처음 처음 | 이전 이전 | 1 | 2 |다음 다음 | 마지막 마지막

CYBERNETICS & HUMAN KNOWING 15(3-4), 2008

Special Issue on Emergence and Downward Determination

 
current issue 15 
 

Original Source Materials for this posting from: Cybernetics & Human Knowing ― A Journal of Second Order Cybernetics, Autopoiesis & Cyber-Semiotics published by Imprint Academic

http://www.chkjournal.org
 

El-Hani, Charbel Niño, Søren Brier, Pille Bunnell, Phillip Guddemi, & Jeanette Bopry (2008). Foreword: Emergence and Downward Determination. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 15(3-4): 5-14.

 

Charbel Niño El-Hani : Associate Professor in the Department of General Biology, Institute of Biology, Federal University of Bahia (UFBa; Universidade Federal da Bahia), Campus de Ondina, CEP: 41270-190 Salvador-BA, Brazil

Email: charbel [AT] ufba.br

Homepage: http://www.gphfecb.ufba.br

See also this URL: http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.jsp?id=K4784764E2
 

The first three paragraphs of this paper:

The concept of emergence made a comeback on the philosophical scene in the 1990s. In this decade, the terms emergent, emergence, and the expressions emergent property, emergent phenomenon, as well as others have been increasingly employed by both philosophers and scientists. This was partly a result of the great development of the sciences of complexity ― interdisciplinary fields of research concerned with the complex properties of life and mind. Another reason for the strong comeback of this philosophical doctrine lies in the criticisms and even the collapse of positivistic reductionism and its proposal for unifying science. The very term emergence and its derivatives have become popular in the context of computer models of non-linear dynamical systems, complex systems research, Artificial Life, consciousness studies, and so forth.

     As the concept of emergence and related notions are increasingly used, it becomes more and more important to keep the exact meaning of the central ideas involved clear, inasmuch as the notion of emergence is often regarded with suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. Indeed, if we can recognize, on the one hand, the intuitive appeal of this notion, on the other hand, we cannot deny that it is interwoven with several quite important philosophical problems. Several philosophers and scientists have tried to make it clear in recent years what is at stake in the notion of emergence as well as in related notions, such as downward causation, downward determination, supervenience, and levels. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are many open issues in this field lending themselves to debate, and new avenues are certainly still waiting to be explored. We intend, with this special issue of Cybernetics & Human Knowing, to contribute to the opening of these new avenues by gathering innovative approaches to the problem of emergence ― and related problems ― from different theoretical perspectives. In particular, we emphasize the contributions of sciences of complexity and cybernetics to the treatment of emergence. After all, emergence has been a concept largely used in general systems theory and cybernetics.

     The special issue is organized in the form of discussions around four position papers, followed by a commentary by another researcher (or researchers) in the field, and a reply from the authors of the original paper.
 

FULL TEXT: http://www.chkjournal.org/content/Pdf/Volume_15_No_4_2008/CHK_15-4_2008_foreword.pdf
 

Arnellos, Argyris, Thomas Spyrou, John Darzentas (2008). Emergence and Downward Causation in Contemporary Artificial Agents. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 15(3-4): 15-41.

 

Argyris Arnellos1, Thomas Spyrou2, John Darzentas3

(1) Research interests: Systems Theory, 2nd-order Cybernetics, Semiotics, Biosemiotics, Complex Systems, Design Theory, Information Theory, Information Systems Design, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Life. Department of Product and Systems Design Engineering, University of the Aegean, 84100, Syros, Greece. Email: arar [AT] aegean.gr

Homepage: http://www.syros.aegean.gr/users/arar

(2) Areas of Expertise: Systems Design, Computer Science, Engineering and Applied Sciences. Department of Product and Systems Design Engineering, University of the Aegean. Email: tsp [AT] aegean.gr

Homepage: http://www.syros.aegean.gr/users/tsp

(3) Areas of Expertise: Systems Design, HCI, Computer Science, Operational Research, Department of Product and Systems Design Engineering, University of the Aegean
 

ABSTRACT: Contemporary research in artificial environments has marked the need for autonomy in artificial agents. Autonomy has many interpretations in terms of the field within which it is being used and analyzed, but the majority of the researchers in artificial environments are arguing in favor of a strong and life-like notion of autonomy. Departing from this point the main aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of the emergence of autonomy in contemporary artificial agents. The theoretical findings of research in the areas of living and cognitive systems, suggests that the study of autonomous agents should adopt a systemic and emergent perspective for the analysis of the evolutionary development of the notions/properties of autonomy, functionality, intentionality and meaning, as the fundamental and characteristic properties of a natural agent. An analytic indication of the functional emergence of these concepts and properties is provided, based on the characteristics of the more general systemic framework of second-order cybernetic and of the interactivist framework. The notion of emergence is a key concept in such an analysis which in turn provides the ground for the theoretical evaluation of the autonomy of contemporary artificial agents with respect to the functional emergence of their capacities. The fundamental problems for the emergence of genuine autonomy in artificial agents are critically discussed and some design guidelines are provided.
 

KEYWORDS: Autonomy, Emergence. Functionality, Meaning, Self-organization, Normativity, Agency, Intentionality, Downward Causation
 

http://www.chkjournal.org/?issue=vol_15_issue_4&article=Emergence%20and%20Downward 
 

Bickhard, Mark H. (2008). Emergence: Process Organization, not Particle Configuration. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 15(3-4): 57-63.

 

Mark H. Bickhard : Department of Philosophy, 15 University Drive, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA

Email: mhb0 [AT] lehigh.edu

Homepage: http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/mhb0.html
 

ABSTRACT: The intuition of emergence is that new properties, properties that make a causal difference in the world, can emerge in higher level organization. A realm of issues in which the metaphysical possibility (or impossibility) of emergence is focal is the realm of mental phenomena. Are minds ― in particular, yours and mine ― genuine emergents, with causal power in the world, or are they at best epiphenomena, with no consequence? I will argue that the simple intuition of emergence is roughly correct, but that it requires a very non-simple shift in underlying metaphysical framework in order to make sense of it. In particular, it requires a rejection of standard particle or substance metaphysical frameworks in favor of a process metaphysics.
 

http://www.chkjournal.org/?issue=vol_15_issue_4&article=Emergence-%20Process
 

Collier, John (2008). A Dynamical Account of Emergence. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 15(3-4): 75-86.

 

John Collier : School of Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Email: collierj [AT] ukzn.ac.za

Homepage: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier 
 

ABSTRACT: Emergence has traditionally been described as satisfying specific properties, notably nonreducibility of the emergent object or properties to their substrate, novelty, and unpredictability from the properties of the substrate. Sometimes more mysterious properties such as independence from the substrate, separate substances and teleological properties are invoked. I will argue that the latter are both unnecessary and unwarranted. The descriptive properties can be analyzed in more detail in logical terms, but the logical conditions alone do not tell us how to identify the conditions through interactions with the world. In order to do that we need dynamical properties ― properties that do something. This paper, then, will be directed at identifying the dynamical conditions necessary and sufficient for emergence. Emergent properties and objects all result or are maintained by dissipative and radically nonholonomic processes. Emergent properties are relatively common in physics, but have been ignored because of the predominant use of Hamiltonian methods assuming energy conservation. Emergent objects are all dissipative systems, which have been recognized as special only in the past fifty years or so. Of interest are autonomous systems, including living and thinking systems. They show functionality and are self governed.
 

http://www.chkjournal.org/?issue=vol_15_issue_4&article=A%20Dynamical%20Account 

PREPRINT: http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Account%20of%20Emergence.pdf 

 

Vieira, Fabiano de Souza, Charbel Niño El-Hani (2008). Emergence and Downward Determination in the Natural Sciences. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 15(3-4): 101-134.

 

Fabiano de Souza Vieira : Graduate Studies Program in History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching, Universidade Federal da Bahia / Universidade Estadual de Feira de Santana

Email: biosv [AT] hotmail.com

Charbel Niño El-Hani : Associate Professor in the Department of General Biology, Institute of Biology, Federal University of Bahia (UFBa; Universidade Federal da Bahia), Campus de Ondina, CEP: 41270-190 Salvador-BA, Brazil

Email: charbel [AT] ufba.br

Homepage: http://www.gphfecb.ufba.br

See also this URL: http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.jsp?id=K4784764E2
 

ABSTRACT: The problem of downward causation ― that is, the problem of how a higher-level phenomenon can cause or determine or structure a lower-level phenomenon ― is central to emergentism and is also highly debated in the literature on emergence. Downward causation can play, in our view, an important role in the development of our understanding of biological networks and the genotype-phenotype relationship. In order to advance in the discussion of the problem of downward causation, we discuss neo-Aristotelian approaches, which claim that causal modes other than efficient causation are needed to account for this phenomenon, particularly, formal and functional causation. We advocate, rather, that a proper understanding of downward causation demands other kinds of determination, besides causal determination. We develop, thus, an account of downward determination. In particular, we consider two issues: (i) What sorts of "things" are said to be determining and determined in a case of downward determination? (ii) What is the meaning of determining in downward determination? By advancing an attempt to answer these questions, we intend to develop a coherent account about how principles of organization constrain and, thus, partially determine the behavior of a system's lower-level constituents. In this account of downward determination, a higher-level organizational pattern, interpreted as a general principle, is the determiner, while lower-level particular processes are determined. The determining influence from a higher-level general organizational principle to particular lower-level processes, in turn, is framed as follows: If lower-level entities a, b, c, ..., n are under the influence of a general organizational principle, W, then they will show a tendency, a disposition, to instantiate process p or a set of processes {P}. The changes in disposition in downward determination can be treated in terms of Popper's propensities, in such a manner that their probability are not just in our minds, but are instantiated in the world.
 

KEYWORDS: Emergence, Downward determination, Propensities, Downward causation, Reductionism
 

http://www.chkjournal.org/?issue=vol_15_issue_4&article=Emergence
 
 

Some Books Related to Emergence

 

 
 
 

forthcoming
 

 
 
 

지금 2009. 03. 31. 화요일. 늦아침 10시 01분(맑음) ~ 04. 01. 수요일. 낮 3시 18분(맑음) 사이에 작성하다.
 

지금 2009. 04. 15. 수요일. 밤 10시 50분. 흐림. 낮 1시쯤부터 가랑비가 내리다가 4시 ~ 5시 사이에 그쳤다. 조금은 더 많이 왔으면 싶은, 그런 감질나는 봄비였지만... 이제 한층 더 푸른 새 잎을 내고 있는 풀과 나무들에겐 아주 꿀맛같은 단비다. 지난 한식날 돌봐주고 온 산소의 잔디들도 좀더 잘 자라겠지...
 

콸리아 / 퀄리아 / qualia 


댓글(1) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

Philosophy of Science Volume 75, Issue 5, December 2008

Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Part II: Symposia Papers

Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander 
 

 

Original Source Materials for this posting from: Philosophy of Science published by University of Chicago Press

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/phos/current

 
Special Section on: Computational Emergence and Its Applications 
 

Humphreys, Paul (Dec. 2008). Computational and Conceptual Emergence. Philosophy of Science 75(5): 584-594. (DOI: 10.1086/596776). 

 

ABSTRACT: A twofold taxonomy for emergence is presented into which a variety of contemporary accounts of emergence fit. The first taxonomy consists of inferential, conceptual, and ontological emergence; the second of diachronic and synchronic emergence. The adequacy of weak emergence, a computational form of inferential emergence, is then examined and its relationship to conceptual emergence and ontological emergence is detailed.
 

Paul Humphreys†‡

†To contact the author, please write to: Corcoran Department of Philosophy, 120 Cocke Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4780; e-mail: pwh2a [AT] virginia.edu.

Homepage: http://people.virginia.edu/~pwh2a

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphreys,_Paul

‡Conversations and correspondence with Mark Bedau, Philippe Huneman, and Cyrille Imbert have much improved this paper.
 

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/596776
 

Huneman, Philippe (Dec. 2008). Emergence Made Ontological? Computational versus Combinatorial Approaches. Philosophy of Science 75(5): 595-607. (DOI: 10.1086/596777).

 

ABSTRACT: I challenge the usual approach of defining emergence in terms of properties of wholes "emerging" upon properties of parts. This approach indeed fails to meet the requirement of nontriviality, since it renders a bunch of ordinary properties emergent; however, by defining emergence as the incompressibility of a simulation process, we have an objective meaning of emergence because the difference between the processes satisfying the incompressibility criterion and the other processes does not depend on our cognitive abilities. Finally, this definition fulfills the nontriviality and the scientific-adequacy requirements better than the combinatorial approach, emergence here being a predicate of processes rather than of properties.
 

Philippe Huneman†‡

†To contact the author, please write to: Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS/Université Paris I Sorbonne), 13 rue du Four 75006, Paris; e-mail: huneman [AT] wanadoo.fr.

‡I warmly thank Paul Humphreys and John Symons for their precious comments on an earlier version of this article.

 

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/596777

Draft: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003129/01/psa_paper2.doc
 

Symons, John (Dec. 2008). A Computational Modeling Strategy for Levels. Philosophy of Science 75(5): 608-620. (DOI: 10.1086/596775).

 

ABSTRACT: Rather than taking the ontological fundamentality of an ideal microphysics as a starting point, this article sketches an approach to the problem of levels that swaps assumptions about ontology for assumptions about inquiry. These assumptions can be implemented formally via computational modeling techniques that will be described below. It is argued that these models offer a way to save some of our prominent commonsense intuitions concerning levels. This strategy offers a way of exploring the individuation of higher level properties in a systematic and formally constrained manner.
 

John Symons†

†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Worrell Hall 306, 500 University Avenue, University of Texas, El Paso, TX 79968; e-mail: jsymons [AT] utep.edu.

Homepage: http://www.johnfsymons.com
 

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/596775

Draft: http://www.johnfsymons.com/A%20Computational%20Modeling%20strategy%20for%20levles.pdf
 
 

Related Books on Emergence

 

 
 

forthcoming
 
 

 
 
 

2009. 03. 22. 일요일. 아침 9시 53분부터 03. 24. 화요일. 늦은 6시 09분 사이에 작성하다.
 

지금 2009. 04. 11. 토요일. 새벽밤 01시 52분. 맑음. 지금 케이비에스(KBS) 1 텔레비전에서는 명화극장 프로그램으로 멜 깁슨(Mel Gibson) 감독 작품인 “The Passion of The Christ”를 하고 있다. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Passion_of_the_Christ)
 

콸리아 / 퀄리아 / qualia 


댓글(0) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

MINDS and MACHINES Volume18 , Number 4, December 2008

Special Section on Dynamic Emergence and Computation

Guest Editors: Paul Humphreys and Philippe Huneman

 

 

Original Source Materials for this posting from: Minds and Machines published by Springer-Verlag

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h62h13007427/?p=d4d10065371e4afa90d9a9fbfd9712d1&pi=1
 

Huneman, Philippe, Paul Humphreys (Dec. 2008). Dynamical Emergence and Computation: An Introduction. Minds and Machines 18(4): 425-430. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9124-4).

 

Received: 20 November 2007, Accepted: 5 May 2008, Published online: 19 November 2008
 

Philippe Huneman1 and Paul Humphreys1

(1) Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, 120 Cocke Hall, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4780, USA

Paul Humphreys, Email: pwh2a [AT] virginia.edu

Homepage: http://people.virginia.edu/~pwh2a

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphreys,_Paul
 

The first page of this paper:

For the last two decades or so, "emergence" has proved to be one of the central issues in many sciences. We are inclined to speak of emergence when, seemingly, some features appear in a system which are either irreducible to the properties of lower-level entities, or are unpredictable from the equations governing the behavior of the parts, or are "new" or novel in some way. In the natural sciences as well as in the human sciences, examples are quite common: the appearance of phase transitions, of traffic-jams, of cell colonies, and so on.

     A quick survey of the literature allow us to distinguish at least two forms of emergence: the first type sometimes being called "synchronic emergence," because the emergent features of the upper level are given as soon as the lower level is there (e.g., mental states, according to some psychological theories), while the second type requires some time to appear (e.g., evolutionary transitions in the history of life), so that it can be called "diachronic emergence" or dynamical emergence. One approach to diachronic emergent phenomena takes them as unpredictable in an analytical way from the equations of the system (the kind of analyticity involved needs to be carefully elaborated), so that one of the only ways to study them is through simulations, namely, ascribing simple ― possibly deterministic ― rules to a set of elements in order to see what happens after a determinate time. The Game of Life, Cellular Automata in general, or the whole field of Artificial Life, are instances of such kinds of models. Although structurally different (because of their use of random methods) genetic algorithms as conceived by Holland are dealing with similar kinds of problems. This establishes a close link between the concept of emergence and computation or computer simulations, which can perhaps be captured by the idea that an emergent phenomenon is one that arises from a ...
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h5w76102v8192vk5/?p=92186dbf0e7448b290e754ea58800e41&pi=0
 

Humphreys, Paul (Dec. 2008). Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence. Minds and Machines 18(4): 431-442. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9125-3).

 

Received: 15 December 2007, Accepted: 10 May 2008, Published online: 27 November 2008
 

Paul Humphreys : Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA

Email: pwh2a [AT] virginia.edu

Homepage: http://people.virginia.edu/~pwh2a

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphreys,_Paul
 

ABSTRACT: I discuss here a number of different kinds of diachronic emergence, noting that they differ in important ways from synchronic conceptions. I argue that Bedau's weak emergence has an essentially historical aspect, in that there can be two indistinguishable states, one of which is weakly emergent, the other of which is not. As a consequence, weak emergence is about tokens, not types, of states. I conclude by examining the question of whether the concept of weak emergence is too weak and note that there is at present no unifying account of diachronic and synchronic concepts of emergence.
 

KEYWORDS: Weak emergence · Supervenience · Pattern emergence · Cellular automaton · Randomness
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/d442431150343t17/?p=77b2aa2849b146aba5551f07d4d10501&pi=1 

Draft: http://people.virginia.edu/~pwh2a/dynamic%20emergence%20Humphreys%20article.pdf 

 

Bedau, Mark A. (Dec. 2008). Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind? Minds and Machines 18(4): 443-459. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9122-6).

 

Received: 4 December 2007, Accepted: 5 May 2008, Published online: 4 November 2008
 

Mark A. Bedau1, 2

(1) Department of Philosophy, Reed College, Vollum College Center 141, 3203 SE Woodstock Blvd., Portland, OR 97202-8199, USA. Email: mab [AT] reed.edu

(2) European School of Molecular Medicine, Milan, Italy

Homepage: http://people.reed.edu/~mab
 

ABSTRACT: Weak emergence is the view that a system's macro properties can be explained by its micro properties but only in an especially complicated way. This paper explains a version of weak emergence based on the notion of explanatory incompressibility and "crawling the causal web." Then it examines three reasons why weak emergence might be thought to be just in the mind. The first reason is based on contrasting mere epistemological emergence with a form of ontological emergence that involves irreducible downward causation. The second reason is based on the idea that attributions of emergence are always a reflection of our ignorance of non-emergent explanations. The third reason is based on the charge that complex explanations are anthropocentric. Rather than being just in the mind, weak emergence is seen to involve a distinctive kind of complex, macro-pattern in the mind-independent objective micro-causal structure that exists in nature. The paper ends by addressing two further questions. One concerns whether weak emergence applies only or mainly to computer simulations and computational systems. The other concerns the respect in which weak emergence is dynamic rather than static.
 

KEYWORDS: Weak emergence · Epistemological emergence · Dynamic emergence · Computational emergence · Micro-causal network · Micro-causal web · Explanatory incompressibility
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/q77202454h5w8241/?p=77b2aa2849b146aba5551f07d4d10501&pi=2
 

Hovda, Paul (Dec. 2008). Quantifying Weak Emergence. Minds and Machines 18(4): 461-473. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9123-5).

 

Received: 7 November 2007, Accepted: 3 May 2008, Published online: 11 November 2008
 

Paul Hovda : Department of Philosophy, Reed College, Vollum College Center 141, 3203 SE Woodstock Blvd., Portland, OR 97202-8199, USA

Email: paul.hovda [AT] reed.edu

Homepage: http://www.reed.edu/~hovdap
 

ABSTRACT: The concept of weak emergence is a refinement or specification of the intuitive, general notion of emergence. Basically, a fact about a system is said to be weakly emergent if its holding both (i) is derivable from the fundamental laws of the system together with some set of basic (non-emergent) facts about it, and yet (ii) is only derivable in a particular manner, called "simulation." This essay analyzes the application of this notion Conway's Game of Life, and concludes that a modification of the notion would provide a better refinement of the general notion of emergence. It is proposed that emergence be taken as a matter of degree, defined in terms of the amount of simulation required to derive a fact.
 

KEYWORDS: Emergence · Simulation · Computation
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/f71w28u0j637k331/?p=77b2aa2849b146aba5551f07d4d10501&pi=3
 

Symons, John (Dec. 2008). Computational Models of Emergent Properties. Minds and Machines 18(4): 475-491. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9120-8).

 

Received: 15 November 2007, Accepted: 3 May 2008, Published online: 14 November 2008
 

John Symons : Department of Philosophy, University of Texas, El Paso, TX, USA

Email: jsymons [AT] utep.edu

Homepage: http://www.johnfsymons.com
 

ABSTRACT: Computational models fail to shed light on general metaphysical questions concerning the nature of emergence. At the same time, they may provide plausible explanations of particular cases of emergence. This paper outlines the kinds of modest explanations to which computational models are suited.
 

KEYWORDS: Emergence · Computational models · Explanation · Cellular automata
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/46203036557005l6/?p=77b2aa2849b146aba5551f07d4d10501&pi=4

Draft: http://www.johnfsymons.com/Computational%20Models%20of%20Emergent%20Properties.pdf
 

Huneman, Philippe (Dec. 2008). Emergence and Adaptation. Minds and Machines 18(4): 493-520. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-008-9121-7).

 

Received: 18 November 2007, Accepted: 5 May 2008, Published online: 21 November 2008
 

Philippe Huneman : IHPST (CNRS/Université Paris I Sorbonne), Paris, France
 

ABSTRACT: I investigate the relationship between adaptation, as defined in evolutionary theory through natural selection, and the concept of emergence. I argue that there is an essential correlation between the former, and "emergence" defined in the field of algorithmic simulations. I first show that the computational concept of emergence (in terms of incompressible simulation) can be correlated with a causal criterion of emergence (in terms of the specificity of the explanation of global patterns). On this ground, I argue that emergence in general involves some sort of selective processes. Finally, I show that a second criterion, concerning novel explanatory regularities following the emergence of a pattern, captures the robustness of emergence displayed by some cases of emergence (according to the first criterion). Emergent processes fulfilling both criteria are therefore exemplified in evolutionary biology by some so-called "innovations", and mostly by the new units of fitness or new kinds of adaptations (like sexual reproduction, multicellular organisms, cells, societies) sometimes called "major transitions in evolution", that recent research programs (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995 Michod 1999) aims at explaining.
 

KEYWORDS: Causation · Emergence · Adaptation · Evolutionary transitions · Cellular automata · Macrostates · Robustness
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/6032375664744422/?p=77b2aa2849b146aba5551f07d4d10501&pi=5
 
 

Related Books on Emergence

 

 
 
 

forthcoming
 

 
 
 

 
 
 

2009. 03. 25. 수요일. 맑음. 꽃샘추위 사흘째. 낮 12시 24분부터 다른 관련 서지 사항과 함께 작성하기 시작해 밤 8시 30분쯤 완성하다.
 

지금 2009. 04. 10. 금요일. 낮 1시 50분. 맑음. 아주 좋은 날씨다. 맞은편 신축 공사장에서 망치 소리가 한가롭게 들려온다. 방문 앞의 수수꽃다리는 연보라색 꽃을 막 피우고 있다. 꽃향기가 은은하게 콧속으로 흘러들어 온다.
 

