Topoi Volume 28, Number 1, March 2009

Special Issue on Embodied Mind, Extended Mind, and Enactivism 

 

 

Original Source Materials for this posting from: Topoi ― An International Review of Philosophy published by Springer Netherlands

http://www.springerlink.com/content/l4310u7xw468/?p=928e154dd5fc4dc099cb0890ed2b4c15&pi=0
 

Kiverstein, Julian, Andy Clark (Mar. 2009). Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many? Topoi 28(1): 1-7. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9041-4).

 

Published online: 8 January 2009
 

Julian Kiverstein1 and Andy Clark1

(1) School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, Scotland, UK

Julian Kiverstein (Corresponding author), Email: J.Kiverstein [AT] ed.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.artandphilosophy.com/philosophy.html

Andy Clark, Email: andy.clark [AT] ed.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/full-academic/andy-clark.html
 

The first page of this paper:

It is increasingly commonplace, both in philosophy and the many sub-disciplines of Cognitive Science, to encounter work said to reflect a vision of mind as 'embodied and environmentally embedded'.1 The phrase itself seems to have been coined by John Haugeland in a similarly titled paper that was circulating widely in the early 1990s2 and that later appeared as Haugeland (1998). There, Haugeland writes that:
 

If we are to understand mind as the locus of intelligence, we cannot follow Descartes in regarding it as separable in principle from the body and the world ... Broader approaches, freed of that prejudicial commitment, can look again at perception and action, at skillful involvement with public equipment and social organization, and see not principled separation but all sorts of close coupling and functional unity ... Mind, therefore, is not incidentally but intimately embodied and intimately embedded in its world (1998, pp. 236-237). 
 

     This passage is remarkably rich in content and pregnant with possibilities. It mentions body, perception, action, skill, equipment, social organization, close coupling, and functional unity. And all of these threads are indeed represented in various approaches gathered under the sheltering umbrella of the embodied, embedded mind. Such projects include (but are by no means exhausted by): work on 'wide computationalism', externalism and the nature of psychological explanation (Wilson 2004); work on 'active externalism' and the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008b); work on 'enactivism' and the continuity of life and mind (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007); work on 'sensorimotor accounts of perception' (O'Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004); work on environment-involving accounts of perception, memory, thought and language (Rowlands 1999); work on the interdependence of conscious perception and action (Hurley 1998); work on deictic pointers and active vision (Ballard et al. 1997); and work on the complementarity between biological and technological resources (Clark 2003).

     Given this large surface diversity, it seems fair to ask what, if anything, forms the deep theoretical core of the embodied, embedded approach? Equally importantly, we may ask to what extent the various projects pursued under the single umbrella are in fact harmonious? Thus Clark (2008a, b) suggests a possible tension between at least two strands of thought prominent in the recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as intrinsically special, and the details of a creature's embodiment as a major and ...
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/4l22n62452375135/?p=6c79b62d38bc4d0a8a764ba641f65b60&pi=0 
 

Di Paolo, Ezequiel A. (Mar. 2009). Extended Life. Topoi 28(1): 9-21. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9042-3).

 

Published online: 18 December 2008
 

Ezequiel Di Paolo1, 2

(1) Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics, University of Sussex, BN1 9QH Brighton, UK

(2) Centre for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Sussex, BN1 9QH Brighton, UK

Email: ezequiel [AT] sussex.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/ezequiel
 

ABSTRACT: This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a perspective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intuitions about what counts as cognitive.
 

KEYWORDS: Extended mind · Enactive approach · Autonomy · Precariousness · Agency · Mediation · Individuation
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/fh04g43733pg2375/?p=e064a08424194b83b86fb2413fd8833d&pi=1

http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/ezequiel/DiPaolo_Extended_Life_final.pdf
 

Thompson, Evan, Mog Stapleton (Mar. 2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28(1): 23-30. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2).

 

Published online: 20 December 2008
 

Evan Thompson1 and Mog Stapleton2

(1) Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 170 St. George Street, Toronto, ON, Canada, M5R 2M8

(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, Scotland, UK

Evan Thompson (Corresponding author), Email: evan.thompson [AT] utoronto.ca

Homepage: http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant

Mog Stapleton, Email: M.L.Stapleton [AT] sms.ed.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/postgraduate/students/phd/mogstapleton.html
 

ABSTRACT: This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between 'incorporation' and mere 'extension' in the body-mind-environment relation.
 

KEYWORDS: Enaction · Extended mind · Autonomy · Sense-making · Emotion · Embodiment · Incorporation
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/g86408172370x226/?p=e064a08424194b83b86fb2413fd8833d&pi=2

http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/postgraduate/students/phd/documents/ThompsonandStapleton2009.pdf
 

Menary, Richard (Mar. 2009). Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis. Topoi 28(1): 31-43. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9044-1).

 

Published online: 23 January 2009
 

Richard Menary : The University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

Email: rmenary [AT] uow.edu.au

Homepage: http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/selpl/philosophy/UOW025977.html
 

ABSTRACT: Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano's formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano's thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce's representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
 

KEYWORDS: Cognitive integration · Enactivism · Extended mind · Intentionality · Intentional directedness · Naturalism · Representation
 

The author thanks Andy Clark and Julian Kiverstein.
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/w046113573651121/?p=e064a08424194b83b86fb2413fd8833d&pi=3
 

Gallagher, Shaun, Anthony Crisafi (Mar. 2009). Mental Institutions. Topoi 28(1): 45-51. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0).

