두 개의 전체주의

생각난 김에 작년봄 '런던북리뷰'(LRB)에 게재됐던 지젝의 기고문 '두 개의 전체주의'를 옮겨온다. 우리말 번역은 '프로메테우스'(05. 03. 12)에 '지젝, 두 개의 전체주의'란 제목으로 게재된 김택님의 것이며, 그 아래에 원문을 이어붙였다. '전체주의'에 대해 사고하고자 할 때 유익한 참조가 되어주는 글이다.  

-(2005년) 2월 3일자 신문에 작은 기사 - 물론 헤드라인 기사는 아니었다 - 하나가 실렸다. 갈고리 십자를 비롯한 여타의 나치 상징물을 공공장소에 전시하는 것을 금지하는 요청에 대한 응답으로 그 대부분이 구사회주의 국가 출신인 일단의 보수적인 유럽의회 의원들은 공산주의적 상징물 역시 동일하게 처리할 것을 요구했다. 낫과 망치는 물론 붉은 별도 금지하라는 것이다. 이러한 제안은 쉽게 기각되지 못했다. 이것은 유럽의 이데올로기적 정체성에 생겨난 깊은 변화를 말해준다.

 
-지금까지도 스탈린주의는 나치즘이 배격당하듯이 간단히 거부되지는 않는다. 물론 우리는 스탈린주의의 끔찍한 면면에 대해 잘 알고 있다. 그러나 사회주의에 대한 향수(Ostalgie)는 아직도 허용되고 있다. ‘굿바이 레닌!’이라는 영화는 만들 수 있지만 ‘굿바이 히틀러!’라는 영화는 생각조차 할 수 없다. 왜일까? 다른 예를 들어보자. 독일에서는 구동독의 혁명가와 당가를 담은 많은 CD가 팔린다. ‘친구이자 동지인 스탈린’이나 ‘당은 항상 옳다’같은 노래는 쉽게 찾아 볼 수 있다. 하지만 나치 노래 모음집을 찾기는 매우 어렵다. 이런 우화적 수준에서도 나치와 스탈린의 세계가 다르다는 것은 분명하다.

-스탈린주의적 인민재판에서 고발당한 사람이 공개적으로 그의 죄를 고백하고 죄를 저지르게 된 이유를 설명하는 것은 쉽게 떠올릴 수 있다. 하지만 나치는 유태인에게 독일 민족을 향한 유태인의 음모에 어떻게 연루되었는가를 고백할 것을 요구하지 않았다. 그 이유는 간단하다. 스탈린주의는 스스로를 계몽주의의 전통에 놓인 것으로 보았다. 이러한 전통에 따르면 진리는 이성적인 사람이라면 누구나 이해할 수 있는 것이다. 얼마나 타락했든 상관없이 모든 사람은 자신의 죄에 대해 책임을 지는 것으로 간주되었다. 그러나 나치에게 있어 유태인의 죄악은 유태인의 생물학적 구성의 한 요소였다. 따라서 그들의 죄를 증명할 필요는 없었던 것이다. 그들은 유태인이라는 이유만으로 죄를 진 것이다. 

 
-스탈린주의의 이데올로기적 허상을 살펴보면 보편적 이성은 역사적 진보라는 무정한 법칙의 외양을 통해 객관화된다. 지도자를 포함한 모두는 그러한 법칙의 노예이다. 나치의 지도자는 연설을 한 후에는 꼿꼿이 서서 조용히 박수를 받아들인다. 그러나 스탈린주의의 경우 의무적으로 치는 박수는 지도자의 연설의 맨 마지막에 터져나온다. 그리고 지도자는 일어서서 같이 박수를 친다. 에른스트 루비치(Ernst Lubitsch)의 <사느냐 죽느냐(Be or Not to Be)>를 보면 히틀러는 나치식 경례에 대해 그의 손을 들고는 ‘나 자신 만세(Heil myself!)!’라고 외친다. 이것은 실제로는 일어나지 않았다는 점에서 순수한 유머이다. 하지만 스탈린은 실제로 다른 사람들과 함께 박수를 치며 ‘스스로에게 만세를! (Heil himself)’이라고 외쳤다.

-스탈린의 생일날 죄수들은 어두침침한 굴락에서 스탈린에게 축하전보를 전송했다. 하지만 유태인이 아우슈비츠에서 히틀러에게 그러한 전보를 보내는 것을 상상할 수 있을까? 이 밋밋한 차이는, 그러나 스탈린 치하에서는 지도자와 그를 따르는 인민이 역사적 이성에 종속된 자들로서 함께 만나는 공간을 지배이데올로기가 상정했음을 입증해준다. 스탈린 치하에서 모든 인민은 적어도 이론적으로는 평등했던 것이다.
 
-의견을 달리하는 공산주의자들이 목숨을 걸고 소련 사회주의의 ‘관료주의적인 변형’과 투쟁을 벌인 것과 같은 것을 나치즘에서는 찾아볼 수 없다. 나치 독일에서 ‘인간의 얼굴을 한 나치즘’같은 것을 주장한 사람은 존재하지 않는다. 바로 여기에 보수적인 역사학자 에른스트 놀테(Ernst Nolte) 같은 사람들이 중립적인 위치를 취하며 공산주의에 적용된 동일한 기준을 왜 나치에게 적용해서는 안 되느냐고 질문하는 온갖 시도의 결점과 편향이 놓여있다. 그는  “만약 하이데거가 나치와 밀회한 것이 용서받을 수 없는 것이라면 루카치와 브레히트 같은 자들은 그보다 훨씬 오랫동안 스탈린주의에 참여했음에도 불구하고 왜 용서를 받는가?”라고 묻는다. 이러한 입장은 나치즘을 볼셰비즘이 먼저 저지른 실천에 대한 반응이자 반복으로 보는 것이다. ‘원초적 죄악’은 공산주의가 먼저 저질렀다는 것이다.

-1980년대 후반 놀테는 소위 수정주의논쟁에서 하버마스의 주요한 논적이었다. 그는 나치즘을 20세기의 전무후무한 죄악으로 간주해서는 안 된다고 주장했다. 곧 나치즘만이 비난받을 짓을 저지른 것이 아니며 오히려 나치즘은 공산주의 이후에 등장했다는 것이다. 나치즘은 공산주의의 위협에 대한 과도한 반응이다. 또한 나치즘의 공포는 소비에트 공산주의에서 이미 자행된 것을 단순히 복제한 것에 지나지 않는다고 그는 주장했다. 놀테의 생각은 공산주의와 나치즘이 ‘동일한 전체주의적 형식’을 공유한다는 것이다. 그리고 그 양자 간의 차이는 다만 구조의 역할 하나하나를 채우고 있는 구체적 행위자들이 다르다(‘계급의 적’ 대신 ‘유태인’)는 데에 있다.

-보통 자유주의자들은 놀테가 나치즘을 상대화하여 공산주의라는 악의 이차적인 메아리로 축소시켰다는 반응을 보였다. 하지만 우리가 공산주의와 나치즘의 극단적인 사악함 사이의 별반 도움이 안 되는 이러한 비교를 집어치운다고 해도 놀테가 말한 요점으로부터 자유로울 수는 없다. 즉 나치즘은 실제로 공산주의적 위협에 대한 반작용이었다. 다시 말해 나치즘은 실제로 계급투쟁을 아리안 종족과 유태인 간의 투쟁으로 대체했었다.

-여기서 문제가 되는 것은 프로이트적 의미로 페어시붕(Verschiebung, 보통 정신분석학에서 ‘전치’로 번역됨)을 뜻하는 ‘대체’라는 말이다. 나치즘은 계급투쟁을 인종적 투쟁으로 대체했고 그렇게 함으로써 그 진정한 성격을 흐리게 만들었다. 공산주의가 나치즘으로 바뀌는 과정에서 무엇이 변화했는가를 보는 것은 형식을 통해 문제를 파악하는 것이다.

-바로 거기에서 나치의 이데올로기가 신비화된다. 즉 정치적 투쟁이 인종적 충돌로 화하며, 사회구조에 내재적인 계급적대는 아리안 공동체의 조화를 교란하는 이질적인 (유태인의) 육체들의 침입으로 환원된다. 놀테의 주장처럼 각각의 경우에 형식적으로 동일한 적대의 구조가 자리 잡는 것이 아니다. 대신 적의 장소가 상이한 요소(즉 계급이 인종으로)로 채워진다. 인종 간의 차이나 충돌과 달리 계급 적대는 완벽하게 사회적 영역에 귀속되어 버리며 그 구성부분이 되고 만다. 결국 파시즘은 계급간의 본질적 적대를 제거한다.

-그렇게 되면 10월 혁명이 어떤 비극을 낳았는가가 분명하게 부각된다. 그 고유한 해방적 잠재력의 측면은 물론 그것이 스탈린주의라는 결과를 산출한 역사적 필연성의 측면 모두에서 말이다. 우리는 스탈린주의적 숙청이 어떤 의미에서 파시스트의 폭력보다 더 ‘비합리적’이었다고 정직하게 인정해야 한다. 그 숙청의 과도함은 스탈린주의가 파시즘과 달리 인증된 도착적 혁명의 예라는 사실에 대한 명백한 흔적이다. 파시즘 치하에서는 - 나치 독일에서조차 - 정치적 반대파로 활동하지만 않는다면 ‘평범한’ 일상의 삶의 외관을 유지하며 생존하는 것이 가능했다(물론 그가 유태인이 아닐 경우에).

-1930년대 후반의 스탈린 치하에서는 반대로 아무도 안전하지 않았다. 누구라도 돌연 고발당하고 체포되어 반역자로 총살당할 수 있었다. 나치즘의 비합리성은 반유태주의, 즉 유태인의 음모에 대한 믿음에 ‘농축’되어 있었다. 반면 스탈린주의의 비합리성은 사회전체에 퍼져있었다. 그러한 이유에서 나치 경찰 조사관은 반국가 행위의 증거와 흔적을 밝히려 한 반면, 스탈린의 조사관은 기쁜 마음으로 증거를 조작하고 음모를 발명해 내었다.
    
-하지만 우리가 인정해야 할 또 하나의 사실은 아직도 우리는 스탈린주의에 대한 만족할만한 이론을 가지고 있지 못하다는 점이다. 이런 점에서 보면 프랑크푸르트학파가 스탈린주의라는 현상에 대한 체계적이고 완벽한 분석을 생산하지 못한 것은 수치스러운 일이다. 물론 몇몇 예외가 있긴 하다. 프란츠 노이만 Franz Neumann의 <베헤모쓰 Behemoth>(1942)는 3개의 거대한 세계체계- 뉴딜 자본주의, 파시즘, 스탈린주의-가 관료주의적이고 범지구적으로 조직된 동일한 ‘관리’사회를 향해 치닫고 있다는 주장을 펼친다.

 

-헤르베르트 마르쿠제(Herbert Marcuse)의 책 중 가장 열정이 식어 있는 <소비에트 맑시즘(Soviet Marxism)>(1958)은 이상하게도 헌신을 분명하게 보여주지 못한 채 소비에트의 이데올로기를 중립적으로 분석하고 있다. 그리고 마지막으로 1980년대에 몇몇 하버마스주의자들이 의견을 달리하는 현상들의 출현을 반영하여 시민사회 개념을 공산주의 레짐에 대한 저항의 장소로 가공하려 시도했다. 흥미는 있지만 스탈린적 전체주의의 특수성에 대한 총체적인 이론은 아니었다. ‘현존사회주의’라는 악몽을 분석하는 것은 삼가면서 해방의 기획이 실패한 조건에 초점을 맞출 것을 요구하는 맑스주의적 사유의 학파들이 어떻게 가능해진 것일까? 그들이 파시즘에 초점을 맞추는 것은 진짜 외상(trauma)과 감히 대면하지 못하고 있다는 침묵의 자백이 아닐까?
 
-여기서 우리는 선택을 해야 한다. 좌파 ‘전체주의’와 우파 ‘전체주의’ 모두가 정치를 비롯한 여러 가지 차이에 대한 불관용에 기초하고 있으며 민주주의와 인간적인 가치를 거부하는 나쁜 것이라는 ‘순수’ 자유주의적 태도는 선험적으로 오류이다. 한쪽 편을 들어 파시즘이 근본적으로 공산주의보다 ‘나쁘다’는 주장을 해야 한다. 합리적으로 두 개의 전체주의를 비교하는 것이 가능하다는 생각은 함축적이든 명시적이든 파시즘이 덜 사악한 것이었으며 공산주의적 위협에 대한 이해할만한 반응이라는 결론에 도달한다.