콸리아 / 퀄리아 / qualia 


댓글(1) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

 

                                 창발적 속성(Emergent properties) 
  

                                 Ricard V. Solé and Jordi Bascompte 
  

(원문 출처: Solé, Ricard V. and Jordi Bascompte (Mar. 2006). Self-Organization in Complex Ecosystems. Princeton University Press. pp. 10~13).
  

                                    EMERGENT PROPERTIES
  

One key ingredient to be introduced in this book is the presence of emergent phenomena. Often, when looking at the macroscopic features of a given system, scientists have tried to find the origin of these properties by looking at the structure of their component parts. Such a view roughly defined the reductionist approach (Wilson, 1998). But the fact that the properties of the individual units cannot always explain the whole has been known from the earliest times of science. In this context, it is often said that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, meaning that the global behavior exhibited by a given system will display different features from those associated to its individual components. A more appropriate statement would be that “the whole is something else than the sum of its parts” since in most cases completely different properties arise from the interactions among components. As an example, the properties of water that make this molecule so unique for life cannot be explained in terms of the separate properties of hydrogen and oxygen, even though we can understand them in detail from quantum mechanical principles. The same limitations apply to biology: Some properties such as memory in the brain cannot be reduced to the understanding of single neurons (Solé and Goodwin, 2001). Life itself is a good example: nucleic acids, proteins, or lipids are not “alive” by themselves. It is the cooperation among different sets that actually creates a self-sustained, evolvable pattern called life. Over the last decades of the twentieth century the shortcomings of the reductionist approach had become increasingly apparent, and at some point a new type of view, known as integrative biology began to emerge.
  

Is reductionism the appropriate way of exploring complex systems? This is a debated issue. Within physics, extreme reductionists are not difficult to find. Advocates of reductionism, such as E. O. Wilson, have pointed out that modern science has been successful largely because of the analytic approach to reality (Wilson, 1998). But this view is being abandoned and replaced by a more global view of reality that takes into account the emergence of new properties. Let us consider one example.
  

Imagine a system composed by a set of n interacting species S1, ..., Sn whose populations are indicated as x1, ..., xn. The interactions are schematically described in figure 1.5a for n = 6. The diagram indicates that each species requires the help of another one for its growth to occur: species S2 needs S1, species S3 needs S2, et cetera. This model was introduced within the context of prebiotic evolution: molecular species would cooperate to enhance their success by means of this so-called hypercycle (Eigen and Schuster, 1979). Species abundances can reach steady states, oscillate, or behave in very complex, unpredictable ways. The cooperation requires the presence of all components: the lack of a single species destroys the hypercycle.
  

In spite of its simplicity, the hypercycle displays an enormous set of dynamical patterns, and its relevance goes far beyond molecular replicators (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995; Cronhjort and Blomberg, 1997). Consider now a simple extension of the previous model. The units (molecules or organisms) move now in a two-dimensional spatial domain where initially we place random amounts of individuals of each species at each site. The domain can be a discrete square lattice of patches where each patch is linked to its four nearest ones. Movement takes place locally, and interactions (as they occur in reality) are also localized in space. Cooperation thus takes place in a well-defined spatial context where units diffuse toward the nearest locations, and interactions are limited to available molecules in a neighborhood. The surprise comes from simulating the previous model (Boerlijst and Hogeweg, 1991; Chacon and Nuño, 1995; Cronhjort, 1995) on a lattice. An example of this is shown in figure 1.5b, where the local concentration of the first species is shown for different points on a 50 × 50 lattice. In spite of the fact that interactions only occur inside a given patch and that molecules or individuals can only move step by step between nearest lattice sites, a large-scale structure has been formed. The size of this structure has a length that is similar to the whole spatial domain and thus its origins cannot be explained from the local nature of the interactions. The spiral wave is a common motif of patterns emerging in models of interacting populations (chapter 3) as a result of a collective synchronization phenomenon.
  

FIGURE 1.5. Emergence of long-range order in a set of cooperating species. In (A) the basic scheme of species interactions is shown. Here the reproduction of each species requires the help of another one. Such a dependence is closed, forming a catalytic cycle (the so-called hypercycle). When these populations interact within a spatially explicit, local context, complex structures, such as spiral waves (B) emerge. Here the population size of the first species S1 (x, y) is shown.
(그림 1.5는 다음 원문에서 참조하시기 바람 ⇒ http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8224.pdf)
  

Spiral waves emerge from a large number of nonlinear models with local interactions. The origin of the spatial structure can be properly explained once the transfer of information introduced by diffusion is taken into account. In other words, once local interactions among nearest sites are considered. These spiral waves cannot be reduced to the knowledge of the interactions among components and represent an emergent phenomenon with little relation to the species-specific features of individuals. Only interaction and diffusion rates are required in order to obtain a complete picture of the emerging structure. The impact of these structures on evolutionary responses has been explored by a number of authors (Boerlijst and Hogeweg, 1991; Boerlijst et al., 1993). Spiral waves in the invasion of parasites, and in a more general context spatially extended patterns, pervade ecological complexity and affect how ecosystems react against external stresses (chapters 3 and 5). Biodiversity patterns are also mediated by the fact that interactions are spatially localized. To a large extent, the limitations imposed by spatial interactions have a creative impact on ecological structures, allowing many different strategies to emerge (chapter 6).

  

References 
  
Boerlijst, M. C. and Paulien Hogeweg (1991a). Self-structuring and selection: spiral waves as a substrate for evolution. In C. G. Langton (ed.) Artificial Life II. ( pp. 255-276). Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
  
Boerlijst, M. C. and P. Hogeweg (1991b). Spiral wave structure in pre-biotic evolution: Hypercycles stable against parasites. Physica D 48(1): 17-28.
  
Boerlijst, M. C., M. E. Lamers, and P. Hogeweg (1993). Evolutionary consequences of spiral waves in a host-parasitoid system. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B 253: 15-18.
  
Chacón, P. and J. C. Nuño (1995). Spatial dynamics of a model for prebiotic evolution. Physica D 81(4): 398-410. (DOI: 10.1016/0167-2789(94)00214-B).
  
Cronhjort, Mikael B. (June 1995). Hypercycles versus parasites in the origin of life: model dependence in spatial hypercycle systems. Origins of Life and Evolution of  Biospheres 25(1-3): 227-233.
  
Cronhjort, Mikael B. and Clas Blomberg (1997). Cluster compartmentalization may provide resistance to parasites for catalytic networks. Physica D 101(3-4): 289-298.
  
Eigen, Manfred and Peter Schuster (1979). The Hypercycle: A Principle of Natural Self-Organization. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
  
Maynard Smith, John and Eörs Szathmáry (1995). The Major Transitions in Evolution. W. H. Freeman. 
  
Solé
, Ricard V. and Brian C. Goodwin (2001). Signs of Life: How Complexity Pervades Biology. Basic Books / HarperCollins Publishers.
  
Wilson, Edward Osborne (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. Knopf.
  

▷ 원문 출처:  『생태복잡계 내의 자기조직화 Self-Organization in Complex Ecosystems』(2006). 

  


  

원문 (프린스턴 대학 출판부에서 무료로 제공하는 맛보기 자료임). 
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8224.pdf 
   


  

Ricard V. Solé is ICREA research professor (the Catalan Institute for research and Advanced Studies), the head of the COMPLEX SYSTEMS LAB in the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain), and External Professor of the Santa Fe Institute (New Mexico, USA). Email: ricard.sole (AT) upf.edu

Ricard V. Solé's Home page:  http://complex.upf.es/~ricard/ 

  


  

Jordi Bascompte is Professor of Research at the Estación Biológica de Doñana (Doñana Biological Station), Sevilla, Spain. Email: bascompte (AT) ebd.csic.es

Jordi Bascompte's Home page: http://bascompte.net/

  

  

  

지금 2008. 02. 18. 월요일. 맑음. 날씨 풀림. 밤 9시 55분. 

콸리아/퀄리아/qualia 

  


댓글(0) 먼댓글(0) 좋아요(0)
좋아요
북마크하기찜하기
 
 
 

    

               창발 ― 철학과 과학에서의 창발 문헌들 (2)  

  

     Emergence in Philosophy and Science: An Extended Bibliography

  

                       assembled and compiled by YSCW-Qualia

  

                             Last updated: June 21(Sat.), 2008

  
  

Aranyosi, István (Mar. 2008). Excluding exclusion: the natural(istic) dualist approach. Philosophical Explorations 11(1): 67-78. (DOI: 10.1080/13869790701799206). 
  

István Aranyosi: Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
  

Abstract: The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism - its form, commitments, and intuitions - makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise.
  

Keywords: Donald Davidson; dualism; exclusion problem; Jaegwon Kim; mental causation

  

   

◈ Baianu, Ion C., Ronald Brown, and James F. Glazebrook (Dec. 2007). Categorical Ontology of Complex Spacetime Structures: The Emergence of Life and Human Consciousness. Axiomathes 17(3-4): 223-352. (DOI:10.1007/s10516-007-9011-2).
  

I. C. Baianu 1, R. Brown 2,  and J. F. Glazebrook 3

(1) FSHN and NPRE Departments, AFC-NMR and NIR Microspectroscopy Facility, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA, Email: ibaianu(AT)uiuc.edu

(2) School of Informatics, University of Wales, Dean St., Bangor, Gwynedd, LL57 1UT, UK, Email: ronnie.profbrown(AT)btinternet.com 

(3) Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eastern Illinois University, 600 Lincoln Ave., Charleston, IL 61920-3099, USA, Email: jfglazebrook(AT)eiu.edu
  

Received: 16 June 2007  Accepted: 25 June 2007  Published online: 22 November 2007
  

Abstract: A categorical ontology of space and time is presented for emergent biosystems, super-complex dynamics, evolution and human consciousness. Relational structures of organisms and the human mind are naturally represented in non-abelian categories and higher dimensional algebra. The ascent of man and other organisms through adaptation, evolution and social co-evolution is viewed in categorical terms as variable biogroupoid representations of evolving species. The unifying theme of local-to-global approaches to organismic development, evolution and human consciousness leads to novel patterns of relations that emerge in super- and ultra- complex systems in terms of colimits of biogroupoids, and more generally, as compositions of local procedures to be defined in terms of locally Lie groupoids. Solutions to such local-to-global problems in highly complex systems with ‘broken symmetry’ may be found with the help of generalized van Kampen theorems in algebraic topology such as the Higher Homotopy van Kampen theorem (HHvKT). Primordial organism structures are predicted from the simplest metabolic-repair systems extended to self-replication through autocatalytic reactions. The intrinsic dynamic ‘asymmetry’ of genetic networks in organismic development and evolution is investigated in terms of categories of many-valued, Łukasiewicz-Moisil logic algebras and then compared with those obtained for (non-commutative) quantum logics. The claim is defended in this essay that human consciousness is unique and should be viewed as an ultra-complex, global process of processes. The emergence of consciousness and its existence seem dependent upon an extremely complex structural and functional unit with an asymmetric network topology and connectivities―the human brain―that developed through societal co-evolution, elaborate language/symbolic communication and ‘virtual’, higher dimensional, non-commutative processes involving separate space and time perceptions. Philosophical theories of the mind are approached from the theory of levels and ultra-complexity viewpoints which throw new light on previous representational hypotheses and proposed semantic models in cognitive science. Anticipatory systems and complex causality at the top levels of reality are also discussed in the context of the ontological theory of levels with its complex/entangled/intertwined ramifications in psychology, sociology and ecology. The presence of strange attractors in modern society dynamics gives rise to very serious concerns for the future of mankind and the continued persistence of a multi-stable biosphere. A paradigm shift towards non-commutative, or non-Abelian, theories of highly complex dynamics is suggested to unfold now in physics, mathematics, life and cognitive sciences, thus leading to the realizations of higher dimensional algebras in neurosciences and psychology, as well as in human genomics, bioinformatics and interactomics.
  

Keywords: Space, time, chronotopoids and spacetime, ST - ST in automata vs. quantum automata and organisms - Categorical ontology and the theory of levels - Relational biology principles - What is life and life's multiple logics, LM- and Q-logic - Organismic categories and relational patterns - Abelian vs. non-Abelian theories - Commutativity limitations in logics, mathematics, physics and emergent systems - Łukasiewicz-Moisil logic algebras of genetic networks and interactomes - Homo erectus, habilis and sapiens - Australopithecus and chimpanzees (Pan) -  The emergence of hominins and hominoides - Cognitive science - Mental representations and intentionality - Brentano, Harman, Dennett, Field and Fodor's philosophy of the mind - Higher dimensional algebra of brain functions - Higher Homotopy-General Van Kampen Theorems (HHvKT) and Non-Abelian Algebraic Topology (NAAT) - Non-commutativity of diagrams and non-Abelian theories - Non-Abelian categorical ontology - Non-commutative topological invariants of complex dynamic state spaces - Double groupoids and quantum double groupoids - Natural transformations in molecular and relational biology - Molecular class variables (mcv) - Natural transformations and the Yoneda-Grothendieck Lemma/construction - The Primordial MR and Archea unicellular organisms - Evolution and memory evolutive systems (MES) - The Thalamocortical model, categorical limits, colimits and MES - Biogroupoids - Variable groupoids, variable categories, variable topology and atlas structures - Irreversibility and open systems - Selective boundaries vs. horizons - Universal temporality - Occam'razor and reductionist approaches - Super-complex systems and brain dynamics - Global and local aspects of biological evolution in terms of colimits of variable biogroupoids, or as chains and compositions of local procedures (COLPs) of locally Lie groupoids in the evolution and co-evolution of species - What is consciousness and synaesthesia? - The human mind, human consciousness and brain dynamics viewed as non-Abelian ultra-complex processes - Emergence of human consciousness through co-evolution/social interactions and symbolic communication - Rosetta biogroupoids as models of human social interactions - Objectivation and memes - Anticipation and feedforward - Systems of internal representations, propositional attitudes and sentence-analogs - Tarskian compositional semantics - Moral duality and strange attractors of modern society dynamics 

  

  

◈ Bailey, Andrew (June 2007). Qualia and the Argument from Illusion: A Defence of Figment. Acta Analytica 22(2): 85-103. (DOI: 10.1007/s12136-007-0002-0). 

  

Andrew Bailey: Department of Philosophy, The University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1, Canada 
  

Received: 15 March 2007  Accepted: 15 April 2007  Published online: 10 July 2007 

  

Abstract: This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours and other qualities that 'fill' our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the 'objective' properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly labels 'figment,' but this result—though metaphysically and epistemologically significant—is not incompatible with either physicalism or naturalized semantics. 
  

Keywords:   Transparency - Representationalism - Intentionalism - Consciousness - Physicalism - Qualia - Illusion 

  

  

◈ Banerjee, Rahul and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.) ( Apr. 11, 2008). Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational and Psychological Approaches, (Progress in Brain Research, Volume 168). Academic Press. 

  


  

Rahul Banerjee (Editor): Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Calcutta, India 

Bikas K. Chakrabarti (Editor): Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, Calcutta, India 

  

Contents

1. Ralph Freeman: Neurometabolic Coupling in the Central Visual Pathway 

2. Zoltán Dienes: Subjective Measures of Unconscious Knowledge

3. Axel Cleeremans: The Dynamics of Consciousness : Temporal Factors Shape Interactions Between Conscious and Unconscious Information Processing 

4. Hakwan Lau: Consciousness ― Simple Information Processing 

5. Narayanan Srinivasan: Attention and Consciousness 

6. Igor Aleksander: Computational Studies of Consciousness 

7. Nandini Chatterjee Singh: Temporal Processing in Speech Production ― New Insights from a Computational Approach 

8. Sisir Roy and Rodolfo Llinás: Dynamic Geometry, Brain Function Modeling and Consciousness 

9. Bikas K. Chakrabarti: Modelling Neural Networks 

10. Jun-Ichi Inoue: A Simple Hopfield-like cellular network model of Plant Intelligence 

11. Klaus Mainzer: The Emergence of Mind and Brain An Evolutionary, Computational and Philosophical Approach 

12. Max Velmans: Separating Conceptual Issues from Empirical Ones in the Study of Consciousness 

13. J. P. Balodhi: Brain, Consciousness & Self : Indian Perspective 

14. Dhananjay Chavan: Vipassana Meditation: Buddha's Tool to Probe Mind and Matter 

15. Rahul Banerjee: Buddha and the Bridging Relations

  

  

◈ Bartels, Andreas and Semir Zeki (Apr. 29, 2005). The chronoarchitecture of the cerebral cortex. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society Series B: Biological Sciences 360(1456): 733-750. (DOI:10.1098/rstb.2005.1627). 
  

Andreas Bartels 1, 2, Semir Zeki 1

1. University College London Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
2. Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics Spemannstrasse 38, 72076 Tübingen, Germany 
  

Abstract: We review here a new approach to mapping the human cerebral cortex into distinct subdivisions. Unlike cytoarchitecture or traditional functional imaging, it does not rely on specific anatomical markers or functional hypotheses. Instead, we propose that the unique activity time course (ATC) of each cortical subdivision, elicited during natural conditions, acts as a temporal fingerprint that can be used to segregate cortical subdivisions, map their spatial extent, and reveal their functional and potentially anatomical connectivity. We argue that since the modular organisation of the brain and its connectivity evolved and developed in natural conditions, these are optimal for revealing its organisation. We review the concepts, methodology and first results of this approach, relying on data obtained with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) when volunteers viewed traditional stimuli or a James Bond movie. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to identify voxels belonging to distinct functional subdivisions, based on their differential spatio-temporal fingerprints. Many more regions could be segregated during natural viewing, demonstrating that the complexity of natural stimuli leads to more differential responses in more functional modules. We demonstrate that, in a single experiment, a multitude of distinct regions can be identified across the whole brain, even within the visual cortex, including areas V1, V4 and V5. This differentiation is based entirely on the differential ATCs of different areas during natural viewing. Distinct areas can therefore be identified without any a priori hypothesis about their function or spatial location. The areas we identified corresponded anatomically across subjects, and their ATCs showed highly area-specific inter-subject correlations. Furthermore, natural conditions led to a significant de-correlation of interregional ATCs compared to rest, indicating an increase in regional specificity during natural conditions. In contrast, the correlation between ATCs of distant regions of known substantial anatomical connections increased and reflected their known anatomical connectivity pattern. We demonstrate this using the example of the language network involving Broca's and Wernicke's area and homologous areas in the two hemispheres. In conclusion, this new approach to brain mapping may not only serve to identify novel functional subdivisions, but to reveal their connectivity as well. 
  

Keywords: fMRI, independent component analysis, cytoarchitecture, functional neuroconnectivity, movie, natural vision 
   
   

◈ Barz, Wolfgang (Sep. 5, 2007). Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness? Acta Analytica 22(3): 183-188. (DOI:10.1007/s12136-007-0007-8).

  

Wolfgang Barz: Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Philosophie, Habelschwerdter Allee 30, 14195 Berlin, Germany 

  

Received: 1 August 2006  Accepted: 31 July 2007  Published online: 5 September 2007

  

Abstract:  It is argued that Searle's argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle's argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of 'aspectual shape' and 'irreducibly subjective,' I conclude that each version of Searle's argument incorporates at least one false premise.

  

Keywords:  Intentionality - Consciousness - Searle - Aspectual shape - Subjectivity 

   

This paper is a descendant of a paper presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel in August 2004. I would like to thank the reviewer of this journal for his/her helpful comments on a previous draft. 

  

     

Bayne, Tim (Dec. 2007). Conscious states and conscious creatures: Explanation in the scientific study of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21(1): 1-22. (doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00118.x).
  

Tim Bayne : St. Catherine's College, University of Oxford
  

Issue online: 06 Dec 2007
  

  

Bealer, George (Dec. 2007). Mental Causation. Philosophical Perspectives 21(1): 23-54. (doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00119.x). 
  

George Bealer : Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, Email: george.bealer(AT)yale.edu, URL: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~gb275 
  

Issue online: 06 Dec 2007 

  

 

◈ Bedau, Mark A. (2007, forthcoming). Pluralism about emergence in biology.

  

Reed College, Portland, Oregon, United States

  

Emergence is an appealing and seemingly natural notion to apply to many biological phenomena, including those in molecular biology. But it is also confusing and controversial. The concept is enmired in disputes about downward causation, subjectivity, and irreducibility, among other things, and there is a zoo of emergence concepts that have been defined and defended in the literature. Although there is a general assumption in this literature that one ought to develop and defend the one proper analysis of emergence, by contrast I will defend pluralism about emergence. This pluralism will be grounded in a general theory that any legitimate conception of emergence must fall under. I will show how a number of different conceptions of emergence are unified by this general theory, especially the three most popular approaches to emergence: what in other publications I have called "nominal" emergence, "weak" emergence, and "strong" emergence. I will then explain how nominal and especially weak emergence have a legitimate and interesting application to molecular biology. I will also show how these two conceptions of emergence defuse all serious worries about the metaphysical legitimacy and epistemological appropriateness of emergence. 

   

  

◈ Bering, Jesse M. (Oct. 2006). The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29(5): 453-462. (doi:10.1017/S0140525X06009101). 

  

Jesse M. Bering: Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, United Kingdom. 

   
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/InstituteofCognitionCulture/Staff/JesseMBering

  

Published online by Cambridge University Press 08 Dec. 2006

  

Abstract: The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment. 

   

Key Words: causal reasoning; death concept; evolutionary theory; existential psychology; folk biology; intelligent design; intentionality; mental representation; teleological reasoning; theory of mind.

   

http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/InstituteofCognitionCulture/Staff/JesseMBering/FileStore/Filetoupload,37919,en.pdf

   

  

◈ Bird, Alexander (Dec. 2007). Causal Exclusion and Evolved Emergent Properties. In Ruth Groff (ed.) Revitalizing Causality: Realism about Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge. 

  

Abstract: Emergent properties are intended to be genuine, natural higher level causally efficacious properties irreducible to physical ones. At the same time they are somehow dependent on or 'emergent from' complexes of physical properties, so that the doctrine of emergent properties is not supposed to be return to dualism. The doctrine faces two challenges: (i) to explain precisely how it is that such properties emerge - what is emergence; (ii) to explain how they sidestep the exclusion problem - how it is that there is room for these properties to be causally efficacious, given the causal completeness of the physical. In this paper I explain how evolved functional properties can meet both challenges. 

  

http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plajb/research/papers/Exclusion_and_emergence.pdf 

  

  

◈ Breakspear, Michael and Cornelis J. Stam (May 29, 2005). Dynamics of a neural system with a multiscale architecture. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society Series B: Biological Sciences 360(1457): 1051-1074. (DOI:10.1098/rstb.2005.1643).

  

Michael Breakspear 1, 2, 3, Cornelis J. Stam 4

1. University of New South Wales The Black Dog Institute, Prince of Wales Hospital and School of Psychiatry Randwick, NSW 2031, Australia

2. Westmead Hospital Brain Dynamics Centre Westmead, NSW 2145, Australia 

3. University of Sydney School of Physics, A28 NSW 2006, Australia 

4. VU University Medical Centre Department of Clinical Neurophysiology Amsterdam, The Netherlands 

  

Abstract: The architecture of the brain is characterized by a modular organization repeated across a hierarchy of spatial scales−neurons, minicolumns, cortical columns, functional brain regions, and so on. It is important to consider that the processes governing neural dynamics at any given scale are not only determined by the behaviour of other neural structures at that scale, but also by the emergent behaviour of smaller scales, and the constraining influence of activity at larger scales. In this paper, we introduce a theoretical framework for neural systems in which the dynamics are nested within a multiscale architecture. In essence, the dynamics at each scale are determined by a coupled ensemble of nonlinear oscillators, which embody the principle scale-specific neurobiological processes. The dynamics at larger scales are 'slaved' to the emergent behaviour of smaller scales through a coupling function that depends on a multiscale wavelet decomposition. The approach is first explicated mathematically. Numerical examples are then given to illustrate phenomena such as between-scale bifurcations, and how synchronization in small-scale structures influences the dynamics in larger structures in an intuitive manner that cannot be captured by existing modelling approaches. A framework for relating the dynamical behaviour of the system to measured observables is presented and further extensions to capture wave phenomena and mode coupling are suggested.