 

Published online: 20 December 2008
 

Shaun Gallagher1, 2 and Anthony Crisafi2, 3

(1) Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences and IST, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1352, USA

(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, England, UK

(3) Philosophy and Humanities, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1352, USA

Shaun Gallagher, Email: gallaghr [AT] mail.ucf.edu

Homepage: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaun_Gallagher_(philosopher) 
 

ABSTRACT: We propose to extend Clark and Chalmers's concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on "objective spirit" which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental processes. We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior.
 

KEYWORDS: Extended mind · Objective spirit · Parity principle · Hegel · Social institutions
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/gt6q8510584wt558/?p=3c42002b544d48ae86d48e198b1e5259&pi=4
 

Rowlands, Mark (Mar. 2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28(1): 53-62. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9046-z).

 

Published online: 8 January 2009
 

Mark Rowlands : Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA

Email: mrowlands [AT] miami.edu

Homepage: http://www.markrowlandsauthor.com

Mark Rowlands' Blog: http://rowlands.philospot.com

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Rowlands
 

ABSTRACT: According to the view that has become known as the extended mind, some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism's environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism's ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common to regard them as essentially variations on the same theme. In this paper, I shall argue that the similarities between enactivist and extended models of cognition are relatively superficial, and the divergences are deeper than commonly thought.
 

KEYWORDS: Ability · Enactivism · Extended mind · Sensorimotor knowledge
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k407u7x172783016/?p=3c42002b544d48ae86d48e198b1e5259&pi=5
 

Gangopadhyay, Nivedita, Julian Kiverstein (Mar. 2009). Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action. Topoi 28(1): 63-73. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9047-y).

 

Published online: 20 December 2008
 

Nivedita Gangopadhyay1 and Julian Kiverstein2

(1) Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 1TB, UK

(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, Scotland, UK

Nivedita Gangopadhyay (Corresponding author), Email: Nivedita.Gangopadhyay [AT] bristol.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/department/staff/ng.html

Julian Kiverstein, Email: j.kiverstein [AT] ed.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.artandphilosophy.com/philosophy.html

URL: www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/contact
 

ABSTRACT: This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O'Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939-1031, 2001; Noë and O'Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley's (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3-40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259-272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1-19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley's active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley's theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.
 

KEYWORDS: Perception · Action · Sensorimotor · Enactivism
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/77um284842525450/?p=3c42002b544d48ae86d48e198b1e5259&pi=6 
 

Johnson-Laird, Philip N., Ruth M. J. Byrne, Vittorio Girotto (Mar. 2009). The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi 28(1): 75-80. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9049-9).

 

Published online: 20 December 2008
 

Philip N. Johnson-Laird1, Ruth M. J. Byrne2  and Vittorio Girotto3

(1) Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA

(2) School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland

(3) University IUAV Venice, Convento delle Terese, 30123 Venice, Italy

Philip N. Johnson-Laird (Corresponding author), Email: phil [AT] princeton.edu

Ruth M. J. Byrne, Email: Ruth.Byrne [AT] tcd.ie

Vittorio Girotto, Email: vgirotto [AT] iuav.it
 

ABSTRACT: This paper replies to Politzer's (2007) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the 'paradoxes' of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
 

KEYWORDS: Human reasoning · Conditionals · Mental models · Probabilistic reasoning
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/f5015036182kl7m2/?p=6d455c070c8e4fb0ac4a4bb3a0b36c67&pi=7
 

Politzer, Guy (Mar. 2009). Could it be the Case that if I am Right My Opponents will be Pleased? A Rejoinder to Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto. Topoi 28(1): 81-85. (DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9048-x).

 

Published online: 20 December 2008
 

Guy Politzer1

(1) CNRS ― Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole normale supérieure, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris, France. Email: politzer [AT] univ-paris8.fr
 

ABSTRACT: I take up the four issues considered by Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto in their reply to Politzer (2007). Based on the conceptual clarification which they adduce, it seems that the disagreement can be settled about the first one (truth functionality) and can be attenuated about the second one (the paradoxes of material implication). However, I maintain and refine my criticisms on the last two (negation and the probability of conditionals), backed up by considerations borrowed from the perspective of the conditional probability semantics for conditionals.
 

KEYWORDS: Conditionals · Probability of conditionals · Negation of conditionals
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/0101011glv674202/?p=6d455c070c8e4fb0ac4a4bb3a0b36c67&pi=8 
 

 

Related Books on Embodied/Embedded/Situated Mind, Extended Mind, and Enactivism

 

forthcoming
 

 
 
 

 

2009. 04. 01. 수요일. 낮 3시 18분 ~ 04. 02. 목요일. 아침 09시 06분 사이에 작성.
 

지금 2009. 04. 09. 목요일. 낮 5시 21분. 맑음. 밀렌 파머(Mylène Farmer)의 노래 “Ange, parle-moi”와 “J'attends”을 들으면서 ... 
 

[지금 2009. 06. 06. 토요일. 늦은 6시 04분. 아까 한낮에는 맑은 편이었는데, 지금은 약간 잿빛이 도는 구름이 하늘을 거의 덮었다. 빗방울이 드문드문 떨어지고 있다. 어제 슈프링거(Springer) 학술지 누리집에 가보았더니 《Topoi》28(1), March 2009 호의 특집 논문들을 무료로 제공하고 있었다. 정말 엄청난 행운이다. 이 논문들을 입수하려면 청주대 도서관까지 가야 했다(충북대 도서관은 슈프링거의 철학 학술지 구독을 서너 해 전부터 끊어버렸다. 너무나 실망스럽다). 그러나 지난 05월 11일 몸을 다쳐 바깥 출입을 전혀 할 수가 없었다. 게다가 몸이 낫는다 하더라도 여러 가지 바쁜 일로 청주대 도서관까지 일부러 갈 수도 없는 형편이다. 그런데 뜻밖에도, 그렇게도 읽어보고 싶었던 저 논문들을 내방에서 즉시 입수할 수 있게 되다니 얼마나 고마운 일인가! 기쁜 마음으로 지금까지 위 특집 논문들을 슈프링거(Springer)에서 무료로 내려받아 내 컴퓨터에 저장했다. 위 특집호에 실린 논문들 중 체화된 마음/확장된 마음/발제주의와 관련이 적어 보이는 아래의 논문 두 편을 지난번 서지 사항 작성 때는 빼놓았었는데 이 참에 마저 작성해서 덧붙여 놓는다.] 
 