-2003년 9월 실비오 베를루스코니는 자신이 관찰한 바에 따르면 무솔리니는 히틀러나 스탈린 혹은 사담 후세인과 달리 누구도 죽이지 않았노라고 격렬히 외쳤다. 진정한 추문은 베를루스코니의 연설이 그의 특이한 성격에서 나온 표현이기는커녕 반파시스트 공동체에 기반하는 전후 유럽의 정체성에 대한 약정을 바꾸려는 진행형의 기획이라는 점이다. 바로 이것이 유럽의 보수주의자들이 제기하는 공산주의의 상징물에 대한 금지 요청이 이해될 수 있는 정확한 맥락이다.

The Two Totalitarianisms

Slavoj Zizek

A small note – not the stuff of headlines, obviously – appeared in the newspapers on 3 February. In response to a call for the prohibition of the public display of the swastika and other Nazi symbols, a group of conservative members of the European Parliament, mostly from ex-Communist countries, demanded that the same apply to Communist symbols: not only the hammer and sickle, but even the red star. This proposal should not be dismissed lightly: it suggests a deep change in Europe’s ideological identity.

Till now, to put it straightforwardly, Stalinism hasn’t been rejected in the same way as Nazism. We are fully aware of its monstrous aspects, but still find Ostalgie acceptable: you can make Goodbye Lenin!, but Goodbye Hitler! is unthinkable. Why? To take another example: in Germany, many CDs featuring old East German Revolutionary and Party songs, from ‘Stalin, Freund, Genosse’ to ‘Die Partei hat immer Recht’, are easy to find. You would have to look rather harder for a collection of Nazi songs. Even at this anecdotal level, the difference between the Nazi and Stalinist universes is clear, just as it is when we recall that in the Stalinist show trials, the accused had publicly to confess his crimes and give an account of how he came to commit them, whereas the Nazis would never have required a Jew to confess that he was involved in a Jewish plot against the German nation. The reason is clear. Stalinism conceived itself as part of the Enlightenment tradition, according to which, truth being accessible to any rational man, no matter how depraved, everyone must be regarded as responsible for his crimes. But for the Nazis the guilt of the Jews was a fact of their biological constitution: there was no need to prove they were guilty, since they were guilty by virtue of being Jews.

In the Stalinist ideological imaginary, universal reason is objectivised in the guise of the inexorable laws of historical progress, and we are all its servants, the leader included. A Nazi leader, having delivered a speech, stood and silently accepted the applause, but under Stalinism, when the obligatory applause exploded at the end of the leader’s speech, he stood up and joined in. In Ernst Lubitsch’s To Be or Not to Be, Hitler responds to the Nazi salute by raising his hand and saying: ‘Heil myself!’ This is pure humour because it could never have happened in reality, while Stalin effectively did ‘hail himself’ when he joined others in the applause. Consider the fact that, on Stalin’s birthday, prisoners would send him congratulatory telegrams from the darkest gulags: it isn’t possible to imagine a Jew in Auschwitz sending Hitler such a telegram. It is a tasteless distinction, but it supports the contention that under Stalin, the ruling ideology presupposed a space in which the leader and his subjects could meet as servants of Historical Reason. Under Stalin, all people were, theoretically, equal.

We do not find in Nazism any equivalent to the dissident Communists who risked their lives fighting what they perceived as the ‘bureaucratic deformation’ of socialism in the USSR and its empire: there was no one in Nazi Germany who advocated ‘Nazism with a human face’. Herein lies the flaw (and the bias) of all attempts, such as that of the conservative historian Ernst Nolte, to adopt a neutral position – i.e. to ask why we don’t apply the same standards to the Communists as we apply to the Nazis. If Heidegger cannot be pardoned for his flirtation with Nazism, why can Lukács and Brecht and others be pardoned for their much longer engagement with Stalinism? This position reduces Nazism to a reaction to, and repetition of, practices already found in Bolshevism – terror, concentration camps, the struggle to the death against political enemies – so that the ‘original sin’ is that of Communism.

In the late 1980s, Nolte was Habermas’s principal opponent in the so-called Revisionismusstreit, arguing that Nazism should not be regarded as the incomparable evil of the 20th century. Not only did Nazism, reprehensible as it was, appear after Communism: it was an excessive reaction to the Communist threat, and all its horrors were merely copies of those already perpetrated under Soviet Communism. Nolte’s idea is that Communism and Nazism share the same totalitarian form, and the difference between them consists only in the difference between the empirical agents which fill their respective structural roles (‘Jews’ instead of ‘class enemy’). The usual liberal reaction to Nolte is that he relativises Nazism, reducing it to a secondary echo of the Communist evil. However, even if we leave aside the unhelpful comparison between Communism – a thwarted attempt at liberation – and the radical evil of Nazism, we should still concede Nolte’s central point. Nazism was effectively a reaction to the Communist threat; it did effectively replace class struggle with the struggle between Aryans and Jews. What we are dealing with here is displacement in the Freudian sense of the term (Verschiebung): Nazism displaces class struggle onto racial struggle and in doing so obfuscates its true nature. What changes in the passage from Communism to Nazism is a matter of form, and it is in this that the Nazi ideological mystification resides: the political struggle is naturalised as racial conflict, the class antagonism inherent in the social structure reduced to the invasion of a foreign (Jewish) body which disturbs the harmony of the Aryan community. It is not, as Nolte claims, that there is in both cases the same formal antagonistic structure, but that the place of the enemy is filled by a different element (class, race). Class antagonism, unlike racial difference and conflict, is absolutely inherent to and constitutive of the social field; Fascism displaces this essential antagonism.

It’s appropriate, then, to recognise the tragedy of the October Revolution: both its unique emancipatory potential and the historical necessity of its Stalinist outcome. We should have the honesty to acknowledge that the Stalinist purges were in a way more ‘irrational’ than the Fascist violence: its excess is an unmistakable sign that, in contrast to Fascism, Stalinism was a case of an authentic revolution perverted. Under Fascism, even in Nazi Germany, it was possible to survive, to maintain the appearance of a ‘normal’ everyday life, if one did not involve oneself in any oppositional political activity (and, of course, if one were not Jewish). Under Stalin in the late 1930s, on the other hand, nobody was safe: anyone could be unexpectedly denounced, arrested and shot as a traitor. The irrationality of Nazism was ‘condensed’ in anti-semitism – in its belief in the Jewish plot – while the irrationality of Stalinism pervaded the entire social body. For that reason, Nazi police investigators looked for proofs and traces of active opposition to the regime, whereas Stalin’s investigators were happy to fabricate evidence, invent plots etc.

We should also admit that we still lack a satisfactory theory of Stalinism. It is, in this respect, a scandal that the Frankfurt School failed to produce a systematic and thorough analysis of the phenomenon. The exceptions are telling: Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (1942), which suggested that the three great world-systems – New Deal capitalism, Fascism and Stalinism – tended towards the same bureaucratic, globally organised, ‘administered’ society; Herbert Marcuse’s Soviet Marxism (1958), his least passionate book, a strangely neutral analysis of Soviet ideology with no clear commitments; and, finally, in the 1980s, the attempts by some Habermasians who, reflecting on the emerging dissident phenomena, endeavoured to elaborate the notion of civil society as a site of resistance to the Communist regime – interesting, but not a global theory of the specificity of Stalinist totalitarianism. How could a school of Marxist thought that claimed to focus on the conditions of the failure of the emancipatory project abstain from analysing the nightmare of ‘actually existing socialism’? And was its focus on Fascism not a silent admission of the failure to confront the real trauma?

It is here that one has to make a choice. The ‘pure’ liberal attitude towards Leftist and Rightist ‘totalitarianism’ – that they are both bad, based on the intolerance of political and other differences, the rejection of democratic and humanist values etc – is a priori false. It is necessary to take sides and proclaim Fascism fundamentally ‘worse’ than Communism. The alternative, the notion that it is even possible to compare rationally the two totalitarianisms, tends to produce the conclusion – explicit or implicit – that Fascism was the lesser evil, an understandable reaction to the Communist threat. When, in September 2003, Silvio Berlusconi provoked a violent outcry with his observation that Mussolini, unlike Hitler, Stalin or Saddam Hussein, never killed anyone, the true scandal was that, far from being an expression of Berlusconi’s idiosyncrasy, his statement was part of an ongoing project to change the terms of a postwar European identity hitherto based on anti-Fascist unity. That is the proper context in which to understand the European conservatives’ call for the prohibition of Communist symbols.

06. 05. 27.

 

P.S. 현대 전체주의론의 모체가 되는 책이 12월에 출간됐다. 한나 아렌트의 <전체주의의 기원>(한길사, 2006)이 그것이다. 지젝의 '두 개의 전제주의'론과 대비해서 읽어봄 직하다.(*그리고 드디어 지젝의 전체주의론이 번역돼 나왔다. <전체주의가 어쨌다고?>(새물결, 2008). 'Wat's up?'시리즈의 하나로 바디우의 <사도 바울>과 함께 나란히 출간됐다. 굿뉴스!) 

정치적 기획으로서의 테러리즘

얼마전 박근혜 한나라당 대표가 지방선거 유세 도중에 피습을 당한 사건이 발생했고, 알다시피 여론의 여론의 초관심사가 되었다. 범인은 현장에서 체포되었고 현재 수사가 진행중이지만, 이 '정치적 테러'의 여파로 가뜩이나 열세이던 집권 여당은 벌써부터 선거에서의 패배를 기정사실화하고 있는 듯하다(물론 한나라당의 사정은 정반대인 것이고). 테러의 배후에 대한 추측성 기사들이 난무했지만(케네디와 김구의 암살이 들먹여졌다) 여느 정치 보도들과 마찬가지로 그러한 기사가 '전달'하는 것은 의미론적인 것이 아니라 화용론적인 것이다. 즉, 거기서 '사실' 관계보다 중요하게 다루어지는 것은 (정치적) '효과'이다.

거기에 끼어들어 그 효과를 확대 재생산하며 몇 마디 보탤 생각은 없고, 대신에 '테러'라는 말이 나에게 가장 실감있게 다가왔었던, 지난 2004년 9월초에 러시아 베슬란에서의 테러 사건과 관련하여 모스크바 통신에 올렸던 글을 이미지 버전으로 정리하여 창고에 넣어두도록 한다(당연한 일이지만, 러시아 TV에서는 현지 생방송으로 인질로 잡혀있던 학생들의 억류 상황과 이후에 벌어진 진압작전에 대해서 자세히 보도했었다). 원래의 제목은 릴케의 시구절인 "그들, 일찍 떠난 자들은 우리를 필요로 하지 않으니"였지만, 내용과 보다 직접적으로 관련된 것으로 바꾼다. '정치적 기획으로서의 테러리즘'은 이 글에서 자세히 검토하게 될 지젝의 <이라크>에 나오는 표현이다.  

러시아의 가을은 테러와 함께 시작됐다. 지난 9월 1일 개학식날에 체첸 분리주의자들에 의해서 북부 오세티야의 베슬란(Beslan)시의 한 학교(러시아에서는 1학년부터 11학년까지 같은 학교에 다닌다)가 점거되면서, 어린 학생들과 학부모 등 1,500명 가량이 인질로 억류되면서 시작된 이번 사건은 지난 금요일(9월 3일) 전격적인(그것이 전격적인 것이었는지 우발적인 것이었는지는 확실하지 않다) 대테러 ‘진압작전’ 끝에 인질 중 다수가 희생된 채로 종결되었다.

오늘(9월 6일)자 <이즈베스찌야>에 따르면, 사망 355명, 부상 435명, 실종 200여명으로 잠정 집계되고 있는데, 부상자 중에는 중상자가 다수 있기 때문에(대부분이 어린 학생들이고, 이들은 모스크바의 아동병원으로 급송되었다) 최종 사망자는 더 늘어날 전망이다. 아마도 최근 몇 년간 러시아에서 발생한 테러 중 최악의 참사로 기록될 듯한데(이곳 언론에서는 금요일까지 ‘베슬란의 드라마’란 표현을 쓰다가 이후엔 ‘베슬란의 비극’이란 표현을 쓰고 있다), 이미 지난 토요일 푸틴 러시아대통령이 공식담화를 통해서 희생자들에 대한 애도를 표시함과 함께 테러행위에 대한 강경대응을 다짐했고, 내일(9월 7일)은 모스크바 중심인 크레믈린 옆 성 바실리 성당 앞에서 대규모의 反테러 집회가 예정돼 있다(페테르부르크에서는 오늘 反테러 집회가 있었다).