  

Keywords: neural dynamics, functional connectivity, multiscale decomposition, nonlinear bifurcations 

  

  

Bregant, Janez (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3(9): 305-320. 

  

Summary: It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of the causal closure of the physical domain; if they do not have them, we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies any sort of causal powers to the mental. So, either we violate the causal closure of physics, or we end up with epiphenomenalism. 

  

The first two sections of the article describe the problem of causal exclusion and Kim's causal dilemma. The last two introduce Horgan's anti-reductionist answer and my objection to that answer. 

   

  

Bruzzo, Angela Alessia and Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (Dec. 2007). Self: an adaptive pressure arising from self-organization, chaotic dynamics, and neural darwinism. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 6(4): 541-568. (DOI: 10.1142/S0129635207001659). 

  
Bruzzo A. A. 1, Vimal R. L. 2

1. Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, 40100 Bologna, Italy

2. Vision Research Institute, 428 Great Road, Suite 11, Acton, MA 01720, USA 
Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India 

  

Received: 25 September 2007, Accepted: 15 October 2007 

   

Abstract: In this article, we establish a model to delineate the emergence of "self" in the brain making recourse to the theory of chaos. Self is considered as the subjective experience of a subject. As essential ingredients of subjective experiences, our model includes wakefulness, re-entry, attention, memory, and proto-experiences. The stability as stated by chaos theory can potentially describe the non-linear function of "self" as sensitive to initial conditions and can characterize it as underlying order from apparently random signals. Self-similarity is discussed as a latent menace of a pathological confusion between "self" and "others". Our test hypothesis is that (1) consciousness might have emerged and evolved from a primordial potential or proto-experience in matter, such as the physical attractions and repulsions experienced by electrons, and (2) "self" arises from chaotic dynamics, self-organization and selective mechanisms during ontogenesis, while emerging post-ontogenically as an adaptive pressure driven by both volume and synaptic-neural transmission and influencing the functional connectivity of neural nets (structure). 

   

Revised Abstract: In this article, we establish a model to delineate the emergence of "self" in the brain making recourse to the theory of chaos. Self is considered as the subjective experience of a subject. As essential ingredients of subjective experiences, our model includes wakefulness, re-entry, attention, memory, and proto-experiences. The stability as stated by chaos theory can potentially describe the non-linear function of "self" as sensitive to initial conditions and can characterize it as underlying order from apparently random signals. Self-similarity is discussed as a latent menace of a pathological confusion between "self" and "others". Our test hypothesis is that (1) consciousness might have emerged and evolved from a primordial potential or proto-experience in matter, where inert matter is the carrier of subjective experiences; and (2) "self" arises from chaotic dynamics, self-organization and selective mechanisms during ontogenesis, while emerging post-ontogenically as an adaptive pressure driven by both volume and synaptic-neural transmission and influencing the functional connectivity of neural nets (structure). 

  

Keywords: Self, self organization, chaos theory, attractor, depersonalization, emergent property, fractals, metastability, consciousness, proto-experience, subjective experience, stability of time

  

  

Buchanan, A., G. Gazzola, & M. A. Bedau (2006). Evolutionary design of a model of self-assembling chemical structures. In Natalio Krasnogor, Steve Gustafson, David A. Pelta & Jose L. Verdegay (eds.) Systems self-assembly: multidisciplinary snapshots. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science. 
  
  

Burkhardt, Hans, Johanna Seibt, and Guido Imaguire (eds.) (Oct. 2007). Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag. (700pp., index, bibliography, library binding). 
  
Mereology is the investigation of part-whole relationships within all domains of reality and conceptualisation. Research in mereology has a long history and a high degree of theoretical articulation yet still lacks a synoptic presentation. The Handbook of Mereology collects international research in this fundamental philosophical discipline in a comprehensive volume, treating a wide range of issues in theoretical mereology, applied mereology and history of mereology. For the first time the Handbook presents mereology as an integrated field of research relevant to scholars working in widely different disciplines such as ontology, metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mind, semantics, linguistics, and knowledge representation. Addressing both specialists and interested readers it aims to serve both as a reference work as well as a systematic introduction to a field with increasing relevance in analytic philosophy.

  

Following the format of the Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, this volume will contain more than 250 articles on specific themes and research results in mereology, together with biographical essays summarizing historical contributions to the field. All articles have been specially commissioned for this work from leading authorities on the respective issues. The contributions are ordered alphabetically, yet survey articles with embedded subarticles and special attention to cross references highlight systematic connections. Each article is followed by a short list of recommended further readings. In addition the book includes the most comprehensive bibliography on mereology up-to-date. 
  

Main Areas: Theoretical Mereology; History of Mereology; Applied Mereology 

  

  

◈ Clark, Andy (Sep. 2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.

     

  

Product Details 

Hardback, 304 pages, 1/8 x 9 1/4 inches 

Published due Sep. 23, 2008 
ISBN13: 978-0-19-533321-3 / ISBN10: 0-19-533321-7 
Price: $35.00 / £18.99 
  

Description (oup.com/us) 

When historian Charles Weiner found pages of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman's notes, he saw it as a "record" of Feynman's work. Feynman himself, however, insisted that the notes were not a record but the work itself. In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that our thinking doesn't happen only in our heads but that "certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world." The pen and paper of Feynman's thought are just such feedback loops, physical machinery that shape the flow of thought and enlarge the boundaries of mind. Drawing upon recent work in psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, robotics, human-computer systems, and beyond, Supersizing the Mind offers both a tour of the emerging cognitive landscape and a sustained argument in favor of a conception of mind that is extended rather than "brain-bound." The importance of this new perspective is profound. If our minds themselves can include aspects of our social and physical environments, then the kinds of social and physical environments we create can reconfigure our minds and our capacity for thought and reason. 
  

Description (oup.com/uk)

Studies of mind, thought and reason have tended to marginalize the role of bodily form, real-world action, and environmental backdrop. In recent years, both in philosophy and cognitive science, this tendency has been identified and, increasingly, resisted. The result is a plethora of work on what has become known as embodied, situated, distributed, and even 'extended' cognition. Work in this new, loosely knit field depicts thought and reason as in some way inextricably tied to the details of our gross bodily form, our habits of action and intervention, and the enabling web of social, cultural, and technological scaffolding in which we live, move, learn, and think. But exactly what kind of link is at issue? And what difference might such a link or links make to our best philosophical, psychological, and computational models of thought and reason? These are among the large unsolved problems in this increasingly popular field. 
  

Drawing upon recent work in psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, robotics, human-computer systems, and beyond, Supersizing the Mind, offers both a tour of the emerging landscape, and a sustained argument in favor of one approach to the key issues. That approach combines the use of representational, computational, and information-theoretic tools with an appreciation of the importance of context, timing, biomechanics, and dynamics. More controversially, it depicts some coalitions of biological and non-biological resources as the extended cognitive circuitry of individual minds. 
  

With a substantial foreword by David Chalmers, Supersizing the Mind is essential reading for all those interested in embodied cognition, the extended mind, and the likely shape of twenty-first century cognitive scientific explanation. 
  

About the Author 

Andy Clark is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, at Edinburgh University in Scotland. He is the author of several books including Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again (1997) and Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and The Future of Human Intelligence (OUP, 2003). 

  

  

◈ Clayton, Philip (Sep. 2006). Emergence from Physics to Theology: Toward a Panoramic View. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 41(3): 675-688. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00768.x).
  

Philip Clayton: Ingraham Professor at the Claremont School of Theology and Professor of Philosophy and Religion at the Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California. During the 2006―2007 academic year, he is visiting professor at Harvard Divinity School, 42 Francis Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. 

  

Issue online: 06 September 2006 

  

Abstract: At its best, the emergence debate provides a helpful model of what religion-science scholarship can and should involve. (At its worst it represents the faddishness and bandwagon effects to which our field is also prone.) Those involved in the debate must pay close attention to concrete theories and results in the natural sciences. They rely on the careful conceptual distinctions that philosophers of science draw concerning complexity, novelty, and organization. The resulting views about human mentality and consciousness are tested against these results and checked for their adequacy to the phenomena of human experience. Emergentist theories of nature and personhood have entailments for one's theory of religion and for theological reflection; conversely, theological accounts may constrain one's interpretation of emergent phenomena. In my response to the four symposiasts I draw out these deeper dimensions of the emergence debate. 

   

  

◈ Cohen, Irun R. and David Harel (Apr. 22, 2007). Explaining a complex living system: dynamics, multi-scaling and emergence. Journal of The Royal Society, Interface 4(13): 175-182. (DOI:10.1098/rsif.2006.0173). 
  

Irun R. Cohen 1, David Harel 2 

1. Department of Immunology, The Weizmann Institute of Science, 76100 Rehovot, Israel 

2. Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, The Weizmann Institute of Science, 76100 Rehovot, Israel 

  

Abstract: Complex living systems are difficult to understand. They obey the laws of physics and chemistry, but these basic laws do not explain their behaviour; each component part of a complex system participates in many different interactions and these interactions generate unforeseeable, emergent properties. For example, microscopic interactions between non-living molecules, at the macroscopic level, produce a living cell. Here we discuss how to explain such complexity in the format of a dynamic model that is mathematically precise, yet understandable. Precise, computer-aided modelling will make it easier to formulate novel experiments and attain understanding and control of key biological processes. 

  

Keywords: biological modelling, reactive animation, emergence properties, reactive system 

  

  

Coveney, Peter V. (June 15, 2003). Self-organization and complexity: a new age for theory, computation and experiment. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society of London Series A: Mathematical, Physical & Engineering Sciences 361(1807): 1057-1079. (DOI: 10.1098/rsta.2003.1191).
  

Peter V. Coveney : Centre for Computational Science, Department of Chemistry, University College London, 20 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0AJ, UK (p.v.coveney (AT) ucl.ac.uk) 
  

Abstract: I first describe the notion of self-organization as a property of far-from-equilibrium nonlinear dissipative dynamical systems. Rather than describing such complex systems at a purely phenomenological level, however, I focus attention on the emergent nature of this complexity, by analysing a few examples of physical and physicochemical systems with simple underlying microscopic dynamics yet complex, self-organizing macroscopic properties. These include several mesoscopic models of fluid dynamics as well as a modern approach to nucleation and growth phenomena. Finally, I discuss how the advent of computational grids is set to provide a major boost to the study of such complex, self-organizing systems.
  

Keywords: Nonlinear Systems, Non-Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics, Mesoscopic Methods, Nucleation And Growth, Renormalization, Computational Grids 
  

http://journals.royalsociety.org/content/52xtbb9dql9vkyuy/fulltext.pdf 

  

  

◈ Coveney, Peter V. and Philip W. Fowler (Sep. 22, 2005). Modelling biological complexity: a physical scientist's perspective. Journal of The Royal Society, Interface 2(4): 267-280. (DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2005.0045). 
  

Peter V. Coveney 1, Philip W. Fowler 1

1. University College London Centre for Computational Science, Department of Chemistry Christopher Ingold Laboratories, 20 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0AJ, UK 
  
Abstract: We discuss the modern approaches of complexity and self-organization to understanding dynamical systems and how these concepts can inform current interest in systems biology. From the perspective of a physical scientist, it is especially interesting to examine how the differing weights given to philosophies of science in the physical and biological sciences impact the application of the study of complexity. We briefly describe how the dynamics of the heart and circadian rhythms, canonical examples of systems biology, are modelled by sets of nonlinear coupled differential equations, which have to be solved numerically. A major difficulty with this approach is that all the parameters within these equations are not usually known. Coupled models that include biomolecular detail could help solve this problem. Coupling models across large ranges of length- and time-scales is central to describing complex systems and therefore to biology. Such coupling may be performed in at least two different ways, which we refer to as hierarchical and hybrid multiscale modelling. While limited progress has been made in the former case, the latter is only beginning to be addressed systematically. These modelling methods are expected to bring numerous benefits to biology, for example, the properties of a system could be studied over a wider range of length- and time-scales, a key aim of systems biology. Multiscale models couple behaviour at the molecular biological level to that at the cellular level, thereby providing a route for calculating many unknown parameters as well as investigating the effects at, for example, the cellular level, of small changes at the biomolecular level, such as a genetic mutation or the presence of a drug. The modelling and simulation of biomolecular systems is itself very computationally intensive; we describe a recently developed hybrid continuum-molecular model, HybridMD, and its associated molecular insertion algorithm, which point the way towards the integration of molecular and more coarse-grained representations of matter. 

  

The scope of such integrative approaches to complex systems research is circumscribed by the computational resources available. Computational grids should provide a step jump in the scale of these resources; we describe the tools that RealityGrid, a major UK e-Science project, has developed together with our experience of deploying complex models on nascent grids. We also discuss the prospects for mathematical approaches to reducing the dimensionality of complex networks in the search for universal systems-level properties, illustrating our approach with a description of the origin of life according to the RNA world view. 

  

Keywords: complexity, systems biology, self-organization, classical molecular dynamics, multiscale model, hybrid models 

  

  

Deguet, Joris, Yves Demazeau, and Laurent Magnin (Aug. 25, 2006). Elements about the emergence issue: a survey of emergence definitions. Complexus 3(1-3): 24-31. (DOI: 10.1159/000094185). 
  
Joris Deguet, a, Yves Demazeau, a, Laurent Magnin, b 

a. Laboratoire Leibniz, Grenoble, France; 

b. Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada 

  

Abstract: Emergence, a concept that first appeared in philosophy, has been widely explored in the domain of complex systems and is sometimes considered to be the key ingredient that makes 'complex systems' 'complex'. Our goal in this paper is to give a broad survey of emergence definitions, to extract a shared definition structure and to discuss some of the remaining issues. We do not know of any comparable surveys about the emergence concept. For this presentation, we start from a broadly applicable approach and finish with more specific propositions. We first present five selected works with a short analysis of each. We then propose a merged analysis in which we isolate a common structure through all definitions but also what we think needs further research. Finally, we briefly describe some perspectives about the emergence engine idea also referred to as emergent engineering. 

  

Keywords: Emergence, Complexity, Level definition

  

http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ArtikelNr=94185&Ausgabe=232060&ProduktNr=227088&filename=94185.pdf

  

  

Dessalles, Jean Louis and Denis Phan (2005). Emergence in multi-agent systems: cognitive hierarchy, detection, and complexity reduction part I: methodological issues. AE2005 : A Symposium in Agent-based Computational Methods in Finance, Game Theory and their applications, Lille, September 15-16. In P. Mathieu, B. Beaufils, and O. Brandouy (eds.), Agent-Based Methods in Finance, Game Theory and their Applications. Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Vol. 564. Berlin: Springer. ISBN: 3-540-28578-4, pp. 147-161. 
  

In a pioneering book on "artificial society" and multi-agent simulations in social sciences, (Gilbert and Conte 1995) put the emphasis on "emergence" as a key concept of such approach: "Emergence is one of the most interesting issues to have been addressed by computer scientists over the past few years and has also been a matter of concern in a number of other disciplines, from biology to political science" (op. cit. p.8). More recently, Agent based Computational Economics (ACE) put the emphasis on the question of emergence, following for instance (Tesfatsion 2002a) or (Axtell and Epstein and Young 2001) The present paper provides a formal definition of emergence, operative in multi-agent framework designed by Agent Oriented Programming, and which makes sense from both a cognitive and an economics point of view. Starting with a discussion of the polysemous concept of emergence, the first part of this paper is dedicated to clarifying the question by focussing on the problem of modelling cognitive agents in artificial societies. The key questions are introduced by way of a paradigmatic example. The second part of this paper is dedicated to introducing and discussing operative definitions and related implications. In order to illustrate our formal definition of emergence, a companion paper (Phan and Galam and Dessalles, 2005) discusses the ACE population game model of (Axtell and Epstein and Young 2001) and builds a multi-level-model based on the formal framework introduced in this paper. 

  

http://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/denis.phan/papers/DessallesPhanAE2005.pdf

  

  

Dessalles, Jean Louis, S. Galam, & Denis Phan (2006). Emergence in multi-agent systems part II: Axtell, Epstein and Young's revisted. 12th International Conference on Economics and Finance, June 22-25, 2006, Limassel, Cyprus. 
  
  

Dessalles,  Jean Louis, Jacques Ferber, and Denis Phan (2007). Emergence in Agent based Computational Social Science: conceptual, formal and diagrammatic analysis. In Y. Shan, A. Yang (eds.) Intelligent Complex Adaptive Systems. Idea Group Inc. (forthcoming). 
  

This chapter provides a critical survey of emergence definitions both from a conceptual and formal standpoint. The notions of downward / backward causation and weak / strong emergence are specially discussed, for application to complex social system with cognitive agents. Particular attention is devoted to the formal definitions introduced by (Muller 2004) and (Bonabeau & Dessalles, 1997), which are operative in multi-agent frameworks and make sense from both cognitive and social point of view. A diagrammatic 4-Quadrant approach, allow us to understanding of complex phenomena along both interior/exterior and individual/collective dimension. 

  

Final version of this paper (June 8, 2007): 

http://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/denis.phan/papers/DessallesFerberPhan2007.pdf

   

   

Dessalles, Jean Louis, Jean Pierre Müller, Denis Phan (2007). Emergence in multi-agent systems: conceptual and methodological issues. In F. Amblard and Denis Phan (eds.) Agent Based Modelling and Simulations in the Human and Social Sciences. Oxford: The Bardwell Press. ISBN-13: 978-1-905622-01-6, September 2007, p 327-356. 

  

First paragraph of this paper:

The notion of emergence has several meanings. In the vernacular language, emergence denotes both a gradual beginning or coming forth, or a sudden uprising or appearance; to emerge also means to become visible; for example, emergence may denote the act of rising out of a fluid. This latter sense is close to its Latin roots, where emergere is the opposite of mergereto be submerged. In what follows, we relate the "act of rising out" to the arising of some phenomenon from a  process, and note the fact that to become visible presupposes some observer. So, the common sense of emergence is linked with the meaning of a process that produces some phenomenon that might be detected by an observer. 

  

http://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/denis.phan/papers/dessallesMullerPhan2007.pdf

  

  

◈ Dietrich, Eric (Mar. 2007). After the humans are gone. Douglas Engelbart Keynote Address, North American Computers and Philosophy Conference Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, August, 2006. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 19(1): 55-67. (DOI: 10.1080/09528130601115339).
  

Eric Dietrich: Philosophy Department, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA 

  

Abstract: Artificial intelligence has long suffered the slings and arrows of humanists arguing in various ways that AI is dangerous to humanity. I argue the opposite: it is humanity that is dangerous, and replacing us by intelligent machines or agents would vastly improve the entire world. My argument beings with two observations. First, humans are extremely dangerous to all the other life on the planet. Second, humans are dangerous to all the other humans. Viewed objectively, getting rid of humans would be a good thing. Yet, it seems obvious that the good for which humans are responsible outweighs humans' negative effects. But what if we could replace humans with beings just as good, or better than we, yet with fewer negative effects? AI provides just this opportunity. I then consider one potent objection to this proposal. Because of their special epistemic status as engineered intelligences, the machines will lack the ability to be awed and inspired by their world. Lacking connections of wonder and inspiration to their world, they will lack the impetus necessary to create art and science. While their world might be better morally than ours, something of incalculable beauty will be lost if we turn Earth over to them. I show that this objection doesn't work. 

  

Keywords: Human extinction; Moral corruption; Artificial intelligence; Robots 

  

  

◈ Ehrsson, H. Henrik (2007). The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences. Science 317(5841): 1048 (Issue of 24 August 2007). (DOI: 10.1126/science.1142175). 
  

H. Henrik Ehrsson: Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK. Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, 171 76 Stockholm, Sweden. 

  

I report an illusion in which individuals experience that they are located outside their physical bodies and looking at their bodies from this perspective. This demonstrates that the experience of being localized within the physical body can be determined by the visual perspective in conjunction with correlated multisensory information from the body. 

  

▷ 신문, 방송, 전문가, 블로거들의 기사와 의견과 논평들: 

http://www.blogrunner.com/snapshot/D/5/3/46CDCBAE0E20A53D/

  

   

◈ Ehrsson, H. Henrik, Katja Wiech, Nikolaus Weiskopf, Raymond J. Dolan, and Richard E. Passingham (June 5, 2007). Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response. PNAS 104(23): 9828-9833. (10.1073/pnas.0610011104). 
  

Published online before print May 21, 2007

  

H. Henrik Ehrsson 1, Katja Wiech 1, 2, Nikolaus Weiskopf 1, Raymond J. Dolan 1, and Richard E. Passingham 1, ¶

1. Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom; 2. Department of Human Anatomy and Genetics, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QX, United Kingdom; and ¶ Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, United Kingdom 

  

Edited by Marcus E. Raichle, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO, and approved April 16, 2007 (received for review November 15, 2006)

  

The feeling of body ownership is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. The underlying neural mechanisms can be studied by using the illusion where a person is made to feel that a rubber hand is his or her own hand by brushing the person's hidden real hand and synchronously brushing the artificial hand that is in full view. Here we show that threat to the rubber hand can induce a similar level of activity in the brain areas associated with anxiety and interoceptive awareness (insula and anterior cingulate cortex) as when the person's real hand is threatened. We further show that the stronger the feeling of ownership of the artificial hand, the stronger the threat-evoked neuronal responses in the areas reflecting anxiety. Furthermore, across subjects, activity in multisensory areas reflecting ownership predicted the activity in the interoceptive system when the hand was under threat. Finally, we show that there is activity in medial wall motor areas, reflecting an urge to withdraw the artificial hand when it is under threat. These findings suggest that artificial limbs can evoke the same feelings as real limbs and provide objective neurophysiological evidence that the rubber hand is fully incorporated into the body. These findings are of fundamental importance because they suggest that the feeling of body ownership is associated with changes in the interoceptive systems. 

  

Keywords: body image | emotion | fMRI | multisensory | self 

  

  

◈ Ehrsson, H. Henrik, Charles Spence, Richard E. Passingham (Aug. 2004). That's My Hand! Activity in Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb. Science 305(5685): 875-877. (DOI: 10.1126/science.1097011). 
  
H. Henrik Ehrsson, 1 Charles Spence, 2 Richard E. Passingham 1, 2

1. Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK.

2. Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK. 

  

When we look at our hands, we immediately know that they are part of our own body. This feeling of ownership of our limbs is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. We have studied the neuronal counterparts of this experience. A perceptual illusion was used to manipulate feelings of ownership of a rubber hand presented in front of healthy subjects while brain activity was measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging. The neural activity in the premotor cortex reflected the feeling of ownership of the hand. This suggests that multisensory integration in the premotor cortex provides a mechanism for bodily self-attribution.

  

  

◈ Érdi, Péter (Nov. 20, 2007). Complexity Explained. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
   

  

About this book

▷ Teaches the basic concepts and methods of complex system research

▷ Shows how complex behavior emerges from interaction of systems and their environment 
▷ Explains that many systems of very different fields have similar architecture 
   

This book explains why complex systems research is important in understanding the structure, function and dynamics of complex natural and social phenomena. It illuminates how complex collective behavior emerges from the parts of a system, due to the interaction between the system and its environment. You will learn the basic concepts and methods of complex system research. It is shown that very different complex phenomena of nature and society can be analyzed and understood by nonlinear dynamics since many systems of very different fields, such as physics, chemistry, biology, economics, psychology and sociology etc. have similar architecture. "Complexity Explained" is not highly technical and mathematical, but teaches and uses the basic mathematical notions of dynamical system theory making the book useful for students of science majors and graduate courses, but it should be readable for a more general audience; actually for those, who ask: What complex systems really are?
  