콸리아 / 퀄리아 / qualia 


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이정모 2009-06-18 16:39   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | 수정 | 삭제 | URL
덕분에 특집호 논문을 모두 다운 받아보았습니다. 정말로 감사드립니다.
그리고 최근에 우편으로 다음 논문을 접하게 되었는데 보셨는지요? 웹에는 아직 공개되지 않은 것 같습니다.
Lisa M. Osbeck 의 " Transformations in Cognitive Science: Implications and Issues Posed" - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2009, Vol. 29, 1,16-33.
EC/ EM 관련 정보있으시면 앞으로도 계속 부탁드립니다

qualia 2009-06-19 00:14   좋아요 0 | URL
앗, 교수님, 찾아주셔서 정말 감사드립니다. 멀리서 교수님을 존경하는 한 사람으로서 큰 영광으로 생각합니다. 한국의 인지과학을 선도적으로 이끌어 가시는 분으로 신문이나 인터넷 매체에서 자주 뵈어왔습니다.

저도 작년 10월 31일에 교수님께서 교수님의 누리집(http://cogpsy.skku.ac.kr)에 올리신 글 「인지과학이 ‘마음’을 바꾸고 있다? Changing its Mind?」를 읽고, "체화 인지와 신경현상학"에 관한 논문 정보를 얻었던 적이 있었습니다(아래에 적어놓은 관련 인터넷 주소 참조). 거의 매일같이 교수님의 누리집에 찾아가서 인지과학에 관한 좋은 글과 정보를 읽고 입수하고 있습니다. 그때마다 정말 감사하는 마음입니다.

(참조1 → http://cogpsy.skku.ac.kr/cwb-bin/CrazyWWWBoard.exe?mode=read&num=3106&db=newarticle&backdepth=1)
(참조2 → http://korcogsci.blogspot.com/2008/10/blog-post_30.html)
(참조3 → http://blog.aladdin.co.kr/qualia/2380743).

그리고 위 논문 정보 고맙습니다. 예, 아직 웹에는 공개되지 않았더군요. 아래에 퍼온 논문 초록을 읽어보니 매우 흥미로운 논문인 듯합니다. 저도 꼭 입수해서 읽어보고는 싶습니다만...ㅠㅠ

교수님께서 이렇게 찾아주셔서 거듭 감사드립니다.

-----------------------------------------

▷ Osbeck, Lisa M. (Spring 2009). Transformations in cognitive science: Implications and issues posed. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29(1): 16-33.

ABSTRACT: Cognitive science currently offers models of cognition that depart substantively from those of information processing models and classical artificial intelligence, while it embraces methods of inquiry that include case-based, ethnographic, and philosophical methods. To illustrate, five overlapping approaches that constitute departures from classical representational cognitive science are briefly discussed in this paper: dynamical cognition, situated cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind theory, and integrative cognition. Critical responses to these efforts from members of the self-proclaimed cognitive science orthodoxy are also summarized. The paper then discusses ethical and epistemological implications arising from the “new” cognitive science and from critical responses to it and considers the broader importance of this literature for theoretical and philosophical psychology.

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/teo/29/1/


이정모 2009-06-19 10:08   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | 수정 | 삭제 | URL
저도 건강이 안좋아서 큰 수술을 하고 쉬고 있습니다. 그래서 그동안 석달을 homepage에 자료를 제대로 못 올리고 있습니더. 조만간 다시 재개하여야겠지만요. mail 보냈으니 확인하여 주세요

qualia 2009-06-19 20:01   좋아요 0 | URL
교수님께서 그동안 많이 아프셨군요. 큰 수술까지 하셨다니, 몹시 걱정스럽습니다. 어서 빨리 건강하게 나으시길 바랍니다.

저 또한 한 달 이상 움직이는 것조차 어려울 정도로 몸이 안 좋았습니다. 몸을 다치고 보니 건강보다 소중한 게 없다는 생각이 듭니다. 어서 빨리 쾌차하시길 빕니다.

조금 전에 교수님께 답장을 드렸습니다. 교수님의 배려에 정말 감사드립니다.

qualia 2009-06-20 02:31   좋아요 0 | URL
조금 전에 교수님께서 보내주신 리사 오스벡(Lisa M. Osbeck) 교수님의 논문을 잘 받았습니다. 정말 감사드립니다. 교수님 덕분에 아주 흥미롭고 유익한 논문을 읽을 수 있게 되어서 매우 기쁩니다. 고맙습니다.
 

Cognitive Computation Volume 1, Issue 1, March 2009

Inaugural Issue of Cognitive Computation

 

 

Original Source Materials for this posting from: Cognitive Computation published by Springer-Verlag

http://www.springerlink.com/content/w2826455k852/?p=107eb42748444c278904347317074098&pi=0
 

Hussain, Amir (Mar. 2009). Cognitive Computation : An Introduction. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 1-3. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9013-z).