그리고 오늘 이번 참사로 희생된 자들(=어린이들)의 장례식이 오늘 엄수됐다. 지젝의 주장대로(<이라크>, 63쪽), 테러리즘을 ‘정치적 기획’의 일부로서 승인한다 하더라도(승인과 동의는 별개의 문제이지만) 이번과 같이 어린 학생들을 대상으로 한 테러는 저열하다. 비록 체젠 문제에 대한 전세계적 여론을 다시금 환기시키는 데 성공함으로써 이번 테러(인질사건)가 목표한 바를 달성했다고 하더라도 이 ‘성공’은 궁극적으로 자기-패배적이다. 내가 살기 위해서, 우리의 아이들이 살기 위해서, 네가 죽어줘야겠다는, 당신의 아이들이 좀 죽어줘야겠다는 논리는 타협의 여지가 전혀 없는 ‘적대적’ 논리이며, 궁극적으로는 러시아가 전복되거나(현 상황에서 체첸의 독립이 뜻하는 바는 러시아 자체의 붕괴이다) 체첸 분리주의자들이 전부 ‘청소’되거나 간의 양자택일만을 강요하는 논리이다.

지젝은 자유주의적 논리를 “테러리즘의 거부를 일종의 초월적 선험성으로 고양시키는 논리”, 즉 테러리즘의 무조건적인 포기를 협상(=타협)의 전제조건으로 내거는 논리라고 비판하는데, 이번 테러리즘의 논리는 그 이면, 즉 “테러리즘 자체를 일종의 초월적 선험성으로 고양시키는 논리”라고 할 만하다. 즉, 그것은 어떠한 협상(=타협)도 거부하는 테러리즘이다. 그런 식의 ‘자기확인’에서 테러리즘이 얻는 것은 “마치 교착(상태)를 지속함으로써(=유지함으로써) 모종의 병리적인(=정념적인) 리비도적 이익”(<이라크>, 55쪽)일 따름이다(양자는 그렇게 공모한다. ‘맥지하드’처럼).

그것이 병리적인 것은 러시아정부의 강경대응이 뻔히 예상됨에도 불구하고(더 나쁜 건, 그 대응이 서툴기도 하다는 것이다. 대테러작전에서 러시아는 미국이나 이스라엘보다 한참 뒤떨어져 있다) 뻔한 결과를 무릅쓰고, 그 결과를 ‘성공’으로 간주하기 때문이다. 지젝이 이들의 논리에 동의할 리는 없어 보이는데, 체첸 문제의 역사적 기원은 지젝이 공언한바 “최선의 자본주의보다도 더 나은 최악의 공산주의 체제”, 즉 스탈린 치하에서의 反민족주의 정책에 있기 때문이다(이러한 정책 기조 때문에 체첸인들이 대거 시베리아로 강제이주 당했다. 극동에 거주하던 한인(韓人)들도 대거 카자흐스탄이나 우즈베키스탄 등의 중앙아시아로 전격 강제이주 당했던 것처럼. 이 한인들이 현재는 러시아에서 소위 ‘고려인’이라고 불리는 우리 동포들이다).

정치적 기획의 일부로서의 테러리즘을 설명하기 위해서, 지젝이 <이라크>(이건 이라크에 대한 책이 아니다. 거꾸로 말하면, 러시아에 대한 책이기도 하고 한국에 대한 책이기도 하다)에서 끌어들이고 있는 것은 “‘하이데거와 정치적인 것’에 관한 영원한 논쟁에 신선한 바람을 불어넣은” 에른스트 놀테의 논변이다. 놀테는 자신의 저작(Martin Heidegger – Politik und Geschichte im Leben und Denken)에서(‘M. 하이데거 – 그의 삶과 사유에서의 정치와 운명’쯤이란 뜻인가?) “1933년의 하이데거의 악명높은 정치적 선택을 변명하기는커녕 정당화한다.”(참고로, 이 정치적 선택에 대한 우리말 참고문헌은 박찬국 교수의 <하이데거와 나치즘>(문예출판사)이다). 즉, “경제적 혼돈과 공산주의적 위협이 있었던 1920년대 후반과 1930년대 초반의 상황 속에서 실행가능한 선택으로서 말이다.”(64쪽)

즉, 하이데거는 공산주의라는 ‘최악’에 굴복하지 않기 위해서, 나치즘(국가사회주의)라는 ‘차악’의 유혹에 넘어갈 수밖에 없었으며, 이 정치적 선택은 그의 ‘실수’가 아니라 ‘역사적으로 옳은’ 선택이었다는 것. “이에 따르면 파시즘 그리고 심지어 나치즘은 궁극적으로 공산주의의 위협에 대한 반작용이었고 그것의 최악의 실천들(강제수용소, 정적의 대량 숙청)을 반복한 것이었다.” 해서, “국가사회주의자들과 히틀러가 단지 자신들을 (볼셰비키적인) ‘아시아적’ 행위의 잠재적인 혹은 실제적인 희생양이라고 간주했기 때문에 ‘아시아적’ 행위(=홀로코스트)를 실행에 옮겼다는 것은 충분히 가능한 일이다.”(번역을 일부 수정했다. 국역본은 “-실행에 옮겼다는 것이 사실일 수 있을까?”(65쪽)라고 옮겼는데, 사실에 대한 ‘의혹’으로 읽힐 수 있기 때문에 모호한 번역이다.) 즉 “(스탈린의) 수용소군도가 (나치의) 아우슈비츠를 앞서지 않았던가?”

여기서 핵심은 공산주의와 파시즘(나치즘)이 모두 나쁜 것이라는 (아름다운 영혼의) ‘순수한’ 자유주의적 자세가 아니라, 어느 하나가 다른 하나보다 ‘더 나쁜 것’이라고 선언하는 자세이다. 그럴 때에만 파시즘, 심지어 나치즘은 가능한 ‘정치적 기획’으로 사고될 수 있다. 해서, 선택지는 두 가지이다. 좌파 전체주의(=反자본주의적 공산주의)와 우파 전체주의(=자본주의적 파시즘). 하이데거는 후자의 편에 섰지만, 지젝이 편드는 쪽은 전자이다. 그는 현 정세에서 ‘거대한 규모로 진행중인 이데올로기-정치적 기획’을 간취하는바, 가령 “무솔리니가 독재자이긴 했지만, 히틀러나 스탈린, 그리고 사담 같은 정치적 범죄자나 살인자는 아니었다”는, 이탈리아 수상 베를로스코니의 발언은 개인적인 돌출행동(스캔들)이 아니라, “反파시즘적 단결에 기초하고 있는 유럽적 정체성에 관한 전후(=2차 대전 이후) 상징적 협약의 조건들을 변화시키려는 기획”으로 보는 것이다.

거기에 대해서, 지젝은 나치즘을 정치적 기획으로 사고하려는 것에 대한 거부의 이면을 아도르노를 비롯한 프랑크푸르트 학파 일반의 이론적 추문(러시아어 번역은 ‘구멍’), 즉 스탈린주의에 대한 분석의 완전한 결여(‘부재’)에서 찾는다(<소비에트 이데올로기>를 쓴 마르쿠제는? *이에 대해서는 지젝의 '두 개의 전체주의' 참조). 해서, “아마도 아도르노와 한나 아렌트 사이의 긴장이라는 궁극적 수수께끼는 거기에 놓여 있을 것이다. 그들 양자는 거부를 공유했다. 그러나, 아렌트에게서 그것은 활동적 삶(vita activa), 참여하는 정치적 삶이라는 적극적인 규범적 관념에 기반해 있었던 반면에 아도르노는 이러한 단계를 거부했다.”(66쪽)

여기서 양자가 ‘거부’한 것은 ‘스탈린주의’이다. 아렌트는 ‘전체주의의 기원’에 대한 상세하고 방대한 분석을 통해서, 그리고 ‘활동적 삶’(=적극적으로 정치에 참여하는 삶)이라는 규범적 관념에 근거하여, 스탈린주의를 거부한 반면에, 아도르노의 거부에는 이러한 단계, 즉 분석과 근거가 결여돼 있다는 것(각주에서 지젝은 이러한 ‘적극적 규범성’으로의 진입 거부를 아도르노의 ‘단순한 실패’가 아니라 ‘마르크스주의의 혁명적 기획’에 대한 ‘충실성’으로 이해하고자 한다).

나치즘을 정치적 기획으로 사고할 경우, 다시 문제는 나치즘(혹은 파시즘)이냐, 스탈린이즘이냐, 이다. ‘더 좋은’, 혹은 ‘더 선한’ 기획이란 선택지로 주어져 있지 않다(주어진 건 무엇이 덜 나쁜 것이냐이다). 해서, “선한 이슬람과 악한 이슬람적 테러리즘에 대한 구별이 사기인 것과 마찬가지로”(우리는 “이슬람은 그런(=테러리즘의) 종교가 아니다. 이슬람은 평화의 종교이다”라는 순진한 진술에 유혹되지 말아야 한다!) “유대인과 이스라엘(정부) 혹은 시오니즘에 대한 전형적인 ‘급진-자유주의적’ 구별 또한 문제 삼아야 한다.”

다시 말해서, “유대인과 이스라엘의 유대인 시민들이 이스라엘의 정치와 시오니즘 이데올로기를 비판하면서도 반유대주의로 비난받지 않고 더 나아가 그 비판을 유대성(Jewishness)에 대한 그들의 바로 그 열정적 애착에, 그들이 유대적 유산에서 보존할 가치가 있다고 여기는 것에 기반한 것으로서 공식화할 수 있는 공간을 열어놓으려는 노력 또한 문제삼아야 한다.”(67쪽) 여기서는 잠시 이 문장을 문제삼아 보기로 하자(이런 번역문은 불친절하다). 몇 번 읽어보면 내용은 짐작할 수 있겠는데, 그런 수고를 굳이 왜 해야 하는지 의심스럽다.

문장의 줄거리는 “(우리는) 유대인과 유대인 시민들이 (어떤) 공간을 열어놓으려는 노력 또한 문제삼아야 한다.”이다. 나머지는 전부 ‘공간’을 수식하는 형용사절이다(아마 원문은 관계형용사절일 듯하다). 다시 정리하면, “즉, (급진-자유주의자들은 그러한 구별을 통해서) 유대인들과 이스라엘의 유대인 시민들이 이스라엘 정부의 정책과 시오니즘 이데올로기를 비판할 수 있는 공간을 열어놓고자 한다. 그러한 공간에서는 반유대주의란 비난을 피해갈 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 그들이 유대적 유산에서 보존할 가치가 있다고 여기는 것, 즉 ‘유대적인 것’에 대한 열정적인 집착에 그 비판의 근거를 둘 수 있게 말이다.” 하지만, 그걸로 충분한가?

물론 충분하지 않다고 지젝은 말한다. 하지만, 내가 국역본 <이라크>와 나란히 읽은 러시아아본에서 이하의 한 페이지 남짓 분량이 빠져 있다. “그러나 이것으로 충분한가?”에 이어지는 건 69쪽에서 “축출되어야 할 하나의 신화는…”이라고 시작되는 문장이다. 이런 대목은 몇 곳에 더 있는데, 국역본의 1장 ‘이라크와 그 너머’에서 87쪽 “좋아, 그러면 꺼져버리고 그만 날 괴롭혀!” 이하는 러시아어본에서 정말로 꺼져버리고 없다. 알려져 있다시피, 국역본은 지젝의 초고를 번역한 것이다. 따라서, 국역본보다 이후에 나온 영어본(Verso, 2004)과는 약간 차이가 날 수도 있다. 그 차이는 물론 영어본의 편집과정에서 생겨날 수 있는 차이이다. 러시아어본이 그 영어본을 충실하게 옮긴 거라면, 국역본과 러시아어본의 차이는 국역본과 영어본의 차이이기도 할 것이다(하지만, 영어본을 아직 확인해볼 수 없는 나로서는 이 점에 관하여 확실하게 말할 수 없다. *어떤 이유인지는 몰라도 러시아아본이 일부 내용을 축약하고 있다).