Contents
1  Complex Systems: The Intellectual Landscape   1
2  History of Complex Systems Research   25
3  From the Clockwork World View to Irreversibility (and Back?)   57
4  The Dynamic World View in Action   109
5  The Search for Laws: Deductive Versus Inductive   165
6  Statistical Laws: From Symmetric to Asymmetric   185
7  Simple and Complex Structures: Between Order and Randomness   201
8  Complexity of the Brain: Structure, Function and Dynamics   237
9  Prom Models to Decision Making   305
10  How Many Cultures We Have?   353
References   365
Index   393

  

Keywords: Brain, Chaos, Competition, Complex Systems, Computers, Cooperation, Determinism, Dynamical Models, Evolution, Mind, Networks, Oscillation, Predictability, Randomness, Unpredictability 
  

Hardcover | 2007 | $69.95 / £38.50 / €49.95 | ISBN-10: 3540357777 | ISBN-13: 978-3-540-35777-3 

XVI + 397 pp. | 126 illus. | 6.2 x 9.4 x 0.8 inches | 162 x 239 x 20 mm 
  

  

◈ Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2005). Computation and Cognition: Four distinctions and their implications. In Anne Cutler (ed.) Twenty-First Century Psycholinguistics: Four Cornerstones (pp. 381-400). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

  

First paragraph:

In this paper I discuss four computational distinctions at the heart of natural computation, and thus relevant to the central and most interesting question of cognitive science: "how the brain computes the mind". I assume that we can think of cognition as a form of computation, implemented by the tissues of the nervous system, and that the unification of high-level computational theories of cognitive function with detailed, local-level understanding of synapses and neurons is the core goal of cognitive (neuro)science. Thus I am concerned here with how the brain computes the mind, following Alan Turing's seminal gambit (Turing, 1950), and much of subsequent cognitive science, in thinking that intelligence is a kind of computation performed by the brain. By thus asserting that the brain is a kind of computer, I must immediately clarify that the natural computations performed by the brain differ dramatically from those implemented by modern digital computers (Richards 1988). Computation (the acquisition, processing and transformation of information) is a more general process than the serial, binary computation performed by common digital computers. From this viewpoint, the assertion that the brain is a kind of computer is a mild one. It amounts to nothing but the everyday assumption that the brain is an organ responsible for acquiring, remembering, processing and evaluating sensory stimuli, and using the knowledge thus acquired to plan and generate appropriate action. 

  

http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~wtsf/downloads/Fitch2005Computation.pdf

  

  

◈ Fitch, W. Tecumseh (Mar. 2008). Nano-intentionality: a defense of intrinsic intentionality. Biology and Philosophy 23(2): 157-177. (DOI:10.1007/s10539-007-9079-5). 
  

W. Tecumseh Fitch: School of Psychology, St Mary's Quad, University of St Andrews, Rm 2.57, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9JP, UK 

  

Received: 23 January 2007  Accepted: 18 June 2007  Published online: 25 August 2007

  

Abstract: I suggest that most discussions of intentional systems have overlooked an important aspect of living organisms: the intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the behaviour of living eukaryotic cells. This goal directedness is nicely displayed by a normal cell's ability to rearrange its own local material structure in response to damage, nutrient distribution or other aspects of its individual experience. While at a vastly simpler level than intentionality at the human cognitive level, I propose that this basic capacity of living things provides a necessary building block for cognition and high-order intentionality, because the neurons that make up vertebrate brains, like most cells in our body, embody such capacities. I provisionally dub the capacities in question "nano-intentionality": a microscopic form of "aboutness". The form of intrinsic intentionality I propose is thoroughly materialistic, fully compatible with known biological facts, and derived non-mysteriously through evolution. Crucially, these capacities are not shared by any existing computers or computer components, and thus provide a clear, empirically-based distinction between brains and currently existing artificial information processing systems. I suggest that an appreciation of this aspect of living matter provides a potential route out of what may otherwise appear to be a hopeless philosophical quagmire confronting information-processing models of the mind.

  

Keywords: Evolution of mind - Evolution of cognition - Intentionality - Intrinsic intentionality

  

http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~wtsf/downloads/NanointentionalityFinal.pdf

   

  

◈ Frith, Chris (Feb. 2004). The pathology of experience. Brain 127(2): 239-242. (doi: 10.1093/brain/awh085). 
  

First paragraph: The fundamental assumption of cognitive neuroscience is that the way we behave and the way we experience the world is determined by the way our brains work. Pathological cases provide the most stringent tests for this assumption. From our knowledge of the way our brains work it should be possible to predict what kind of behaviour or experience will occur as a result of damage to a specific brain region or system. Lichtheim (1885) was the first to describe this approach. In his simple model of how the brain processes speech Lichtheim pointed out that there were seven possible 'interruption points' in this system. He then specified the different kinds of aphasia that should result from damage at each of these points. A striking and erroneous early example of the approach concerns cerebral achromatopsia. For many years neurologists refused to accept the existence of this disorder on the basis of the mistaken belief that it was incompatible with the way the brain worked (Zeki, 1990). Today the demonstration of segregation in the visual system predicts the existence of many specific disorders including achromatopsia (impaired colour perception), akinetopsia (impaired visual movement perception) and prosopagnosia (impaired face recognition).
  

http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/127/2/23

  

http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/127/2/239.pdf

  

  

◈ Gao, Shan (Mar. 2008). A Quantum Theory of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 13(1): 39-52. (DOI:10.1007/s11023-007-9084-0
  

Shan Gao: Institute of Electronics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, LongZeYuan 24-3-501, ChangPing District, Beijing, 102208, P.R. China
  

Received: 28 June 2006  Accepted: 21 November 2007  Published online: 4 December 2007

  

Abstract: The relationship between quantum collapse and consciousness is reconsidered under the assumption that quantum collapse is an objective dynamical process. We argue that the conscious observer can have a distinct role from the physical measuring device during the process of quantum collapse owing to the intrinsic nature of consciousness; the conscious observer can know whether he is in a definite state or a quantum superposition of definite states, while the physical measuring device cannot "know". As a result, the consciousness observer can distinguish the definite states and their quantum superposition, while the physical measuring device without consciousness cannot do. This provides a possible quantum physical method to distinguish man and machine. The new result also implies that consciousness has causal efficacies in the physical world when considering the existence of quantum collapse. Accordingly consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This may establish a quantum basis for panpsychism, and make it be a promising solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Furthermore, it is suggested that a unified theory of matter and consciousness includes two parts: one is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state, and the other is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness and relating to conscious content. Lastly, some experimental schemes are presented to test the proposed quantum theory of consciousness.

  

Keywords: Quantum collapse - Consciousness - Causal efficacies of consciousness - Quantum effects of consciousness - To distinguish man and machine - Panpsychism - Unified theory of matter and consciousness

  

  

Gilbert, Nigel (2002). Varieties of Emergence. (Paper presented at the Agent  2002 Conference: Social agents: ecology, exchange, and evolution, Chicago.) In Sallach, D. (ed.) Social Agents: Ecology, Exchange, and Evolution. Agent 2002 Conference. University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. pp. 41-54. 
  

The simulation of social agents has grown to be an innovative and powerful research methodology. The challenge is to develop models that are computationally precise, yet are linked closely to and are illuminating about social and behavioral theory.

   

The social element of social simulation models derives partly from their ability to exhibit emergent features. In this paper, we illustrate the varieties of emergence by developing Schelling's model of residential segregation (using it as a case study), considering what might be needed to take account of the effects of residential segregation on residents and others; the social recognition of spatially segregated zones; and the construction of categories of ethnicity. We conclude that while the existence of emergent phenomena is a necessary condition for models of social agents, this poses a methodological problem for those using simulation to investigate social phenomena.

  

http://www.eicstes.org/EICSTES_PDF/PAPERS/Varieties%20of%20emergence%20(Gilbert).pdf

  

  

Gomes, Antônio, Ricardo Gudwin, Charbel Niño El-Hani, and João Queiroz (Nov. 2007). Towards the emergence of meaning processes in computers from Peircean semiotics. Mind & Society 6(2): 173-187. (DOI:10.1007/s11299-007-0031-9). 
  

Antônio Gomes 1 , Ricardo Gudwin 1 , Charbel Niño El-Hani 2  and João Queiroz 3

(1) DCA/FEEC/UNICAMP, Caixa Postal 6101, 13083-852 Campinas(SP), Brazil

(2) Institute of Biology, Federal University of Bahia, Campus de Ondina, CEP: 41270-190 Salvador-BA, Brazil

(3) Graduate Studies Program on History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching, Federal University of Bahia/State University of Feira de Santana, Campus de Ondina, CEP: 1270-190 Feira de Santana, Brazil 

  

Received: 18 January 2006  Accepted: 9 October 2006  Published online: 26 April 2007
  

Abstract:  In this work, we propose a computational approach to the triadic model of Peircean semiosis (meaning processes). We investigate theoretical constraints about the feasibility of simulated semiosis. These constraints, which are basic requirements for the simulation of semiosis, refer to the synthesis of irreducible triadic relations (Sign-Object-Interpretant). We examine the internal organization of the triad S-O-I, that is, the relative position of its elements and how they relate to each other. We also suggest a multi-level approach based on self-organization principles. In this context, semiosis is described as an emergent process. Nevertheless, the term 'emergence' is often used in a very informal way in the so called 'emergent' computation, without clear explanations and/or definitions. In this paper, we discuss in some detail the meaning of the theoretical terms 'emergence' and 'emergent', showing how such an analysis can lead to improvements of the algorithm proposed.
  

Keywords:  Meaning - Semiosis - Emergence - Simulation - C. S. Peirce

  

  

Goodenough, Ursula (Dec. 2007). The Emergence of Sex. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 42(4): 857-872. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2007.00877.x). 
  

Ursula Goodenough: Professor of Biology in the Department of Biology, Box 1137, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130; e-mail: ursula (AT) biology2.wustl.edu.
  

Issue online: 21 November 2007 
  

Abstract: Biological traits, the foci of natural selection, are by definition emergent from the genes, proteins, and other "nothing-buts" that constitute them. Moreover, and with the exception of recently emergent "spandrels," each can be accorded a teleological dimension ― each is "for" some purpose conducive to an organism's continuation. Sex, which is "for" the generation of recombinant genomes, may be one of the most ancient and ubiquitous traits in biology. In the course of its evolution, many additional traits, such as gender and nurture, have emerged. Patterns of sexual exchange are the basis for patterns of biological evolution and are central to the process of eukaryotic speciation. Human sexuality is central to our selves. 

  

  

◈ Griesmaier, Franz-Peter (2003). On explaining phenomenal consciousness. Journal of  Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15(2): 227-242. (DOI: 10.1080/0952813021000055207). 
  

Franz-Peter Griesmaier: Department of Philosophy, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3392, USA 
  

Abstract: Over the last two decades, doubts have been expressed about the adequacy of materialism as the correct framework for explaining phenomenal consciousness (the experience of saturated greenness one has when looking at a lush lawn, for example). This paper reconstructs a generic form of the various arguments that have been used to defend the view of the materialistically inexplicable nature of consciousness (MINC). This reconstruction reveals that the arguments turn on an impoverished notion of explanation. By discussing some examples from the history of science, the paper shows that a reasonable notion of explanation has to be wider than the one utilized in the argument for MINC, which opens the possibility for the materialistic explicability of consciousness. The author ends the paper by raising a question about the very intelligibility of the project of trying to explain the so-called nature of consciousness as opposed to the regularities characteristic of the relation between states of consciousness and brain states. 
  

Keywords: Consciousness; Qualia; Explanation; Materialism; Explanatory Gap

  

  

◈ Groff, Ruth (ed.) (Dec. 2007). Revitalizing Causality: Realism about Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge. 
     

  

Hardcover, 288 pages 

Publication Date: Dec. 20, 2007

ISBN-10: 0-415-37218-6 / ISBN-13: 978-0-415-37218-3 

Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 0.9 inches 

List Price: $150.00

  

About the Book: This cutting edge collection of new and previously published articles by philosophers and social scientists addresses just what it means to invoke causal mechanisms, or powers, in the context of offering a causal explanation. A unique collection, it offers the reader various disciplinary and inter-disciplinary divides, helping to stake out a new, neo-Aristotelian position within contemporary debate. 

   

  

Hall, John Storrs (May 30, 2007). Beyond AI: Creating the Conscience of the Machine. Amherst: Prometheus Books. 
  


  

Book Description

Artificial intelligence (AI) is now advancing at such a rapid clip that it has the potential to transform our world in ways both exciting and disturbing. Computers have already been designed that are capable of driving cars, playing soccer, and finding and organizing information on the Web in ways that no human could. With each new gain in processing power, will scientists soon be able to create supercomputers that can read a newspaper with understanding, or write a news story, or create novels, or even formulate laws? And if machine intelligence advances beyond human intelligence, will we need to start talking about a computer's intentions?
  

These are some of the questions discussed by computer scientist J. Storrs Hall in this fascinating layperson's guide to the latest developments in artificial intelligence. Drawing on a thirty-year career in artificial intelligence and computer science, Hall reviews the history of AI, discussing some of the major roadblocks that the field has recently overcome, and predicting the probable achievements in the near future. There is new excitement in the field over the amazing capabilities of the latest robots and renewed optimism that achieving human-level intelligence is a reachable goal.
  

But what will this mean for society and the relations between technology and human beings? Soon ethical concerns will arise and programmers will need to begin thinking about the computer counterparts of moral codes and how ethical interactions between humans and their machines will eventually affect society as a whole. Weaving disparate threads together in an enlightening manner from cybernetics, computer science, psychology, philosophy of mind, neurophysiology, game theory, and economics, Hall provides an intriguing glimpse into the astonishing possibilities and dilemmas on the horizon.

   

Table of Contents

Preface   15

1  Introduction   19

2  The road to intelligence   33

3  Cybernetics   45

4  Symbolic AI : the golden age   61

5  Diaspora   81

6  The new synthesis   103

7  Beyond human Ken?   119

8  Autogeny   133

9  Representation and search   147

10  Fun and games   165

11  Design and learning   181

12  Analogy and perception   195 

13  Design for a brain   209

14  An economy of mind   227

15  Kinds of minds   241

16  When   249

17  Philosophical extrapolations   263

18  Evolutionary ethics   293

19  Asimov's three laws of robotics   315

20  The age of virtuous machines   333

21  Profiles of the future   357

Notes   369

Bibliography   391

Index   403
  

About the Author

J. Storrs Hall. Ph.D. (Laporte, PA), the founding chief scientist of Nanorex, Inc., is a research fellow for the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing and the author of Nanofuture: What's Next for Nanotechnology, the "Nanotechnologies" section for The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Energy, and numerous scientific articles. He has designed technology for NASA and was a computer systems architect at the Laboratory for Computer Science Research at Rutgers University from 1985 to 1997.
  

Hardcover | 2007 | $28.00 | £19.99 

ISBN-10: 1591025117 | ISBN-13: 978-1591025115

408 pp. | 6.1 x 9 x 1.3 inches | 155 x 230 x 29 mm | 
  

  

Hall, John Storrs (Oct. 2007). Self-improving AI: an Analysis. Minds and Machines 17(3): 249-259. (DOI: 10.1007/s11023-007-9065-3).
  

John Storrs Hall: Storrmont, Laporte, PA, USA (Email: josh (AT) autogeny.org)

  

Received: 12 October 2006  Accepted: 8 May 2007  Published online: 7 September 2007
  

Abstract: Self-improvement was one of the aspects of AI proposed for study in the 1956 Dartmouth conference. Turing proposed a "child machine" which could be taught in the human manner to attain adult human-level intelligence. In latter days, the contention that an AI system could be built to learn and improve itself indefinitely has acquired the label of the bootstrap fallacyAttempts in AI to implement such a system have met with consistent failure for half a century. Technological optimists, however, have maintained that a such system is possible, producing, if implemented, a feedback loop that would lead to a rapid exponential increase in intelligence. We examine the arguments for both positions and draw some conclusions.
  

Keywords:  Artificial intelligence - Learning - Self-improving - Autogeny - Complexity barrier - Bootstrap fallacy
  

This paper is based on Chapter 7 of the author's forthcoming book Beyond AI: Creating the Conscience of the Machine (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, May 2007), which was in turn based on the paper delivered at AI@50

  

   

Halley, Julianne D. and David A. Winkler (Dec. 2006). Classification of Self-Organization and Emergence in Chemical and Biological Systems. Australian Journal of Chemistry 59(12): 849-853. (DOI: 10.1071/CH06191).
  

Julianne D. Halley A, and David A. Winkler A , B

A. Centre for Complexity in Drug Design, CSIRO Molecular and Health Technologies, Private Bag 10, Clayton South VIC 3169, Australia.

B. Corresponding author. Email: dave.winkler (AT) csiro.au
  

Submitted: 5 June 2006    Accepted: 13 October 2006    Published: 20 December 2006
  

Abstract: Most chemical and biological systems are complex, but the application of complex systems science to these fields is relatively new compared to the traditional reductionist approaches. Complexity can provide a new paradigm for understanding the behaviour of interesting chemical and biological systems, and new tools for studying, modelling, and simulating them. It is also likely that some very important, but very complicated systems may not be accessible by reductionist approaches. This paper provides a brief review of two important concepts in complexity, self-organization and emergence, and describes why they are relevant to chemical and biological systems. 

  

  

Halley, Julianne D. and David A. Winkler (2006, forthcoming). Towards consistent concepts of self-organization and self-assembly.
  

Abstract: We critically review concepts of self-organization and self-assembly, and suggest consistent and workable definitions of both concepts that are applicable across many scientific disciplines. In essence, we distinguish self-organization from self-assembly on a thermodynamic basis, where self-organization implies a non-equilibrium process and self-assembly is reserved for spontaneous processes tending toward equilibrium. This discrimination is consistent with early uses of both terms. 

  

  

Harris, Martha L. (Jan. 28, 2008, in press). Chemical reductionism revisited: Lewis, Pauling and the physico-chemical nature of the chemical bond. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A. (doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2007.11.006). 
  

Martha L. Harris : Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Room 316, Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1K7, Canada, Email: martha.harris (AT) utoronto.ca 
  

Available online 28 January 2008.
  

Abstract: The wave-mechanical treatment of the valence bond, by Walter Heitler and Fritz London, and its ensuing foundational importance in quantum chemistry has been traditionally regarded as the basis for the argument that chemistry may be theoretically reduced to physics. Modern analyses of the reductionist claim focuses on the limitations to achieving full reduction in practice because of the approximations used in modern quantum chemical methods, but neglect the historical importance of the chemical bond as a chemical entity. This paper re-examines these arguments with a study of the development of the valence bond by chemist Gilbert Lewis within a chemically autonomous framework, and its extension by Linus Pauling using Heitler and London's methods. Here, we see that the chemical bond is best described as a theoretical synthesis or physico-chemical entity, to represent its full interdisciplinary importance from the philosophical and historical perspectives.
  

Keywords: Reductionism; Chemical bond; Linus Pauling; Gilbert Lewis; HeitlerLondon; Chemical autonomy

  

  

Hendry, Robin Findlay and Paul Needham (2007). Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58(2): 339-353.  (doi:10.1093/bjps/axm008). 
  

Robin Findlay Hendry and Paul Needham

Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN UK

Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
  

In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevin's recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called.

  

  

Huneman, Philippe (2006). Emergence made ontological? Computational vs. combinatorial approaches. In [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver): PSA 2006 Symposia. 
  

Available online: January 09, 2007
  

This paper challenges the usual approach of emergence in terms of properties of wholes “emerging” upon properties of parts (“combinatorial approach”). I show that this approach mostly fails to face the requirement of non triviality, since it makes a whole bunch of ordinary properties emergent. As most of authors recognize, this meaning of emergence is mostly epistemological. On the contrary, by defining emergence as the incompressibility of a simulation process, we come up with an objective meaning of emergence since I argue that the difference between the processes satisfying the incompressibility criterion and the others do not depend upon our cognitive abilities. Then I show that this definition may fulfil the non triviality requirement and the scientific adequacy requirement better than the computational approach, provided that we think emergence as a predicate of processes rather than properties, and that we make use of the descriptive language of computational mechanics (Crutchfield and Hanson). Finally, I answer an objection by Epstein, concerning agent-based models, that pretends to show that in this context emergence is either impossible or trivial.
  

Keywords: emergence - unpredictability - simulation - agent-based models - processes - supervenience - computation - randomness 
  

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003129/01/psa_paper2.doc

⇒ 문장이 정확하지 않고 매끄럽지 않음. 오타가 많음. 

  

  

Huneman, Philippe (2007). Emergence and adaptation. Minds and Machines. (forthcoming). 
   
  

Ibanez, Agustin (Jan. 2007). Complexity and Cognition: A Meta-Theoretical Analysis of the Mind and Brain as a Topological Dynamical System. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 11(1): 51-90.
  

Agustin Ibanez: Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile
  

Abstract: The application of theories of complexity to the study of cognition has only recently started but it has already caused high expectations and controversies. Currently an extensive evaluation of the theoretical status of these theories does not exist. In an attempt to fill in that gap, this text develops a meta-theoretical analysis that presents a reconstruction of the theories of complexity applied to cognition, establishing their theoretical status, conceptual cores, basic assumptions and explanation strategies. Freeman's theory of cerebral chaos will be analyzed first. Then a meta-theory generalization to neuro-cognitive theories will be presented. It will be sustained that the central theoretical core of cognitive complexity theories are based on the metaphor of the mind, the brain or cognition as a dynamic system, founded a time-space topology. The framework of this study is based on ontology of processes and an ontological pluralism. The explicative strategies are supported by emergentistic approaches and nomological derivation based on mathematical laws. The prototypes of the theory are strongly backed up by computer simulations. This paper concludes by suggesting the existence of two antagonical perspectives (universalistic and pluralistic) in the core of these theories.
  

Keywords: chaos theory, complexity theory, brain dynamics, dynamic approach to cognition, meta-theoretical analysis 

   
  

◈ Igamberdiev, Abir U. (Sep.-Oct. 2007). Physical limits of computation and emergence of life. BioSystems 90(2): 340-349. 
   

Abir U. Igamberdiev: Department of Plant Science, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2, Canada
  

Received 14 July 2006; revised 18 September 2006; accepted 21 September 2006. Available online 24 September 2006.
  

Abstract: The computational process is based on the activity linking mathematical equations to a materialized physical world. It consumes energy which lower limit is defined by the set of Planck's values, i.e. by the physical structure of the Universe. We discuss computability from the quantum measurement framework. Effective quantum computation is possible via the maintenance of a long-living cold decoherence-free internal state, which is achieved by applying error-correction commands to it and by screening it from thermal fluctuations. The quantum Zeno effect enables coherent superpositions and entanglement to persist for macroscopic time intervals. Living systems maintain coherent states via realization of their own computing programs aiming them to survive and develop, while their non-computable behavior corresponds to a generative power that arises beyond combinatorial capabilities of the system. Emergence of life brings in the Universe a creative activity that overcomes the limits of computability.
  

Keywords: Quantum computation; Monad; Leibniz; Measurement; Coherence

  

   

◈ Jacquette, Dale (2002). Searle's Antireductionism. Facta Philosophica 4: 143-166.
  

  

◈ Jacquette, Dale (forthcoming). Supervenience of Qualia and Intentionality. Philo: The Journal of the Society of Humanist Philosophers
   
  

◈ Jacquette, Dale (forthcoming). Supervenience (on Steroids) and the Mind. In Roberto Poli (ed.) Causality and Motivation. Ontos Verlag. 
  