 

Amir Hussain : University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland, UK

Email: ahu [AT] cs.stir.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.cs.stir.ac.uk/~ahu
 

Published online: 20 February 2009
 

The first page of this paper:

A very warm welcome to the first quarterly Issue of Cognitive Computation ― a vibrant addition to Springer's Neuroscience journals portfolio for 2009.

     The launch of Cognitive Computation by Springer, heralds an exciting new era in a strongly interdisciplinary area. As reflected in its name, Cognitive Computation identifies a distinctive, timely and productive niche at this growing interface between neuroscience, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. Cognitive Computation is hence unique both in its scope and target, and its broad remit is also evidenced in the breadth of its Editorial and Advisory Boards.

     Cognitive Computation specifically aims to publish cutting-edge articles describing original basic and applied work involving biologically inspired theoretical, computational, experimental and integrative accounts of all aspects of natural and artificial cognitive systems. By establishing a forum to bring together different scientific communities, Cognitive Computation will promote a more comprehensive and unified understanding of diverse topics, including those related to perception, action, attention, learning and memory, decision making, language processing, communication, reasoning, problem solving and consciousness aspects of cognition.

     The Editorial Board is truly international and includes leading experts from Finland, Switzerland, Germany, Turkey, Japan, and the USA as well as the United Kingdom. Dr. Igor Aleksander from Imperial College, London, is the Honorary Editor-in-Chief and Dr. John Taylor from King's College, London, is Chair of the strategic Advisory Board.

     Cognitive Computation is published in both electronic and quarterly print formats. All articles are initially published online via Online FirstTM, a feature that allows authors to bring their work to the attention of their peers at a very early stage of the publication process. All authors, via the Springer Open ChoiceTM program, also have the option of publishing their articles using the open access publishing model.

     This first Issue of Cognitive Computation is composed of 10 invited contributions from leading researchers in their subject areas, all of whom are also members of the journal's Editorial Board. The selection of these papers has been no less a daunting task as several equally outstanding invited contributions from other experts have had to be moved to the second Issue due to space constraints. The selected papers for this Issue are predominantly state-of-the-art reviews of some of the key journal areas with the first three contributions by Taylor, McClelland and Aleksander making up the keynote papers for this Issue.

     The first keynote contribution is by Taylor, who describes a piorneering multi-modular approach to "Cognitive Computation". Taylor raises a number of very interesting points in his ongoing attempts to construct an artificial being empowered with its own cognitive powers. Initially, he lists a range of key questions relevant to the creation of such a machine and step-by-step attempts to answer these by providing convincing evidence from national and international research projects he had led over the years. Taylor's theory is one of very few attempts to construct a global brain theory of cognition and consciousness and is based on a unique multi-modular approach including vision and attention, motor action, language and emotion. Conventional studies in cognition and consciousness on the other hand, have primarily focussed on single modalities such as vision (such as the visual awareness models of Koch and Crick) or more abstract formulations (such as those of Aleksander).
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/e4823n22u7414p27/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=0

http://www.springerlink.com/content/e4823n22u7414p27/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/e4823n22u7414p27/fulltext.pdf
 

Taylor, John G. (Mar. 2009). Cognitive Computation. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 4-16. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-008-9001-8).

 

John G. Taylor : Department of Mathematics, King's College Strand, London, WC2R2LS, UK

Email: john.g.taylor [AT] kcl.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.mth.kcl.ac.uk/~jgtaylor

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_G._Taylor
 

Published online: 23 January 2009
 

ABSTRACT: We present a proposal as to how to create a Cognitive Machine. We start by raising a set of basic questions relevant to the creation of such a machine. These include the nature of human cognition and how it might be modelled, is consciousness crucial for cognition, and how might an autonomous cognitive agent impute the internal mental state of another such agent. In the following sections we propose a set of possible answers to these questions. The paper finishes with conclusions as to the most viable and interesting directions to be pursued to create cognitive machines.
 

KEYWORDS: Autonomous agents · Attention · Emotion · Consciousness · Mental simulation · Theory of mind
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/j742434067803jh8/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=1

http://www.springerlink.com/content/j742434067803jh8/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/j742434067803jh8/fulltext.pdf
 

McClelland, James L. (Mar. 2009). Is a Machine Realization of Truly Human-Like Intelligence Achievable? Cognitive Computation 1(1): 17-21. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9015-x).

 

James L. McClelland : Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Bldg 420, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305, USA

Email: mcclelland [AT] stanford.edu

Homepage: http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~jlm

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_McClelland
 

Received: 20 January 2009, Accepted: 28 January 2009, Published online: 18 February 2009
 

ABSTRACT: Even after more than a half a century of research on machine intelligence, humans remain far better than our strongest computing machines at a wide range of natural cognitive tasks, such as object recognition, language comprehension, and planning and acting in contextually appropriate ways. While progress is being made in many of these areas, computers still lack the fluidity, adaptability, open-endedness, creativity, purposefulness, and insightfulness we associate with the supreme achievements of human cognitive ability. Reasons for this and prospects for overcoming these limitations are discussed.
 

KEYWORDS: Human cognition · Open-ended problem solving · Computational theory · Cognitive architecture · Learning algorithms · Nurturance · Culture · Education
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/r623721nk805h5nw/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=2

http://www.springerlink.com/content/r623721nk805h5nw/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/r623721nk805h5nw/fulltext.pdf
 

Aleksander, Igor (Mar. 2009). Designing Conscious Systems. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 22-28. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9008-9).

