms that metaphorical expressions are saying something real to God.⁷¹⁾  He believes that metaphorical expressions about God in the Scripture tells us the existence of God's emotional life, especially God's passibility or passiveness.  In my view Carson's conception, suffering God, is very meaningful because, if God is truly our God, he must know and be sympathetic with our suffering.⁷²⁾

        I here feel that Carl is required to say more: pleased God.  If God can be suffered, he can be pleased.  He can be pleased by our daily prayer and worship, praise in the midst of radical suffering and evil, resistance against social evils.  If God cannot be pleased by our worship, our worship is meaningless.  If God cannot be pleased in any way, our ethical efforts at last lose their meaning.  For this reason Carson's suffering God needs to include pleased God because suffering and pleased God is more internal to God's emotional life, i.e., his interacting personhood, than just suffering God.

        Another importance in Carson is his compatibilism, an emphasis upon both God's sovereignty and human responsibility.  Right is his intention that two propositions should be guarded even in face of evil.  His explanations are, however, somewhat deficient. 

        First, Carson maintains that sovereign God can make use of evil for his good will.  This appears to delineate God as extremely sovereign.  But some may feel that God is miserable to the extent that he has to make use of evils or evil ways.  Is there not other choice?  In my view it is better to assert that God permits evil and helps human beings struggle against it rather than make use of it because God is not the Cosmic Tyrant, as Carson argued, and he really respects human dignity and freedom.  This may be a way of describing God as less sovereign power but is that of drawing God as supremely sovereign goodness.

        Second, when Carson discuss Christian attitude toward evil, he "prefers to speak of moral responsibility rather than freedom, partly because freedom is a problematical concept to define, but more substantially because human freedom is, in effect, limited--until it is creatively and providentially  exercised in submission to and co-operation with God's will and purpose."⁷³⁾  It is, of course, true that a human being is not totally free ,and human freedom is fragile.  Human freedom is, however, still effective because it is the precondition for human responsibility.  In this respect, when he speak of human responsibility, Carson is required to discuss human freedom rather than preclude it.

        I have an objection to Carson's world perspective, i.e., 'the fallen world.'  This conception is a half truth because the Scripture also witnesses the blessed world.  In addition, this fallen world, for Carson, seems to have no continuity with that redeemed world.  If this world is, however, not in continuity with that world in any sense, our struggle against evil may deteriorate into an egoism in that it is an instrument for avoiding God's punishment hereafter.  And our ethical effort may fall into meaninglessness in that it cannot contribute to the Kingdom of God in any sense.  For this reason Carson is required to describe this world both fallen and blessed and therefore in both discontinuity and continuity with that world.

        Carson's understanding of poverty is too simplistic because poverty in reality are often constituted by complex causes, which are human (both individual and socio-political factors) and nonhuman (such as hurricane, drought), rather than a single and independent cause.  For this reason it is too arbitrary for Carson to classify the poor into fivefold such as "the unfortunate poor," "the oppressed poor," "the lazy poor," "the poor who are dependent on the punished," and "the voluntary poor."

        Carson's understanding of death is also simple because he thinks death merely as punishment upon sin.  The Scripture, however, witnesses more than Carson's teaching.  Paul Ramsey succinctly summarizes it: "Christians believe that death and dying are a part of life and no less than birth a gift of God."⁷⁴⁾  For Christian death is not the end but the beginning, no matter how subjectively or objectively immortal.  And a comfortable death is understood God's blessing rather than punishment.  In this Carson's understanding of death should be revised into a broader conception.

        Problematic is his assertion that moral evil is inclusive of natural evil because nature also is within the order of the fallen world.  Upon this assertion does Paul Ellingworth make an attack as follows:

Similarly, although Carson refers more than once to suffering caused by natural disasters, and offers a helpful exposition of Luke 13:1-5, he does not really address the problem of the apparently blind autonomy with which a tidal wave can wipe out 200,000 people in Bangladesh.  It is all very well to say that 'it might be better if we spent less time debating the time remembering that we must give an account to the God of justice' (59); but theodicy remains that we must give an account to the only or even the most important part, of evangelism and pastoral care.⁷⁵⁾

The "apparently blind autonomy" of natural evil means that natural evil is out of our control, i.e., not the realm of our responsibility.  For this reason it is erroneous to assert that moral evil is inclusive of natural evil.