  

◈ Jacquette, Dale (in preparation). Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Emergent Consciousness. Continuum Books. (2nd revised edition of Philosophy of Mind). 
  

  

◈ Jacquette, Dale (in preparation). The Emergent Mind: Property Dualism, Qualia and Intentionality. 
   
  

◈ Jacquette, Dale and Guido Imaguire (eds.) (in preparation). Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.

  
  

Kauffman, Stuart A. (Dec. 2007). Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 42(4): 903-914. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2007.00879.x).
  

Stuart A. Kauffman: Founding Director of the Institute for Biocomplexity and Informatics at the University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada.
  

Issue online: 21 November 2007
  

Abstract: We have lived under the hegemony of the reductionistic scientific worldview since Galileo, Newton, and Laplace. In this view, the universe is meaningless, as Stephen Weinberg famously said, and organisms and a court of law are "nothing but" particles in morion. This scientific view is inadequate. Physicists are beginning to abandon reductionism in favor of emergence. Emergence, both epistemological and ontological, embraces the emergence of life and of agency. With agency comes meaning, value, and doing, beyond mere happenings. More organisms are conscious. None of this violates any laws of physics, but it cannot be reduced to physics. Emergence is real, and the tiger chasing the gazelle are real parts of the real universe.
  

We live, therefore, in an emergent universe. This emergence often is entirely unpredictable beforehand, from the evolution of novel functionalities in organisms to the evolution of the economy and human history. We are surrounded on all sides by a creativity that cannot even be prestated. Thus we have the first glimmerings of a new scientific worldview, beyond reductionism. In our universe emergence is real, and there is ceaseless, stunning creativity that has given rise to our biosphere, our humanity, and our history. We are partial co-creators of this emergent creativity.
  

It is our choice whether we use the God word. I believe it is wise to do so. God can be our shared name for the true creativity in the natural universe. Such a view invites a new sense of the sacred, as those aspects of the creativity in the universe that we deem worthy of holding sacred. We are not logically forced to this view. Yet a global civilization, hopefully persistently diverse and creative, is emerging. I believe we need a shared view of God, a fully natural God, to orient our lives. We need a shared view of the sacred that is open to slow evolution, because rigidity in our view of the sacred violates how our most precious values evolve and invites ethical hegemony. We need a shared global ethic beyond our materialism. I believe a sense of God as the natural, awesome creativity in the universe can help us construct the sacred and a global ethic to help shape the global civilization toward what we choose with the best of our limited wisdom. 
   
  

Kauffman, Stuart A. (May 2008). Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion. Basic Books. 
  

  

Book Description 

A compelling and sweeping argument that complexity theory can build a bridge between science and religion. Consider the woven integrated complexity of a living cell after 3.8 billion years of evolution. Is it more awe-inspiring to suppose that a transcendent God fashioned the cell, or to consider that the living organism was created by the evolving biosphere?

  

As the eminent complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman explains in this ambitious and groundbreaking new book, people who do not believe in God have largely lost their sense of the sacred and the deep human legitimacy of our inherited spirituality. For those who believe in a Creator God, no science will ever disprove that belief. In Reinventing the SacredKauffman argues that the science of complexity provides a way to move beyond reductionist science to something new: a unified culture where we see God in the creativity of the universe, biosphere, and humanity.
  

Kauffman explains that the ceaseless natural creativity of the world can be a profound source of meaning, wonder, and further grounding of our place in the universe. His theory carries with it a new ethic for an emerging civilization and a reinterpretation of the divine. He asserts that we are impelled by the imperative of life itself to live with faith and courage--and the fact that we do so is indeed sublime. Reinventing the Sacred will change the way we all think about the evolution of humanity, the universe, faith, and reason. 
   

Table of Contents 

Preface     ix 

Beyond Reductionism     1 

2 Reductionism     10 

3 The Physicists Rebel     19 

4 The Nonreducibility of Biology to Physics     31 

5 The Origin of Life     44 

6 Agency, Value, and Meaning     72 

7 The Cycle of Work     88 

8 Order for Free     101 

9 The Nonergodic Universe     120 

10 Breaking the Galilean Spell     129

11 The Evolution of the Economy     150 

12 Mind     177 

13 The Quantum Brain?     197 

14 Living into Mystery     230 

15 The Two Cultures     246 

16 Broken Bones     255 

17 Ethics Evolving     259 

18 A Global Ethic     273 

19 God and Reinventing the Sacred     281 

Acknowledgments     289 

Notes     291 

Bibliography     305 

Index     307 

  

About the Author

Stuart A. Kauffman is the founding director of the Institute for Biocomplexity and Informatics and a professor of biological sciences, physics, and astronomy at the University of Calgary. He is Emeritus Professor of Biochemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, a MacArthur Fellow, and an external professor at the Santa Fe Institute. His books include The Origins of Order and At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity. He lives in Calgary, Canada.
  

Hardcover | 320 pp. | May 5, 2008 | $27.00 |

ISBN-10: 0465003001 | ISBN-13: 978-0465003006

Trim Size: 9.3 x 6.4 x 1.3 inches

  

  

Kistler, Max (2005). Is Functional Reduction Logical Reduction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2(14): 219-234.
  

Summary: The functionalist conception of mental properties, together with their multiple realizability, is often taken to entail their irreducibility. It might seem that the only way to revise that judgement is to weaken the requirements traditionally imposed on reduction. However, Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that we should, on the contrary, strengthen those requirements, and construe reduction as what I propose to call "logical reduction", a model of reduction inspired by emergentism. Moreover, Kim claims that what he calls "functional reduction" allows one to reduce (at least some) mental properties by these new standards. I argue against both theses. First, I present a counterexample to the emergentist model of reduction: The model judges irreducible certain properties which are clearly reducible. Second, I contest that functional reduction as construed by Kim satisfies the emergentist constraints. Functional reduction implies, over and above a functional definition of the reduced property, the indication of its realizers. But the latter information corresponding to the discovery of a (local) bridge law, is empirical and not purely logical.

  

   

◈ Krasnogor, Natalio, Steve Gustafson, David A. Pelta, and Jose L. Verdegay (eds.) (Apr. 2008). Systems Self-Assembly: Multidisciplinary Snapshots. Elsevier Science. 

   


  

▷ Natalio Krasnogor : Automated Scheduling, Optimisation, and Planning Research Group, School of Computer Science and IT, University of Nottingham, UK 

▷ Steve Gustafson : Automated Scheduling, Optimisation, and Planning Research Group, School of Computer Science and IT, University of Nottingham, UK 

▷ David A. Pelta : Depto. de Ciencias de la Computacion e Inteligencia Artificial, E.T.S. de Ingenieria Informatica, Universidad de Granada

▷ Jose L. Verdegay : Depto.de Ciencias de la Computacion e Inteligencia Artifical, E.T.S. de Ingenieria Informatica, Universidad de Granada
  

Key Features

▷ The only book to showcases state-of-the-art self-assembly systems that arise from the computational, biological, chemical, physical and engineering disciplines

▷ Coherent, integrated view of both book practice examples and new trends with a clearly presented computational flavor

▷ Written by world experts in each area 
  

Description

Self-assembly is a process that creates complex heirarchical structures through the statistical exploration of alternative configurations. These processes occur without external intervention. Self-Assembly processes are ubiquitous in nature. Understanding how nature produces self-assembled systems will represent an enormous leap forward in our technological capabilities. Robustness and versatility are some of the most important properties of self-assembling natural systems. Although systems where self-assembly occurs, or which are created by a self-assembling process, are remarkably vaired, some common principles are starting to be discerned. The unifying thread throughout the book is the "Computational Nature of Self-Assembling Systems."
  

Audience

Scientists, researchers and post-graduate students, practitioners in industry, engineering and science, managers, decision-makers and policy makers
  

Contents 

Ch. 1: Introduction to Systems Self-Assembly: Multidisciplinary Snapshots Ch. 2: Self-Assembly and Membrane Computing Ch. 3: Simulation of Self-Assembly Processes Using Abstract Reduction Systems Ch. 4: Nanostructured Assemblies Far From and Close to Equilibrium Ch. 5: From Proteins to Software Self-Assembly: Computational Principles Ch. 6: Programmable Micro-Self-Assembly Ch. 7: Self-Assembly as an Engineering Concept Across the Size-Scale Ch. 8: Nonequilibrium Nanopatterns in Reactive Soft Matter Ch. 9: Kinetics, Thermodynamics, and "Locking" Self-Assembly Ch.10: Computation, Communication, and Self-Assembly in Synthetic Multicellular Systems Ch.11: Principles and Implementations of Self-Assembly in Dissipative Systems Ch.12: Principles of Self-Assembly and Automated Design

  

  

Lee, Geoffrey (Dec. 2007). Consciousness in a space-time world. Philosophical Perspectives 21(1): 341-374. (doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00130.x). 
  

Georffrey Lee : Philosophy Department, New York University, Email: gfl204(AT)nyu.edu 
  

Issue online: 06 Dec 2007

  

  

◈ Lenggenhager, Bigna, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger, and Olaf Blanke (2007). Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science 314(5841): 1096-1099. (Issue of 24 August 2007). (DOI: 10.1126/science.1143439).
  

Bigna Lenggenhager, 1 Tej Tadi, 1 Thomas Metzinger, 2, 3 Olaf Blanke, 1, 4*

1. Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Station 15, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.

2. Philosophical Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 55099 Mainz, Germany.

3. Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 60438 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

4. Department of Neurology, University Hospital, 1214 Geneva, Switzerland.
  

Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This spatial unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, leading to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness. On the basis of these clinical data, we designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to disrupt the spatial unity between the self and the body. We found that during multisensory conflict, participants felt as if a virtual body seen in front of them was their own body and mislocalized themselves toward the virtual body, to a position outside their bodily borders. Our results indicate that spatial unity and bodily self-consciousness can be studied experimentally and are based on multisensory and cognitive processing of bodily information.

  

  

◈ Le Poidevin, Robin (2005). Missing Elements and Missing Premises: A Combinatorial Argument for the Ontological Reduction of Chemistry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(1): 117-134. (doi:10.1093/phisci/axi106).
  

Robin Le Poidevin: School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, England 
  

Does chemistry reduce to physics? If this means 'Can we derive the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics?', recent discussions suggest that the answer is 'no'. But sup posing that kind of reduction ― 'epistemological reduction' ― to be impossible, the thesis of ontological reduction may still be true: that chemical properties are determined by more fundamental properties. However, even this thesis is threatened by some objections to the physicalist programme in the philosophy of mind, objections that generalize to the chemical case. Two objections are discussed: that physicalism is vacuous, and that nothing grounds the asymmetry of dependence which reductionism requires. Although it might seem rather surprising that the philosophy of chemistry is affected by shock waves from debates in the philosophy of mind, these objections show that there is an argumentative gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical connection linking chemical properties with properties at the sub-atomic level, and, on the other, the philosophical thesis of ontological reduction. The aim of this paper is to identify the missing premises (among them a theory of physical possibility) that would bridge this gap. 

  

  

Levin, Simon A. (Dec. 2005). Self-organization and the Emergence of Complexity in Ecological Systems. BioScience 55(12): 1075-1079.
  

What explains the remarkable regularities in distribution and abundance of species, in size distributions of organisms, or in patterns of nutrient use? How does the biosphere maintain exactly the right conditions necessary for life as we know it? Gaia theory postulates that the biota regulates conditions at levels it needs for survival, but evolutionary biologists reject this explanation because it lacks a mechanistic basis. Similarly, the notion of self-organized criticality fails to recognize the importance of the heterogeneity and modularity of ecological systems. Ecosystems and the biosphere are complex adaptive systems, in which pattern emerges from, and feeds back to affect, the actions of adaptive individual agents, and in which cooperation and multicellularity can develop and provide the regulation of local environments, and indeed impose regularity at higher levels. The history of the biosphere is a history of coevolution between organisms and their environments, across multiple scales of space, time, and complexity.

  

  

Licata, Ignazio, and Ammar Sakaji (eds.) (June 2008). Physics of Emergence and Organization. World Scientific Publishing Company. 
  

  

Ignazio Licata: Institute for Scientific Methodology, Italy 

Ammar Sakaji: Ajman University, Abu Dhabi
  

This book is a state-of-the-art review on the Physics of Emergence. The challenge of complexity is to focus on the description levels of the observer in context-dependent situations. Emergence is not only an heuristic approach to complexity, but it also urges us to face a much deeper question ― what do we think is fundamental in the physical world?
  

This volume provides significant and pioneering contributions based on rigorous physical and mathematical approaches ― with particular reference to the syntax of Quantum Physics and Quantum Field Theory ― dealing with the bridge-laws and their limitations between Physics and Biology, without failing to discuss the involved epistemological features.
  

Physics of Emergence and Organization is an interdisciplinary source of reference for students and experts whose interests cross over to complexity issues.
  

Contents:

○ An Invitation to Complexity (G J Chaitin)

○ Logical Openness in Physics and Biology (I Licata)

○ Gauge Generalized Principle for Complex Systems (G Resconi)

○ Phase Transitions in Biological Matter (E Pessa) 

○ The Dissipative Quantum Model of Brain and Laboratory Observations (W J Freeman & G Vitiello) 

○ Turing Systems: A General Model for Complex Patterns in Nature (R Barrio) 

○ Primordial Evolution in the Finitary Process Soup (O Gornerup & J P Crutchfield) 

○ Order in the Nothing: Autopoiesis and the Organizational Characterization of the Living (L Bich & L Damiano) 

○ Information, Uncertainty and Fuzziness in Complex System Models (T Vámos) 

○ and other papers
   

Hardback, 432 pages, Pub. date: Scheduled Summer 2008 

ISBN-10: 981-277-994-9 

ISBN-13: 978-981-277-994-6 

Price: US$135.00 / £69.00 
   
  

◈ Liljenström, Hans, and Peter Århem (eds.) (Nov. 8, 2007). Consciousness Transitions: Phylogenetic, Ontogenetic and Physiological Aspects. Elsevier Science. 
  


  

▷ Hans Liljenström: Agora for Biosystems, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Sigtuna, Sweden 

▷ Peter Århem: Agora for Biosystems, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Sigtuna, Sweden 

   

It was not long ago when the consciousness was not considered a problem for science. However, this has now changed and the problem of consciousness is considered the greatest challenge to science. In the last decade, a great number of books and articles have been published in the field, but very few have focused on the how consciousness evolves and develops, and what characterizes the transitions between different conscious states, in animals and humans. This book addresses these questions. Renowned researchers from different fields of science (including neurobiology, evolutionary biology, ethology, cognitive science, computational neuroscience and philosophy) contribute with their results and theories in this book, making it a unique collection of the state-of-the-art of this young field of consciousness studies. 
  

Table of Contents 

Preface

Contributors

1. Beyond Cognition - On Consciousness Transitions (P. Århem and H. Liljenström)

2. The Remote Roots of Consciousness in Fruit-fly Selective Attention (B. van Swinderen)

3. The Evolution of Consciousness in Animals (R.V. Rial, M.C. Nicolau, A. Gamundí, M. Akaârir, C. Garau and S. Esteban)

4. On the Origin of Consciousness ― Some Amniote Scenarios (P. Århem, I. Lindahl, P. Manger and A. Butler) 

5. A Bird's Eye View of Consciousness (E. MacPhail)

6. The Molecular Biology of Consciousness Investigated with Genetically Modified Mice (J-P. Changeux)

7. The Emergence of Consciousness in the Fetus and the Newborn (H. Lagercrantz) 

8. An Inside-Out Paradigm for Consciousness and Intelligence (R. Cotterill) 

9. Consciousness Without a Cerebral Cortex (B. Merker)

10. Three Types of State Transition Underlying Perception (W.J. Freeman)

11. Conscious Contents Provide and Coherent Global Information (B. Baars)

12. Evolutionary and Developmental Aspects of Intersubjectivity (P. Gärdenfors)

13. The Phenomenon of Consciousness from a Popperian Perspective (P. Munz)

Index 

   

  

◈ Lombardi, Olimpia and Martín La Barca (Jan. 2005). The Ontological Autonomy of the Chemical World. Foundations of Chemistry 7(2): 125-148. (DOI: 10.1007/s10698-004-0980-6).
  

Olimpia Lombardi 1  and Martín La Barca 2

(1)  CONICET  Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, USA

(2)  Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Universidad Nacional de San Martín, USA
  

Abstract: In the problem of the relationship between chemistry and physics, many authors take for granted the ontological reduction of the chemical world to the world of physics. The autonomy of chemistry is usually defended on the basis of the failure of epistemological reduction: not all chemical concepts and laws can be derived from the theoretical framework of physics. The main aim of this paper is to argue that this line of argumentation is not strong enough for eliminate the idea of a hierarchical dependence of chemistry with respect to physics. The rejection of the secondary position of chemistry and the defense of the legitimacy of the philosophy of chemistry require a radically different philosophical perspective that denies not only epistemological reduction but also ontological reduction. Only on the basis of a philosophically grounded ontological pluralism it is possible to accept the ontological autonomy of the chemical world and, with this, to reverse the traditional idea of the 'superiority' of physics in the context of natural sciences.

  

  

◈ Lombardi, Olimpia and Martín La Barca (Feb. 2008). The ontological autonomy of the chemical world: a response to Needham. Foundations of Chemistry 8(1): 81-92.
  

Olimpia Lombardi 1, 2, 3 and Martín La Barca 3 

(1)  CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina

(2)  Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina

(3)  Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, C1034ACP Buenos Aires, Argentina 
  

Published online: 15 March 2006 

   

   

Macdonald, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (forthcoming). Mental Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences.

   
  

◈ Macdonald, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (forthcoming). Emergence in Mind. In Macdonald and Macdonald (eds.) Emergence. Oxford University Press.

   
  

Macdonald, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (eds.) (forthcoming). Emergence. Oxford University Press.

   
  

◈ Macdonald, Graham (Sep. 2007). Emergence and Causal Powers. Erkenntnis 67(2): 239-253. (DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9063-0). 
  
Graham Macdonald 1, 2

(1)  Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand

(2)  Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, Ireland

Email: graham.macdonald(AT)canterbury.ac.nz 
  

Received: 30 July 2006  Accepted: 30 October 2006  Published online: 22 August 2007
  

Abstract: This paper argues that the non-reductive monist need not be concerned about the 'problem' of mental causation; one can accept both the irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties and the causal closure of the physical. More precisely, it is argued that instances of mental properties can be causally efficacious, and that there is no special barrier to seeing mental properties whose instances are causally efficacious as being causally relevant to the effects they help to bring about. It is then shown that the causal relevance of mental properties is consistent with there being no downward causation, so the dilemma of 'epiphenomenalism or reduction' can be avoided. Non-reductive monism lives on as a viable position in the philosophy of mind. 

  

  

Markič, Olga (2004). Crane on the Mind-Body Problem and Emergence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2(11): 199-205. 
  

Summary: In his book Elements of Mind, Tim Crane gives us a very clear and interesting introduction to the main problems in the philosophy of mind. The central theme of his book is intentionality, but he also gives an account of the mind-body problem, consciousness, and perception, and then he suggests his own solutions to these problems. In this paper I will concentrate on a part in which he discusses the mind-body problem. My main aim will be to look at different physicalistic positions in relation to the mental causation problem, particularly at emergentism as Crane's favourite position.

  

  

◈ Mayr, Ernst (Nov. 10, 1961). Cause and Effect in Biology: Kinds of causes, predictability, and teleology are viewed by a practicing biologist. Science 134(3489): 1501-1506. (DOI: 10.1126/science.134.3489.1501).
  
  

McCaskill, John S., Norman H. Packard, Steen Rasmussen, Mark A. Bedau (May 22, 2007). Evolutionary self-organization in complex fluids. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society, Series B, Biological Sciences. (in press).
  

John S. McCaskill 1, 3, 6, Norman H. Packard 2, 3, 6, Steen Rasmussen 3, 4, 6, Mark A. Bedau 2, 5, 6

1. BioMIP, Ruhr-University-Bochum c/o BMZ, Otto-Hahn-Strasse 15, 44227 Dortmund, Germany

2. ProtoLife Srl, via della Libertá, 30175 Venice, Italy 

3. Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87506, USA

4. Los Alamos National Laboratory, SOS, EES-6, MS-D462, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA  

5. Reed College, 3203 SE Woodstock Boulevard, Portland, OR 97202, USA

6. European Centre for Living Technology, Ca' della Zorza, Dorsoduro 3859, 30125 Venice, Italy 
  

This paper explores the ability of molecular evolution to take control of collective physical phases, making the first decisive step from independent replicators towards cell-like collective structures. We develop a physical model of replicating combinatorial molecules in a ternary fluid of hydrocarbons, amphiphiles and water. Such systems are being studied experimentally in various laboratories to approach the synthesis of artificial cells, and are also relevant to the origin of cellular life. The model represents amphiphiles by spins on a lattice (with Ising coupling in the simplest case), coupled to replicating molecules that may diffuse on the lattice and react with each other. The presence of the replicating molecules locally modulates the phases of the complex fluid, and the physical replication process and/or mobility of the replicating molecules is influenced by the local amphiphilic configuration through an energetic coupling. Consequently, the replicators can potentially modify their environment to enhance their own replication. Through this coupling, the system can associate hereditary properties, and the potential for autonomous evolution, to self-assembling mesoscale structures in the complex fluid. This opens a route to analyse the evolution of artificial cells. The models are studied using Monte Carlo simulation, and demonstrate the evolution of phase control. We achieve a unified combinatorial framework for the description of isotropic families of spin-lattice models of complex phases, opening up the physical study of their evolution.
  

Keywords: molecular evolution, self-assembly, Ising, protocell, amphiphile, self-organization 
   
  

McGivern, Patrick (Sep. 8, 2007). Reductive levels and multi-scale structure. Synthese. (in press). 
   
Patrick McGivern: Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, 4-115 Humanities Centre, Edmonton, AB, Canada, T6G 2E5
  

Received: 21 April 2006  Accepted: 6 August 2007  Published online: 8 September 2007
  

Abstract: I discuss arguments about the relationship between different "levels" of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim's "supervenience argument." A central feature of Kim's argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with "micro-based" properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim's. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised.

  

Keywords:  Levels - Reduction - Multi-scale models - Composition - Physicalism 
   
  

Megill, Jason (Dec. 2007). Naturalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 20(6): 681-686. (DOI: 10.1080/09515080701665896).
  

Abstract: I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism.
  

Keywords: Mental Causation; Naturalim; Physicalism; Qualia 

  

  

Minati, Gianfranco, Mario Abram, Eliano Pessa (eds.) (forthcoming, July 2008). Processes of Emergence of Systems and Systemic Properties: Towards a General Theory of Emergence (Proceedings of the International Conference, Castel Ivano, Italy 18-20 October 2007). World Scientific Publishing Company.

  

Gianfranco Minati, Mario Abram (Italian Systems Society, Italy) & Eliano Pessa (University of Pavia, Italy)
  

This book contains the Proceedings of the 2007 Conference of the Italian Systems Society. Papers deal with the interdisciplinary study of processes of emergence, considering theoretical aspects and applications from physics, cognitive science, biology, artificial intelligence, economics, architecture, philosophy, music and social systems. Such an interdisciplinary study implies the need to model and distinguish, in different disciplinary contexts, the establishment of structures, systems and systemic properties. Systems, as modeled by the observer, not only possess properties, but are also able to make emergent new properties; while current disciplinary models of emergence are based on theories of phase transitions, bifurcations, dissipative structures, multiple systems and organization. The present volume focuses on both generalizing those disciplinary models and identifying correspondences and new more general approaches. The general conceptual framework of the book relates to the attempt to build a general theory of emergence as a general theory of change, corresponding to Von Bertalanffy's project for a general system theory. 
  