 

Igor Aleksander : Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department, Imperial College, London, SW7 2BT, UK

Email: i.aleksander [AT] imperial.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.iis.ee.ic.ac.uk/aleksander.html

Homepage: http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/people/i.aleksander

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Aleksander
 

Published online: 23 January 2009
 

ABSTRACT: This paper reviews computational work that is currently developing under the heading of 'Machine Consciousness' and sets out to provide a guide for those who wish to contribute to this field. First, questions of philosophical concern as to the appropriateness of this activity are raised and discussed. Then some classical designs and computational attitudes are described before arguing that fine-grain neural approaches are needed to provide truly phenomenal representations that stand in relation to the behaviour of a computational organism as subjective mental states stand in relation to the existence of a conscious organism. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the validity and benefits of designing conscious systems.
 

KEYWORDS: Machine consciousness · Phenomenology · Conscious robots · Virtual machines
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/tj6n72845j62p468/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=3

http://www.springerlink.com/content/tj6n72845j62p468/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/tj6n72845j62p468/fulltext.pdf
 

Gurney, Kevin N. (Mar. 2009). Reverse Engineering the Vertebrate Brain: Methodological Principles for a Biologically Grounded Programme of Cognitive Modelling. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 29-41. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9010-2).

 

Kevin N. Gurney : Department of Psychology, Adaptive Behaviour Research Group, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S10 2TP, UK

Email: k.gurney [AT] shef.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.shef.ac.uk/psychology/staff/academic/kevin-gurney.html
 

Received: 26 December 2008, Accepted: 15 January 2009, Published online: 4 February 2009
 

ABSTRACT: How are we to go about understanding the computations that underpin cognition? Here we set out a methodological framework that helps understand different approaches to solving this problem. We argue that a very powerful stratagem is to attempt to 'reverse engineer' the brain and that computational neuroscience plays a pivotal role in this programme. En passant, we also tackle the oft-asked and prior question of why we should build computational models of any kind. Our framework uses four levels of conceptual analysis: computation, algorithm, mechanism and biological substrate. As such it enables us to understand how (algorithmic) AI and connectionism may be recruited to help propel the reverse-engineering programme forward. The framework also incorporates the notion of different levels of structural description of the brain, and analysis of this issue gives rise to a novel proposal for capturing computations at multiple levels of description in a single model.
 

KEYWORDS: Methodology · Levels of analysis · Computation · Cognition · Basal ganglia · Brain architecture · Computational neuroscience
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k33231338114166v/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=4

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k33231338114166v/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k33231338114166v/fulltext.pdf
 

Haikonen, Pentti O. A. (Mar. 2009). The Role of Associative Processing in Cognitive Computing. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 42-49. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9006-y).

 

Pentti O. A. Haikonen : Nokia Research Center, P.O. Box 407, NOKIA GROUP, 00045, Finland

Email: pentti.haikonen [AT] pp.inet.fi

Homepage: http://personal.inet.fi/cool/pentti.haikonen
 

Published online: 23 January 2009
 

ABSTRACT: The traditional approaches ― of symbolic artificial intelligence (AI) and of sub-symbolic neural networks ― towards artificial cognition have not been very successful. The rule-based symbolic AI approach has proven to be brittle and unable to provide any real intelligence (Mckenna, Artificial intelligence and neural networks: steps toward principled integration, Academic Press, USA, 1994). On the other hand, traditional artificial neural networks have not been able to advance very much beyond pattern recognition and classification. This shortcoming has been credited to the inability of conventional artificial neural networks to handle syntax and symbols. Hybrid approaches that combine symbolic AI and sub-symbolic neural networks have been tried with results that fall short of the ultimate goal. It has been argued that traditional AI programs do not operate with meanings and consequently do not understand anything (Searle, Minds, brains & science, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 1984; Searle, The mystery of consciousness, Granta Books, London, 1997). It seems that in this way some essential ingredient is missing, but there may be a remedy available. Associative information processing principles may enable the utilization of meaning and the combined sub-symbolic/symbolic operation of neural networks.
 

KEYWORDS: Associative processing · Machine cognition · Symbolic neural networks · Meaning · Ontology
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h352016830883xq0/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=5

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h352016830883xq0/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h352016830883xq0/fulltext.pdf
 

Seth, Anil K. (Mar. 2009). Explanatory Correlates of Consciousness: Theoretical and Computational Challenges. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 50-63. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9007-x).

 

Anil Seth : Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QJ, UK

Email: a.k.seth [AT] sussex.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.anilseth.com
 

Published online: 25 January 2009
 

ABSTRACT: Consciousness is a key feature of mammalian cognition and revealing its underlying mechanisms is one of the most important scientific challenges for the 21st century. In this article I review how computational and theoretical approaches can facilitate a transition from correlation to explanation in consciousness science. I describe progress towards identifying 'explanatory correlates' underlying four fundamental properties characterizing most if not all conscious experiences: (i) the co-existence of segregation and integration in conscious scenes, (ii) the emergence of a subjective first-person perspective, (iii) the presence of affective conscious contents, either transiently (emotion) or as a background (mood) and (iv) experiences of intention and agency that are characteristic of voluntary action. I also discuss how synthetic approaches can shed additional light on possible functions of consciousness, the role of embodiment in consciousness, and the plausibility of constructing a conscious artefact.
 

KEYWORDS: Consciousness · Explanatory correlate · Causal density · Complexity · Perspectivalness · Emotion · Volition · Computational model · Selfhood · Emergence
 

Invited article for inaugural issue of Cognitive Computation.
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/86746t420143q622/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=6

http://www.springerlink.com/content/86746t420143q622/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/86746t420143q622/fulltext.pdf

http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/anils/php/processPdf.php?item=56
 

Underwood, Geoffrey (Mar. 2009). Cognitive Processes in Eye Guidance: Algorithms for Attention in Image Processing. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 64-76. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-008-9002-7).