어쨌든 지젝은 ‘선한’ 레비나스적 유대교를 ‘악한’ 여호와의 전통과 대립시키려는 급진-자유주의적 시도를 비판한다. 그건 한낱 환상일 뿐이다. 왜냐하면, “유대교 그 자체는 참을 수 없는 절대적 모순의 계기이며, 최악(=일신교적 폭력)과 최선(=타자에 대한 책임)이 절대적 긴장 속에 있는 계기이며, 동일하고 일치하는 동시에 절대적으로 양립불가능한 것”이기 때문이다. 그리고, 그 틈새, 그 긴장이 바로 유대교의 핵심이다. 이러한 사정은 이슬람의 경우에도 마찬가지이다. ‘원리주의적 테러리스트들에 의해 오용된 이슬람’과 ‘참된 이슬람’이 따로 있는 게 아니다. 그것은 결정불가능하다. 즉 이슬람은 “우리의 현대적 곤경에 대해 파시즘적으로 응답할 수 있는 ‘최악의’ 잠재력을 품고 있다는 바로 그러한 이유에서, 그것은 (자본주의적 세계질서에 저항하는) ‘최선’을 위한 장소로 판명날 수도 있다.” 해서, “우리의 과업은 이러한 애매한 사실을 어떻게 정치적으로 이용하는가이다.”(68쪽)

지젝이 ‘중동에서의 행위를 위한 온건한 제안’이란 절의 마지막 대목에서 덧붙이고 있는 것은 들뢰즈가 ‘이접적 종합’(disjunctive synthesis)이라고 부른 것의 한 역사적 사례인바(1937년 9월 26일 아돌프 아이히만이 유대인의 팔레스타인 이주를 용이하게 하기 위한 협력방안을 논의하기 위해서 베를린에서 기차에 탑승한 것), 그것은 나치와 급진 시오니스트들이 공통의 이해관계를 갖고 있었다는 걸 보여주는 사례이다. 그러한 이해관계 내에서 나치와 시오니스트는 서로 구별가능하지 않(았)다. 그것이 소위 변증법에서의 ‘대립물의 통일’이고 (짜고 치는 고스톱처럼) 세상이 돌아가는 이치이다.

지젝이 ‘온건한 제안’으로 제시하고 있는 내용은, 다시 앞으로 돌아가서 59-60쪽에 집약돼 있다. 오늘날 중동에서(그리고 체첸에서, 더불어 한반도에서) 진정으로 근본적인 윤리-정치적 행위는 무엇이 될 것인가? “이스라엘인과 아랍인 모두에게 그것은 예루살렘의 (정치적) 통제를 포기하는 제스처에 있을 것이다. 다시 말해 예루살렘 구(舊)시가지를 (일시적으로) 어떤 중립적인 국제적 세력이 통제하는 국가-외적인 종교적 참배의 장소로 변형시키는 것을 승인하는 제스처에 말이다.”(59쪽)

궁극적으로 “우리는 이스라엘의 유대인과 팔레스타인인을 결합시키는 두-민족 세속국가라는 ‘불가능한 꿈’을 포기해서는 안된다. 장기적으로 볼 때 진짜 유토피아는 이러한 두-민족 국가의 유토피아가 아니라 그 두 공동체들을 명백히 분할하는 장벽의 유토피아이다.”(60쪽) 이 대목에서 ‘유토피아’란 말은 ‘불가능한 꿈’과 동의어이다(즉 부정적인 의미로 사용되고 있음에 주의해야 한다). 여기서 ‘장벽’은 1967년 이전의 이스라엘과 서안 지구의 점령된 영토를 분리시키는 장벽으로서 1989년까지 동/서독을 분할했던 장벽과 “섬뜩하게 닮아있다.”(우리의 휴전선은?) 그 다음 세 문장의 순서 A-B-C는 러시아어본의 경우 A-C-B로 돼 있는데, (역시나 영어본의 경우가 어떤지는 모르겠지만) 논리상 후자가 더 적절한 듯하여, 여기서는 문장의 순서를 재배열해서 옮긴다.

(A) 이러한 새로운 장벽의 환영(=환상)은, 그것이 ‘정상적인’ 법치와 사회생활을 항구적인 긴급사태로부터 분리해주는 분할선으로 기능하리라는 것, 즉 그것이 긴급사태의 상황을 ‘저기 바깥’ 영역으로 국한시키리라는 것이다.
(C) 양 진영 각각은, 이러한 인종적으로 ‘깨끗한’ 국가의 포기가(=‘깨끗한’ 국가를 포기하는 것이) 단지 타자를 위해 행해지는 희생이 아니라 스스로를 위한 해방이라는 것을 깨달아야 한다.
(B) 그것은 중동에서의 또 다른 진정한 ‘사건’, “우리에게 유대인도 팔레스타인인도 없다”는 바울적 의미에서의 진정한 정치적 보편성의 폭발이 되었을 것이다.

지젝이 핵심적으로 강조하는 것은 ‘진정한 보편성’이다(바울은 언제나 그러한 보편성의 이름으로 참조된다). 민족주의나 민족국가를 그가 문제삼는 이유는 그것이 진정한 보편성이라는 기준에 미달하기 때문이다. 다시 한번 상기하자면, “오늘날 미국에 대한 문제는, 그것이 새로운 세계 제국이라는 것이 아니라 그렇지 않다는 것, 즉 그런 척하면서도 무자비하게 자신의 이익을 추구하는 민족국가로서 계속 행동한다는 것이다.”(32쪽) 사실 덩치값을 못하는 건 미국만의 문제가 아니라, (덩치가 좀 줄긴 했어도) 러시아의 문제이기도 하며, (덩치가 작은) 체첸이라고 해서 예외는 아니다(한국의 덩치는 어떤가?).

체첸 분리주의자들의 테러에 내가 공감하지 않는 것은 그들이 겉으로 내세우는 체첸 민족주의 혹은 이슬람주의라는 상상적 명분이나, 러시아의 역사적 탄압에 대한 저항이라는 상징적 명분, 그리고 석유 송유관을 둘러싼 경제적 이권 다툼이라는 실재적 명분이 모두 우리가 기대할 만한 ‘보편성’에 미달하기 때문이다(“우리에게는 러시아인도 체첸인도 없다”는 보편성 말이다). 즉 러시아와 체첸의 적대적 관계는 보편적 적대가 아닌 상대적 적대에 근거하고 있으며, 이에 바탕을 둔 분리주의적 테러리즘이 진정한 ‘해방’을 가져다 줄 리는 만무하다. 때문에 거듭 애꿎은 것은 어린 목숨들이다.

반복하지만, 우리가 거부해야 하는 것은 “테러리즘 자체를 일종의 초월적 선험성으로 고양시키는 논리”이다. 그것은 “테러리즘의 거부를 일종의 초월적 선험성으로 고양시키는 논리”가 위선적인 만큼이나 저열한 논리이다. 테러리즘은 정치적 기획이 될 수 있다. 하지만, 테러를 위한 테러리즘은 결코 그러한 정치적 기획이 될 수 없다. 이 둘은 결정불가능한 것인가? 하지만 확실한 건 양립불가능하다는 것이다. 이러한 애매한 사실을 우리는 정치적으로 어떻게 이용할 수 있을 것인지? 어린 목숨들의 희생을 우리는 어떻게 애도하고 보상할 수 있을 것인지?..

06. 05. 26.

누가 슬라보예 지젝을 미워하는가(영문)

라캉닷컴(Lacan.com)에서 지젝에 관한 소개내용을 옮겨온다. 마지막에 감사의 뜻이 언급되고 있지만, 토니 마이어스의 <누가 슬라보예 지젝을 미워하는가>(앨피, 2005)의 내용을 간추린 것이다. 마이어스의 원서를 안 갖고 계신 분들도 주요 대목들을 대조하여 읽어보면, 훨씬 이해가 빠를 듯하여 옮겨놓는다.

INFLUENCES

The three main influences on Slavoj Zizek's work are G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx and Jacques Lacan

1. Hegel provides Zizek with the type of thought or methodology that he suse. This kind of thinking is called dialectical. In Zizek's reading of Hegel, the dialectic is never finally resolved.

2. Marx is the inspiration behind Zizek's work, for what he is trying to do is to contribute to the Marxist tradition of thought, specifically that of a critique of ideology.

3. Lacan provides Zizek with the framework and terminology for his analyses. Of particular importance are Lacan's three registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. Zizek locates the subject at the interface of the Symbolic and the Real.

The Imaginary
The basis of the imaginary order is the formation of the ego in the "mirror stage". Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, "identification" is an important aspect of the imaginary. The relationship whereby the ego is constituted by identification is a locus of "alienation", which is another feature of the imaginary, and is fundamentally narcissistic. The imaginary, a realm of surface appearances which are deceptive, is structured by the symbolic order. It also involves a linguistic dimension: whereas the signifier is the foundation of the symbolic, the "signified" and "signification" belong to the imaginary. Thus language has both symbolic and imaginary aspects. Based on the specular image, the imaginary is rooted in the subject's relationship to the body (the image of the body).

The Symbolic
Although an essentially linguistic dimension, Lacan does not simply equate the symbolic with language, since the latter is involved also in the imaginary and the real. The symbolic dimension of language is that of the signifier, in which elements have no positive existence but are constituted by virtue of their mutual differences. It is the realm of radical alterity: the Other. The unconscious is the discourse of the Other and thus belongs to the symbolic order. Its is also the realm of the Law that regulates desire in the Oedipus complex. Th symbolic is both the "pleasure principle" that regulates the distance from das Ding, and the "death drive" which goes beyond the pleasure principle by means of repetition: "the death drive is only the mask of the symmbolic order." This register is determinant of subjectivity; for Lacan the symbolic is characterized by the absence of any fixed relations between signifier and signified.

The Real
This order is not only opposed to the imaginary but is also located beyond the symbolic. Unlike the latter, which is constituted in terms of oppositions such as "presence" and "absence", there is no absence in the real. The symbolic opposition between "presence" and "absence" implies the possibility that something may be missing from the symbolic, the real is "always in its place: it carries it glued to its heel, ignorant of what might exile it from there." If the symbolic is a set of differentiated signifiers, the real is in itself undifferentiated: "it is without fissure". The symbolic introduces "a cut in the real," in the process of signification: "it is the world of words that creates the world of things." Thus the real emerges as that which is outside language: "it is that which resists symbolization absolutely." The real is impossible because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order. This character of impossibility and resistance to symbolization lends the real its traumatic quality.

THE SUBJECT
Unlike almost all other kinds of contemporary philosophers, Zizek argues that Descartes' cogito is the basis of the subject. However, whereas most thinkers read the cogito as a substantial, transperent and fully self-conscious "I" which is in complete command of its destiny, Zizek proposes that the cogito is an empty space, what is left when the rest of the world is expelled from itself. The Symbolic Order is what substitutes for the loss of the immediacy of the world and it is where the void of the subject is filled in by the process of subjectivization. The latter is where the subject is given an identity and where that identity is altered by the Self.

Reading Schelling via Lacan
Once the Lacanian concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real are grasped, Zizek, in philosophical writings such as his dicussion of Schelling, always interprets the work of other philsophers in terms of those concepts. This is so because "the core of my entire work is the endeavour to use Lacan as a privileged intellectual tool to reactualize German idealism". (The Zizek Reader) The reason Zizek thinks German idealism (the work of Hegel, Kant, Fichte and Schelling) needs reactualizing is that we are thought to understand it in one way, whereas the truth of it is something else. The term "reactualizing" refers to the fact that there are different possible ways to interpret German idealism, and Zizek wishes to make "actual" one of those possibilities in distinction to the way it is currently realized.

At its most basic, we are taught that German idealism believes that the truth of something could be found in itself. For Zizek, the fundamental insight of German idealism is that the truth of something is always outside it. So the truth of our experience lies outside ourselves, in the Symbolic and the Real, rather than being buried deep within us. We cannot look into our selves and find out who we truly are, because who we truly are is always elsewhere. Our selves are somewhere else in the Symbolic formations which always precede us and in the Real which we have to disavow if we are to enter the Symbolic order.

The reason that Lacan occupies a privileged position for Zizek's lies in Lacan's proposition that self-identity is impossible. The identity of something, its singularity or "oneness", is always split. There is always too much of something, and indivisible remainder, or a bit left-over which means that it cannot be self-identical. The meaning of a word, i.e., can never be found in the word itself, but rather in other words, its meaning therefore is not self-identical. This principle of the impossibility of self-identity is what informs Zizek's reading of the German idealists. In reading Schelling, i.e., the Beginning is not actually the beginning at all - the truth of the Beginning lies elsewhere, it is split or not identical to itself.