Contents

○ Theoretical Problems of Systemics

○ Emergence

○ Emergence in Architecture, Artificial Intelligence, Economics and Management, Medicine, and Social Systems

○ Cognitive Science: Models and Systems
  

Hardback, 350pp. (approx.) Pub. date: Scheduled Fall 2008

ISBN-10: 981-279-346-1 / ISBN-13: 978-981-279-346-1 

Price: US$118.00 / £64.00 
   
   

Misteli, Tom (Oct. 15, 2001). The Concept of Self-Organization in Cellular Architecture. The Journal of Cell Biology 155(2): 181-185. (doi/10.1083/jcb.200108110).
  

Tom Misteli : National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, 41 Liberty Drive, Building 41/B, Bethesda, MD 20892. Tel.: (301) 402-3959 Fax: (520) 832-0970. E-mail: mistelit (AT) mail.nih.gov
  

Abstract: In vivo microscopy has recently revealed the dynamic nature of many cellular organelles. The dynamic properties of several cellular structures are consistent with a role for self-organization in their formation, maintenance, and function; therefore, self-organization might be a general principle in cellular organization.
  

Key words: self-organization; cytoskeleton; nucleus; Golgi complex; dynamics 

http://www.jcb.org/cgi/reprint/155/2/181.pdf

  

  

◈ Montecucco, Nitamo Federico (Jan. 2006). Coherence, Brain Evolution, and the Unity of Consciousness: The evolution of Planetary Consciousness in the Light of Brain Coherence Research. World Futures 62(1 & 2): 127-133. (DOI: 10.1080/02604020500412790).
  

Nitamo Federico Montecucco, a, b

a Faculty of Medicine, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

b Faculty of Educational Science, University of Siena, Siena, Italy
  

Abstract: The law of coherence helps us understand the physical force behind the increasing complexity of the evolutionary process, from quanta, to cells, to self-awareness and collective consciousness. The coherent electromagnetic field is the inner glue of every system, the "intelligent" energy-information communication that assures a cooperative and synergic behavior to all the components of the system, as a whole, allowing harmonious evolution and unity of consciousness. Neuropsychological experiments show that the different brain areas communicate with more or less coherence according to different states of consciousness: high values are correlated with states of psychophysical integrity and well-being, whereas low values with states of conflict and depression. If we expand isomorphically these brain discoveries, we will have four main general states of coherence: from disgregation to unity, which represents an important element, in the General System Theory, to differentiate between inanimate and animate system, and to understand how billions cells become a single living organism, and then how billions of human beings could eventually generate planetary consciousness. In this light the resolution of the global ecosystem crisis implicates human transformation from a low to a highly coherent state of consciousness. The key to the entire process seems to be the coherent nature of consciousness. 
  

Keywords: Brain synchronization; coherence; evolution of consciousness; self-awareness; unity of consciousness 
  
 
  

◈ Moyer, Mark (Mar. 2008). Weak and global supervenience are strong. Philosophical Studies 138(1): 125-150. (DOI:10.1007/s11098-006-9002-y).
  

Mark Moyer: Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont, 70 S. Williams Street, Burlington, VT 05401, USA
  

Received: 16 June 2005  Accepted: 5 April 2006  Published online: 29 September 2006
  

Abstract: Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers. 
  

Keywords: Supervenience - Anomalous monism

   
  

Muller, Hans (Mar. 2008). Why qualia are not epiphenomenal. Ratio 21(1): 85-90. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00386.x).
  

Hans Muller : Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Beirut 1107 2020 Lebanon, Email: hmuller132000(AT)yahoo.com 
  

Issue online: 24 Jan 2008
  

Abstract: In this article, I give an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert. I show that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal. If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question.

  

  

Needham, Paul (Feb. 2006). Ontological reduction: A comment on Lombardi and Labarca. Foundations of Chemistry 8(1): 73-80. (DOI: 10.1007/s10698-005-9002-6).

  

Paul Needham: Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
  

Received: 22 September 2005  Accepted: 18 October 2005  Published online: 8 March 2006
  

Abstract: In a recent article in this journal (Foundations of Chemistry, 7 (2005), 125-148) Lombardi and Labarca call into question a thesis of ontological reduction to which several writers on reduction subscribe despite rejecting a thesis of epistemological reduction. Lombardi and Labarca advocate instead a pluralistic ontology inspired by Putnam's internal realism. I suggest that it is not necessary to go so far, and that a more critical view of the ontological reduction espoused by the authors they criticise circumvents the need to resort to their radical alternative. 
   
  

Needham, Paul (Jan. 28, 2008, in press). Is Water a Mixture? ― Bridging the Distinction Between Physical and Chemical Properties. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. (doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2007.11.005). 

  

Paul Needham : Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, Email: paul.needham (AT) philosophy.su.se 
  

Received 9 March 2007;  revised 4 July 2007.  Available online 28 January 2008.
  

Abstract: Two inter-linked theses are defended in this paper. One is the Duhemian theme that a rigid distinction between physical and chemical properties cannot be upheld. Duhem maintained this view not because the latter are reducible to the former, but because if physics is to remain consistent with chemistry it must prove possible to expand it to accommodate new features, and a rigid distinction would be a barrier to this process. The second theme is that naturally occurring isotopic variants of water are in fact distinct substances, and naturally occurring samples of water are mixtures of these substances. For most practical purposes it is convenient to treat protium oxide, deuterium oxide, and so on, as the same chemical substance, but to insist on this as a matter of principle would stand in conflict with the first thesis.
  

Keywords: Water; Isotopes; Pierre Duhem; Physical property; Chemical property 

  

  

◈ Ney, Alyssa (Mar. 2008). Physicalism as an attitude. Philosophical Studies 138(1): 1-15. (DOI:10.1007/s11098-006-0006-4). 
  

Alyssa Ney: Philosophy, University of Rochester, Box 270078, Rochester, NY 14627, USA, Email: aney (AT) mail (DOT) rochester (DOT) edu
  

Published online: 25 September 2006
  

Abstract: It is widely noted that physicalism, taken as the doctrine that the world contains just what physics says it contains, faces a dilemma which, some like Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor have argued, shows that "physicalism is the wrong answer to an essentially trivial question". I argue that both problematic horns of this dilemma drop out if one takes physicalism not to be a doctrine of the kind that might be true, false, or trivial, but instead an attitude or oath one takes to formulate one's ontology solely according to the current posits of physics.
  

Keywords: Physicalism - Hempel's dilemma 
   
  

Olofsson, Peter (Aug. 7, 2007). Intelligent design and mathematical statistics: a troubled alliance. Biology and Philosophy. (in press). 

  

Peter Olofsson: Mathematics Department, Trinity University, One Trinity Place, San Antonio, TX 78212-7200, USA 
  

Received: 28 February 2007  Accepted: 4 June 2007  Published online: 7 August 2007
  

Abstract:  The explanatory filter is a proposed method to detect design in nature with the aim of refuting Darwinian evolution. The explanatory filter borrows its logical structure from the theory of statistical hypothesis testing but we argue that, when viewed within this context, the filter runs into serious trouble in any interesting biological application. Although the explanatory filter has been extensively criticized from many angles, we present the first rigorous criticism based on the theory of mathematical statistics.
  

Keywords:  Intelligent design - Evolution - Mathematical statistics - Hypothesis testing

  

   

◈ Perlovsky, Leonid I, and Robert Kozma (eds.) (2007). Neurodynamics of Cognition and Consciousness. Springer.

  

 
  
About this book: 

This book addresses dynamical aspects of brain functions and cognition. Experimental evidence in humans and other mammalians indicates that complex neurodynamics is crucial for the emergence of higher-level cognition and consciousness. Dynamical neural systems with encoding in limit cycle and non-convergent attractors have gained increasing popularity in the past decade. The role of synchronization, desynchronization, and intermittent synchronization on cognition has been studied extensively by various authors, in particular by authors contributing to the present volume. This volume gives an overview of recent advances in this interdisciplinary field of cognitive and computer science related to dynamics of cognition, including experimental studies, dynamical modelling and interpretation of cognitive experiments, and theoretical approaches. The following topics are covered in this book: spatio-temporal dynamics of neural correlates of higher-level cognition; dynamical neural memories, including continuous and discrete approaches; mathematical and physical models of cognition; experiments on dynamical aspects of cognition; interpretation of normal and abnormal cognitive behaviours.
  

This volume is of great interest for researchers and graduate students working on practical and modeling aspects of cognitive dynamics. It provides a comprehensive introduction to the field, which can be used as a supplementary textbook for cognitive science and computer science and engineering graduate courses covering intelligent behavior in biological and artificial systems. 
  

Table of contents 

Neurodynamics of Cognition and Consciousness - Leonid I. Perlovsky and Robert Kozma

Part I: Neurocognition and Human Consciousness 

Proposed Cortical "Shutter" Mechanism in Cinematographic Perception - Walter J. Freeman

Toward a Complementary Neuroscience: Metastable Coordination Dynamics of the Brain - J. A. Scott Kelso and Emmanuelle Tognoli

The Formation of Global Neurocognitive State - Steven L. Bressler

Neural Dynamic Logic of Consciousness: the Knowledge Instinct - Leonid I. Perlovsky

Cortical Circuits of Cognition and Consciousness 

Using ADP to Understand and Replicate Brain Intelligence: the Next Level Design? - Paul J. Werbos

Neurodynamics of Intentional Behavior Generation - Robert Kozma

How Does the Brain Create, Change, and Selectively Override Its Rules of Conduct? - Daniel S. Levine
  

Part II: Cognitive Computing Principles and Implementations

Cognitive Computing for Sensory Perception 

Shape Recognition Through Dynamic Motor Representations - Navendu Misra and Yoonsuck Choe

A biologically inspired dynamic model for object recognition - Khan M. Iftekharuddin, Yaqin Li, Faraz Siddiqui

Recognizing Human Emotional States from Facial Expression Using a Brain-Inspired Model - Jia-Jun Wong, Siu-Yeung Cho

Engineering Applications of Olfactory Model from Pattern Recognition to Artificial Olfaction - Guang Li, Jin Zhang and Walter J. Freeman

Dynamic Neural Memories and Cognition

Recursive Nodes with Rich Dynamics as Modeling Tools for Cognitive Functions - Emilio Del-Moral-Fernandez

Giving Meaning to Cycles to Go beyond the Limitations of Fixed Point Attractors - Colin Molter, Utko Salihoglu and Hugues Bersini

Complex Biological Memory Conceptualized as an Abstract Communication System ― Human Long Term Memories Grow in Complexity during Sleep and Undergo Selection while Awake - Bruce G. Charlton and Peter Andras

Nonlinear High-Order Model for Dynamic Synapse with Multiple Vesicle Pools - Bing Lu, Walter M. Yamada and Theodore W. Berger
  

   

◈ Perovic, Slobodan (Sep. 2007). The Limitations of Kim's Reductive Physicalism in Accounting for Living Systems and an Alternative Nonreductionist Ontology. Acta Biotheoretica 55(3): 243-267.

  

Slobodan Perovic: Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, 3A36 Paterson Hall, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6

  

Received: 13 July 2006  Accepted: 5 June 2007  Published online: 11 July 2007
  

Abstract: Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument is a general ontological argument, applicable to any properties deemed supervenient on a microproperty basis, including biological properties. It implies that the causal power of any higher-level property must be reducible to the subset of the causal powers of its lower-level properties. Moreover, as Kim's recent version of the argument indicates, a higher-level property can be causally efficient only to the extent of the efficiency of its micro-basis. In response, I argue that the ontology that aims to capture experimentally based explanations of metabolic control systems and morphogenetic systems must involve causally relevant contextual properties. Such an ontology challenges the exclusiveness of micro-based causal efficiency that grounds Kim's reductionism, since configurations themselves are inherently causally efficient constituents. I anticipate and respond to the reductionist's objection that the nonreductionist ontology's account of causes and inter-level causal relations is incoherent. I also argue that such an ontology is not open to Kim's overdetermination objection.
  

Keywords: Ontology - Reductionism - Causation - Overdetermination - Metabolic control - Morphogenesis - Nonseparability - Emergence 
   
     

◈ Polger, Thomas W. (Jan. 24, 2008, in press). H2O 'Water', and Transparent Reduction. Erkenntnis(DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8). 
  

Thomas W. Polger : Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374, USA, Email: thomas.polger(AT)uc.edu, URL: http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw
  

Received: 9 August 2006  Accepted: 3 December 2007  Published online: 23 January 2008
  

Abstract: Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers' and Jackson's critique of Block and Stalnaker crucially hinges on a reductio argument, and that the reductio can be defused. I conclude that the counterexamples given by Block and Stalnaker are cogent. If I am right, then we have no reason to accept Chalmers' and Jackson's contentions that physicalism requires a priori, transparent, reductive explanations of all facts in terms of microphysical facts. This conclusion has consequences for C&J's argument that conceptual analysis is essential to philosophical methodology. 

  

  

◈ Powell, Alexander (2007, forthcoming). Emergence, causation and levels in biological systems. 
  

ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society, Exeter, United Kingdom

email: ap269 (AT) exeter.ac.uk
  

Despite the far-reaching accomplishments of molecular biology in elucidating numerous aspects of cellular and organismic biology, considerable doubt exists in the minds of many biologists as to whether complete knowledge of the parts of a biological system will suffice to explain the behaviour and properties of the whole. Several decades of intense development in scientific computing, and the development and assimilation of ideas from complexity studies and elsewhere, mean that researchers now have substantial resources with which to develop scientific responses to their doubts about molecular determinism. Already we see an increasing interest in the collective, in vivo and interactional aspects of biomolecular phenomena, and experimental techniques are being found to supplement in silico work. In addition there are a number of long-standing scientific lineages to build upon. But some argue that new theoretical paradigms will be needed in order to address the deepest biological puzzles. The concept of emergence looks set to be associated with systems thinking just as reductionism has come to be associated with molecular biology. I will outline some of the philosophical connections between emergence, causation and reduction, paying particular attention to the notions of mechanism and levels. I will argue that if the concept of emergence has a part to play it will be in helping us to develop a coherent and inclusive account of the causal possibilities of complex systems. 
  
  

Rasmussen, Steen, Mark A. Bedau, Liaohai Chen, David W. Deamer, David C. Krakauer, Norman H. Packard, and Peter F. Stadler (July 2, 2004). Living and Nonliving Matter. Science 305(5680): 41-43. (DOI: 10.1126/science.305.5680.41).
   
  

Rasmussen, Steen, Liaohai Chen, David Deamer, David C. Krakauer, Norman H. Packard, Peter F. Stadler, Mark A. Bedau (Feb. 13, 2004). Transitions from Nonliving to Living Matter. Science 303(5660): 963-965. (DOI: 10.1126/science.1093669).
  

S. Rasmussen is at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA. L. Chen is at Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL 60439, USA. D. Deamer is at the University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA. D. C. Krakauer is at the Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87506, USA. N. H. Packard is with ProtoLife Srl, Venice, Italy. P. F. Stadler is at the University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany. M. A. Bedau is at Reed College, Portland, OR 97202, USA. E-mail: steen At lanl.gov (S.R.)
  

Researchers interested in the origins of life on Earth have long pondered what constitutes the transition from nonliving to living matter. In this meeting report, Rasmussen and colleagues discuss two recent workshops that were convened to describe the systems needed to synthesize simple life forms--called artificial cells or protocells--both in the laboratory and as simulations.
  

http://www.ees.lanl.gov/staff/steen/papers/963.pdf

  

   

Reid, Robert G. B. (Mar. 2007). Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment. The MIT Press. 

  

  

Natural selection is commonly interpreted as the fundamental mechanism of evolution. Questions about how selection theory can claim to be the all-sufficient explanation of evolution often go unanswered by today's neo-Darwinists, perhaps for fear that any criticism of the evolutionary paradigm will encourage creationists and proponents of intelligent design. 
   

In Biological Emergences, Robert Reid argues that natural selection is not the cause of evolution. He writes that the causes of variations, which he refers to as natural experiments, are independent of natural selection; indeed, he suggests, natural selection may get in the way of evolution. Reid proposes an alternative theory to explain how emergent novelties are generated and under what conditions they can overcome the resistance of natural selection. He suggests that what causes innovative variation causes evolution, and that these phenomena are environmental as well as organismal.
  

After an extended critique of selectionism, Reid constructs an emergence theory of evolution, first examining the evidence in three causal arenas of emergent evolution: symbiosis/association, evolutionary physiology/behavior, and developmental evolution. Based on this evidence of causation, he proposes some working hypotheses, examining mechanisms and processes common to all three arenas, and arrives at a theoretical framework that accounts for generative mechanisms and emergent qualities. Without selectionism, Reid argues, evolutionary innovation can more easily be integrated into a general thesis. Finally, Reid proposes a biological synthesis of rapid emergent evolutionary phases and the prolonged, dynamically stable, non-evolutionary phases imposed by natural selection.
  

About the Author

Robert G. B. Reid is Emeritus Professor of Biology at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. He is the author of Evolutionary Theory: The Unfinished Synthesis.
  

Product Details: 7 x 9 inches, 535 pp., $38.00/£23.95 (CLOTH), ISBN-10: 0-262-18257-2, ISBN-13: 978-0-262-18257-7 

   

Table of Contents

Series Foreword     xi

Preface     xiii

Introduction: The Re-invention of Natural Selection     1

1 Paradigm Drift     27

2 Prologue to Emergence     67

3 Evolution by Association     95

4 The Physiological Arena     137

5 Development and Evolution     179

6 Epigenetic Mechanisms     223

7 Orthogenesis     267

8 The Re-invention of Emergence     289

9 From the Particular to the General     329

10 An Emergence Theory     363

11 A Biological Synthesis     401

Notes      437

Bibliography     465

Index     505 

  

   

◈ Richardson, Kurt (Jan. 2004). The Problematisation of Existence: Towards a Philosophy of Complexity. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 8(1): 17-40. 

  

Kurt Richardson: Institute for the Study of Coherence and Emergence
  

Abstract: By assuming that the Universe is best described as a cellular automaton, and by making use of results from the field of computational mechanics, this paper discusses an extension of the notion of existence from a simple binary opposition to that of a continuum. It is argued that none of the traditional objects of science, or any objects from any discipline, formal or not, can be said to be real in any absolute sense though a substantial realism may be associated with them. By problematising existence it is proposed that an evolutionary philosophy referred to as critical pluralism is more sensitive to the demands of complexity than contemporary scientific approaches. Though many of the conclusions reported herein are not original, the fact that they can be 'proved' in a scientific sense, and explored scientifically, is certainly of interest and is an interpretation of complexity theory that has received little attention.
  

Keywords: complexity theory, philosophy, pluralism, cellular automata, computational mechanics 
   
     

Richardson, Robert C., and Achim Stephan (Winter 2007). Emergence. Biological Theory 2(1): 91-96. (doi:10.1162/biot.2007.2.1.91).
  

▷ Robert C. Richardson : Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, USA, Email:  robert.richardson(AT)uc.edu

▷ Achim Stephan : Institute for Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Email: achim.stephan(AT)t-online.de 
  

First Page

From roughly the middle of the 19th century, from the publication of John Stuart Mill's System of Logic (1843) through at least the first several decades of the 20th century, emergentism enjoyed a considerable run as both a scientific and philosophical hypothesis. It was understood at the time as an alternative  both to reductionism ― what was then called "mechanism" ― and to vitalism. C. D. Broad articulated one of the last defenses of emergentism in these early phases of emergentist thought in The Mind and its Place in Nature (1925). Since it seemed clear to many that neither of the alternatives were viable scientific prospects, emergentism looked like an attractive alternative.

          There were many other important advocates of emergence. We already mentioned Mill, who is arguably the patron saint of emergentism. In his System of LogicMill distinguished between "homopathic" and "heteropathic" effects, which he thought were exemplified, respectively, in "mechanical" and "chemical" combinations. His thought was that homopathic cases obeyed principles of vector composition and were additive; by contrast, in heteropathic cases there was a failure of vector composition or additivity. Chemical combinations were heteropathic. The products of chemical interactions were evidently qualitatively different from the substrates that grounded the reaction. Mill's standard example was the combination of methane and oxygen, yielding as products carbon dioxide and water. Mill (1843: 371) said, "The chemical combination of two substances produce, as is well known, a third substance with properties different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together." Broad (cf. 1925: 65) likewise favored the view that chemistry was the most "plausible" case of emergence.

          Emergentism came under critical fire toward the end of the first quarter of the 20th century, but it was still a lively topic of discussion (see Stephan 1992 for historical details). McLaughlin explains the demise of British emergentism this way:
  

In their quest to discover "the connexion or the lack of connexion of the various sciences" (Broad 1923: 41-42), the Emergentists left the dry land of the a priori to brave the sea of empirical fortune. (The only route is by sea, of course.) They set off in a certain direction, and for a while winds of evidence were in their sails; but the winds gradually diminished, and eventually ceased altogether to blow their way. Without these winds in its sails, the British Emergentist movement has come to an almost complete halt (McLaughlin 1992: 90).
  

          There was nothing resembling an a priori refutation of emergentism. It failed on empirical grounds. The specific reef upon which British emergentism was wrecked, McLaughlin (1992: 54) suggests, was the rise of modern quantum physics. Emergence had hitherto been a plausible empirical hypothesis, but its plausibility faded in the light of scientific advances. British emergentists thought that chemical bonding was likely to exhibit emergent properties. McLaughlin's thought is that the achievements of quantum mechanics in explaining the nature of the chemical bond undercut that idea. He speculates that this led to the demise of British emergentism. The question we pose is whether there are other plausible cases of emergence in the scientific literature.
  

Nine Constraints on Emergence

To many, the prospects of an aggressive reductionism and of some sort of neo-vitalism still look unattractive. There is little attraction to anything resembling vitalism; accordingly, the attraction of reductionism derives largely from the lack of plausible alternatives. In recent discussions emergentism has gained a new set of advocates. We will here explore that alternative, one which escapes the apparent, or evident, failings of both vitalism and reductionism. We will look toward serious attempts to understand what emergence might come to, inspired by prevailing science. Our goal is not to defend the …

  

  

Robbins, Stephen E. (Winter 2007). Time, Form and the Limits of Qualia. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28(1): 1-22.
  

Stephen E. Robbins, Metavante Corporation [Formerly, Asst. Professor, Chatham College, Pittsburgh. But now Asst. Vice President, Metavante Corp, Milwaukee (a banking software firm).  Application Architect, responsible for strategic direction of the lending systems].

Home page: http://www.stephenrobbins.com 
  

Abstract: Our understanding of qualia is extremely weak when considerations of time are brought into play. Ignored has been the fact that the scale of time imposed by the brain on the events of the matter-field already defines quality, and that there is an essential primary memory or continuity of time that underlies all qualitative events. This weakness is magnified when the concept of qualia is applied to form. The origin of the dilemma lies in the fact that the problem of qualia is posed in the context of an abstract space and time. When the time-evolution of the matter-field is taken as indivisible or non-differentiable, the problem can be reposed. It becomes a problem of the optimal specification of properties of an already qualitative matter-field at a particular scale of time. 
  

Keywords: qualia, dynamic form, time
  

Requests for reprints should be sent to Stephen E. Robbins, Ph.D., Center for Advanced Product Engineering, Metavante Corporation, 10850 W. Park Place, PP11, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53224. Email: Stephen.Robbins (AT) Metavante.com
  

http://www.stephenerobbins.com/Articles/Qualia-Mind-Behavior-3-revised.pdf 

  

  

Russell, Michael J. (June 2007). The Alkaline Solution to the Emergence of Life: Energy, Entropy and Early Evolution. Acta Biotheoretica 55(2):  133-179. (10.1007/s10441-007-9018-5). 
  