        Carson's arguments, such as God's personhood, passibility, compatibilism, are theologically insightful and biblically adequate, even if they include some logical deficiencies.  But other arguments, such as poverty, death, natural evil, are untenable or required to be revised.  Nevertheless, I conclude that Carson's view of suffering and evil, on the whole, is very persuasive and meaningful because I think that his rediscovery of God's personhood and his ingenious discovery of passibility and compatibilism surpass his minor deficiencies in other parts.

---

1)      How Long, O Lord?: Reflections on Suffering and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1990)    p. 9

2)      In actuality Carson mentions that "the different kinds of false steps that I am delineating in this chapter are not mutually exclusive, and to that extent the three-part division I have imposed is artificial" (Ibid., p. 33.).

3)       Ibid., p. 24.

4)       Ibid., p. 25.

5)       In order to prove this the author points out the fact that some sufferings in the bible stories still remains unrelieved in such cases as in Jeremiah, Timothy, Trophimus, and Paul and that there are some stories which cannot be reduced to a simple "triumphalism." Ibid., p. 26.

6)       Ibid., p. 32.

7)       Ibid., p. 33.

8)       Ibid., p.36.

9)       Ibid., pp. 36-37.

10)      Ibid., p. 39.

11)      Ibid., p. 41.

12)      Ibid., p. 51.

13)      Ibid., p. 94.

14)      Ibid., p. 110.

15)      Ibid., p. 133.

16)      Ibid., p. 154.

17)      Ibid., p. 179.

18)      Ibid., p. 42.

19)      Ibid., p. 45.

20)      Actually Carson asserts as follows:     "From this perspective, the distinction that many make between moral evils and natural evils needs careful qualification.  At one level, of course, a useful distinction may be made: there is a difference between, say, a rape and a destructive tornado, between a war caused by human avarice and an earthquake that no human being could either start or stop.  Yet from another perspective, both kinds of evil, and the suffering caused by both kinds of evil, and the suffering caused by both kinds of evil, are the result of sin, of rebellion--and therefore of moral evil."

Ibid., p. 43.

21)      Ibid., p. 47.

22)      Ibid., pp. 51-54.

23)      Ibid., p. 57.

24)      Ibid., p. 58.

25)      Ibid., p. 59.

26)      Ibid., p. 61.

27)      Ibid., p. 62.

28)      Here Carson argues that Christians should think their responsibility for correcting social injustices rather than ask why God allows such evils because he believes that human beings as sinners are primarily chargeable for social evils.

29)      Ibid., p. 62.

30)      Ibid., pp. 69-79.

31)      Ibid., p. 83.

32)      Ibid., p. 97.

33)      Ibid., p. 98.

34)      Ibid., p. 98-101.

35)      For this reason the Christian Church protects herself not by resorting to war but by other means among which excommunication is the final means to impose spiritual, rather than physical, punishments upon someone to be punished (Ibid., pp. 104-105).

36)      Ibid., pp. 101-103.

37)      Ibid., p. 106.

38)      Ibid., pp. 110-117.

39)      Ibid., pp. 125-127.

40)      Ibid., p. 128.

41)      Ibid., pp. 137, 140.

42)      Ibid., pp. 149-151.

43)      Ibid., pp. 158-160.

44)      Ibid., p. 168.

45)      Ibid., p. 172.

46)      Ibid., pp. 173-4.

47)      Carson maintains that "The God on whom we rely knows what suffering all about, not merely in the way that God knows everything, but by experience" (Ibid., p. 179).  This proves that God is neither a Cosmic tyrant who exercises his irresponsible power over against miserable creatures, nor a deistic God who is totally indifferent to our sufferings and miseries (Ibid.).

48)      Ibid., p. 180.