How, precisely, does the Word discharge the tension of the rotary motion, how does it mediate the antagonism between the contarctive and the expansive force? The Word is a contraction in the guise of its very opposite of an expansion - that is, in pronouncing a word, the subject contracts his being outside himself; he "coagulates" the core of his being in an external sign. In the (verbal) sign, I - as it were - find myself outside myself, I posit my unity outside myself, in a signifier which represents me. (The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters)

The Subject of the Enunciation and the Subject of the Enunciated
The subject of enunciation is the "I" who speaks, the individual doing the speaking; the subject of the enunciated is the "I" of the sentence. "I" is not identical to itself - it is split between the individual "I" (the subject of enunciation) and the grammatical "I" (the subject of the enunciated). Although we may experience them as unified, this is merely an Imaginary illusion, for the pronoun "I" is actually a substitute for the "I" of the subject. It does not account for me in my full specificity; it is, rather, a general term I share with everyone else. In order to do so, my empirical reality must be annihilated or, as Lacan avers, "the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing".

The subject can only enter language by negating the Real, murdering or substituting the blood-and-sinew reality of self for the concept of self expressed in words. For Lacan and Zizek every word is a gravestone, marking the absence or corpse of the thing it represents and standing in for it. It is partly in the light of this that Lacan is able to refashion Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" as "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I think not". The "I think" here is the subject of the enunciated (the Symbolic subject) whereas the "I am" is the subject of the enunciation (the Real subject). What Lacan aims to disclose by rewriting the Cartesian cogito in this way is that the subject is irrevocably split, torn asunder by language

The Vanishing Mediator
The concept of "vanishing mediator" is one that Zizek has consistenly employed since For They Know Not What They Do. A vanishing mediator is a concept which somehow negotiates and settles - hence mediating - the transition between two opposed concepts and thereafter disappears. Zizek draws attention to the fact that a vanishing mediator is produced by an assymetry of content and form. As with Marx's analysis of revolution, form lags behind content, in the sense that content changes within the parameters of an existing form, until the logic of that content works its way out to the latter and throws off its husk, revealing a new form in ots stead. Commenting Fredric Jameson's "Syntax of Theory" (The Ideologies of Theory, Minnesota, 1988), Zizek proposes that

The passage from feudalism to Protestantism is not of the same nature as the passage from Protestantism to bourgeois everyday life with its privatized religion. The fisrt passage concerns "content" (under the guise of preserving the religious form or even its strengthening, the crucial shift - the assertion of the ascetic acquisitive stance in economic activity as the domain of manifestation of Grace - takes place), whereas the second passage is a purely formal act, a change of form (as soon as Protestantism is realized as the ascetic acquisitive stance, it can fall off as form). (For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political factor)

Zizek sees in this process evidence of Hegel's "negation of the negation", the third moment of the dialectic. The first negation is the mutation of the content within and in the name of the old form. The second negation is the obsolescence of the form itself. In this way, something becomes the opposite of itself, paradoxically, by seeming to strengthen itself. In the case of Protestantism, the universalization of religious attitudes ultimately led to its being sidelined as a matter of private contemplation. Which is to say that Protestantism, as a negation of feudalism, was itself negated by capitalism.

THE FORMULAS OF SEXUATION

Jouissance
The pleasure principle functions a a limit of enjoyment; it is a law that commands the subject to "enjoy as little as possible". At the same time, the subject constantly attempts to trangress the prohibitions imposed on his enjoyment, to go "beyond the pleasure principle". The result of transgressing the pleasure principle is not more pleasure, but pain, since thre is only a certain amount of pleasure that the subject can bear. beyond this limit, pleasure becomes pain, and this "painful pleasure" is what Lacan calls jouissance: jouissance is suffering. The term expresses the paradoxical satisfaction the subject derives from his symptom, that is the suffering he derives from his own satisfaction.

Woman
Lacan in Encore states that jouissance is essentially phallic: "jouissance, insofar as it is sexual, is phallic, which means that it does not relate to the Other as such." However, Lacan admits a specifically feminine jouissance, a supplementary jouissance which is beyond the phallus, a jouissance of the Other. This feminine jouissance is ineffable, for women experience it but know nothing about it. Going beyond the phallus, it is of the order of the infinite, like mystical ecstasy.

"Woman doesn't exist", la femme n'existe pas, which Lacan rephrases as "there is no such a thing as Woman", il n'y a pas La femme. Lacan questions not the noun "woman", but the definite article which precedes it. For the definite article indicates universality, and this is the characteristic that woman lacks: "woman does not lend herself to generalisation, even to phallocentric generalisation." He also speaks of her as "not-all", pas toute; unlike masculinity - a universal function founded upon the phallic exception (castration), woman is a non-universal which asmits no exception. "Woman as a symptom" (Seminar RSI) means that a woman is a symptom of a man, in the sense that a woman can only ever enter the psychic economy of men as a fantasy object, the cause of their desire.

For Zizek, woman is what sustains the consistency of man; woman non-existence actually represents the radical negativity which constitutes all subjects. The terms "man" and "woman" do not refer to a biological distinction or gender roles, but rather two modes of the failure of Symbolization. It is this failure which means that "there is no sexual rapport".

POSTMODERNITY
For Zizek, present society, or postmodernity, is based upon the demise in the authority of the big Other. Continuing the theorists of the contemporary risk society, who advocate the personal freedoms of choice or reflexivity, which have replaced this authority, Zizek argues that these theorists ignore the reflexivity at the heart of the subject. For Zizek, lacking the prohibitions of the big Other, in these conditions, the subject's inherent reflexivity manifests itself in attachments to forms of subjection, paranoia and narcissism. In order to ameliorate these pathologies, Zizek proposes the need for a political act or revolution - one that will alter the conditions of possibility of postmodernity (which he identifies as capitalism) and so give birth to a new type of Symbolic Order in which a new breed of subject can exist.

The Law
Zizek refers to the law throughout his work. The term "the law" signifies the principles upon which society is based, designating a mode of collective conduct based upon a set of prohibitions. However, for Zizek, the rule of the law conceals an inherent unruliness which is precisely the violence by which it established itself as law in the first place.

"At the beginning" of the law, there is a certain "outlaw", a certain real of violence which coincides with the act itself of the establishment of the reign of the law... The illegitimate violence by which law sustains itself must be concealed at any price, because this concealment is the positive condition of the functioning of the law. (For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor)

The authority of the law stems not from some concept of justice, but because it is the law. Which is to say that the origin of the law can be found in the tautology: "the law is the law". If the law is to function properly, however, we must experience it as just. It is only when the law breaks down, when it becomes a law unto itself, and it reaches the limits of itself, do we glimpse those limits and acknowledge its contingency by reference to the phrase "the law is the law".

The Desintegration of the Big Other
One key aspect of the universalization of reflexivity is the resulting desintegration of the big Other, the communal network of social institutions, customs and laws. For Zizek, the big Other was always dead, in the sense that it never existed in the first place as a material thing. All it ever was (and is) is a purely symbolic order. It means that we all engage in a minimum of idealization, disavowing the brute fact of the Real in favor of another Symbolic world behind it. Zizek expresses this disavowal in terms of an "as if". In order to coexist with our neighbors we act "as if" they do not smell bad or look ridiculous.

The big Other is then a kind of collective lie to which we all individually subscribe. We all know that the emperor is naked (in the Real) but nonetheless we agree to the deception that he is wearing new clothes (in the Symbolic). When Zizek avers that "the big Other no longer exists" is that in the new postmodern era of reflexivity we no longer believe that the emperor is wearing clothes. We believe the testimony of our eyes (his nakedness in the Real) rather than the words of the big Other (his Symbolic new clothes). Instead of treating this as a case of punctuting hypocrisy, Zizek argues that "we get more than we bargained for - that the very community of which we were a member has disintegrated" (For They Know Not What They Do). There is a demise in "Symbolic efficiency".

Symbolic efficiency refers to the way in which for a fact to become true it is not enough for us just to know it, we need to know that the fact is also known by the big Other too. For Zizek, it is the big Other which confers an identity upon the many decentered personalities of the contemporary subject. The different aspects of my personality do not claim an equal status in the Symbolic - it is only the Self or Selves registered by the big Other which display Symbolic efficiency, which are fully recognized by everyone else and determine my socio-economic position. The level at which this takes place is not

that of "reality" as opposed to the play of my imagination - Lacan's point is not that, behind the multiplicity of phantasmatic identities, there is a hard core of some "real Self", we are dealing with a symbolic fiction, but a fiction which, for contingent reasons that have nothing to do with its inherent structure, possesses performative power - is socially operative, structures the socio-symbolic reality in which I participate. The status of the same person, inclusive of his/her very "real" features, can appear in an entirely different light the moment the modality of his/her relationship to the big Other changes. (The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Center of Political Ideology)

The Return of the Big Other
Besides the construction of little big Others as a reaction of the demise of the big Other, Zizek identifies another response in the positing of a big Other that actually exists in the Real. The name Lacan gives to an Other in the Real is "the Other of the Other". A belief in an Other of the Other, in someone or something who is really pulling the strings of society and organizing everything, is one of the signs of paranoia. Needless to say that it is commonplace to argue that the dominant pathology today is paranoia: countless books and films refer to some organization which covertly control governments, news, markets and academia. Zizek proposes that the cause of this paranoia can be located in a reaction to the demise of the big Other:

When faced with such a paranoid construction, we must not forget Freud's warning and mistake it for the "ilness" itself: the paranoid construction is, on the contrary, an attempt to heal ourselves, to pull ourselves out of the real "illness", the "end of the world", the breakdown of the symbolic universe, by menas of this substitute formation. Looking Awry: an Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture)

Paradoxically, then, Zizek argues that the typical postmodern subject is one who displays an otright cynicism towards official institutions, yet at the same time believes in the existence of conspirancies and an unseen Other pulling the strings. This apparently contradictory coupling of cynicism and belief is strictly correlative to the demise of the big Other. Its disappearance causes us to construct an Other of the Other in order to escape the unbearable freedom its loss encumbers us with. Conversely, there is no need to take the big Other seriously if we believe in an Other of the Other. We therefore display cynicism and belief in equal and sinceres measures.

Postmodernism: An Over-Proximity to the Real
One of the ways in which Zizek's understanding of the postmodern can be characterized is as an over-proximity of the Real. In postmodern art (or postmodernism0 Zizek identifies various manifestations of this, such as the technique of "filling in the gaps". What Zizek means by this can be seen in his comparative analysis of The Talented Mr. Ripley (book and film). In Patricia Highsmith's novel, Ripley's homosexuality is only indirectly proposed, but in Anthony Minghella's film Ripley is openly gay. The repressed content of the novel, the absence around which it centers, is filled in. For Zizek, what we lose by covering over the void in this way is the void of subjectivity:

By way of "filling in the gaps" and "telling it all", what we retreat from is the void as such, which is ultimately none other than the void of subjectivity (the Lacanian "barred subject"). What Minghella accomplishes is the move from the void of subjectivity to the inner wealth of personality. (The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory)

In Highsmith's novel the status of Ripley's sexuality is. at most, equivocal. As such, the book remains "innocent" in the eyes of the big Other because it does not openly trangress one of its norms. While we can interpret the clues in the story as indicating Ripley's homosexuality, we do not have to do so. The film, on the other hand, "shows it all", Ripley is here objectively homosexual. So whereas in one instance the reader can decide subjectively whether or not Ripley is gay, the film allows no such room for manoeuvre and the viewer is forced to accept Minghella's reading of the text.

IDEOLOGY
For Zizek, we are not so much living in a post-ideological era as in an era dominated by the ideology of cynicism. Adapting from Marx and Sloterdijk, he sums up the cynical attitude as "they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it". Ideology in this sense, is located in what we do and not in what we know. Our belief in an ideology is thus staged in advance of our acknowledging that belief in "belief machines", such as Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses. It is "belief before belief."

Pinning Down Ideology with Points de Capiton
One of the questions Zizek asks about ideology is: what keeps an ideological field of meaning consistent? Given that signifiers are unstable and liable to slippages of meaning, how does an ideology maintain its consistency? The answer to this problem is that any given ideological field is "quilted" by what, following lacan, he terms a point de capiton (literally an "upholstery button" though is has also been translated as "anchoring point"). In the same way that an upholstery button pins down stuffing inside a quilt and stops it from moving about, Zisek zrques that a point de capiton is a signifier which stops meaning from sliding about inside the ideological quilt. A point de capiton unifies an ideological field and provides it with an identity. Freedom, i.e, is in itself an open-ended word, the meaning of which can slide about depending on the context of its use.