Michael J. Russell: Planetary Science and Life Detection Section 3220, MS:183-601, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91109-8099, USA (Email: Michael.J.Russell (AT) jpl.nasa.gov)
  

Received: 7 May 2007  Accepted: 7 May 2007  Published online: 18 August 2007
  

Abstract: The Earth agglomerates and heats. Convection cells within the planetary interior expedite the cooling process. Volcanoes evolve steam, carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide and pyrophosphate. An acidulous Hadean ocean condenses from the carbon dioxide atmosphere. Dusts and stratospheric sulfurous smogs absorb a proportion of the Sun's rays. The cooled ocean leaks into the stressed crust and also convects. High temperature acid springs, coupled to magmatic plumes and spreading centers, emit iron, manganese, zinc, cobalt and nickel ions to the ocean. Away from the spreading centers cooler alkaline spring waters emanate from the ocean floor. These bear hydrogen, formate, ammonia, hydrosulfide and minor methane thiol. The thermal potential begins to be dissipated but the chemical potential is dammed. The exhaling alkaline solutions are frustrated in their further attempt to mix thoroughly with their oceanic source by the spontaneous precipitation of biomorphic barriers of colloidal iron compounds and other minerals. It is here we surmise that organic molecules are synthesized, filtered, concentrated and adsorbed, while acetate and methane—separate products of the precursor to the reductive acetyl-coenzyme-A pathway—are exhaled as waste. Reactions in mineral compartments produce acetate, amino acids, and the components of nucleosides. Short peptides, condensed from the simple amino acids, sequester ‘ready-made’ iron sulfide clusters to form protoferredoxins, and also bind phosphates. Nucleotides are assembled from amino acids, simple phosphates carbon dioxide and ribose phosphate upon nanocrystalline mineral surfaces. The side chains of particular amino acids register to fitting nucleotide triplet clefts. Keyed in, the amino acids are polymerized, through acidbase catalysis, to alpha chains. Peptides, the tenuous outer-most filaments of the nanocrysts, continually peel away from bound RNA. The polymers are concentrated at cooler regions of the mineral compartments through thermophoresis. RNA is reproduced through a convective polymerase chain reaction operating between 40 and 100℃. The coded peptides produce true ferredoxins, the ubiquitous proteins with the longest evolutionary pedigree. They take over the role of catalyst and electron transfer agent from the iron sulfides. Other ironnickel sulfide clusters, sequestered now by cysteine residues as CO-dehydrogenase and acetyl-coenzyme-A synthase, promote further chemosynthesis and support the hatchery—the electrochemical reactor—from which they sprang. Reactions and interactions fall into step as further pathways are negotiated. This hydrothermal circuitry offers a continuous supply of material and chemical energy, as well as electricity and proticity at a potential appropriate for the onset of life in the dark, a rapidly emerging kinetic structure born to persist, evolve and generate entropy while the sun shines.
  

Keywords: Acetyl phosphate - CODH/ACS - Iron sulfide - Hydrothermal - OEC - Pyrophosphate 
  

▷ An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10441-007-9026-5 
   
  

Ryan, Alex J. (Dec. 2007). Emergence is coupled to scope, not level. Complexity 13(2): 67-77. 
  

Alex J. Ryan: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Edinburgh, SA 5111 Australia
  

Received: 23 June 2007; Accepted: 30 August 2007; Published Online: 4 December 2007
  

Abstract: Since its application to systems, emergence has been explained in terms of levels of observation. This approach has led to confusion, contradiction, and incoherence. When the concept of level is replaced by a framework of scope, resolution and state, this confusion is dissolved. We find that emergent properties are determined by the relationship between the scope of macrostate and microstate descriptions. This is formally demonstrated with mathematical examples, including the nonorientable, one sided and one edged emergent properties of the Möbius strip. Emergent properties are identified as nonlocal, because of spatially or temporally extended structure. This establishes normative definitions of emergent properties and emergence, which make sense of previous descriptive definitions of emergence. The central insight that emergence is coupled to scope means that emergence is objective, in the sense that it is independent of the knowledge of the observer. This framework is then used to identify fundamental limits to our ability to capture emergence in formal systems, and propose an alternative approach towards identifying system boundaries.
  

Keywords: emergence · emergent properties · scope · level
  
  

Sabatés, Marcelo H. (1999). Consciousness, Emergence and Naturalism. Teorema XVIII(1): 139-153.
  

In this paper I examine some aspects of Searle's emergentist position regarding consciousness. First, I discuss Searle's reasons for considering the emergence relation a causal relation and argue that his own view might benefit from a notion of noncausal dependence. Second, I analyze the plausibility of Searle's strategy for keeping the irreducibility of consciousness within a naturalistic framework. In this respect I criticize, in particular, his view according to which the subjectivity of consciousness is just the result of "the pragmatics of our definitional practices".
  

http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001232/01/SABATES.pdf

  

      

◈ Saigusa, Tetsu, Atsushi Tero, Toshiyuki Nakagaki, and Yoshiki Kuramoto (2008). Amoebae Anticipate Periodic Events. Physical Review Letters 100(1): 018101. (doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.100.018101).
  

URL: http://link.aps.org/abstract/PRL/v100/e018101
  

▷ Tetsu Saigusa: Graduate School of Engineering, Hokkaido University, N13 W8, Sapporo 060-8628, Japan 

▷ Atsushi Tero and Toshiyuki Nakagaki: Research Institute for Electronic Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 060-0812, Japan 

▷ Yoshiki Kuramoto: Department of Nonlinear Science, ATR Wave Engineering Laboratories, 2-2-2 Hikaridai, Seika-Cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
  

(Received 2 July 2007; published 3 January 2008)
  

When plasmodia of the true slime mold Physarum were exposed to unfavorable conditions presented as three consecutive pulses at constant intervals, they reduced their locomotive speed in response to each episode. When the plasmodia were subsequently subjected to favorable conditions, they spontaneously reduced their locomotive speed at the time when the next unfavorable episode would have occurred. This implied the anticipation of impending environmental change. We explored the mechanisms underlying these types of behavior from a dynamical systems perspective.
  

==============================
  

▷ Ball, Philip (2008). Cellular memory hints at the origins of intelligence. Nature 415(7177): 385. (Issue of 24 January 2008, doi:10.1038/451385a).
  

http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080123/full/451385a.html
  

Slime mould displays remarkable rhythmic recall. 
  

Learning and memory ― abilities associated with a brain or, at the very least, neuronal activity ― have been observed in protoplasmic slime, a unicellular organism with multiple nuclei.
  

When the amoeba Physarum polycephalum is subjected to a series of shocks at regular intervals, it learns the pattern and changes its behaviour in anticipation of the next one to come (1), according to a team of researchers in Japan. Remarkably, this memory stays in the slime mould for hours, even when the shocks themselves stop. A single renewed shock after a 'silent' period will leave the mould expecting another to follow in the rhythm it learned previously. Toshiyuki Nakagaki of Hokkaido University in Sapporo and his colleagues say that their findings "hint at the cellular origins of primitive intelligence". 
  

It is well-established that cells receive, interpret and adjust to environmental fluctuations, says microbiologist James Shapiro of the University of Chicago, Illinois. But if the results stand up, he says, "this paper would add a cellular memory to those capabilities". 
  

The organism chosen by the Japanese team could scarcely seem less promising as a quick learner. Physarum polycephalum is a slime mould belonging to the Amoebozoa phylum. It moves at a steady rate of about one centimetre per hour at room temperature, but this changes with the humidity of its environment. It slows down in drier air, and Nakagaki's team used this sensitivity to stimulate learning. 
  

The team found that when the mould experienced three episodes of dry air in regular succession an hour apart, it apparently came to expect more: it slowed down when a fourth pulse of dry air was due, even if none was actually applied. Sometimes this anticipatory slow-down would be repeated another hour later, and even a third. The same behaviour was seen when the pulses were experienced at other regular time intervals ― say, every half hour or every 1.5 hours.
  

If the dry episodes did not recur after the first three, the amoeba's sense of expectation gradually faded away. But then applying a single dry pulse about six hours later commonly led to another anticipatory slowing in step with the earlier rhythm.
  

The same team has previously shown that these amoebae can negotiate mazes and solve simple puzzles (2, 3). So the new finding adds to "the cool things Physarum can do", says applied mathematician Steven Strogatz of Cornell University in Ithaca, New York.
  

Like all living organisms, slime moulds have built-in biochemical oscillators, like the human body clock. In other kinds of slime mould, these oscillators can create periodic ripple patterns in response to environmental stress, helping the organism coordinate its movements. Nakagaki's group thinks that the versatile rhythmic sense of Physarum stems from many different biochemical oscillators in the colony operating at a continuous range of frequencies. 
  

The team's calculations show that such a group of oscillators can pick up and 'learn' any imposed rhythmic beat, although the knowledge decays quickly once stimulus ceases. The calculations also show that a memory of the beat can stay within the system, and be released again by a single, later pulse ― just as the researchers observed. 
   

References

1. Saigusa, T., Tero, A., Nakagaki, T. & Kuramoto, Y. Phys. Rev. Lett100, 018101 (2008).

2. Nakagaki, T., Yamada, H. & Tóth, Á. Nature 407, 470 (2000).

3. Nakagaki, T., Kobayashi, R., Nishiura, Y. & Ueda, T. Proc. R. Soc. B 271, 2305-2310 (2004). 
  

============================== 
  

Physics News Update (The AIP Bulletin of Physics News)

Number 852 #1, January 3, 2008 by Phil Schewe
  

Amoebas Anticipate Climate Change
  

A new experiment shows that amoebas will slow their motion in synch with periodic adverse changes in their environment, and will, as if in anticipation, even slow down when the adverse condition is not delivered. A team of scientists from Hokkaido University and the ATR Wave Engineering Laboratories in Japan cultured the single-celled slime mold Physarum polycephalum (a member of the amoeba clan) in a bed of oat flakes on agar. Every ten minutes the air was made slightly cooler and drier, which had the effect of slowing the movement of the amoebas down a narrow lane. Then more favorable air would be restored and the motion continued as before. 
  

After several cycles, the amoebas slowed even when the adverse conditions did not materialize. Later still, when the organisms have been tricked into anticipating impending climate change several times, they refrain from slowing without an actual change in conditions. One of the researchers, Toshiyuki Nakagaki from Hokkaido [nakagaki(AT)es(DOT)hokudai(DOT)ac(DOT)jp], cautions that amoebas do not have a brain and that this is not example of classic "Pavlovian" conditioned response behavior. Nevertheless, it might represent more evidence for a primitive sensitivity or "intelligence" based on the dynamic behavior of the tubular structures deployed by the amoeba. (Saigusa et al., Physical Review Letters 11 January 2008)
  

http://www.aip.org/enews/physnews/2008/split/852-1.html
  

 

Sanguineti, Vincenzo R. (Oct. 2006). The Rosetta Stone of the Human Mind: Three languages to integrate neurobiology and psychology. New York: Springer. 
  

 
  

About this book

The study of the brain-mind complex has been hampered by the dichotomy between objective biological neuroscience and subjective psychological science, based on speculative topographic models and psychodynamics formulations. The two antithetical avenues of research, premises, and dynamic hypotheses, have evolved in a polarization of neuroscience. This is partly responsible for the failure to unravel the transformation of neural events into mental images: how matter becomes imagination, and vice versa. This book illustrates how the simultaneous use of these two approaches enriches the understanding of the neural and mental realms, and adds new dimensions to our perception of neuropsychological events; how the two different scientific metaphors are similar in what they describe; and how the awareness and application of these perspectives are helpful in getting a deeper theoretical grasp on major mental events, better understanding single minds, and formulating a more integrated therapeutic intervention.
  

Contents
  

Forewords:

Danatella Marazziti

Alwyn Scott

Nick Mansfield

David R. Hawkins

  

Introduction

The Puzzle 
  

Part I: Learning the Languages 

1. Humanity's Search for Mind and the Subject: A Brief Review of the Evolution of Neuropsychobiology

2. An "Ideographic," Suprapersonal Language of Rules and Universal Symbols: Alwyn Scott and Nonlinear Dynamics

3. A "Demotic," First-Person Language of the Individual and the Social System: Apuleius and the Myth of Psyche

4. The Language of the Objective Observer: Gerald Edelman and Neurodarwinism: Antonio Damasio and the Feeling of Knowing

Gerald Edelman and Neurodarwinism

Antonio Damasio and the Feeling of Knowing 
  

Part II: Seeking the Understanding

5. Consciousness

6. The Unconscious

7. The Database

8. Affectivity

9. The Neural/Mental Gap: Intuition, Self and Ego,

a. Trilingual Map 
  

Part III: Applying the Knowledge  

10. The Three Languages and Science: A New Scientific Paradigm?

11. The Three Languages and Treatment

12. The Psychotherapeutic Dialogue: Intersubjectivity

13. The Role of a New Science for Psyche Upon Society and Culture
  

References

Name Index

Subject Index
  

Dr. Vincenzo R. Sanguineti's Home page

http://www.vsanguineti.com/index.htm

  

  

◈ Scerri, Eric R. (1994). Has Chemistry Been at Least Approximately Reduced to Quantum Mechanics? PSA 1, (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association): 160-170. 
  

  

◈ Scerri, Eric R. (1998). Popper's Naturalized Approach to the Reduction of Chemistry. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12: 33-44.

  
  

◈ Scerri, Eric R. (1999). The Quantum Mechanical Explanation of the Periodic System (Author Reply). Journal of Chemical Education 76: 1189.

  
  

◈ Scerri, Eric R. (Jan. 2004). Just how ab initio is ab initio quantum chemistry? Foundations of Chemistry 6(1): 93-116. (10.1023/B:FOCH.0000020998.31689.16). 
  

Eric R. Scerri: Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, UCLA
  
  

◈ Scerri, Eric R. (Sep. 2006). The Periodic Table: Its Story and Its Significance. New York, Oxford University Press. 
  


   

Description

The periodic table is one of the most potent icons in science. It lies at the core of chemistry and embodies the most fundamental principles of the field. The one definitive text on the development of the periodic table by van Spronsen (1969), has been out of print for a considerable time. The present book provides a successor to van Spronsen, but goes further in giving an evaluation of the extent to which modern physics has, or has not, explained the periodic system. The book is written in a lively style to appeal to experts and interested lay-persons alike. 
  

The Periodic Table begins with an overview of the importance of the periodic table and of the elements and it examines the manner in which the term 'element' has been interpreted by chemists and philosophers. The book then turns to a systematic account of the early developments that led to the classification of the elements including the work of Lavoisier, Boyle and Dalton and Cannizzaro. The precursors to the periodic system, like Dobereiner and Gmelin, are discussed. In chapter 3 the discovery of the periodic system by six independent scientists is examined in detail.
  

Two chapters are devoted to the discoveries of Mendeleev, the leading discoverer, including his predictions of new elements and his accommodation of already existing elements. Chapters 6 and 7 consider the impact of physics including the discoveries of radioactivity and isotopy and successive theories of the electron including Bohr's quantum theoretical approach. Chapter 8 discusses the response to the new physical theories by chemists such as Lewis and Bury who were able to draw on detailed chemical knowledge to correct some of the early electronic configurations published by Bohr and others.
  

Chapter 9 provides a critical analysis of the extent to which modern quantum mechanics is, or is not, able to explain the periodic system from first principles. Finally, chapter 10 considers the way that the elements evolved following the Big Bang and in the interior of stars. The book closes with an examination of further chemical aspects including lesser known trends within the periodic system such as the knight's move relationship and secondary periodicity, as well at attempts to explain such trends. 
  

Features 

⊙ The first comprehensive book on the evolution and significance of the periodic table, the central icon of chemistry, since the publication of Van Spronsen's classic book of 1969 which has been out of print for many years. 

⊙ Considers the concepts and ideas underlying the periodic table and its relation to quantum physics, something that was not provided in Van Spronsen. 
  

Product Details

Hardback, 368 pages; 57 halftones, 17 line illus.; 6-1/8 x 9-1/4 inches 

ISBN-10: 0-19-530573-6 

ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530573-9

Price: $35.00

  

  

Scerri, Eric R. (Dec. 2007). The ambiguity of reduction. HYLE ― International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry 13(2): 67-81.
  

Abstract: I claim that the question of whether chemistry is reduced to quantum mechanics is more ambiguous and multi-faceted than generally supposed. For example, chemistry appears to be both reduced and not reduced at the same time depending on the perspective that one adopts. Similarly, I argue that some conceptual issues in quantum mechanics are ambiguous and can only be laid to rest by embracing paradox and ambiguity rather than regarding them as obstacles to be overcome. Recent work in the reduction of chemistry is also reviewed, including discussions of the ontological reduction of chemistry and the question of the emergence of chemistry from physics.
  

Keywords: quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry, epistemological reduction, ontological reduction, emergence, positivism.
  
  

◈ Scerri, Eric R. (in press). Reduction and Emergence in Chemistry ― Two Recent Approaches. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2006.
   
  

Schlosser, Markus Ernst (Mar. 2008). Agent-causation and agential control. Philosophical Explorations 11(1): 3-21. (DOI: 10.1080/13869790701750597).
  

Markus Ernst Schlosser: Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
  

Abstract: According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation is possible, as I will argue against that theory on the ground that it fails as a theory of agency. I will argue that the non-reductive agent-causal theory fails to account for agency, because it fails to account for agential control: it cannot explain why the stipulated irreducible relation between the agent and an action constitutes the agent's exercise of control over the action. This objection, I will argue, applies to the agent-causal theory in particular, and to the non-reductive approach in general.
  

Keywords: agency; agent-causation; substance-causation; control; origination; free will

   
   
  

Scott, Alwyn C. (Oct. 2007). The Nonlinear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life. Berlin: Springer Verlag.

  


   

About this book 

Written in Alwyn Scott's inimitable style  lucid and accessible  The Nonlinear Universe surveys and explores the explosion of activity in nonlinear science that began in the 1970s and 1980s and continues today. The book explains the wide-ranging implications of nonlinear phenomena for future developments in many areas of modern science, including mathematics, physics, engineering, chemistry, biology, and neuroscience. Arguably as important as quantum theory, modern nonlinear science  and an appreciation of its implications  is essential for understanding scientific developments of the twenty-first century.
  

Contents 

1  Introduction   1

2  Chaos   19

3  Solitons   43 

4  Nerve Pulses and Reaction-Diffusion Systems   63 

5  The Unity of Nonlinear Science   79 

6  Physical Applications of Nonlinear theory   101

7  Nonlinear Biology   181

8  Reductionism and Life   277

9  Epilogue   303

A  Phase Space   307

B  Quantum Theory   315

References   321

  

Keywords: Butterfly effect, Chaos, Emergence, Solitons, Turbulence

  

Written for: Students, university teachers, other scientists, scientifically literate laypersons; academic and public libraries 
  

Hardcover | 2007 | $69.95 / £35.00 / €49.95 | ISBN-13: 978-3-540-34152-9 

XIV + 364 pp. | 6.2 x 9.4 x 0.9 inches | 164 x 240 x 25 mm | 86 illus.

  

  

Seager, William (2003). Yesterday's Algorithm: Penrose and the Gödel Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3(9): 265-273.
  

Summary: Roger Penrose is infamous for defending a version of John Lucas's argument that Gödel's incompleteness results show that the mind cannot be mechanistically (or, today, computationally) explained. Penrose's argument has been subjected to a number of criticisms which, though correct as far as they go, leave open some peculiar and troubling features of the appeal to Gödel's theorem. I try to reveal these peculiarities and develop a new criticism of the Penrose argument.
  
  

Shani, Itay (July 2007). The Myth of Reductive Extensionalism. Axiomathes 17(2): 155-183.
  

Itay Shani: Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Private Bag 3, Wits, Johannesburg, 2050, South Africa
  

Received: 7 March 2007  Accepted: 7 August 2007  Published online: 1 September 2007
  

Abstract: Extensionalism, as I understand it here, is the view that physical reality consists exclusively of extensional entities. On this view, intensional entitities must either be eliminated in favor of an ontology of extensional entities, or be reduced to such an ontology, or otherwise be admitted as non-physical. In this paper I argue that extensionalism is a misguided philosophical doctrine. First, I argue that intensional phenomena are not confined to the realm of language and thought. Rather, the ontology of such phenomena is intimately entwined with the ontology of properties. After providing some evidence to the popularity of extensionalism in contemporary analytic philosophy, I investigate the motivating reasons behind it. Considering several explanations, I argue that the main motivating reason is rooted in the identification of matter with extension, an identification which is one of the hallmarks of the mechanistic conception of nature inherited from the founding fathers of our modern scientific outlook. I then argue that such a conception is not only at odds with a robust ontology of properties but is also at odds with our best contemporary physics. Rather than vindicating extensionalism contemporary science undermines the position, and the lesson to be drawn from this surprising fact is that extensionalism needs no longer be espoused as a regulative ideal of naturalistic philosophy. I conclude by showing that the ontological approach to intensional phenomena advocated throughout the paper also gains support from an examination of the historical context within which 'intension' was first introduced as a semantic notion.
  

Keywords: Extensional entities - Extensionalism - Intensional entities - Mechanistic philosophy - Modes - Naturalism - Properties
  
  

Sherman, Jeremy, Terrence W. Deacon (Dec. 2007). Teleology for the Perplexed: How Matter Began to Matter. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 42(4): 873-901. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2007.00878.x).
  

Jeremy Sherman: Professor of social science at Expression College of the Digital Arts, 1830 Sonoma Ave., Berkeley, CA 94707; e-mail: js (AT) jeremysherman.com.
  

Terrence W. Deacon: Professor of biological anthropology, Department of Anthropology and Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720; e-mail: deacon (AT) berkeley.edu.
  

Issue online: 21 November 2007
  

Abstract: Lacking a plausible model for the emergence of telos (purposive, representational, and evaluative relationships, as in life and consciousness) from simple material and energetic processes, the sciences operate as though all teleological relationships are physically epiphenomenal. Alternatively, in religion and the humanities it is assumed either that telos influences the material world from an outside or transcendental source or that it is a fundamental and ineffable property of things. We argue that a scientifically sound and intuitively plausible model for the physical emergence of teleological dynamics is now realizable. A methodology for formulating such a model and an exemplar case ― the autocell ― are presented. An autocell is an autocatalytic set of molecules that produce one another and also produce molecules that spontaneously accrete to form a hollow container, analogous to the way virus capsules form. The molecular capsules that result will spontaneously enclose some of the nearby molecules of the autocatalytic set, keeping them together so that when the autocell is broken open autocatalysis will resume. Autocells are thus self-reconstituting, self-reproducing, and minimally evolvable. They are not living and yet have necessary precursor attributes to telos, including individuality, functional interdependence of parts, end-directedness, a minimal form of representation, and a normative (evaluational) relationship to different environmental properties. The autocell thus serves as a missing link between inanimate (nonlife) and animate (living) phenomena. We conclude by discussing the challenges that a natural origin for telos poses for religious thought.
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (2006). Emergence, Theology and the Manifest Image. In Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (2007). Consciousness, Emergence and Mereology. In Hans Burkhardt , Johanna Seibt, and Guido Imaguire (eds.) Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag.
  
  

◈ Silberstein, Michael (2007). Quantum Theology Debunked. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science. (forthcoming).
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (in press). Emergence: A Map of the Territory. Philosopher's Compass.
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (in press). Emergence and Consciousnes. In Timothy Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilken (eds.) Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (in press). Questioning Causal Closure. Synthese
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (forthcoming). Emergence vs. Fundamentalism in Fundamental Physics. 
  
  

Silberstein, Michael (forthcoming). Emergence in Condensed Matter Theory. 

   

   

Solé, Ricard V. and Jordi Bascompte (Mar. 2006). Self-Organization in Complex Ecosystems. Princeton University Press. 