49)      Ibid., pp. 180-181.

50)      Furthermore, Carson urges that we should understand the cross not simply as the event of God's being reconciled with sinners but also as that of the divine justice's being reconciled with the divine love.  It is what he calls God as "both the subject and the object of propitiation" (Ibid., p.182).

51)      Ibid., p. 185.

52)      Ibid., p. 186.

53)      Ibid.

54)      Ibid., p. 188.

55)      Ibid., pp.190-191.

56)      Of course, it is noted that Carson regards self-sacrificial love as another characteristic of Jesus' death (Ibid., p. 193).

57)      Ibid., p. 192.

58)      Ibid., p. 201.

59)      Ibid.

60)      Ibid.

61)      Ibid., p. 213.

62)      Ibid., p. 218.

63)      Ibid., p. 219.

64)      Ibid., p. 220.

65)      Ibid., p. 221.

66)      Ibid., p. 229.

67)      First, we should obey the sovereign God who controls all things in the universe, who is inclusive of the entire history and every detail of whatever happens, and who is mutually interacting and personally responding to us (Ibid., pp. 239-245). Second, we should trust God who established his credibility to us by having made himself suffered on the cross and won victory over against suffering and evil (Ibid., p. 246).

68)      Ibid., pp. 232-233.

69)      Ibid., p. 233.

70)      Ibid., pp. 233-234.

71)      He doesn't, however, forget to point out that they are not literally identical with who God is. 

72)      Here I uses 'sympathetic with' as 'feeling together with.'

73)      Paul Ellingworth, "Book Review on Carson's book How Long, O Lord?," in The Evangelical Quarterly, No. 64, 1992, p. 362.

74)      Paul Ramsey, "Reference Points in Deciding about Abortion" in The Morality of Abortion, ed. Noonam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970) p. 95.

75)      Paul Ellingworth, "Book Review," p. 362.

Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy

Presented by Kang Hoon Lee

a)      What understanding of the concept of divine providence is to be found in Farley's work?

        How can we understand the divine providence?  The answer, for Farley, seems to be closely related to the adequate understanding of the problem of evil.  How can we understand the reality of evil?  Traditional answers may be three: that evil is given as the divine punishment for sin; that evil is an element constitutive of the cosmic harmony; and that evil is the pedagogical test of God to purify or correct the Christian souls.¹⁾  Farley thinks these answers to be inadequate because they deteriorates into the justification of evil, the impassibility or indifference to the innocent sufferer, and the incapability to resist against evil.  Then, what can be the central point in discussion of evil?  Farley's answer is that it is suffering.

        Why should we pay attention to the issue of suffering in discussion of evil?  It is because some²⁾ sufferings, i.e., what Farley calls 'radical suffering,' illuminates why evil cannot be justifiable, how desperately the helpless sufferers need immediate help and care, and why evil should be resisted.  For the reason Farley wants to move the focal point of evil from punitive, aesthetic, and pedagogical perspectives to suffering and begins with suffering in her theodicy.

        Then, what is the source of suffering and evil?  Farley answers that it is not the divine sovereignty to determine every details of whatever happens, nor the divine powerlessness, but the tragic structures of the created world that open the possibility of evil by leaving creatures to be free and the future to be indeterminate.³⁾  In this respect evil is inevitable but should not be attributed to God.  Nevertheless, Farley seems to insinuate that God is not totally exempted from the moral responsibility for evil in that he made room in creation for the possibility and actuality of evil.

        Here it can be raised a question: Why did God create the world to be so vulnerable?  The answer to this question is central to Farley's understanding of the divine power and goodness.  According to her, God has a desire for creativity (=eros), the desire created creatures to be self-caused, and therefore they can be and are inflicted by suffering and evil; however, God acknowledges creatures' own values, his love is foolish enough to endure real risks instead of resorting to supernatural or transhistorical interventions, and therefore his power is persuasive rather than dominating or coercive.  In this respect God is described as all-good or all-loving but not as all-powerful and symbolically defined as compassion.