A right-wing interpretation of the word might use it to designate the freedom to speculate on the market, whereas a left-wing interpretation of it might use it designate freedom from the inequalities of the market. The word "freedom" therefore does not mean the same thing in all possible worlds: what pins its meaning down is the point de capiton of "right-wing" or "left-wing". What is at issue in a conflict of ideologies is precisely the point de capiton - which signifier ("communism", "fascism", "capitalism", "market economy" and so on) will be entitled to quilt the ideological field ("freedom", "democracy", Human rights" and son on).

The Two Deaths
The fact that for Zizek the apparently all-inclusive whole of life and death are supplemented, by both a living death and a deathly life, points to the way in which we can die not just once, but twice. Most obviously, we will suffer a biological death in which our bodies will fail and eventually disintegrate. This is death in the Real, involving the obliteration of our material selves. But we can also suffer a Symbolic death. This does not involve the annihilation of our actual bodies, rather it entails the destruction of our Symbolic universe and the extermination of our subject positions.

We can thus suffer a living death where we are excluded from the Symbolic and no longer exist for the Other. This might happen if we go mad or if we commit an atrocious crime and society disowns us. In this scenario, we still exist in the Real but not in the Symbolic. Alternatively, we might endure a deathly life or more a kind of life after death. This might happen if, after our bodies have died, people remember our names, remember our deeds and so on. In this case, we continue to exist in the Symbolic even though we have died in the Real.

The gap between the two deaths, Zizek argues, can be filled either by manifestations of the monstrous or the beautiful. In Shakespeare's Hamlet for example, Hamlet's father is dead in the Real, however, he persists as a terifying and monstrous apparition because he was murdered and thereby cheated of the chance to settle his Symbolic debts. Once that debt has been repaid, following Hamlet's killing of his murderer, he is "completely" dead. In Sophocles' Antigone, the heroine suffers a SYmbolic death before her Reak death when she is excluded fom the community for wanting to bury his traitorous brother.

This destruction of her social identity instils her character with a sublime beauty. Ironically Antigone enters the domain between the two deaths "precisely in order to prevent her brother's second death: to give him a proper funeral that will secure his eternalization" (The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Centre of Political Ontology). That is, she endures a Symbolic death in order that her brother, who has been refused proper burial rites, will not suffer a Symbolic death himself.

The Spectre of Ideology
Zizek distinguishes three moments in the narrative of an ideology.
1. Doctrine - ideological doctrine concerns the ideas and theories of an ideology, i.e. liberalism partly developed from the ideas of John Locke.
2. Belief - ideological belief designates the material or external manifestations and apparatuses of its doctrine, i.e. liberalism is materialized in an independent press, democratic elections and the free market.
3. Ritual - ideological ritual refers to the internalization of a doctrine, the way it is experienced as spontaneous, i.e in liberalism subjects naturally think of themselves as free individuals.

These three aspects of ideology form a kind of narrative. In the first stage of ideological doctrine we find ideology in its "pure" state. Here ideology takes the form of a supposedly truthful proposition or set of arguments which, in reality, conceal a vested interest. Locke's arguments about government served the interest of the revolutionary Americans rather than the colonizing British.

In a second step, a successful ideology takes on the material form which generates belief in that ideology, most potently in the guise of Althusser's State Apparatuses. Third, ideology assumes an almost spontaneous existence, becoming instinctive rather than realized either as an explicit set of arguments or as an institution. the supreme example of such spontaneity is, for Zizek, the notion of commodity fetishism.

In each of these three moments - a doctrine, its materialization in the form of belief and its manifestation as spontaneous ritual - as soon as we think we have assumed a position of truth from which to denounce the lie of an ideology, we find ourselves back in ideology again. This is so because our understanding of ideology is based on a binary structure, which contrasts reality with ideology. To solve this problem, Zizek suggests that we analyze ideology using a ternary structure. So, how can we distinguish reality from ideology? From what position, for example, is Zizek able to denounce the New Age reading of the universe as ideological mystification?

It is not from the position in reality because reality is constituted by the Symbolic and the Symbolic is where fiction assumes the guise of truth. The only non-ideological position available is in the Real - the Real of the antagonism. Now, that is not a position we can actually occupy; it is rather "the extraideological point of reference that authorizes us to denounce the content of our immediate experience as 'ideological.'" (Mapping Ideology) The antagonism of the Real is a constant that has to be assumed given the xistence of social reality (the Symbolic Order). As this antagonism is part of the Real, it is not subject to ideological mystification; rather its effect is visible in ideological mystification. Here, ideology takes the form of the spectral supplement to reality, concealing the gap opened up by the failure of reality (the Symbolic) to account fully for the Real.

While this model of the structure of reality does not allow us a position from which to assume an objective viewpoint, it does presuppose the existence of ideology and thus authorizes the validity of its critique. The distinction between reality and ideology exists as a theoretical given. Zizek does not claim that he can offer any access to the "objective truth of things" but that ideology must be assumed to exist if we grant that reality is structured upon a constitutive antagonism. And if ideology exists we must ne able to subject it to critique. This is the aim of Zizek's theory of ideology, namely an attempt to keep the project of ideological critique alive at all in an era in which we are said to have left ideology behind.

RACISM AND FANTASY

Fantasy as a Mask of the Inconsistency in the Big Other
One way at looking at the relationshipbetween fantasy and the big Other is to think of fantasy as concealing the inconssistency of the Symbolic Order. To understand this we need to know why the big Other is inconsistent or structured around a gap. The answer to this question is that when the body enters the field of signification or the big Other, it is castrated. What Zizek means by this is that the price we pay for our admission to the univerdal medium of language is the loss of our full body selves.

When we submit to the big Other we sacrifice direct access to our bodies and, instead, are condenmned to an indirect relation with it via the medium of language. So, whereas, before we enter language we are what Zizek terms "pathological" subjects (the subject he notates by S), after we are immersed in language we are what he refers to as "barred" subjects (the empty subject he notates with $). What is barred from the barred subject is precisely the body as the materialization or incarnation of enjoyment (jouissance). Material jouissance is strictly at odds with, or heterogenous to, the immaterial order of the signifier.

For the subject to enter the Symbolic Order, then, the Real of jouissance or enjoyment has to be evacuated from it. Which is another way to saying that the advent of the symbol entails "the murder of the thing". Although not all jouissance is completely evacuated by the process of signification (some of it persists in what are called the erogenous zones), most of it is not Symbolized. And this entails that the Symbolic Order cannot fully account for jouissance - it is what us missing in the big Other. The big Other is therefore inconsistent or structured around a lack, the lack of jouissance. It is, we might say, castrated or rendered icomplete by admitting the subject, in much the same way as the subject is castrated by its admission.

What fantasy does is conceal this lack or incompletion. So, as we saw previoulsly when alluding to the formulas of sexuation, "there is not sexual relationship" in the big Other. What the fantasy of a sexual scenario thereby conceals is the impossibility of this sexual relationship. It covers up the lack in the big Other, the missing jouissance. In this regard, Zizek often avers that fantasy is a way for subjects to organize their jouissance - it is a way to manage or domesticate the traumatic loss of the jouissance which cannot be Symbolized.

The Window of Fantasy
For Zizek, racism is produced by a clash of fantasies rather than by a clash of symbols vying for supremacy. There are several distinguishing features of fantasy:
1. Fantasies are produced as a defence against the desire of the Other manifest in "What do you want from me?" - which is what the Other, in its incosnsistency, really wants from me.
2. Fantasies provide a framework through which we see reality. They are anamorphic in that they presuppose a point of view, denying us an objective account of the world.
3. Fantasise are the one unique thing about us. They are what make us individuals, allowing a subjective view of reality. As such, our fantasies are extremely sensitive to the intrusion of others.
4. Fantasies are the way in which we organize and domesticate our jouissance.

Postmodern Racism
Zizek contends that today's racism is just as reflexive as every other part of postmodern life. It is not the product of ignorance in the way it used to be. So, whereas racism used to involve a claim that another ethnic group is inherently inferior to our own, racism is now articulated in terms of a respect for another's culture. Instead of "My culture is better than yours", postmodern or reflexive racism will argue that "My culture is different from yours". As an example of this Zizek asks "was not the official argument for apartheid in the old South Africa that black culture should be preserved in its uniqueness, not dissipated in the Western melting-pot? (The Fragile Absolute, or Why the Christian Legacy is Worth Fighting For)

For him, what is at stake here is the fethishistic disawoval of cynicism: "I know very well that all ethnic cultures are equal in value, yet, nevertheless, I will act as if mine is superior". The split here between the subject of enunciated ("I know very well...") and the subject of the enunciation ("...nevertheless I act as if I didn't") is even preserved when racists are asked to explain the reasons for their behavior. A racist will blame his socio-economic environment, poor childhood, peer group pressure, and so on, in such a way as to suggest to Zizek that he cannot help being racist, but is merely a victim of circumstances. Thus postmodern racists are fully able to rationalize their behavior in a way that belies the traditional image of racism as the vocation of the ignorant.

The Ethnic Fantasy
If "ethnic tension" is a conflict of fantasies, what is then the racist fantasy? For Zizek there are two basic racist fantasies. The first type centers around the apprehension that the "ethnic other" desires our jouissance. "They" want to steal our enjoyment from "us" and rob us of the specificity of our fantasy. The second type proceeds from an uneasiness that the "ethnic other" has access to some strange jouissance. "They" do not things like "us". The way :they" enjoy themselves is alien and unfamiliar. What both these fantasies are predicated upon is that the "other" enjoys in a different way than "us":

In short, what really gets on our nerves, what really bothers us about the "other", is the peculiar way he organizes his jouissance (the smell of his food, his noisy songs and dances, his strange manners, his attitude to work - in the racist perspective, the "other" is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labor. ( Looking Awry: an Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture)

So ethnic tension is caused by a conflict of fantasies if we regard fantasy as a way of organizing jouissance. The specificity of "their: fantasy conflicts with the specificity of "our" fantasy".

For Zizek, the perception of a threat, by "them" as well as by "us", remains strong. The last two decades have witnessed a marked rise in racial tension and ethnic nationalism. Following Lacan and Marx, Zizek ascribes this rise to the process of globalization. This process refers to the way in which capitalism has spread across the world. displaceing local companies in favor of multinational ones. The effects of this process are nor necessarily just commercial, for what is at stake are the national cultures and politics bodies which underpin, and are supported by, resident industries. When McDonald's opens up in Bombay, for example, it is not just another business, but represents a specifically American approach to food, culture and social organization. The more capitalism spreads, the more it works to dissolve the efficacy of national domains, dissipating local traditions and values in favor of universal ones.

The only way to offset this increased homogeneity and to assert the worth of the particular against the global is to cling to our specific ethnic fantasy, the point of view which makes us Indians, British or Germans. And if we try to avoid being dissolved in the multicultural mix of globalization by sticking to the way we organize jouissance, we will court the risk of succumbing to a racist paranoia. Even if we attempt to institute a form of equality between the ways in which we aorganize enjoyment, unfortunately, as Zizek points out, "fantasies cannot coexist peacefully" (Looking Awry

The Ethics of Fantasy
For Zizek is the state that should act as a buffer between the fantasies of different groups, mitigating the worst effects of thoses fantasies. If civil society were allowed to rule unrestrained, much of the world would succumb to racist violence. It is only the forces of the state which keep it in check.

In the long term, Zizek argues that in order to avoid a clash of fantasies we have to learn to "traverse the fantasy" (what lacan terms "traversing the fantôme). It means that we have to acknowledge that fantasy merely functions to screen the abyss or inconsistency in the Other. In "traversing" or "going through" the fantasy "all we have to do is experience how there is nothing 'behind' it, and how fantasy masks precisely this 'nothing'". (The Sublime Object of Ideology<)

The subject of racism, be it a Jew, a Muslim, a Latino, an African-American, gay or lesbian, Chinese, is a fantasy figure, someone who embodies the void of the Other. The underlying argument of all racism is that "if only they weren't here, ife would be perfect, and society will be haromious again". However, what this argument misses is the fact that because the subject of racism is only a fantasy figure, it is only there to make us think that such a harmonious society is actually possible. In reality, society is always-already divided. The fantasy racist figure is just a way of covering up the impossibility of a whole society or an organic Symbolic Order complete unto itself:

What appears as the hindrance to society's full identity with itself is actually its positive condition: by transposing onto the Jew the role of the foreign body which introduces in the social organism disintegration and antagonism, the fantasy-image of society qua consistent, harmonious whole is rendered possible. (Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Holliwood and Out)

Which is another way of saying that if the Jew qua fantasy figure was not there, we would have to invent it so as to maintain the illusion that we could have a perfect society. For all the fantasy figure does is to embody the existing impossibility of a complete society.