 

Geoffrey Underwood : School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK

Email: geoff.underwood [AT] nottingham.ac.uk

Homepage: http://www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/staff/gju
 

Published online: 16 January 2009
 

ABSTRACT: When inspecting an image for the first time, how does the viewer decide where to look next? The saliency map hypothesis proposes that viewers initially analyse the image for variations in low-level visual features including intensity, colour, and edge orientation, and that their eyes are guided towards the most salient region. The saliency of objects in scenes may provide an explanation of why some experiments find that incongruent objects attract attention whilst other studies do not find this effect. Experiments that have monitored eye movements during scene inspection have found some support for the saliency map hypothesis, particularly when pictures are inspected in anticipation of a memory test. Under some circumstances the hypothesis fails to account for inspection patterns. When scenes are inspected to check the presence or absence of a named object, or when two images are compared to determine whether they are identical, or when the viewer has specialised domain knowledge of the scene depicted, then saliency has little influence. This paper evaluates the saliency map hypothesis of scene perception using evidence of eye movements made when images are first inspected, and concludes that visual saliency can be used by viewers, but that its use is both task-dependent and knowledge-dependent.
 

KEYWORDS: Attention · Scene perception · Saliency map models · Eye movements · Fixation scanpaths
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/hj80r9lg646275x1/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=7

http://www.springerlink.com/content/hj80r9lg646275x1/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/hj80r9lg646275x1/fulltext.pdf
 

Gros, Claudius (Mar. 2009). Cognitive Computation with Autonomously Active Neural Networks: An Emerging Field. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 77-90. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-008-9000-9).

 

Claudius Gros : Institute of Theoretical Physics, J.W. Goethe University Frankfurt, 60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Email: gros07 [AT] itp.uni-frankfurt.de

Homepage: http://itp.uni-frankfurt.de/~gros
 

Published online: 23 January 2009
 

ABSTRACT: The human brain is autonomously active. To understand the functional role of this self-sustained neural activity, and its interplay with the sensory data input stream, is an important question in cognitive system research and we review here the present state of theoretical modeling. This review will start with a brief overview of the experimental efforts, together with a discussion of transient versus self-sustained neural activity in the framework of reservoir computing. The main emphasis will be then on two paradigmal neural network architectures showing continuously ongoing transient-state dynamics: saddle point networks and networks of attractor relics. Self-active neural networks are confronted with two seemingly contrasting demands: a stable internal dynamical state and sensitivity to incoming stimuli. We show, that this dilemma can be solved by networks of attractor relics based on competitive neural dynamics, where the attractor relics compete on one side with each other for transient dominance, and on the other side with the dynamical influence of the input signals. Unsupervised and local Hebbian-style online learning then allows the system to build up correlations between the internal dynamical transient states and the sensory input stream. An emergent cognitive capability results from this set-up. The system performs online, and on its own, a nonlinear independent component analysis of the sensory data stream, all the time being continuously and autonomously active. This process maps the independent components of the sensory input onto the attractor relics, which acquire in this way a semantic meaning.
 

KEYWORDS: Recurrent neural networks · Autonomous neural dynamics · Transient state dynamics · Emergent cognitive capabilities
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h4jp4l1674k474q0/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=8

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h4jp4l1674k474q0/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/h4jp4l1674k474q0/fulltext.pdf
 

Sun, Ron (Mar. 2009). Motivational Representations within a Computational Cognitive Architecture. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 91-103. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9005-z).

 

Ron Sun : Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180, USA

Email: rsun [AT] rpi.edu

Homepage: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun
 

Published online: 4 February 2009
 

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses essential motivational representations necessary for a comprehensive computational cognitive architecture. It hypothesizes the need for implicit drive representations, as well as explicit goal representations. Drive representations consist of primary drives ― both low-level primary drives (concerned mostly with basic physiological needs) and high-level primary drives (concerned more with social needs), as well as derived (secondary) drives. On the basis of drives, explicit goals may be generated on the fly during an agent's interaction with various situations. These motivational representations help to make cognitive architectural models more comprehensive and provide deeper explanations of psychological processes. This work represents a step forward in making computational cognitive architectures better reflections of the human mind and all its motivational complexity and intricacy.
 

KEYWORDS: Cognitive architecture · Motivation
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/bh27371300862gq2/?p=83a7b4bc0f724b2398694aafc0e0a37c&pi=9

http://www.springerlink.com/content/bh27371300862gq2/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/bh27371300862gq2/fulltext.pdf
 

Ziemke, Tom, Robert Lowe (Mar. 2009). On the Role of Emotion in Embodied Cognitive Architectures: From Organisms to Robots. Cognitive Computation 1(1): 104-117. (DOI: 10.1007/s12559-009-9012-0).

 

Tom Ziemke1 and Robert Lowe1

(1) Informatics Research Centre, School of Humanities & Informatics, University of Skövde, PO Box 408, 54128 Skövde, Sweden

Tom Ziemke (Corresponding author), Email: tom.ziemke [AT] his.se

Homepage: http://ziemke.org

Robert Lowe, Email: robert.lowe [AT] his.se
 

Received: 2 January 2009, Accepted: 15 January 2009, Published online: 6 February 2009
 

ABSTRACT: The computational modeling of emotion has been an area of growing interest in cognitive robotics research in recent years, but also a source of contention regarding how to conceive of emotion and how to model it. In this paper, emotion is characterized as (a) closely connected to embodied cognition, (b) grounded in homeostatic bodily regulation, and (c) a powerful organizational principle ― affective modulation of behavioral and cognitive mechanisms ― that is 'useful' in both biological brains and robotic cognitive architectures. We elaborate how emotion theories and models centered on core neurological structures in the mammalian brain, and inspired by embodied, dynamical, and enactive approaches in cognitive science, may impact on computational and robotic modeling. In light of the theoretical discussion, work in progress on the development of an embodied cognitive-affective architecture for robots is presented, incorporating aspects of the theories discussed.
 