        Then, what is compassion?  Compassion is interactive because of its relational character: interaction begins with the compassionate knowledge to participate in the others' suffering; this knowledge produces concrete actions for the suffering people; these action are self-enjoyment rather than unpleasant self-sacrifice; self-enjoyment discloses that one's happiness is dependent upon and constituted by others' happiness; and therefore compassion empowers people to resist against suffering and evil.⁴⁾  In this respect the role of God as compassionate power in the presence of suffering and evil is understood two: first, caring for sufferers; second, empowering people to resist suffering and evil.  Both of them are what is called 'redemption' and Farley's doctrine of redemption is concentrated on the second role.

        Here it can be first asked, Is the empowering power of compassion resistable?  Farley' answer is 'yes' because she believes that the divine mercy cannot force human beings to accept the empowering power of compassion.  Secondly, Is the empowering power the divine mercy or punishment?  It is not the punishment but the mercy of God because, while condemning radical suffering and evil, it redeems evildoers as well as the suffering cause by the condemnation.⁵⁾

        Then, what are the vehicles of the divine redemption?  Farley answers that they are both religious--the Scripture and the Church-- and secular--nature and history.  According to her, the Scripture presents us the vision of resistance against suffering and evil through the dangerous memories, and the Church preserves this vision and enacts resistance against suffering and evil.⁶⁾  However, Farley describes the Scripture and the Church as ambiguous because they are not free from ideological corruptions such as racism, sexism, and have often justified them and therefore because they are partially effective and partially corrupted.

        She provides no explanation for nature as a secular means of the divine redemption.  And Farley qualifies the redemptive fulfillment within history instead of beyond history.⁷⁾  Of course, she acknowledges that the recalcitrance of sin and evil can be illuminated by such visions as the utopian perfection of the past and the eschatological consummation of the future.⁸⁾  However, she asserts these visions--especially the futuristic vision that in the Final day there will be the posthumous recompensation for the present suffering and evil-- to be ineffective because she believes that resistance within history alone proves God to be present and to work in the suffering and evil of history and that human resistance against suffering and evil is to participate in the divine life and to be morally responsible for suffering neighbors.⁹⁾ 

        In this respect Farley boldly acknowledges that there is no certainty for the complete ending of suffering and evil within history.  However, she refuses to remain in cynicism or skepticism.  Rather she seems to maintain that in the midst of radical suffering and evil we should stand upon the Christian faith in the Cross as "the ultimate revelation and enactment of God's power to redeem human beings"¹⁰⁾ and the Resurrection as the hint on the non-finality of evil.¹¹⁾

b)      To what extent do you find this concept a promising one for a constructive contemporary statement of the Christian doctrine of providence?

        First of all, her explanation for the source of evil is quite applaudable in that evil is not attributed to God and that human beings may have positive responsibility for resisting against evil.

        Second, Farley tries to assist the divine power and goodness without losing any meaning of them in that she rejects a description of God as all-powerful who determines whatever happens or as the Cosmic Tyrant who mercilessly exercises his controlling and irresponsible power upon creatures.  I agree with her opinion that the divine power as omnipotence is wrong because God is "creative of and" partly "controls individuals with some decision-making power of their own, some ability to settle details left undetermined by the highest power instead of "monopolizing decision-making."¹²⁾

        Third, she seems to repudiate the divine omniscience when she says that the future is undetermined.  This repudiation is adequate because "God does not already or eternally know what we do tomorrow, for, until we decide, there are no such entities as our tomorrow's decisions."¹³⁾

        Fourth, her understanding of human nature and history is insightful in that, as far as she/he is human, a human being will still remain sinful and the historical achievement of justice will be no more than fragmentary.

        Fifth, Farley tends to see reality as such in the context of the too narrow vision.  For example, when she envisages the structure of the created world mainly in terms of the tragic vision, she is blind of such an  important element as creativity, divine or human.   For this reason she seems to insinuate that God is partially responsible for evil by remarking the tragic structure of the creation.  If the universe is structured to be free and the future is open to creatures, evil is, however, entirely attributed to creatures, human or non-human.  In this respect her book seems to give readers the bad impression that she is too narrowly attached to the tragic vision.