Lacan.com thanks Tony Myers who graciously lent material from his Slavoj Zizek, London: Routledge, 2003.

 

06. 05. 14.

 

P.S. 아래는 라캉닷컴이 제공하고 있는 지젝의 간략한 전기적 이력이다.

 

He was born the only child of middle-class bureaucrats (who hoped he would become an economist) on 21 March 1949 in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia and, at that time, part of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was, then, under the rule of Marshal Tito (1892-1980), one of the more 'liberal' communist countries in the Eastern Bloc, although, as Zizek points out, the freedoms the regime granted its subjects were rather ambivalent, inducing in the population a form of pernicious self-regulation. One aspect of state control that did have a positive effect on Zizek, however, was the law which required film companies to submit to local university archives a copy of every film they wished to distribute. Zizek was, therefore, able to watch every American and European release and establish a firm grasp of the traditions of Hollywood which have served him so well since.

Zizek's interest in the films of Hollywood was matched only by a dislike for the films and, particularly, the literature of his own country. Much of Slovenian art was, for him, contaminated by either the ideology of the Communist Party or by a right-wing nationalism. Slovenian poetry specifically is still, according to Zizek, falsely venerated as "the fundamental cornerstone of Slovene society". Consequently, from his teenage years onwards, Zizek devoted himself to reading only literature written in English, particularly detective fiction.

 

Pursuing his own cultural interests, Zizek developed an early taste for philosophy and knew by the age of 17 that he wanted to be a philosopher. Studying at the University of Ljubljana, Zizek published his first book when he was 20 and went on to earn a Bachelor of Arts (philosophy and sociology) in 1971, and then went on to complete a Master of Arts (philosophy) in 1975. The 400-page thesis for the latter degree was entitled "The Theoretical and Practical Relevance of French Structuralism", a work which analysed the growing influence of the French thinkers Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Gilles Deleuze.

 

Unfortunately, although Zizek had been promised a job at the university, his thesis was deemed by the officiating panel to be politically suspicious and he therefore lost the job to another candidate who was closer to the party line. According to his fellow Slovenian philosopher Miaden Dolar (b. 1951), the authorities were concerned that the charismatic teaching of Zizek might improperly influence students with his dissident thinking.

Disappointed by this rejection of his talents, Zizek spent the next couple of years in the professional wilderness, undertaking his National Service in the Yugoslav army, and supporting his wife and son as best he could by occasionally translating German philosophy. However, in 1977 several of his influential connections secured him a post at the Central Committee of the League of Slovene Communists where, despite his supposedly dissident politics, he occasionally wrote speeches for leading communists and, during the rest of the time, studied philosophy.

 

In these years, Zizek became part of a significant group of Slovenian scholars working on the theories of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) and with whom he went on to found the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis in Ljubljana. This group, among whose best-known members are Dolar and Zizek's second wife Renata Salecl (b. 1962), established editorial control over a journal called Problem! (in which Zizek was not afraid to author bad reviews of his own books, or even to write reviews of books that did not exist), and began to publish a book series called Analecta. Zizek himself is unsure as to why so many Lacanians should have gathered in Ljubljana, but he does point out that, in contrast to the other countries in the former Yugoslavia, there was no established psychoanalytic community to hamper or mitigate their interest in the usually controversial work of the Frenchman.

Although still disbarred from a traditional university position, in 1979 Zizek's friends procured him a better job as Researcher at the University of Ljubljana's Institute for Sociology. At the time, Zizek thought that this was an intellectual cul-de-sac in which the communist regime placed those who were inconvenient to them. As it transpired, however, this job, which would be the envy of most academics, meant Zizek was able to pursue his research interests free from the pressures of teaching and bureaucracy. It was there that, in 1981, he earned his first Doctor of Arts degree in philosophy.

 

It was also in 1981 that Zizek travelled to Paris for the first time to meet some of the thinkers he had been writing about for so long and writing to - (he has several books by Jacques Derrida, for example, dedicated to him). Although Lacan was chief among these thinkers, he died in 1981 and it was actually Lacan's son-in-law, Jacques-Alain Miller, who was to prove more decisive in Zizek's development.

Miller conducted open discussions about Lacan in Paris (and he still does), but he also conducted a more exclusive thirty-student seminar at the Ecole de la Cause Freudienne in which he examined the works of Lacan on a page by page basis. As the only representatives of Eastern Europe, both Zizek and Dolar were invited to join this seminar and it is there that Zizek developed his understanding of the later works of Lacan which still informs his thinking today. Miller also procured a teaching fellowship for Zizek and became his analyst. It was during these analytical sessions with Miller, which often only lasted ten minutes, that Zizek learned the truth of his oft-reported assertion that educated patients report symptoms and dreams appropriate to the type of psychoanalysis they are receiving. The result of Zizek's fabrication was that the sessions with Miller often ended up as a game of intellectual cat-and-mouse.

This game ended in something of an impasse when Zizek completed his second Doctor of Arts (this time in psychoanalysis) at the Universite Paris-VIII in 1985. Miller, with whom Zizek had successfully defended his thesis, was the head of a publishing house but he delayed publishing Zizek's dissertation and so Zizek had to resort to a publisher outside the inner circle of Lacanians. This second major disappointment of his professional career threw Zizek back on his own resources. These resources were already being put to more obvious political ends back in Slovenia where Zizek became a regular columnist in a paper called Mladina. Mladina was a platform for the growing democratic opposition to the communist regime, a regime whose power was gradually diminishing throughout the second half of the 1980s in the face of growing political pluralism in both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

 

In 1990, the first democratic elections were held in Slovenia and Zizek stood for a place on the four-man Presidency - he came a narrow fifth. Although he stood as a Liberal Democrat candidate, this position was more strategic than a matter of conviction as he was attempting to defeat the conservative alliance between the nationalists and the ex-communists. Zizek does not, as he has often said, mind getting his political hands dirty. Nor did he mind becoming the Ambassador of Science for the Republic of Slovenia in 1991.

Although Zizek continues to provide informal advice to the Slovenian government, his energies over the past decade have been firmly geared towards his research. Indeed, since 1989 and the publication of The Sublime Object of Ideology, Zizek has launched over 15 monographs, and a number of edited works written in English, on an eager public. He has also written books in German, French and Slovene, as well as having his work translated into Dutch, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, Slovak, Serbo-Croatian and Swedish. The prolific intensity of Zizek's written output has been matched by his international success as a lecturer where he has faithfully transcribed the molten energy of the word on the page to the word on the stage across four different continents.

 

Apart from his post at what is now the Institute for Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, Zizek has also held positions at SUNY Buffalo; the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; the Tulane University, New Orleans; the Cardozo Law School, New York; Columbia University, New York; Princeton University; the New School for Social Research, New York; and at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor since 1991. He also maintains his editorial role for the Analecta series in Slovenia, as well as helping establish Wo es war (a series based on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxism) and SIC (a series devoted to Lacanian analyses of culture and politics) in German and English.

At all stages in Zizek's life, then, we can detect the insistence of a theme. When he was growing up he preferred the films of Hollywood to the dominant culture of poetry in his own country. As a student he developed an interest in, and wrote about, French philosophy rather than the official communist paradigms of thought. When he began his professional career he preferred to read Lacan in terms of other philosophers rather than adhering to the orthodox Lacanian line. And, as we have seen, as a philosopher himself, he constantly refers to popular culture rather than those topics customarily studied by the subject. In each case, therefore, Zizek's intellectual development has been marked by a distance or heterogeneity to the official culture within which he works. He has always been a stain or point of opacity within the ruling orthodoxy and is never fully integrated by the social or philosophical conventions against which he operates.

The point is that although Zizek's unauthorized approach has cost him the chance to become part of the established institutions on at least two occasions (once with his Master's thesis and once with his second Doctorate), he has defined his position only in his resistance to those institutions. This is not necessarily a question of Zizek initiating some kind of academic rebellion, nor even of proving how in the long run his talents have surpassed the obstacles erected against them, but rather of claiming that the character or identity of Zizek's philosophy is predicated upon the failure of the institutions to accomodate his thought.

 

The eventual success of Zizekian theory proceeds partly from its clearly failure, from the fact that Zizek was able to perceive himself as alien to the system in which he worked. It was this alienation, this difference to the discourse of philosophy of which it was and is a part, which forged the identity of Zizek's own thought. Because Zizekian theory was no part of the objective system, it was in itself subjective. The reason that this is so pertinent is that Zizek describes the formation of what is known as the "subject" in a similar way. Indeed, one of Zizek's main contributions to critical theory is his detailed eleboration of the subject.

Nobody has to be vile

'London Review of Books'(06. 04. 06)에 실린 지젝의 글을 옮겨놓는다. 지젝은 이 저널에 해마다 두어 편의 글을 기고하고 있는데, 'Nobody has to be vile'(아무도 야비해질 필요가 없다)은 올해의 첫번째 기고문이다. 시간이 나면(언제?) 내용을 정리해두도록 하고, 일단은 창고에 넣어둔다.  

Since 2001, Davos and Porto Alegre have been the twin cities of globalisation: Davos, the exclusive Swiss resort where the global elite of managers, statesmen and media personalities meets for the World Economic Forum under heavy police protection, trying to convince us (and themselves) that globalisation is its own best remedy; Porto Alegre, the subtropical Brazilian city where the counter-elite of the anti-globalisation movement meets, trying to convince us (and themselves) that capitalist globalisation is not our inevitable fate – that, as the official slogan puts it, ‘another world is possible.’ It seems, however, that the Porto Alegre reunions have somehow lost their impetus – we have heard less and less about them over the past couple of years. Where did the bright stars of Porto Alegre go?

Some of them, at least, moved to Davos. The tone of the Davos meetings is now predominantly set by the group of entrepreneurs who ironically refer to themselves as ‘liberal communists’ and who no longer accept the opposition between Davos and Porto Alegre: their claim is that we can have the global capitalist cake (thrive as entrepreneurs) and eat it (endorse the anti-capitalist causes of social responsibility, ecological concern etc). There is no need for Porto Alegre: instead, Davos can become Porto Davos.

So who are these liberal communists? The usual suspects: Bill Gates and George Soros, the CEOs of Google, IBM, Intel, eBay, as well as court-philosophers like Thomas Friedman. The true conservatives today, they argue, are not only the old right, with its ridiculous belief in authority, order and parochial patriotism, but also the old left, with its war against capitalism: both fight their shadow-theatre battles in disregard of the new realities. The signifier of this new reality in the liberal communist Newspeak is ‘smart’. Being smart means being dynamic and nomadic, and against centralised bureaucracy; believing in dialogue and co-operation as against central authority; in flexibility as against routine; culture and knowledge as against industrial production; in spontaneous interaction and autopoiesis as against fixed hierarchy.

Bill Gates is the icon of what he has called ‘frictionless capitalism’, the post-industrial society and the ‘end of labour’. Software is winning over hardware and the young nerd over the old manager in his black suit. In the new company headquarters, there is little external discipline; former hackers dominate the scene, working long hours, enjoying free drinks in green surroundings. The underlying notion here is that Gates is a subversive marginal hooligan, an ex-hacker, who has taken over and dressed himself up as a respectable chairman.

Liberal communists are top executives reviving the spirit of contest or, to put it the other way round, countercultural geeks who have taken over big corporations. Their dogma is a new, postmodernised version of Adam Smith’s invisible hand: the market and social responsibility are not opposites, but can be reunited for mutual benefit. As Friedman puts it, nobody has to be vile in order to do business these days; collaboration with employees, dialogue with customers, respect for the environment, transparency of deals – these are the keys to success. Olivier Malnuit recently drew up the liberal communist’s ten commandments in the French magazine Technikart:

1. You shall give everything away free (free access, no copyright); just charge for the additional services, which will make you rich.

2. You shall change the world, not just sell things.

3. You shall be sharing, aware of social responsibility.

4. You shall be creative: focus on design, new technologies and science.

5. You shall tell all: have no secrets, endorse and practise the cult of transparency and the free flow of information; all humanity should collaborate and interact.

6. You shall not work: have no fixed 9 to 5 job, but engage in smart, dynamic, flexible communication.

7. You shall return to school: engage in permanent education.

8. You shall act as an enzyme: work not only for the market, but trigger new forms of social collaboration.

9. You shall die poor: return your wealth to those who need it, since you have more than you can ever spend.

10. You shall be the state: companies should be in partnership with the state.

Liberal communists are pragmatic; they hate a doctrinaire approach. There is no exploited working class today, only concrete problems to be solved: starvation in Africa, the plight of Muslim women, religious fundamentalist violence. When there is a humanitarian crisis in Africa (liberal communists love a humanitarian crisis; it brings out the best in them), instead of engaging in anti-imperialist rhetoric, we should get together and work out the best way of solving the problem, engage people, governments and business in a common enterprise, start moving things instead of relying on centralised state help, approach the crisis in a creative and unconventional way.