KEYWORDS: Affect · Cognitive architectures · Cognitive robotics · Computational modeling · Embodied cognition · Emotion · Grounding · Homeostasis · Motivation · Organisms
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/x30436v0871313p6/?p=50241b71931947578d9285b411cd04ef&pi=10

http://www.springerlink.com/content/x30436v0871313p6/fulltext.html

http://www.springerlink.com/content/x30436v0871313p6/fulltext.pdf 
 

 

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2009. 04. 02. 목요일. 맑은 중에 구름 많음. 아침 09시 06분쯤 ~ 늦은 6시 10분쯤까지 작성하다. 
 

콸리아 / 퀄리아 / qualia 


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Continental Philosophy Review Volume 41, Number 2 , June 2008

Special Issue on: Affectivity and intersubjectivity: Perspectives from Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Guest Editor: Brady Thomas Heiner

 

 

Original Source Materials for this posting from: Continental Philosophy Review published by Springer-Verlag

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k0w5k4218371/?p=a1021bd581284372ac77804a7adb0836&pi=3
 

Heiner, Brady Thomas (June 2008). Guest editor’s introduction: The recorporealization of cognition in phenomenology and cognitive science. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 115-126. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9076-7).

 

Brady Thomas Heiner : Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA. Email: bheiner [AT] ic.sunysb.edu
 

Published online: 3 July 2008
 

The first page of this paper:

A remarkably productive area of interdisciplinary research is emerging at the intersection of phenomenology and cognitive science. Part of the motivation of this exchange has arisen from recent transformations taking place in the sorts of questions cognitive scientists are asking about cognition. After the successive waves of behaviorism and computationalism, cognitive scientists are now increasingly turning their attention to the embodied, emplaced, and enactive dimensions of cognition. This developing approach within the disciplines of cognitive science insists that cognition is best characterized as belonging to embodied, situated subjects, i.e., beings who are in-the-world. Guiding this movement toward more contextualized features of cognition and perception is an increased attention, on the part of many cognitive scientists, to phenomenological research on consciousness and the body, which, for the last century, has developed useful methodological and conceptual tools for understanding the intertwining of subjectivity, the body, and the world. It is precisely with respect to the embodied, embedded, and enactive aspects of cognition and perception that phenomenological philosophy and cognitive science have converged on a kindred domain of research. 

     This special issue of Continental Philosophy Review brings together a diverse, international group of scholars who are working in and across the disciplinary domains of phenomenology, psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, social theory, and philosophy of mind. Each contributor draws resources from phenomenology in order to address the theme of "affectivity and intersubjectivity." This thematic couplet was chosen to orient this special issue on phenomenology and cognitive science because it is indicative of important methodological developments that have taken place in both disciplines -- the general drift of which I will designate as the Recorporealization of Cognition (RoC). While it is beyond the task of this introduction to give a full-fledged account of these distinct and internally ...
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/b4678831885205n1/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=0
 

Waldenfels, Bernhard (June 2008). The role of the lived-body in feeling. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 127-142. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9077-6).

 

Bernhard Waldenfels : Department of Philosophy, University of Bochum, Bochum, Germany 

Email: Bernhard.Waldenfels [AT] rz.ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Homepage: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/staff/waldenfels/start.html 

 

Published online: 18 July 2008
 

ABSTRACT: Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is not formed through the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a process that is susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning, which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is confronted by disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings makes the brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living organ that selects and "evaluates" what is "important." Finally, cross-cultural comparison shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding and willing, which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to mention a highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different studies on gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler, Gefühle und Urteilskraft. Ein Plädoyer für die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The following reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and takes the pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its point of departure.
 

KEYWORDS: Feeling · Affectivity · Pathos · Lived-body · Phenomenology
 

Translated by Christina M. Gould : Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA. e-mail: cgould [AT] siu.edu
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/7479t43260195824/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=1
 

Behnke, Elizabeth A. (June 2008). Interkinaesthetic affectivity: a phenomenological approach. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 143-161. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9074-9).

 

Elizabeth A. Behnke : Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body, P.O. Box 66, Ferndale, WA 98248, USA. Email: sppb [AT] openaccess.org
 

Published online: 2 July 2008
 

ABSTRACT: This Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity first clarifies the sense of affectivity that is at stake here, then shows how Husserl's distinctive approach to kinaesthetic experience provides evidential access to the interkinaesthetic field. After describing several structures of interkinaesthetic-affective experience, I indicate how a Husserlian critique of the presupposition that we are "psychophysical" entities might suggest a more inclusive approach to a biosocial plenum that includes all metabolic life.
 

KEYWORDS: Phenomenology · Husserl · Transcendental · Kinaesthetic · Affection · Affectivity · Intercorporeal · Body · Biosocial · Psychophysical
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/m059653108527701/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=2
 

Gallagher, Shaun (June 2008). Intersubjectivity in perception. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2):163-178. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9075-8).

 

Shaun Gallagher : Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816, USA. Email: gallaghr [AT] mail.ucf.edu

Homepage: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/gallintro.html

Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaun_Gallagher_(philosopher)
 

Published online: 3 July 2008
 

ABSTRACT: The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
 

KEYWORDS: Embodied cognition · Extended mind ·  Enactive perception · Intersubjectivity · Object perception
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/t357166pv1r0u717/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=3
 

Heiner, Brady Thomas, Kyle Powys Whyte (June 2008). A proposal for genetically modifying the project of “naturalizing” phenomenology. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 179-193. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9081-x).