        Sixth, she is not clear about how we can experience the empowering power to resist against suffering and evil in the actual world and what the power transforms in human beings.

        Seventh, it is ambiguous for her to argue in discussion of the divine ungroundedness that the divine compassion is rooted in the total otherness of God rather than in the divine attributes.  By this argument Farley seems to try to secure the divine compassion from the ideological taints, based upon the tradition of the theology of negation.  However, the total alterity of God implies the absoluteness of God which is purely abstract, will any desire or thing to happen, and therefore cannot make any increase or realization of value in the divine life.  This means that the total otherness or the absoluteness of God cannot have love because compassion has a relational character and therefore can be done only in respect of the relativity of God which is concrete, wills and does in history, and therefore makes increases or actualizations of value in the divine life.  In this respect, Farley seems to commit "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness"¹⁴⁾ by presupposing the enduring entity of God as the concrete reality.

        Eighth, Farley seems to be ignorant of how evildoers can be redeemed, while she says caring for sufferers and resistance for both sufferers and their neighbors.  For this reason she is required to say repentance-forgiveness for evildoers.  However, she rejects this conception in her discussion of the doctrine of mercy.  The rejection seems to imply that premature proclamation of forgiveness may weaken the capability to resist against suffering and evil.  But this leads her to be blind to how evildoers can be redeemed from their sins and evils. 

        On the basis of these analyses, Farley's conception of the divine providence looks to be somewhat promising but includes some unclarities and logical inconsistecies.

---

1)      Farley mentions four types of traditional theodicies, but in my view pedagogical type and eschatological type can be combined into one.  See: Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990) p. 22

2)      It is not that all sufferings are evil because some may be deserved and just.

3)      p.98.

4)       Ibid., pp. 116-119.

5)       Ibid., pp. 121-122.

6)       Ibid., pp. 129-130.

7)       Ibid., p. 131.

8)       Ibid., p. 130.

9)       In her article, "Resistance as a Theological Category: The Cunning of History Revisited" (Bridges vol. 3: Spr-Sum, 1991), Farley boldly asserts the futuristic vision to be illusionary: "It is an illusion of th logic of sovereignty that history will in some unambiguous way overcome the devastation of war, injustice, and radical evil" (p. 124).

10)      Wendy Farley, Tragic Vision and the Divine Compassion, p. 112.

11)      Ibid., p. 132

12)      Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence & Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: Suny, 1984) p. 38.

13)      Ibid., p. 39.

14)      Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology INY: The Free Press, 1978) p. 7.

"the mysterious meeting of two freedoms"

A.      To what main question is Gutierrez's discussion of "the mysterious meeting of two freedoms"(ch. 9) directed, and how does he answer that question?

        The main question that Gutierrez directs in his discussion of "the mysterious meeting of two freedoms" in chapter 9 is: Is it sufficient enough to explain whatever happens, especially all God's actions in history, in predictable ways which are provided by the fixed schemes of theologies?¹⁾  The succinct answer of Gutierrez to the question may be that a God-talk by rational language alone is sufficient enough and thereby a liberation theology in Latin America requires mystical language.  Gutierrez answers that question by three steps: "the turning point of the world"²⁾(pp. 67-72), "the freedom of God"³⁾(pp. 72-75), and "human littleness and respect for God"⁴⁾(pp. 75-81).  Let's explore how Gutierrez answer that question.

1.      The turning point of the world

        The innocent who suffers unjustly experience the absence or silence of God and find no language about God.  Is God really absent or silent?  Is it impossible for them to say about God?  Gutierrez's answer is that God is present in and talking to them at the situation and thereby they can say about God.  Then, why are they ignorant of the fact?  For they do not understand where the divine providence has its origin. 