  

  

Can physics be an appropriate framework for the understanding of ecological science? Most ecologists would probably agree that there is little relation between the complexity of natural ecosystems and the simplicity of any example derived from Newtonian physics. Though ecologists have long been interested in concepts originally developed by statistical physicists and later applied to explain everything from why stock markets crash to why rivers develop particular branching patterns, applying such concepts to ecosystems has remained a challenge.
  

Self-Organization in Complex Ecosystems is the first book to clearly synthesize what we have learned about the usefulness of tools from statistical physics in ecology. Ricard Solé and Jordi Bascompte provide a comprehensive introduction to complex systems theory, and ask: do universal laws shape the structure of ecosystems, at least at some scales? They offer the most compelling array of theoretical evidence to date of the potential of nonlinear ecological interactions to generate nonrandom, self-organized patterns at all levels.
  

Tackling classic ecological questions--from population dynamics to biodiversity to macroevolution--the book's novel presentation of theories and data shows the power of statistical physics and complexity in ecology. Self-Organization in Complex Ecosystems will be a staple resource for years to come for ecologists interested in complex systems theory as well as mathematicians and physicists interested in ecology. 
  

Ricard V. Solé is Professor of Research at the Catalan Institute for Research and Advanced Studies in Spain, head of the Complex Systems Lab at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, external professor at the Santa Fe Institute, and Senior Member of the NASA-Associate Center of Astrobiology. His recent books include Signs of Life: How Complexity Pervades BiologyJordi Bascompte is Associate Professor of Research at the Spanish Research Council, and a Visiting Scientist at the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He was awarded a European Young Investigator Award, and is coeditor of Modeling Spatiotemporal Dynamics in Ecology.
  

Table of Contents

1 Complexity in ecological systems     1

2 Nonlinear dynamics     17

3 Spatial self-organization : from pattern to process     65

4 Scaling and fractals in ecology     127

5 Habitat loss and extinction thresholds     171

6 Complex ecosystems : from species to networks     215

7 Complexity in macroevolution     263

App. 1 Lyapunov exponents for ID maps     317

App. 2 Renormalization group analysis     319

App. 3 Stochastic multispecies model     321

References     325

Index     359
  

Paper | 2006 | $47.50 / £27.95 | ISBN13: 978-0-691-07040-7

Cloth | 2006 | $105.00 / £62.00 | ISBN13: 978-0-691-07039-1

392 pp. | 6 x 9 | 112 line illus. 6 tables.

  

  

◈ Solé, Ricard V., Ramon Ferrer-Cancho, Jose M. Montoya, and Sergi Valverde (Sep./Oct. 2002). Selection, tinkering, and emergence in complex networks. Complexity 8(1): 20-33. (DOI: 10.1002/cplx.10055).
  

Published online: January 21, 2003 
  

Ricard V. Solé 1, 2, Ramon Ferrer-Cancho 1, Jose M. Montoya 1, 3, Sergi Valverde 1

1. ICREA-Complex Systems Lab, GRIB-UPF, Barcelona, Spain 

2. Sante Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501 

3. Department of Ecology, University of Alcalá Madrid, Spain 
   
  

Solé, Ricard V. and Brian Goodwin (2000 / 2002). Signs of Life: How Complexity Pervades in Biology. Basic Books / HarperCollins Publishers. 

  

  

In every major field of biology, from molecular genetics and neurobiology, through animal behavior and ecology, to evolution, extinction, and economics, there are well-known phenomena that today's standard theories are powerless to explain: Why don't cells in identical environments with identical genomes live identical lives? How do such simple creatures as ants and termites manage such complex behavior as building nests? Why did all the animal kingdom's basic body plans appear in a single geological era, and no new ones since? Yet, as Ricard Solé and Brian Goodwin show, various tools of complexity theory can offer us new ways to understand these phenomena. A tour of biology such as you've never seen before, Signs of Life is about explaining the unexplainable -- by using new ideas to answer questions yesterday's ideas can't help us with.
  

Table of Contents

Preface     ix 

1. Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Emergence     1

2. Order, Complexity, Disorder     29

3. Genetic Networks, Cell Differentiation, and Development     61

4. Physiology on the Edge of Chaos     89 

5. Brain Dynamics     119

6. Ants, Brains, and Chaos     147

7. The Baroque of Nature     179

8. Life on the Edge of Catastrophe     211

9. Evolution and Extinction     243

10. Fractal Cities and Market Crashes     277

Notes     305

Index     317
  

Paper | 2002 | $18.50 | 5.8 x 9 x 0.9 | 336 pp. | ISBN-13: 978-0465019281

Cloth | 2000 | $30.00 | 6.2 x 9.5 x 1.2 | xii + 320 pp. | ISBN-13: 978-0465019274 
  

▷ Carl Anderson (Zoology Institute, Regensburg University, Germany) reviews this book in American Scientist (September-October 2001 issue). 

http://www.americanscientist.org/template/BookReviewTypeDetail/assetid/14647#21733 

   

▷ Armin P. Moczek (Center for Insect Science, Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology, and Department of Biology Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721) reviews this book in Complexity Volume 7, Issue 4, March/April 2002, Pages: 16-17.   

http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/97519452/ABSTRACT

  

▷ Ajay B. Chitnis (1Laboratory of Molecular Genetics, National Institute of Child Health and, Human Development, 9000 Rockville Pike, Bethedsa, MD 20892 USA) and Geoffrey J. Goodhill (Department of Neuroscience, Georgetown University Medical Center, 3900 Reservoir Road NW, Washington, DC 20007 USA ) review this book in Cell Volume 105, Issue 3, 4 May 2001, Pages 328-329.   

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WSN-4319PYN-M&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=f9eef91e2f1959ad1eabf31f4ffabc1e 

  

  

◈ Solé, Ricard V. and Sergi Valverde (Jan. 06, 2008). Spontaneous emergence of modularity in cellular networks. Journal of The Royal Society, Interface 5(18): 129-133. (doi: 10.1098/rsif.2007.1108). 
   

Ricard V. Solé 1, 2, Sergi Valverde 1, 2

1. Complex Systems Lab, ICREA-UPF, Dr Aiguader 88, 08003 Barcelona, Spain 

2. Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA 
  

Available online July 11, 2007
  

Abstract: Modularity is known to be one of the most relevant characteristics of biological systems and appears to be present at multiple scales. Given its adaptive potential, it is often assumed to be the target of selective pressures. Under such interpretation, selection would be actively favouring the formation of modular structures, which would specialize in different functions. Here we show that, within the context of cellular networks, no such selection pressure is needed to obtain modularity. Instead, the intrinsic dynamics of network growth by duplication and diversification is able to generate it for free and explain the statistical features exhibited by small subgraphs. The implications for the evolution and evolvability of both biological and technological systems are discussed.
  

Keywords: complex networks, modularity, evolvability, tinkering, network biology 
  

http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/workingpapers/07-06-013.pdf 

   
   

Stapp, Henry P. (July 2007). Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 

  

  

About this book

The classical mechanistic idea of nature that prevailed in science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was an essentially mindless conception: the physically described aspects of nature were asserted to be completely determined by prior physically described aspects alone, with our conscious experiences entering only passively. During the twentieth century the classical concepts were found to be inadequate. In the new theory, quantum mechanics, our conscious experiences enter into the dynamics in specified ways not fixed by the physically described aspects alone. Consequences of this radical change in our understanding of the connection between mind and brain are described.
  

Contents 

1  Science, consciousness and human values   1

2  Human knowledge as the foundation of science   11

3  Actions, knowledge, and information   17

4  Nerve terminals and the need to use quantum theory   29

5  Templates for action   33

6  The physical effectiveness of conscious will and the quantum zeno effect   35

7  Support from contemporary psychology   41

8  Application to neuropsychology   47

9  Roger Penrose's theory and quantum decoherence   51

10  Non-orthodox versions of quantum theory and the need for process 1   55

11  The basis problem in many-worlds theories   65

12  Despised dualism   79

13  Whiteheadian quantum ontology   85

14  Interview   99

15  Consciousness and the anthropic questions   119

16  Impact of quantum mechanics on human values   139

17  Conclusions   145

A  Gazzaniga's The Ethical Brain   147

B  Von Neumann : knowledge, information, and entropy   153

C  Wigner's friend and consciousness in quantum theory   161

D  Orthodox interpretation and the mind―brain connection   165

E  Locality in physics   169

F  Einstein locality and spooky action at a distance   173

G  Nonlocality in the quantum world   181 

References   187 

Index   195
  

Keywords: Foundations of ethics, Mind-brain connection, Neuropsychology, Quantum physics, Science and religion

  

"Stapp's book is a bold and original attack on the problem of consciousness and free will based on the openings provided by the laws of quantum mechanics. This is a serious and interesting attack on a truly fundamental problem."

Tony Leggett [Physics Nobel Laureate, 2003]
  

"In his new book, Stapp insists that the "causal closure of the physical", in particular concerning quantum theory, is an untenable myth. He elaborates on ideas of Bohr, von Neumann, Heisenberg and, from a philosophical point of view, James and Whitehead to sketch a complex picture in which the physical and the mental are emphatically conditioned by each other. Stapp's wide-ranging proposal offers stimulating reading, a strong sense of conceptual coherence and intuitive appeal, and empirical predictions that deserve to be refined and tested."

Harald Atmanspacher 
  

"A highly readable book of genuine wisdom by one of the foremost minds for our generation. The paradoxical enigma of consciousness and matter has been tackled by virtually every modern philosopher and many scientists as well. Unfortunately most philosophers have grounded their thinking in century old physics while most scientists fail to understand the nuances of philosophical thought. Here a foremost quantum physicist speaks to us not only from a profound understanding of physics, but with a sophistication about consciousness and philosophy of mind that few short of William James and Alfred North Whitehead have sustained. The result is a radical rethinking of issues as fundamental and vital as free will, ethics, the mind-body problem, and the dimensions of human nature itself."

Allan Combs
  

Written for: Scientists, interested lay persons, academic and other large bookstores 
   

Hardcover | 2007 | $39.95 / £23.00 / €29.95 | ISBN-13: 978-3-540-72413-1

XII + 198 pp. | 6.3 x 9.3 x 0.6 inches | 168 x 237 x 16 mm | 9 illus.

  

  

Stapp, Henry P. (Jan. 28, 2008). Physicalism Versus Quantum Mechanics. (Third Draft). 
   

Henry P. Stapp: Theoretical Physics Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; University of California, Berkeley, California 94720 
  

Abstract: In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the conception of "physical" used on this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Some of those properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics. It is argued that the difficulties that have plagued physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, dissolve when the classical idea of the physical is replaced by its quantum successor. The argument is concretized in way that makes it accessible to non-physicists by exploiting the recent evidence connecting our conscious experiences to macroscopic measurable synchronous oscillations occurring in well-separated parts of the brain. A specific new model of the mind-brain connection that is fundamentally quantum mechanical but that ties conscious experiences to these macroscopic synchronous oscillations is used to illustrate the essential disparities between the classical and quantum notions of the physical, and in particular to demonstrate the failure in the quantum world---beyond what is entailed by the randomness in the outcomes of observations---of the principle of the causal closure of the physically described aspects of nature. 
  

http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/Physicalism.pdf
  

  

◈ Tabony, James (Aug. 31, 2006). Self-Organization and Other Emergent Properties in a Simple Biological System of Microtubules. Complexus 3(4): 200-210. (DOI: 10.1159/000095480). 

  

James Tabony: Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Département Réponse et Dynamique Cellulaires, Laboratoire d'Immunochimie, INSERM U548, Grenoble, France 
  

Abstract: In biological systems, emergent properties may develop due to numerous individual molecular elements in a population being strongly coupled in a non-linear manner. Under suitable conditions, the formation in vitro of a population of microtubules, a major component of the cellular skeleton (cytoskeleton), behaves as a complex system and develops a number of emergent phenomena. These preparations, which initially contain just two molecular species, a nucleotide and a protein, self-organize by reaction and diffusion and the morphology that develops is determined at a critical moment early in the process by weak external factors, such as gravity and magnetic fields. The process also results in other emergent phenomena, namely replication of form, generation of positional information, and collective transport and organization of colloidal-sized particles. Microtubules are responsible both for cellular organization and the transport of subcellular particles from one part of the cell to another. Frequently, this behaviour is triggered by some weak internal or external factor. The in vitro observations outlined thus illustrate how in a simple biological system, a complex behaviour may give rise to emergent phenomena that outwardly resemble major biological functions. 
  

Keywords: Self-organization, biological, Cell biology, Microtubules, Reaction-diffusion, Bifurcations and triggering factors, Particle transport and organization, Positional information, Replication of form
  

http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ArtikelNr=95480&Ausgabe=232188&ProduktNr=227088&filename=95480.pdf

  

  

Thompson, Paul (2003). The Revival of ‘Emergence’ in Biology: Autocatalysis, Self-Organisation and Mathematical Necessity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3(9): 217-229.
  

Summary: Holism and emergence are coherent notions. The paper points to the classes of emergent phenomena—such as autocatalysis—that are taken as commonplace phenomena in biological sciences. Thus it questions the Democritean credo, "wholes are completely determined by their parts" (in some of its forms, called mereological determinism), that has become a dogma of contemporary philosophy. A living thing requires the ability to initiate, mediate and terminate processes that produce products that make up the whole. Autocatalysis is one such mechanism, and its action at the level of the whole produces effects on the parts such that the properties, manifested by the parts in the absence of the whole engaged in autocatalysis, are altered. For these reasons, some writers suggest that autocatalysis is a law of organization and that it is emergent. It also appears that this is a case of downward causation—one that clearly occurs in nature. If this is not a case of downward causation on Kim's terms, then biological systems that are claimed to be emergent do not need to involve downward causation in his sense. The author thinks that this constitutes downward causation in an important sense—the causal properties of the whole drive the behavior of the parts. Another set of examples comes from chaos dynamics. Relying on this evidence, the author challenges the Democritean credo (and mereological determinism) and shifts the onus of proof. 
   
  

◈ Toner, Patrick (Dec. 9, 2007, in press). Emergent substance. Philosophical Studies. (DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9160-6). 
  

Patrick Toner : Department of Philosophy, Wake Forest University, Tribble Hall, Winston Salem, NC 27109, USA, Email: tonerpj(AT)wfu.edu
  

Received: 18 April 2007  Accepted: 13 August 2007  Published online: 8 December 2007 
  

Abstract: In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts. The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are "human atoms" co-located with human organisms. It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances, this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do. 

  

   

◈ Trogdon, Kelly (Jan. 15, 2008, in press). Physicalism and sparse ontology. Philosophical Studies(DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7). 
  

Kelly Trogdon : Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, 352 Bartlett Hall, 130 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003, USA, Email: ktrogdon(AT)philos.umass.edu
  

Received: 5 August 2007  Accepted: 23 December 2007  Published online: 15 January 2008
  

Abstract: A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim's disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralismPriority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call 'fine-grained reductionism', a particular version of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may have thought.
  

Keywords: Physicalism - Sparse ontology - Monism - Pluralism - Intrinsicality - Realization - Distribution - Ontological dependence 
  
  

◈ Tsakiris, Manos, Maike D. Hesse, Christian Boy, Patrick Haggard and Gereon R. Fink (2007). Neural Signatures of Body Ownership: A Sensory Network for Bodily Self-Consciousness. Cerebral Cortex 17(10): 2235-2244. (doi:10.1093/cercor/bhl131).
  

published online on November 30, 2006
  

Manos Tsakiris 1, 2, Maike D. Hesse 3, 4, Christian Boy 5, Patrick Haggard 2 and Gereon R. Fink 4, 6

1. Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK, 2. Insitute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Department of Psychology, University College London, London, UK, 3. Department of Neurology—Cognitive Neurology, University Hospital Aachen, Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, Aachen, Germany, 4. Institute of Neuroscience and Biophysics, Department of Medicine, Research Centre Juelich, Juelich, Germany, 5. Department of Nuclear Medicine, University Hospital Aachen, RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany, 6. Department of Neurology, University Hospital Cologne, Cologne University, Cologne Germany
  

Body ownership refers to the special perceptual status of one's own body, which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself. We studied the neural correlates of body ownership by controlling whether an external object was accepted as part of the body or not. In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), correlated visuotactile stimulation causes a fake hand to be perceived as part of one's own body. In the present study, we distinguished between the causes (i.e., multisensory stimulation) and the effect (i.e., the feeling of ownership) of the RHI. Participants watched a right or a left rubber hand being touched either synchronously or asynchronously with respect to their own unseen right hand. A quantifiable correlate of the RHI is a shift in the perceived position of the subject's hand toward the rubber hand. We used positron emission tomography to identify brain areas whose activity correlated with this proprioceptive measure of body ownership. Body ownership was related to activity in the right posterior insula and the right frontal operculum. Conversely, when the rubber hand was not attributed to the self, activity was observed in the contralateral parietal cortex, particularly the somatosensory cortex. These structures form a network that plays a fundamental role in linking current sensory stimuli to one's own body and thus also in self-consciousness.
  

Key Words: agency,  body ownership,  insula,  rubber hand illusion,  self-consciousness,  somatosensory cortex 
  
  

◈ Valdman, Mikhail (Oct. 1997). Will zombies talk about consciousness? -The paradox of phenomenal judgment: its implications for naturalistic dualism and other theories of mind. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 9(4): 471-490. (DOI: 10.1080/095281397146997).
  

Abstract: David Chalmers argues that a materialist theory of mind is in principle unattainable because consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. In order to demonstrate this, he needs to make a convincing case for the conceptual possibility of zombies. His position, however, is rather tenuous due to the paradoxical nature of phenomenal judgments (among other things). That is, the fact that zombies would have to talk about consciousness and conscious experience may render them inconceivable. It is argued that this paradox is indeed fatal to his position, because zombies will never make meaningful phenomenal judgments. 
  

Keywords: Consciousness; Dualism; Materialism; Zombies; Chalmers

  

   

◈ Van Lommel, Pim (Jan. 2006). Near-Death Experience, Consciousness, and the Brain: A New Concept about the Continuity of Our Consciousness Based on Recent Scientific Research on Near-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest. World Futures 62(1 & 2): 134-151. (DOI: 10.1080/02604020500412808).
  

Pim Van Lommel: Rijnstate Hospital, Arnhem, The Netherlands
  

Abstract: In this article first some general aspects of near-death experience will be discussed, followed by questions about consciousness and its relation to brain function. Details will be described from our prospective study on near-death experience in survivors of cardiac arrest in the Netherlands, which was published in the Lancet in 2001. In this study it could not be shown that physiological, psychological, or pharmacological factors caused these experiences after cardiac arrest. Neurophysiology in cardiac arrest and in a normal functioning brain will be explained. Finally, implications for consciousness studies will be discussed, and how it could be possible to explain the continuity of our consciousness. Scientific study of NDE pushes us to the limits of our medical and neurophysiologic ideas about the range of human consciousness and mind-brain relation. 
  

Keywords: Informational fields of consciousness; mind-brain relation; near-death experience 
  
  

Weber, Bruce H. (Dec. 2007). Emergence of Life. Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 42(4): 837-856. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2007.00876.x).
  

Bruce H. Weber: Professor of Biochemistry Emeritus, California State University Fullerton, and Robert H. Woodworth Chair in Science and Natural Philosophy Emeritus, Bennington College. His address is Department of Chemistry & Biochemistry, California State University Fullerton, Fullerton, CA 92835-6866; email: bhweber (AT) fullerton.edu.
  

Issue online: 21 November 2007
  

Abstract: Discussions of the origin of life usually assume that there is a specific event, however improbable, by which dead matter became a living entity. Naturalistic accounts, although in seeming opposition to theistic explanations of the apparent design of even the simplest cells, often share the assumption that there is a specific line to be crossed. If the problem is recast as one of a process of emergence of biochemistry from protobiochemistry, which in turn emerged from the organic chemistry and geochemistry of primitive earth, the resources of the new sciences of complex systems dynamics can provide a more robust conceptual framework within which to explore the possible pathways of chemical complexification leading to life. In such a view the emergence of life is the result of deep natural laws (the outlines of which we are only beginning to perceive) and reflects a degree of holism in those systems that led to life. Further, there is the possibility of developing a more general theory of biology and of natural organization from such an approach. The emergence of life may thus be seen as an instance of the broader innate creativity of nature and consistent with a possible natural teleology.
  
  

◈ Weber, Marcel (Jan. 2008). Critical notice: Darwinian reductionism. Biology and Philosophy 23(1): 143-152. (DOI: 10.1007/s10539-007-9080-z).
  

Marcel Weber: Science Studies Program and Philosophy Department, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 21, Basel, 4003, Switzerland
  

Received: 17 July 2007  Accepted: 1 August 2007  Published online: 25 August 2007
  

Abstract:  This notice provides a critical discussion of some of the issues from Alex Rosenberg's Darwinian Reductionism, in particular proper functions and the relationship of proximate and ultimate biology, developmental programs and genocentrism, biological laws, the principle of natural selection as a fundamental law, genetic determinism, and the definition of "reductionism." 

   

Keywords: Reductionism - Proper functions - Ultimate vs. proximate biology - Biological laws - Developmental programs - Genocentrism - Principle of natural selection - Genetic determinism 

  

Alex Rosenberg, Darwinian Reductionism. Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2006. Cloth $40.00spec ISBN: 978-0-226-72729-5 (ISBN-10: 0-226-72729-7).
  
  

◈ Williams, J. Robert G. (John Robert Gareth) (June 12, 2007). Metaphysical indeterminacy, supervenience, and emergence. (work in progress).
  

Dept of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, UK, LS2 9JT

http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/

   

Metaphysical Indeterminacy (on the view of it I like) leads to a failure of properties of composite objects to supervene on the properties of their parts. In relevantly similar cases, philosophers have used this phenomena to argue that wholes can have emergent properties. I argue that though in one sense the properties of the whole supervenes on the properties of its parts, in at least two other senses the properties of the whole do supervene on the properties of its parts, even given indeterminacy. And moreover, the putative emergent properties turn out to be reductively definable in terms of the properties of their parts. Those kinds of failures of supervenience to which indeterminacy leads are not, then, do not give us reason to postulate emergent properties of the whole. 
   

http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/EmergenceIndeterminacy.pdf

  

     

◈ Wimsatt, William C. (June 2007). Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality. Harvard University Press. 
   

   
Analytic philosophers once pantomimed physics: they tried to understand the world by breaking it down into the smallest possible bits. Thinkers from the Darwinian sciences now pose alternatives to this simplistic reductionism.
  

In this intellectual tour--essays spanning thirty years--William Wimsatt argues that scientists seek to atomize phenomena only when necessary in the search to understand how entities, events, and processes articulate at different levels. Evolution forms the natural world not as Laplace's all-seeing demon but as a backwoods mechanic fixing and re-fashioning machines out of whatever is at hand. W. V. Quine's lost search for a "desert ontology" leads instead to Wimsatt's walk through a tropical rain forest.

  

This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world. Against eliminative reductionism, Wimsatt pits new perspectives to deal with emerging natural and social complexities. He argues that our philosophy should be rooted in heuristics and models that work in practice, not only in principle. He demonstrates how to do this with an analysis of the strengths, the limits, and a recalibration of our reductionistic and analytic methodologies. Our aims are changed and our philosophy is transfigured in the process. 

  

  

◈ Zeki, Semir (June 29, 2005). The functional specialization of the brain in space and time. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society Series B: Biological Sciences 360(1458): 1145-1183. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1666).

  

Semir Zeki: Wellcome Laboratory of Neurobiology, University College London Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
  

Abstract: The visual brain consists of many different visual areas, which are functionally specialized to process and perceive different attributes of the visual scene. However, the time taken to process different attributes varies