 

Brady Thomas Heiner1 and Kyle Powys Whyte1  

(1) Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA

Brady Thomas Heiner (Corresponding author), Email: bheiner [AT] ic.sunysb.edu

Kyle Powys Whyte, Email: kwhyte [AT] ic.sunysb.edu
 

Published online: 5 July 2008
 

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we examine Shaun Gallagher's project of "naturalizing" phenomenology with the cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology (FLP). While we think it is a productive proposal, we argue that Gallagher does not employ genetic phenomenological methods in his execution of FLP. We show that without such methods, FLP's attempt to locate neurological correlates of conscious experience is not yet adequate. We demonstrate this by analyzing Gallagher's critique of cognitive neuropsychologist Christopher Frith's functional explanation of schizophrenic symptoms. In "constraining" Gallagher's FLP program, we discuss what genetic phenomenological method is and why FLP ought to embrace it. We also indicate what types of structures a genetically modified FLP will consider, and how such an approach would affect the manner in which potential neurological correlates of conscious experience are conceptually understood and experimentally investigated.
 

KEYWORDS: Phenomenology · Cognitive science · Schizophrenia · Thought-insertion
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/q3660r688257m802/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=4
 

Ratcliffe, Matthew (June 2008). The phenomenological role of affect in the Capgras delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 195-216. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9078-5).

 

Matthew Ratcliffe : Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, DH1 3HN, UK. Email: m.j.ratcliffe [AT] durham.ac.uk
 

Published online: 28 June 2008
 

ABSTRACT: This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by 'affective relatedness' in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content 'this entity is not my spouse but an impostor' can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience.
 

KEYWORDS: Affect · Belief · Capgras delusion · Feeling of unfamiliarity · Horizons · Possibilities
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/vu7t86320117nr05/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=5
 

Stawarska, Beata (June 2008). Feeling good vibrations in dialogical relations. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 217-236. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9079-4).

 

Beata Stawarska : Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, USA. Email: stawarsk [AT] uoregon.edu
 

Published online: 3 July 2008
 

ABSTRACT: I engage phenomenological and empirical perspectives on dialogical relations in infancy in a mutually enlightening and challenging relation. On the one hand, the empirical contributions provide evidence for the primacy of first-to-second person interrelatedness in human sociality, as opposed to the claim of primary syncretism heralded by Merleau-Ponty, and also in distinction from the ego-alter ego model routinely used in phenomenology. On the other hand, phenomenological considerations regarding the lived affective experience of dialogical relatedness enrich and render intelligible the psychological accounts of dialogue in terms of observable behavior. Phenomenological and empirical perspectives on dialogical relatedness thus combine to offer an affectively charged and conversationally patterned notion of primary intersubjectivity in the I-you mode.
 

KEYWORDS: Conversational patterns · Infancy · I-you relations · Language
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k0134724627380m1/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=6
 

Depraz, Natalie (June 2008). The rainbow of emotions: at the crossroads of neurobiology and phenomenology. Continental Philosophy Review 41(2): 237-259. (DOI: 10.1007/s11007-008-9080-y).

 

Natalie Depraz1, 2  

(1) Philosophy, University of Rouen, Rouen, France

(2) University of Paris IV, Sorbonne, Paris, France

Email: natalie.depraz [AT] univ-rouen.fr
 

Published online: 5 July 2008
 

ABSTRACT: This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal field: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/Körper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and breath can become constitutive of a subjective (qua intersubjective) point of view, we give an account of the specific circular and systemic dynamic that we call "the rainbow of emotions." This dynamic, we argue, is composed of both structural and experiential components and better evidences the seamless, non-dual articulation between the organic and the experiential.
 

KEYWORDS: Emotions · Intersubjectivity · Neurophenomenology · Heart · Coupling
 

http://www.springerlink.com/content/1x6056515706697m/?p=82f666cbc8be4668889dfc5671c84138&pi=7
 
 

Related Books on Embodied/Embedded/Situated Cognition, Extended Mind, Enacted Perception, and Neurophenomenology

 

  
 

forthcoming
 

 
 
 

2009. 04. 02. 목요일. 맑은 중에 구름이 많다. 늦은 6시 10분쯤 ~ 밤 10시 14분까지 작성. 나주아 벨리젤(Najoua Belyzel)의 새 노래 "Au Féminin" 과 "La Bienvenue"를 들으면서 작성했다. 조금은 애잔한 나주아 벨리젤의 목소리가 매우 호소력 있게 들린다.  

 

지금 2009. 04. 07. 화요일. 낮 2시 06분. 화창한 봄날씨다. 방문을 활짝 열어놓는다. 봄햇볕이 정말 화사하게 부서진다. 따스하고 생명의 기운이 충만한 그런 봄날씨의 전형이다. 내가 가장 좋아하는 풋풋한 봄의 기운이 곳곳에서 피어오르고 있다. 옆집의 정원에서는 꽃나무가 뽀얀 꽃망울을 터트리고 있다. 하지만, 내 방문 앞의 작은 정원에 홀로 서 있는 수수꽃다리는 아직 꽃망울을 터트리지 않았다. 하트 모양새의 이파리는 갓 피어나 연한 연두색이고 손가락 마디만큼 작다. 좀더 있어야 그 취할 듯한 꽃내음을 진탕 뿜어내리라. 
 

 

콸리아 / 퀄리아 / qualia 


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