        For Gutierrez the experience of the divine absence or silence does not mean the literal absence or silence of God but implies a ciphered massage sent from God.  The traditional decipherments of the cipher seem to three: the denial of the reality of evil, the understanding of evil as the result of temporal retribution, and finally the pedagogical understanding of evil.  In this section Gutierrez' assault is concentrated upon the second, the doctrine of temporal retribution from two respects.

        First, the doctrine misunderstands the origin of the divine providence.  Gutierrez seems to think that the doctrine presupposes that the divine plan has it origin in justice.  He, of course, acknowledges that the preferential love for the poor is necessary but thinks that it is not sufficient because he clearly sees that every seeking justice in the world is involved in some degrees of self-interest and thereby is at best merely the relative achievement of the universal love.⁵⁾  For the reason Gutierrez maintains that God's plan is essentially rooted in the free and gratuitous love of God.

        Second, the doctrine erroneously presupposes God's actions in history to be predictable.  Gutierrez, however, argues that the divine activities in history are essentially free and beyond human preestimates and thereby that they are fundamentally unpredictable and mysterious.  According to him, since God's love is free, it cannot be controlled or manipulated by human; while, as the divine love is gratuitous, it is given to all humankind without any charge.  For the reason God takes an initiative in loving human beings which is the meeting point of two mysterious freedoms, God and human.  This is what Gutierrez calls "the turning point of the world."  In this respect Gutierrez seems to decipher the absence or silence of God as the meeting point of two mysterious freedoms,

2.      The freedom of God

        According to Gutierrez' account, Job with his friends also pretends to know all God's actions in history and protest against God.  In Job 39: 4-25 God attacks against Job's protests by saying the mysterious plans of God toward the world of nature.  The divine providence in creation is to allow the creatures to enjoy their own freedom.  Here it can be asked: Why does God remark on that freedom instead of giving Job a direct answer to the question why the innocent suffer unjustly?  Gutierrez' answer is: For God makes Job recognize that a human cannot understand fully whatever happens in history including the divine activities.

        According to Gutierrez animals in nature are created to live freely on their own purpose.  Humans, however, tend to misunderstand the original purpose of creation from the anthropocentric view of "utility."⁶⁾  Likewise, they erroneously regard it possible to understand whatever happens in history including all God's actions.  But God is essentially free, his free activities are largely unpredictable, and his unpredictable ways of behavior in history cannot understood fully by humans.  For the reason only when accept the divine grace (=the grace of God's love), humans can understand the divine providence in the midst of the absence or silence.

3.      Human littleness and respect for God

        For Gutierrez the acceptance of the divine grace (=the grace of God's love) has two stages: the confession of human littleness and respect for God.  The first stage is to confess human littleness before God.  At this moment the confession does not include repentance.  Gutierrez argues that, when confessing his littleness, Job does not repent his sin and still has the questions about "God's just government of the world."⁷⁾  The answer to the question is sought on the second stage.

        The second stage is to respect for God.  Why do the innocent suffer unjustly?  Why does God permit evil?  Gutierrez' answer is: For God is not all-powerful in that he respects for human freedom, cannot punish evildoers arbitrarily, and his freedom is, thereby, restricted by it.⁸⁾  However, Gutierrez denies that human can know God fully and completely.  God is still God and human is still human even when the divine power is limited by human freedom.  Why is the divine power restricted by human freedom?  Is a human, in its origin, powerful enough to restrict God's power?  No.  The restriction is imposed by God himself.⁹⁾  Why does he impose restrictions upon his omnipotence?  The answer may be: For God truly loves and respects for us.  Since God first loves and respects for us, it is necessary for us to respect for God.

        But a question still remains: If evil will not be destroyed by God, is it out of the control of God's power?  Gutierrez' answer is that evil is under God's control even though it will not be destroyed.  If God controls over evil, why is there still evil?  Is his controlling power not strong enough?  It seems to be hard to seek the answer to the question because it is not given.  The answer may be that God permits evil but will finally withdraw it just as everything come from God and will return to him.  The final paragraph of chapter 9 seems to insinuate the possibility of this answer.