Liberal communists like to point out that the decision of some large international corporations to ignore apartheid rules within their companies was as important as the direct political struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Abolishing segregation within the company, paying blacks and whites the same salary for the same job etc: this was a perfect instance of the overlap between the struggle for political freedom and business interests, since the same companies can now thrive in post-apartheid South Africa.

Liberal communists love May 1968. What an explosion of youthful energy and creativity! How it shattered the bureaucratic order! What an impetus it gave to economic and social life after the political illusions dropped away! Those who were old enough were themselves protesting and fighting on the streets: now they have changed in order to change the world, to revolutionise our lives for real. Didn’t Marx say that all political upheavals were unimportant compared to the invention of the steam engine? And would Marx not have said today: what are all the protests against global capitalism in comparison with the internet?

Above all, liberal communists are true citizens of the world – good people who worry. They worry about populist fundamentalism and irresponsible greedy capitalist corporations. They see the ‘deeper causes’ of today’s problems: mass poverty and hopelessness breed fundamentalist terror. Their goal is not to earn money, but to change the world (and, as a by-product, make even more money). Bill Gates is already the single greatest benefactor in the history of humanity, displaying his love for his neighbours by giving hundreds of millions of dollars for education, the fight against hunger and malaria etc. The catch is that before you can give all this away you have to take it (or, as the liberal communists would put it, create it). In order to help people, the justification goes, you must have the means to do so, and experience – that is, recognition of the dismal failure of all centralised statist and collectivist approaches – teaches us that private enterprise is by far the most effective way. By regulating their business, taxing them excessively, the state is undermining the official goal of its own activity (to make life better for the majority, to help those in need).

Liberal communists do not want to be mere profit-machines: they want their lives to have deeper meaning. They are against old-fashioned religion and for spirituality, for non-confessional meditation (everybody knows that Buddhism foreshadows brain science, that the power of meditation can be measured scientifically). Their motto is social responsibility and gratitude: they are the first to admit that society has been incredibly good to them, allowing them to deploy their talents and amass wealth, so they feel that it is their duty to give something back to society and help people. This beneficence is what makes business success worthwhile.

This isn’t an entirely new phenomenon. Remember Andrew Carnegie, who employed a private army to suppress organised labour in his steelworks and then distributed large parts of his wealth for educational, cultural and humanitarian causes, proving that, although a man of steel, he had a heart of gold? In the same way, today’s liberal communists give away with one hand what they grabbed with the other.

There is a chocolate-flavoured laxative available on the shelves of US stores which is publicised with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! – i.e. eat more of something that itself causes constipation. The structure of the chocolate laxative can be discerned throughout today’s ideological landscape; it is what makes a figure like Soros so objectionable. He stands for ruthless financial exploitation combined with its counter-agent, humanitarian worry about the catastrophic social consequences of the unbridled market economy. Soros’s daily routine is a lie embodied: half of his working time is devoted to financial speculation, the other half to ‘humanitarian’ activities (financing cultural and democratic activities in post-Communist countries, writing essays and books) which work against the effects of his own speculations. The two faces of Bill Gates are exactly like the two faces of Soros: on the one hand, a cruel businessman, destroying or buying out competitors, aiming at a virtual monopoly; on the other, the great philanthropist who makes a point of saying: ‘What does it serve to have computers if people do not have enough to eat?’

According to liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity: charity is part of the game, a humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitation. Developed countries are constantly ‘helping’ undeveloped ones (with aid, credits etc), and so avoiding the key issue: their complicity in and responsibility for the miserable situation of the Third World. As for the opposition between ‘smart’ and ‘non-smart’, outsourcing is the key notion. You export the (necessary) dark side of production – disciplined, hierarchical labour, ecological pollution – to ‘non-smart’ Third World locations (or invisible ones in the First World). The ultimate liberal communist dream is to export the entire working class to invisible Third World sweat shops.

We should have no illusions: liberal communists are the enemy of every true progressive struggle today. All other enemies – religious fundamentalists, terrorists, corrupt and inefficient state bureaucracies – depend on contingent local circumstances. Precisely because they want to resolve all these secondary malfunctions of the global system, liberal communists are the direct embodiment of what is wrong with the system. It may be necessary to enter into tactical alliances with liberal communists in order to fight racism, sexism and religious obscurantism, but it’s important to remember exactly what they are up to.

Etienne Balibar, in La Crainte des masses (1997), distinguishes the two opposite but complementary modes of excessive violence in today’s capitalism: the objective (structural) violence that is inherent in the social conditions of global capitalism (the automatic creation of excluded and dispensable individuals, from the homeless to the unemployed), and the subjective violence of newly emerging ethnic and/or religious (in short: racist) fundamentalisms. They may fight subjective violence, but liberal communists are the agents of the structural violence that creates the conditions for explosions of subjective violence. The same Soros who gives millions to fund education has ruined the lives of thousands thanks to his financial speculations and in doing so created the conditions for the rise of the intolerance he denounces.

06. 04. 07.

지젝과 '험버트 험버트'의 진실

어제 '롤리타' 달력도 정리한 김에, 지젝의 <롤리타> 읽기를 간단히 정리해둔다. 주인공 험버트 험버트의 분신 구조에 관한 해명인데, 관련내용은 <진짜 눈물의 공포>(울력, 2004), 154-5쪽에 있다. 역자들은 <롤리타>의 주인공 'Humbert Humbert'를 '훔버트 훔버트'라고 표기했는데, 국역본 <롤리타>에 따라서 여기서는 '험버트 험버트'로 표기한다. 에드리안 라인의 <롤리타>(1997)에서 제레미 아이언스가 맡은 역이 바로 험버트 험버트이다(큐브릭의 영화에서는 제임스 메이슨이 연기했다. 한편, 큐브릭의 <롤리타>에서는 '롤리타'가 님펫으로서는 너무 성숙하다. 아마도 시대적 제약 때문이지 않았을까 싶다. 님펫은 9-14살까지이다).

지젝: "나보코프의 <롤리타>에 나오는 험버트 험버트를 생각해보라. 나보코프는 천재적인 솜씨를 발휘하여 주인공의 세례명을 성과 일치시킨다. 다름 아닌 그의 이름 안에 분신의 구조가 이미 존재한다는 것이다!"

'세례명'은 'Christian name'의 사전적 의미이지만, 일반적으론 (성과 대비하여) 그냥 '이름'을 뜻하므로 "이름과 성을 일치시킨다"로 이해하면 되겠다. 그러니까 <롤리타>의 남자 주인공은 이름이 '험버트'이고 성도 '험버트'이다(그의 환상세계는 '험버랜드'이다). 즉, 한 이름 안에 두 '험버트'가 들어 있는 것이다. 지젝이 지나가면서 덧붙이는 것은 키에슬롭스키의 영화 <화이트>에서 남자 주인공의 이름이 '카롤 카롤'이라는 것. 지젝은 그걸 '나보코프식 아이러니'의 빼어난 흉내라고 본다.  

지젝: "따라서 험버트 험버트는 자신과 롤리타를 괴롭히는 외설스런 분신인 퀼티를 필요로 한다. 퀼티는 상징적인 것(=상징계)에서 배제된(=폐제된) 아버지의 이름이 실재(the Real) 속에(=실재로서) 편집증적으로 귀환하는 것이다(험버트 험버트라는 이름에서 나타나듯이 제대로 된 성이 없다). 이는 <롤리타>가 성관계의 불가능성을 나타내는 방식이기도 하다. 험버트 험버트와 롤리타의 밀통관계는 편집증적 제3자(=퀼티)의 개입으로 방해받는 동시에 유지된다." 참고로, 'Quilty'란 이름은 'Guilty'(죄의식)을 막바로 떠올리게 하는 이름이다. 아래는 퀼티 역의 프랭크 랑겔라.

지젝: "나보코프는 정신분석학을 열렬히 반대하기는 하지만 아버지의 기능이 멈추는 것과, 자신의 분신과 맺는 살인적인 편집증적 관계 사이에 연관성이 있음을 잘 알고 있었다." 여기에 덧붙여진 각주: "더욱 정확하게 말하자면 이 불가능성의 전치는 삼중적이다. 샬로트는 험버트를 사랑하고, 험버트는 롤리타를 사랑하며 롤리타는 퀼티를 사랑하고 퀼티는 아무도 사랑하지 않는다." 샬로트는 롤리타의 엄마이다. 그리고 실제로 나보코프는 문학작품에 대한 프로이트적 독해를 혐오했다.  

지젝: "따라서 <롤리타>를 통속적인 의사-프로이트적 방식으로, '억압된 동성애'의 사례로 읽는 것은 잘못이다. 초점은 험버트 험버트가 자신의 분신 퀼티와의 직접적인 동성애적 연루를 피하기 위해 성적 매력이 있는 소녀를 선택했다는 것이 아니다. 그 반대로 퀼티는 험버트와 롤리타의 불가능한 관계를 보충하는 필수적인 제3자이다." 다르게 말하면, 퀼티는 그 불가능성의 알리바이가 되겠다.

지젝: "이는 (<베로니카의 이중생활>에서) 두 명의 베로니크에게도 동일하게 적용된다. 폴란드의 베로니카에서 프랑스의 베로니크로 이동할 때 우리는 베로니카가 콘서트 무대 위에서 죽은 후에 무덤쪽에서 찍은(그녀의 시체의 불가능한 시점 쇼트) 드라이어식(Dreyeresque) 쇼트를 보게 되는데, 이 쇼트에 뒤이어, 사랑을 나누고는 마치 무언가 알 수 없는 상실을 감지한 듯 형언키 어려운 슬픔을 느끼는 베로니크로의 직접적인 커트가 이어진다. 그녀의 분신의 흔적은 사랑의 훼방꾼으로서, 성행위의 조화를 깨는 침입자로서 간섭해 들어온다. 다시금 분신의 형상은 성관계의 불가능성과 정확히 상관관계를 갖는다."(강조는 나의 것)

지젝의 '힌트'는 거기까지이다. 이어지는 건 보충적인 '음란패설'인바, "그렇다면 이러한 불가능성은 무엇인가?" 쿠바의 경우를 예로 들어보자. "쿠바에서는 한 남자가 다른 사람에게 '내가 저 여자를 가졌었지!'라고 뽐낼 때 그것은 단순한(straight) 질(vaginal) 성교만이 아니라 항문 삽입까지를 포함한다. '단순한' 성교는 여전히 페팅의 형태로 간주될 뿐이고 항문 삽입만이 더없이 완전한 성관계를 대표한다. 왜 그런가?"

"질은 항문의 창백하고도 왜곡된 복사본으로 간주되기 때문이다. 항문이 순수한 플라톤적 이데아(털도 없고 갈라진 틈도 없는 분명하고도 단순한 동그런 구멍)와 같다면, 돌기와 곁가지로 가득 찬 질은 항문의 이상적인 단순성과는 거리가 먼, 항문의 왜곡된 물적 실현인 것이다. 이는 성관계가 존재하지 않음을 보충할 또다른 방법이 아닌가?" 여기서 "'자연스런' 삽입(=질 삽입)은 '부자연스런' 이상적 모델(=항문 삽입)에 비해 이차적인 것으로 평가절하된다."

그리고 이러한 "항문/질의 대비는 남성에게서는 팔루스/페니스의 차이로 나타난다. 이는 마치 '페니스가 삽입되긴 했지만 내 구멍은 여전히 팔루스를 향해 열려 있어요'라고 말하듯이 항문으로 삽입당하면서 동시에 자신의 열린 질의 구멍을 과시하는 여자들을 담은 표준화된 포르노 쇼트에서 잘 나타나는 바이다." 물론, 이러한 쇼트는 인터넷 공간에 지천으로 널려 있기도 하다.

결론은, 다시 반복하건대, 성관계의 불가능성이다. 물론 이 '불가능성'은 병리적인/심리적인 차원의 것이 아니라 구조적인/실재적 차원의 것이다. 그리고 분신은 그 구조적 불가능성의 편집증적 귀환이라는 것. 그것이 지젝이 말하는 '험버트 험버트'의 진실이다.

06. 03. 29.