The Lord's signature follows: "Everything under heaven is mine."  Everything that is and happens bears in some way God's trademark; that is why human beings do not understand it completely.¹⁰⁾

B.     How adequate do you find his handling of this question?

        Gutierrez's handling of the main question has both adequacies and inadequacies.  He seeks the ultimate motivation for Christian praxis not in the preferential love but in the universal love because every seeking justice in history has to do with some degrees of self-interest and Christian practice without seeking spiritual value merely deteriorates into political programs.  This makes him emphasize the importance of grace which is apt to be disregarded by the activist theologies.  However, his assertion of the disinterested faith is doubtful because nobody in the world is exempted from the taints of self-interest.  In this respect disinterestedness may be the ultimate ideal of Christian motivation but can never be achieved in history.¹¹⁾

        The strength of Gutierrez is found in his dealing with the divine power.  If the divine power is understood all-powerful to determine every detail of the world, God becomes immoral and irresponsible because God is totally responsible for evil when God has all power while his creature has no power.  If God must be morally good, his power should be restricted and shared by his creatures to some degree.  For the reason Gutierrez affirms the two freedoms, the freedom of God and of human. 

        However, he is not consistent in championing two freedoms in that he does not deal with the source of evil.  Gutierrez is silent about the source of evil as well as about the reason why he is silent about that.  He just acknowledges the reality of evil clearly.  But without elucidation of where evil comes, is it possible to understand the reason why the innocent must suffer unjustly and to give them the true hope? 

        Finally, it should be noted that the author seems to confuse between 'unpredictable' and 'unknowable' when he discusses the mystery of God in the midst of absence or silence.  On the literal level we cannot know something unknowable in no way.  On the same level we may or may not know something unpredictable.  In this respect two words cannot be used interchangeably.  Of course, the author does not use the word 'unknowable' but his logic behind his discussion of the mysterious reality of God is that the unpredictable is the unknowable.  Based upon this logic, Gutierrez blames Job with his friends to be those who pretends to know the unknowable God.  Unknowable is necessarily unpredictable, but not vice versa.

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1)  In the earlier pages of the chapter Gutierrez mentions that the aim of chapter 9 is to share the tradition of mystical language about God with the Scriptures, especially the book Job: "God speaks, but in an unpredictable way--making no reference to concrete problems and therefore not responding to the distress and questions of Job...What God says is disconcerting to the reader, but Job seems to understand it (see 40: 3-4, and 42: 1-6).  Our aim is to share this understanding."(p. 68)  According to this presupposition, the author interprets God's addresses to Job in Job 39: 13-25 as "an implied question: Must all that happens in history, including God's action, necessarily fit hand in glove with the theological categories that reason has developed?"(p. 75)  In addition, he understands God's question to Job in Job 40: 8 as following questions: "Do you persist in staying locked into a world of easy explanations?  Are you going to dispute my right to control what comes upon you?  Are you trying to imprison my free and gratuitous love in your theological concept?  Do you want to make yourself judge of my actions?(p. 77) Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994)

2)      Ibid., p. 67

3)      Ibid., p. 72

4)      Ibid., p. 75

5)      For the reason Gutierrez argues that the retribution theory is a kind of self-interest and thereby cannot be the true motivation for Christian practice.  He says: "...the doctrine of retribution is not the key to understanding the universe; this doctrine can give rise only a commonplace relationship of self-interest with God and others." Ibid., p.70

6)      Ibid., p. 75

7)      Ibid., p. 76

8)      Gutierrez says as follows:

   God wants justice indeed, and desires that divine judgement (mishpat)reign in the world; but God cannot impose it, for the nature of created beings must be respected.  God's power is limited by human freedom; for without freedom God's justice would not be present within history.  Furthermore, precisely because human beings are free, they have the power to change their course and be converted.  The destruction of the wicked would put an end to that possibility.

        Ibid., p.77

9)      Gutierrez says: "Yahweh too has limits, which are self-imposed."     Ibid., p. 79

10)     Ibid., p. 81

11)     See chapter 4 of Reinhold Niebuhr's book, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (SanFransico: Harper Collins Publishers, 1987)